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SUMMARY
This thesis, the research for which was carried out 
between 1982 and 1985 at the Centre for European 
Industrial Studies and funded by the University of Bath, 
has, as its objective, a wide-ranging investigation of 
the activities and achievements of regional development 
agencies in four EEC member-states, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. As is indicated 
in the literature survey which forms part of the second 
chapter of the thesis, there existed, at the time this 
research was carried out, few published academic accounts 
of the operations of such agencies. Consequently, the 
first part of this work(Chapters 1,2 and 3)sets out to 
give a clear description of the agencies under study up 
to 1985, tracing in particular the political and economic 
circumstances of their establishment. In the second, 
analytic part of the work, various aspects of the 
agencies' composition are studied in greater detail, 
drawing upon both existing records and previously 
unpublished material, as well as personal interviews with 
Agency staff, politicians and local government officials. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, evaluations are made of the 
agencies' relative economic performance. Wherever 
appropriate, comparison is made between agencies under 
study.
ii
In the concluding chapter of the thesis (Chapter Nine), 
factors common to the agencies studied are considered, 
and an evaluation is made of their economic and political 
role, both actual and potential, drawing upon the findings 
of previous chapters. Examples are also given of areas in 




Chapter Page N o .
1. Regional development agencies in the
UK and the Benelux countries 1
2. Regional development agencies - literature
survey 50
3. UK regional development agencies - a brief
description 77
4. Regional development agencies in the
Benelux countries 202
5. Regional development agencies - powers,
functions and aims 296
6. Regional development agencies - finance,
structure and control 347
7. Agency performance (UK agencies) 388
8. Agency performance (Benelux agencies) 456
9. Regional development agencies in the UK
and the Benelux countries - conclusion 479
iv
CHAPTER ONE
Regional Development Agencies in the UK and Benelux Countries
1. Introduction
On undertaking an analysis of regional development agencies one is 
immediately presented with problems of definition. In a recent survey 
of regional development agencies in Europe, Douglas Allen and Kevin 
Yuill state that, 'there is no undisputed definition of a regional 
development agency', before proceeding to offer their own, which 
covers 'any publicly - financed institution outside the mainstream of 
central and local government administration, having powers designed 
for the specific purpose of promoting industrial development 
(including non-manufacturing activities) in regions that are generally 
designated as problem or priority areas.' ^
However, this definition, broad though it is, does not properly 
embrace certain of the agencies which it is the object of this thesis 
to study. Firstly, they are not all exclusively publicly - financed, 
indeed the degree of private sector financial support which they 
receive may serve as a useful measure of canparison. Secondly, the 
term 'outside the mainstream of central and local government' may 
exclude agencies which form part of a government department, or whose 
activities are closely supervised by a particular department. 
Finally, it is not the purpose of this study to limit the analysis of 
regional development agencies to those which operate in 'problem 
regions' as defined by national governments. One of the countries
1
surveyed (Belgium) operates a network of agencies which covers the 
whole of the country, others operate in regions which, for various 
economic and political reasons are not recognised by central 
government as 'development areas'. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study a regional development agency will be defined as 'an 
organisationally distinct body, created by a public initiative for the 
primary purpose of encouraging the economic and industrial development 
of a specified region'.
2. Regional Development Agencies - A Brief History
In the following section, an attempt will be made to trace the 
historical development of regional development agencies as instruments 
of economic change. This will take the form of a series of references 
to organisations bearing one or more of the characteristics associated 
with our definition of regional development agencies as they have 
manifested themselves in the industrialised countries of the West, 
over the past fifty years. It will therefore, be necessary for the 
narrative to move swiftly, at times from one continent to another, and 
consequently, it should be borne in mind that the pattern being 
followed is chronological, rather than one based upon spatial 
categorisations.
The most commonly-cited antecedent of the modern-day regional 
development agency is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 
Southern United States, which, in both its budget and staff resources, 
dwarfs the bodies which form the subject-matter of this study. TVA 
was created in 1933, as part of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' designed to
2
revitalise the depressed American economy^. It embodied President 
Roosevelt's belief in the efficacy of national planning in developing 
under-utilised natural resources, and in that sense, predated postwar 
European thinking on regional policy, which saw it as a means of 
achieving increased national output rather than purely being a measure 
of social justice. Of its four statutory aims, three were concerned 
with specific measures such as improvements in the navigation of the 
Tennessee River and flood control programmes, the reafforestation and 
the proper use of marginal lands, and the reopening of an old 
explosives plant, but the fourth gave the TVA the general power to 
provide for the agricultural and industrial development of the
•3
valley . This meant that the TVA had the capacity to develop into a 
comprehensive regional development authority, the organisation of 
which reflected its innovative, quasi-govemmental status; in the 
words of Roosevelt himself 'a corporation clothed with the power of 
government, but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a 
private enterprise'^.
In line with its objectives of high level production of cheap power 
and cheap fertiliser, the TVA concentrated upon massive 
infrastructural projects such as the dredging of the river, and the 
construction of dams, flood-barriers and power-stations. Thus the 
nature of the task it undertook was, in terms of project-size, much 
greater than that of modem European agencies. The task was described 
by James Gober, chief of the Authority's Developmental Planning 
Section in 1980, when he stated that through the TVA an area four- 
fifths the size of England had been transformed over a period of fifty 
years ' frcm an agricultural to an urban society1 ^ . In 1981, the TVA
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owned 29 power-producing dams, 12 coal-fired and 4 operating nuclear 
plants, which together generated 27,000 megawatts, half the installed 
capacity of England and Wales. In 1980 it received from the federal 
government an annual sum of $150 million, and employed directly 53,000 
people. In the 1979/80 financial year, $3.2 billion was raised in 
revenue in the region to cover the costs of the electricity 
programme^. Therefore, it carries out functions, which in European 
countries, would be the responsibility of local authorities or 
national state corporations. Moreover, its industrial development 
functions have remained limited to the provision of industrial 
estates, and the attraction of inward investment. However, the TVA 
remains of importance to this study because of its public yet 
entrepreneurial character, its comprehensive approach to regional 
development, and its apparent success - population in the area rose in 
the first fifty years of its existence by 400% (from 220,000 to 
875,000) and wages increased fran 41% to 79% of the national average. 
For this reason both proponents and critics of European agencies have 
had cause to refer to it.
The demands which the entry of the United States into the Second World 
War made on heavy industry gave a great spur to the industrialisation 
of the Tennessee Valley area, with the construction of coal-burning 
electric plants to service the American atomic expansion programme. 
Similarly, in other countries, the War led national governments to 
intervene more directly in the workings of their economies, in order 
to guarantee supplies of essential materials. Consequently, they 
began to take steps to plan and regulate industry on a national and 
regional scale. In Britain for example, a government report published
4
in 1940 (The Barlow Report) called for government action to disperse 
and decentralise industry, to create balanced employment within 
regions, and to redevelop congested urban areas . The Report was 
followed by the setting up of the Department of Town and Country 
Planning in 1943, and by the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, and 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which introduced a system of 
Industrial Development Control certificates®.
The influence of the TVA was also brought to bear in Italy, with the 
creation in 1947 of SVIMEZ ('Association for the Industrial 
Development of the Mezzogiomo') and in 1950, of the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiomo ('Southern Development Fund' )^ . Since the end of the War, 
American economic experts had been working alongside the Italian 
government in implementing Marshall Aid and, with the sluggish 
response of the South to the new injection of capital, the TVA 
presented a ready model for the Italians to emulate^®.
The Cassa was charged with the aim of making agricultural and related 
improvements in the South, the relative deprivation of whose 
population had long been recognised. However, the remit of the Cassa 
was limited because of the fear of hindering the expansion of northern 
industries, with their vital contribution to the readjustment of the 
balance of payments. The Cassa was to implement 'extraordinary 
interventions' in addition to existing government measures, and was to 
operate as a supranational authority, under a Committee of Ministers 
for the South. Its initial projects, dealing with irrigation, 
afforestation and land reclamation were justified as part of a 'pre­
industrialisation process' by which social and physical infrastructure
5
was developed as a precondition of the South being able to sustain 
industrial growth in later years. However, like the TVA, the Cassa 
expanded its horizons over time. Between 1951 and 1959, a series of 
laws were passed extending its remit into the field of industrial 
development, and the construction of public utilities. It also 
established interests in a number of 'Cassa - related' bodies, which 
included credit institutions, holding companies providing equity 
participation for private companies, and organisations supplying 
technical assistance to local firms and public authorities.
The history of the Cassa to the present day can be divided into a 
number of chronological phases, each relating to a separate period of 
government policy toward the South. For example, up until 1957, as 
has been shown above, policy tended to promote special public works, 
whereas between 1957 and 1965 the emphasis switched to measures of 
industrialisation, and between 1965 and 1970, steps were taken to co­
ordinate projects within a framework of national economic planning. 
This has prompted one commentator to observe that the Cassa has proved 
'a remarkably flexible instrument particularly responsive to...the 
shiftings of higher policy, and to changes in economic development 
theory'^. Its role is essentially a reactive rather than an 
innovatory one, and was defined in the 1950 legislation as 'the 
carrying out of the Mezzogiomo development plans laid down by the 
Committee of Ministers for the Mezzogiomo'^. This was subsequently 
amended to the carrying out of 'the central government's policies as 
set out in the five-year programme of the Interministerial Committee 
for Economic Planning (CIPE), and those policies requested by the 
Mezzo g i o m o  regions, and approved by the Minister for the
6
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Mezzogiomo' . Again, like the TVA, its budget and resources are now 
far larger than those of the agencies to be covered in this study. In 
1978/9 its expenditure was £1826.4 million (or 32592 milliard lire), 
and it employed 3400 staff. Its structure and activities, therefore,
1 A
more closely resemble those of a government department .
During this early postwar period, many Western nations, like Italy, 
were faced with the twin aims of regenerating their industries for 
peacetime production whilst at the same time, ensuring a socially 
equitable spatial distribution of industrial resources. In the 
Republic of Ireland, the policy response to the objectives involved on 
the one hand, the creating in 1950 of the Industrial Development 
Authority and, in 1952, An Foras Tionscail, (the Industrial 
Institute). The former, which presently is one of the most prominent 
industrial development organisations in Western Europe was established 
to promote such development, in particular to attract foreign 
industry. The latter was made responsible for the promotion of 
industry in the underdeveloped areas, and was empowered to give grants 
toward the costs of industrial buildings and equipment. In 1969, as 
a result of the Industrial Development Act, the IDA assumed the 
responsibilities of An Foras Tionscail, and inherited broader powers, 
which included the building of factory space, the provision of grants 
and financial assistance for industry, and responsibility for the co- 
ordination of regional industrial development .
Legislation in 1958 had previously provided for the establishment of 
Gael tar ra Eireann (The Authority for the Development of the Irish 
Speaking Areas), whose primary aim was to promote the use of the Irish
7
language in the Gaeltacht (far Western areas), through the provision
16of employment and the encouragement of economic development . At
first, Gaeltarra Eireann merely promoted the Irish government's 'Rural
Industries Scheme', but its powers were extended under the Gaeltacht
Industries (Amendment) Act 1965, by which it could take part in the
formation of private companies, buy and sell shares and make grants.
In 1980 Gaeltarra Eireann was reconstituted as Udaras na Gaeltachta, a
body to which representatives of the Gaeltacht areas could be 
17elected • Reference should also be made to the Shannon Free Airport
Development Company (SFADCo.), which came into being in 1959 to
1 fipromote the attractions of Shannon Airport as a 'duty-free zone . 
This led to the creation of an industrial estate within this zone, and 
the construction of a New Town, all of which was supervised by SFADCo. 
The organisation currently has responsibility for the economic 
development of the Mid West region of Ireland, and operates in 
conjunction with the IDA.
All the organisations to which reference has so far been made, have 
with the exception of the TVA, and on a smaller scale, SFADCo., 
represented centralised methods of policy implementation. However, as 
will be demonstrated in numerous examples contained in this work, many 
regional development organisations have been linked with 
decentralising trends. This, it could be argued, represented the 
motive force behind the creation in France in 1955 of a network of 
Societ’es de Develefpment Regional (Regional Development Companies). 
These private companies, formed in conjunction with the commercial 
banks and public financial institutions of Paris were to provide 
financial facilities for industrial enterprise in the regions,
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initially in the form of equity investment. As most such businesses 
preferred to increase their borrowings rather than their stockholders, 
the SDR's powers were extended firstly to lending money to companies 
in which they had equity holdings, and subsequently to any qualifying 
firm within the region. They have been described 'as quasi-banks to 
regional industrial enterprises'^, and though their functions have 
increased over time, particularly with regard to the servicing of 
small and medium-sized businesses (PME's), they do not carry out 
regional industrial development on a broad scale. The main instrument 
of regional policy in France is QATAR (Delegation Na L 'Amenagement du 
Territoire et Na 1'Action Regional), which was created in 1963^. It 
is small, and in contrast to the SDR's, a highly centralised body 
which co-ordinates the regional dimension of policies implemented by 
government departments. In practice, it has also played a significant 
part in the formulation of regional policy. It is responsible for the 
administration of regional incentives schemes, but in structure and 
functions, it generally has little in common with the agencies in this 
study.
A prominent concern of many governments after the War was the 
attraction of foreign investment, and, as has been shown above, this 
responsibility often tended to devolve upon industrial development 
organisations. This is true, for example, of both DATAR and the 
Cassa. It is, therefore, appropriate to refer in this context to the 
Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration, known as Fcmento, 
which was created in 1950, and combines factory building programmes 
with the offer of large incentives to incoming (mainly American) 
investors^. The Administration worked in conjunction with the Puerto
9
Rico Industrial Development Company, established in 1942 to build and 
run its own factories making bottles, paperboard and shoes. Because 
agencies such as Fcmento are often to be found in competition with 
European agencies for large mobile investment projects (such as 
DeLorean) they are frequently grouped together in the public mind. 
However, a distinction should be made between such national industrial 
development organisations, and those which operate to promote regional 
economic development. The latter, which will form the subject-matter 
of this study, by promoting the industrial development of a particular 
region within a nation-state, invoke a series of questions of 
political, economic and cultural significance Which are not raised in 
the same manner by bodies which operate at a national level. In 
certain cases, the distinction may not be clear-cut, for example, 
where a network of regional agencies are implementing central 
government policies, or where a national agency operates according to 
a set of predetermined regional priorities. Nevertheless, in general 
terms, national industrial development organisations, except where 
they operate on a specifically regional plane, will be considered to 
be outside the scope of this study.
The decades of the 1950's and the 1960's were, comparatively speaking, 
years of prosperity for the Western economies, interrupted only 
occasionally by recessionary phases such as that of 1958/9. Thus, 
pressures on governments to redistribute economic and industrial 
resources between regions eased. Nevertheless, there remained areas 
of economic deprivation which maintained an historical claim to 
special assistance. One such area, that of the Mezzogiomo, has 
already been mentioned, and a second was the Highlands and Islands of
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Scotland. In 1965, as the culmination of seme forty years of lobbying 
by various representatives and advisory groups, the United Kingdom 
government established the Highlands and Islands Development Board, 
and thus marked a significant departure from the structure of previous 
industrial development organisations. The details surrounding the 
creation of the Board are described below. It is sufficient to note 
here the comments of Geddes that its 'uniqueness and innovatory 
nature... as a regional development agency...has been widely
on
noticed and Macallum, who saw in its creation 'another new step in
regional economic development', having regard in particular to its
' unprecedentedly wide range of powers' . It represented the climax
of eighty years of government concern for the area, expressed through
the creation of agencies such as the Congested Districts Board, and
the Crofters' Commission. The idea of a Highland development
authority had first been proposed in the 1920's, by the Scottish TUC,
and the Scottish Liberal Party, and was subsequently adopted by the
Scottish Labour Party in the early 1960' s^. Its creation constituted
an acknowledgement of the economic and social problems which had
affected the area during a period of prosperity for the UK economy as
a whole. The Board's objectives, as defined by legislation illustrate
the two major preoccupations of central government policy at this
time. The Board was set up 'for the purpose of assisting the people
of the Highlands and Islands to play a more effective part in the
25economic and social development of the nation . In other words the 
government was responding on social grounds, to the plight of the 
Highlander, 'the man on Scotland's conscience as one government 
minister commented, whilst maintaining that the measure would be of 
benefit to the national economy, by developing the area's contribution
11
to industrial output, increasing tax revenue, and reducing public
welfare expenditure. Indeed, Warren argues that the setting up of the
HIDB reflects a move away frcm the social bias of policy in favour of
27applying economic criteria to Highland assistance .
The Board was given the power to make grants and loans to a wide range 
of industrial, commercial and other undertakings, to acquire land, to 
build factories, service and maintain them, and to offer advisory and 
support services to businesses. In 1968, Parliament added the power 
to take equity shareholding in companies. Nevertheless, it was not 
until 1975 that agencies were established in other UK peripheral 
regions.
At this time in the United States of America, more conventional means
were being employed to tackle regional problems. The Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965, created an Economic Development
7 fiAdministration (EDA)^ which built upon the success of its
predecessor, the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA), which had
introduced the concept of providing economic development assistance to 
79lagging regions^ . The assistance took the form of technical 
assistance in planning, loans and grants for the construction of
on
public facilities, and low interest loans to public business firms . 
In the same year 1965, another act established the Appalachian 
Regional Commission, the task of which was to co-ordinate a joint 
federal/state development programme . The geographical remit of the 
ARC covers parts of seme 13 states, and its operations are governed by 
a panel of representatives from each of those states under the joint 
chairmanship of a federal appointee, and an elected state
12
representative. The task of the ARC is one of co-ordination and 
planning, rather than implementation, and its functions concern 
infrastructural rather than industrial development. The bulk of its 
expenditure has in the past been allocated to highway construction, 
and other projects have involved environmental reclamation, water 
resource development, educational programmes, and the provision of 
ccmmunity infrastructure. Cumberland has described it as representing 
'another unique stage in the pragmatic US tradition of creating new 
pluralistic institutions to meet specific regional development 
needs '^.
The examples given above indicate that by the mid 1960's interest in 
regional policy questions was reawakening. It has been argued that 
this expressed the urgent need of capital to diversify into new 
markets, and locate production in areas with comparatively high labour 
reserves. Conversely, it could be claimed that it reflected the 
slackening of economic growth, particularly in countries such as 
Britain, where the Labour government had made regional policy a major 
priority. Although regional agencies in the UK have not customarily 
been considered directly as instruments of regional policy, in that 
they do not, with the exception of the Northern Ireland Industrial 
Development Board (JDB), created in 1982, administer the regional 
incentives schemes which form the backbone of that policy, it is 
instructive to consider their formation against this background. A 
number of commentators have identified periods during which regional 
policy was particularly forcefully applied by government . For 
example, immediately after the War, with many firms anxious to 
reestablish and relocate, the government was keen to direct industry
13
to peripheral regions. The impetus slackened during the 1950's as low 
levels of unemployment prevailed, but policy measures were revived 
following the sharp recession of 1958/9. The government traditionally 
used a 'carrot and stick' approach to the distribution of industry, 
offering the inducement of financial incentives for businesses setting 
up in designated development areas, whilst at the same time regulating 
development through the Industrial Development Certificates mentioned 
above, by which planning permission could be withheld from projects in 
non-assisted areas. The Labour government added a significant 
incentive in 1967 with the introduction of the Regional Employment 
Premium (REP), a subsidy of £1.50 per week per adult male employed in 
manufacturing industries in Development Areas. In apparent 
contradiction of the trend toward selectivity in the distribution of 
regional aid with which the HUB, for example, was associated, REP was 
available automatically to firms operating in Development Areas, 
regardless of the nature of their business or their capital/labour 
ratios.
The Conservative government, elected in June 1970, favoured stricter 
control over regional expenditure, and the encouragement of industry 
in these areas through tax allowances rather than grants. Investment 
grants to Assisted Areas introduced by the Labour Government in 1966 
were abolished, and replaced by depreciation allowances. However, as 
the economic climate deteriorated, the government was forced to 
recognise the political importance of the policy, and in 1972, it 
performed what has been described as a remarkable U-tum. The 1972 
Industry Act which it introduced was 'the most comprehensive and most 
interventionist piece of legislation concerning government assistance
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to the private sector ever to have been passed in Britain1, according 
to one economist*^. It provided for reversion to the standard grants 
system and for a regional development grant which was to be paid at 
the rate of 20% in Development Areas on capital equipment such as 
plant, machinery or industrial buildings. The most far reaching 
measures, however, were contained in Sections 7 & 8 of the Act; 
Section 7 provided for discretionary government assistance to projects 
in the Assisted Areas, which either created or maintained employment. 
Under the terms of Section 8 assistance could be given to projects 
outside the regions, which improved productivity or updated products. 
It was by way of this clause that much assistance was to be paid out 
to rescue companies such as British Leyland and Rolls-Royce, large 
parts of whose operations were situated outside the Assisted Areas. 
This selective assistance was made available at the discretion of the 
Secretary of State for Industry, with the guidance of Industrial 
Development Advisory Boards, staffed by leading industrialists, on a 
regional basis. The 1972 Act provided the regional policy background 
in the context of which the remaining UK agencies were created, its 
greatest significance being its provision for industrial assistance to 
be awarded on a sectoral rather than purely spatial basis.
It was in Northern Ireland at this time that developments began to 
foreshadow those on the mainland in relation to regional development. 
As the result of a recommendation frcm a committee reviewing social 
and economic development in Northern Ireland, the Cairncross 
Committee , the government established in 1972, the Northern Ireland 
Finance Corporation (NIFC), which was empowered to provide financial 
assistance, in the form of equity investment and loans, to local
15
canpanies^. The immediate motive behind the establishment of the 
NIFC appears to have been a desire to bolster Northern Irish 
manufacturing companies, which it was feared, would be adversely 
affected by the civil disturbances, which were at their height, at 
this time. Cairncross had expressed concern that the inward 
investment momentum built up during the 1960's would be lost without 
special aid. In the previous year, 1971, in the wake of the Bolton 
Report on the Financing of Small Firms, a Local Enterprise Development 
Unit (TiEDU) had been established in Northern Ireland to promote and 
expand small local industries, employing not more than fifty
07
personsJ . LEDU was established as a limited company, funded entirely 
by the Department of Commerce, but free to take its own decisions 
within the framework of guidelines laid down by the Department. It 
seems a neat irony that the Unionists at Stormont in two of their 
final acts were providing public backing for industrial initiatives, 
whilst their Conservative colleagues at Westminster were attempting to 
reverse the process on the mainland. Nevertheless, these two 
interventions marked another stage in the trend toward selective 
intervention through regional government organisations which the UK 
government was presently to adopt. The Labour government which took 
power in October 1974, after the party had secured an overall 
parliamentary majority in the second General Election of that year, 
could not have been expected to temper in any way, commitment to 
traditional regional policy instruments in the way that the 
Conservatives had attempted four years earlier. Much of its electoral 
support was drawn from the Assisted Areas, and was under threat from 
the increased popularity of the Scottish and Welsh Nationalist 
Parties. Indeed those changes that did take place, it has been
16
argued, were merely a response to such pressures. As Eirug comments, 
writing on the Welsh Development Agency 'little or no apparent thought 
had been given to the role of regional economic development agencies
*50
in Labour Party thinking up until 1974 . He also quotes an
executive director of the WDA, who noted that the setting up of the 
Agency 'had little to do with regional economic policies...It was 
borne out of reactions to the rise of nationalist feelings in Scotland 
and Wales.
The West Central Scotland Plan, initiated by the Scottish Office, and 
published in 1974, proposed a Scottish Economic Development 
Corporation (SEDOQR) with powers of direct intervention in Scottish 
industry^®. The first official reference to development agencies 
occurred in a government White Paper on offshore oil and gas policy, 
which proposed the setting up of a Scottish Development Agency 'to 
strengthen.. .the instruments available from promoting the development 
of Scotland's economy... It also promised that a similar agency
for Wales would eventually be established, contingent upon the 
development of oil exploration in the Celtic Sea. However, Welsh MP's 
were not keen to go into another General Election without a specific 
commitment to a Welsh Development Agency^. Consequently, in the next 
parliamentary session, following the issuing of a consultative paper, 
and discussions with representatives of the relevant bodies, the 
Scottish and Welsh Development Agency Bills passed through Parliament. 
They received the Royal Assent on 12 November 1975, together with the 
Industry Bill, which provided for the establishment of the National 
Enterprise Board. The hybrid parentage of the agencies can thus be 
clearly seen. On the one hand, they were presented as a form of
17
administrative devolution, designed to assuage nationalist grievances, 
prior to the carrying through of legislative devolution. On the 
other, they were important constituents of Labour's National 
Industrial Strategy. Cooke analyses this strategy as attempting to 
regenerate the economy through four methods:^
i) sectoral performance evaluation.
ii) subsidised industrial restructuring.
iii) planning agreements
iv) direct agency investment ie. through NEB, SDA and WDA.
In order to carry out these tasks, the instruments of regional policy
needed to be able to direct assistance more selectively. A
parliamentary review of regional policy had concluded in 1973 that
'much has been spent, and may well have been wasted. Regional policy
has been empiricism run mad, a game of hit-and-miss, played with more
enthusiasm than success. It called for a more rational and
systematic base for the formulation and execution of regional policy.
Certainly, the creation of the Scottish and Welsh Agencies was
considered, in some quarters, a radical departure from existing
policy. As the bills setting up the Scottish and Welsh Development
Agencies were introduced in parliament, the Industrial Development
Officer of South Glamorgan County Council wrote that 'simultaneously
in London, Glasgow and Cardiff, the government announced the death of
30 years of British regional policy. The traditional 'stick and
carrot' method of attracting industry to development areas is being
put away and regional and industrial policy will from now on go on the 
45offensive.
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The agencies were given powers which included making equity and loan
investments in private conpanies, building, servicing and managing
factories and industrial estates, reclaiming derelict land and
carrying out safety-work on mineral-waste deposits, and providing
technical and canmercial assistance to industry. In the following
year, the government disbanded the NIFC, and replaced it with a
Northern Ireland Development Agency (NIDA), along the lines of its
46Scottish and Welsh counterparts, but with a more restricted remit .
NIDA which was itself to be replaced in 1982 by the IDB, was given the
full powers of a comprehensive development agency. In 1977, the
Development Board for Rural Wales (EBRW) was established to operate as
the HIDB now did, within the geographical boundaries of another
agency, but charged with the specific duty of stimulating the Welsh
rural economy^. Like the HIDB, the DBRW also had a statutory
responsibility for the social as well as economic development of its
region. A rural development authority for Wales had long been a dream
of Welsh nationalists, but the Board itself was primarily an
amalgamation of two existing bodies, the Mid Wales Industrial
Development Association (MWIDA) and the Newtown Development 
48Corporation . The manifesto of the Labour Party for the October 1974
election had promised 'a unified statutory authority.. .to use and
develop the social fabric and economic resources of rural Wales to the 
49full. However, with the setting-up of the WDA, it was thought by 
some that the activities of a rural development agency could be 
carried out within its framework. That the DBRW subsequently came 
into being was an acknowledgement both of the perceived inability of 
the WDA to carry out this task, and the political determination of the
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then Welsh Secretary of State, John Morris.
Following the establishment of these agencies in the UK, a number of 
English local authorities have created municipal enterprise boards, 
with powers to invest in local industry. The most notable examples 
have been those established in Greater London (GLEB), West Yorkshire 
(WYEB), and the West Midlands (WMEB)^. within individual towns and 
cities, development corporations and enterprise trusts have multiplied 
in recent years, the former aimed at the attraction of inward 
investors, the latter at providing information and assistance for 
small business. Local authority initiatives have become more 
ccmmonplace as the political pressures on the authorities to portray 
themselves as taking active steps to create jobs have grown in 
proportion to the growth in unemployment. As the activities of 
development corporations and enterprise trusts take place at a 
subregional level, they will not be discussed in the course of this 
work, but further reference will be made to Enterprise Boards, as 
within the regions in which they operate, they carry out significant 
industrial development functions. Attention will also be paid to the 
National Enterprise Board, the state holding company which, together 
with the Scottish and Welsh agencies formed a distinct arm of the 1974 
Labour government's institutional framework by which industrial 
regeneration was to be encouraged. The NEB established two regional 
boards, in the north-east and north-west of England, but the 1975 
Industry Act, under the terms of which the Board was created, did not 
allocate it any definite role in regional development^. Its main 
concern was selective state intervention on a sectoral, rather than 
spatial basis. Its attempts to integrate a regional element into its
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activities were prompted by the opinions expressed in certain regions 
of England that Scotland and Wales were, through the mechanisms of the 
Scottish and Welsh development agencies, receiving an unfair 
proportion of available government resources. 'The wide range of 
powers and enormous budget available to the Scottish Development 
Agency for industrial promotion were especially resented by 
politicians who found the Government's claim that equivalent powers 
and money were available in England through the National Enterprise 
Board singularly hollow. Eventually, in 1983, after the NEB had 
been stripped of most of its responsibilities, and subsumed together 
with the National Research Development Corporation (NDRC) into the 
British Technology Group (BTG), the regional boards were wound up.
Having considered in some detail, developments which led to the 
establishment of regional agencies in the UK, it might now be useful 
to discover whether or not these developments were paralleled in the 
rest of Europe.
In Belgium, provision for the establishment of agencies was made as
early as 1970 under the terms of the Regionalisation Laws of 15 July 
531970 . This legislation represented an attempt by central government
to solve the constitutional problems which had arisen from long­
standing regional divisions within the Belgian state. Belgium 
achieved independence from Dutch rule in 1830, and had always been 
divided by a 'linguistic frontier', running east-west across the 
country. North of this line, the people of the provinces of West and 
East Flanders, Antwerp, Limburg and Northern Brabant speak a local 
variety of Dutch known as Flemish. To the South, in Hainaut Namur,
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liege, Luxembourg and Southern Brabant, the inhabitants, known as 
Walloons, are French-speaking. A third area, that of Greater 
Brussels, though in the Flemish sector, developed as a French-speaking 
enclave, and is now officially designated as a bilingual zone. These 
linguistic differences have been exacerbated by economic variations 
between the regions. Regional problems and policies in Belgium will 
be dealt with at greater length below, but it is necessary here to 
give a brief outline of their history, in order to place in context 
the creation of regional development agencies.
Wallonia became an industrialised region long before Flanders, which
was, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a 1peasant-
*54supported, low-wage agricultural economy c
Consequently, Wallonians produced higher levels of per capita output, 
and enjoyed correspondingly higher standards of living. However, 
since the Second World War, the position has been completely reversed. 
The staple industries of the Wallonian economy, coal and steel, have 
experienced a significant decline in manpower. In two provinces, 
Liege and Hainaut, employment in the coal industry declined by over 
90% during the period 1953-1973. Since the 1930's, the Wallonian 
population has increased little, whereas that of Flanders has grown by 
approximately one million, and now constitutes 55% of the national 
population. Since the War, the Flemish economy has developed rapidly, 
benefiting from the State-inspired modernisation of the economy, which 
took place during the 1960's, and also from a programme of regional 
incentives, under the Regional Expansion Laws of 1959 and 1966. In 
1967, per capita income in Flanders surpassed that of Wallonia for the
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first time. According to F J Gay, writing in 1975 'in recent years
75-90% of foreign industrial investment in Belgium has been devoted to 
55Flanders . These above-mentioned factors amounted to what another
commentator referred to as 'a potentially volatile combination of a
sharp reversal in relative prosperity linked to continuing linguistic
5fiand cultural antagonisms.
Hence, following the recommendations of a government commission, 
measures of decentralisation were introduced in 1970, which included 
the creation of three regional economic councils (CER's), for 
Flanders, Wallonia and B r a b a n t * these councils were each to consist 
of 50 members drawn from the Belgian parliament and the provincial 
councils, as well as employer and trade union representatives. Also 
established under the Law of 15 July were the Office de Promotion 
Industrielle (OPI) and the Bureau du Plan (Central Economic Planning
50
O f f i c e ) F i n a l l y ,  the existing provincial councils were empowered 
to set up regional development companies. The companies (SDR's - 
societes de developpement regional) were to study methods of economic 
development, to draw up 'inventories of needs' (inventaire des 
besoins) for their own regions, to advise and co-ordinate the sectoral 
aspects of the national 5-year economic plan, and to provide financial 
assistance for industry, where support was not forthcoming from the 
private sector. The creation of agencies in Belgium was not, 
therefore, intended to solve the difficulties of specified 'problem' 
regions, but represented part of a process of administrative 
devolution, involving all regions. In fact, the Flemish and Wallonian 
councils executed their remits in slightly different ways, in that 
whilst five agencies were created in Flanders, reflecting both the
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heterogeneous nature of the Flemish economy and the existence of 
economic councils in each of the provinces, which could be converted 
into SDR's, only one, covering all five provinces, was established in 
Wallonia. The seventh agency created was the Societe" de Developpement 
Regional de Bruxelles (SDRB), covering the Greater Brussels area. 
These agencies did not become operational until the mid-1970's, partly 
because of the constitutional complexities involved in the setting up 
of regional institutions in Belgium, but also because of the impetus 
provided by the sharply worsened economic conditions which resulted 
from the oil crisis of 1973.
Also established in Belgium during this period was the Fondatione 
Rurale de Wallonie, which in 1975 began advising on co-ordinating the
CQ
integrated development of rural areas in Wallonia . Since 1978, the 
FRW has been funded by the Belgian Ministry for Wallonian Affairs, 
though it also receives funds from private sources.
In contrast to the position in Belgium, agencies have been established
in the Netherlands only in areas which the central government
considers to be in need of special aid. There exists in the
Netherlands a long history of physical and spatial planning, which
originally focused on the interrelated problems of controlling the
growth of the Rands tad, and protecting the prime agricultural land of 
60the area . This was in turn closely concerned with regional policy, 
particularly as one proposed solution to these problems was the 
dispersal of population to growth-centres in the depressed regions. 
In 1956, a government report suggested that autonomous industrial 
growth should be encouraged in the regions, to act as a counter to the
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expansion of industry in the Randstad area. The government of the 
Netherlands, therefore, pursued a vigorous regional policy (see below) 
throughout the 1960's and early 1970's with the objective of 
implementing national planning goals. The decision to set up 
development agencies was perceived as part of that trend, noted above, 
toward greater selectivity in the allocation and distribution of 
regional aid, and also a recognition of the special problems of 
particular areas, which could not be solved by conventional regional 
policy measures alone.
The first agency was established in 1974 as the Noordelijke
Onwikkelings Maatschappij (NOM - Northern Development Company),
covering an area previously designated the Northern Development Area,
and which included Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe. In the following
year, the Industriebank Limburgs Instituut Voor Ontwikkeling en
Financiering (LIOF - The Industry Bank of Limburg's Institute for
Development and Finance) was set up to serve Limburg, another area
61with a history of special assistance . As far back as 1934, a 
ccmpany had been formed to give financial assistance to businesses in 
the area, as a response to the problems of the coal industry. Between 
1965 and 1975, the Limburg coalfield was run down to a state of 
closure, with the loss of 45,000 jobs. As a response, in 1966, the 
whole of South Limburg was designated a Reconversion Area. Other 
agencies have been established in Gelderse (GOM) and Overijissel (OQM) 
and a further one is planned for North Brabant. Yuill has shown that 
the seven provinces which are served by the agencies each have a lower 
per capita income than the other Dutch provinces . There are 
differences in the range of powers and breadth of functions of the
25
four existing agencies, and this will be dealt with in greater detail 
below.
Finally, in this section, it is necessary to make reference to
developments in this field in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. It is
difficult to compare the institutions of this country, the size of
which is roughly equivalent to that of the English county of Kent, and
whose population numbers approximately 350,000, with those of the
other Western European nations. Indeed, the economic problems which
Luxembourg has faced in recent years bear closer resemblance to those
of certain regions within other countries, than to those of the
countries as a whole^. These problems stem from Luxembourg's
dependence on one main industry, that of steel, which suffered a
severe structural crisis during the mid 1970's, as a result of
declining demand from Western markets and increasingly competitive
supplies from the newly industrialised countries. Steel production in
Luxembourg is dominated by ARBED, a group of companies which,
together, form the fourth largest steel-makers in Western Europe. In
1977, ARBED established, in Luxembourg, a 'Division Anti-Crise' (Anti-
Crisis Division) to provide alternative forms of employment for
64redundant personnel . In the following year, as part of this 
Division, a 'Departement d'Industries Nouvelles' (New Industries 
Department) was created with the aim of attracting new investors to 
the Grand Duchy, and assisting them, wherever possible, to set up 
business. The Department employs only three full-time staff, and is 
funded from within the ARBED organisation. It is therefore, 
substantially different from the other agencies in this survey. The 
factors which led to its creation may therefore be expected to differ
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also. As a large-scale employer within the Grand-Duchy, ARBED can be 
seen to have been fulfilling its social responsibilities in 
establishing the New Industries Department, whilst at the same time 
making a useful public relations gesture. At the same time, it has a 
financial interest in persuading incoming investors to occupy some of 
the premises which it has vacated as a result of its restructuring 
programme. Furthermore, ARBED relies heavily on the good will of the 
Luxembourg government as a major concern operating in a small country. 
For its part, the government has taken 1000 steel-workers on to its 
programme of 'general works in the public interest', and is 
guaranteeing fran 20 to 80% of their wages^.
It is not easy to reconcile the New Industries Department with our 
earlier definition of a regional development agency. In only the 
broadest sense can it be described as a public initiative, the 
Luxembourg government having, somewhat reluctantly, taken a 20% stake 
in ARBED (Luxembourg) to provide emergency capital during its recent 
difficulties. It does not pursue industrial development functions on 
a broad scale, but only as they relate to the servicing of incoming 
investment projects. Neither does it operate to the benefit of a 
specific region within the Grand Duchy, though, at a national planning 
level, Luxembourg is divided on a spatial basis, into the declining 
agricultural sectors of the North and East, and the heavily 
industrialised cantons of the South and West. It must, however, be 
borne in mind, that in a country of this size, many of the functions 
customarily associated with a regional development agency can, as 
conveniently, be carried out by the relevant department of the central 
government. As the only independent organisation in Luxembourg
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carrying out these quasi-developmental functions, the New Industrial 
Department merits consideration of greater length in a subsequent 
chapter.
Regional development agencies - theoretical perspectives
In the preceding section, the historical development of the regional 
development agency has been outlined by reference to the various 
organisations concerned with regional economic development which have 
been established in the countries of Western Europe, and North and 
Central America. One conclusion which may be drawn from this study is 
that the creation of those organisations did not appear to follow any 
set pattern, rather each example tended to be tailored to the 
political needs of its creators, and the specific nature of its task. 
Such 'ad hoc' development does not lend itself readily to 
incorporation within a general theoretical framework; however, it is 
to such a framework that attention must now be paid, if a general 
explanatory analysis of regional development agencies in modem Europe 
is to be achieved. A number of differing theoretical perspectives, 
within each of which the concept of regional development agencies can 
be accommodated will be presented, and where appropriate, criticised. 
Finally, a brief effort will be made to identify ways in which the 
agencies themselves perceive their role.
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'Reformist' Theories
The arguments outlined below have been grouped together under the 
title of 'reformist' theories, because they each take as their 
starting point the need for government intervention to make good 
perceived weaknesses or faults in the operation of the market, which 
have resulted in regional inequalities. They thus differ from the 
arguments of social market economists, whose goal is the unhindered 
working of the market, and the Marxist perspective which anticipates 
the complete collapse of the market system.
The social-democratic governments of the UK and Benelux countries, 
which, in the mid 1970's established a number of regional development 
organisations generally based their programmes on 'reformist' 
arguments, even if they tended to explain their actions by reference 
to pragmatic goals rather than ideological perspectives. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, development agencies were seen by the 
Labour government of 1974-79, as a means of providing investment 
capital which the private sector could not (or would not) supply to 
the depressed regions. As J R Davies wrote in 1978 'the case for the 
SDA is based on the argument that private institutions and market 
forces have failed to solve the problems of the Scottish economy.
The agencies were, nevertheless, to accept the discipline of the 
market, and their officers were continually at pains to make it clear 
that they would not support companies which they considered 
commercially unsound, 'we are emphatically not in business to support 
lame ducks' the Chief Executive of the WDA explained in an early
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fi 7article on the Agency's modus operandi . This attitude was echoed by 
his SDA counterpart, in oral evidence to the Wilson Committee in 1978: 
'we are not about cases that do not have the reasonable prospect of 
profit and viability.'*’®
Effecting improvements in the regional economies through limited 
government intervention was also the concern of those who saw in the 
agencies a means of improving methods of policy delivery by making 
them more responsive to and aware of local needs. Their viewpoint was 
summed up by Mawson and Miller: 'a development agency ought to have 
the freedom to act outside of the day-to-day political and 
bureaucratic constraints of government; to focus on the problems of 
the indigenous sector rather than continue to rely cn inward mobile 
investment; and to enter into financial arrangements suited to 
supporting long term developments in place of the vagaries of annual 
Government budgeting requirements.
For others, however, activity within regions at the micro-level could
never provide a long-term solution to the problems of regional
imbalance. Small firms in these areas would always be prey to the
unfair competition of leading companies located in the Central belt.
To achieve a proper balance of industry within regions, it would be
necessary to harness the power of these multi-product, multi-company
and multi-national enterprises which make up what Holland referred to
70as the meso-econcmic sector . The state must, through the mechanisms 
of planning agreements with private companies, and the taking into 
public ownership of leading industries, direct investment in growth 
sectors into the depressed regions. The role of regional development
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agencies in this context is to act as state entrepreneurs, maintaining 
equity investment in leading companies within the region, and making 
their own contribution to job-creation by starting up canpanies on 
their own initiative. These were the arguments out of which Labour's 
National Industrial Strategy of 1974-75 was formed. The reasons why 
they were not translated into practice during the government's 
remaining four years in office will be touched upon in a later section 
of this work.
ii) 'Social market' theories
One question which may naturally arise from the above description of 
the theoretical underpinnings of Labour's National Industrial 
Strategy, is that of how regional development agencies, as an integral 
part of that strategy, came to be assimilated into the programme of 
the radical Conservative administration elected in May 1979. The 
Thatcher government did not accept the quasi-corporatist arrangements 
by which the economy had been managed by governments of varying 
political hue over the previous fifteen years. It propounded an anti­
statist philosophy which regarded the growth of the state sector as 
having placed a burden on private enterprise, and removed resources 
from it. This philosophy was reflected in its policy toward the NEB, 
which lost both its separate identity, and the bulk of its powers, 
including that of making investments at a regional level. The 
regional development agencies, however, though issued with revised 
guidelines for operations, which reduced to a subsidiary role their 
investment function, were not abolished. During the 1983 General
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Election campaign, the government praised the work of both the SDA and
WE&, and by 1986, the former Conservative Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry was able to reflect that whilst 'at one time it was
legitimately feared that the SDA would become an agent for state
ownership and unacceptable state intervention. That risk has been
removed... it is now regarded as indispensable right across the
71political spectrum in Scotland'
From what has been noted of the agencies' functions above, they may 
not be expected to fit in readily with the 'private sector' philosophy 
of the Conservative government. They can, however, be reconciled with 
the government's belief in the concepts of the 'social market 
economy1, according to which the role of the state consists in the 
creation of a market order, in which individuals are free to pursue 
their objective of capital accumulation. As Gamble comments, in 
outlining the social market philosophy 'a minimal state does not mean 
a weak state. On the contrary, the state has to be strong to ensure 
the conditions in which a free economy can work. That means 
confronting and transforming all those institutions and interests
77
which currently stand in the way. The Conservative Campaign Guide
for the 1983 General Election declares the aim of government
industrial policy to be 'to remove, wherever possible, obstacles and
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burdens imposed on the private sector. The agencies, in the 
carrying out of functions such as the provision of factory space for 
incoming investors, assisting small businesses with financial, 
technical or legislative difficulties and landscaping the environment 
can, according to the proponents of this theory, been seen to be 
'removing obstacles' and creating a market order. According to social
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market theory, regional economic imbalances will, in time, be 
corrected by the workings of the market (such as changes in wage- 
differentials between regions, and labour migration) provided that 
obstacles to the free working of that market are removed, A 
Government White Paper on Regional Industrial Development published in 
December 1983 stated that 1 imbalances between areas in employment 
opportunities should in principle be corrected by the natural 
adjustment of labour markets. This statement was qualified by the 
admission that these processes alone could not overcome present 
regional imbalances, and it would appear that current UK government 
thinking is that agencies are useful tools in the modernisation and 
diversification of the economic base in regions which have been held 
back by the dominance of traditional industries and work practices. 
The agencies are frequently described in this context as 'catalysts’ 
of development, undertaking the initial groundwork which makes 
projects attractive to the private sector. For example, in the 
industrial property market, a sector traditionally controlled by 
government in Assisted Areas, the agencies now operate frequently in 
partnership with private companies, guaranteeing rents and providing 
infrastructure, but charging commercial rents, in order that the 
market is not depressed, and other private sector initiatives 
discouraged.
In his publication for the Centre for Policy Studies 'Second Thoughts
on Regional Policy', Hallett gives a clear idea of the role of a
75regional development agency, as perceived by a market economist . 
The investment function, operated with buy-back options for invested 
companies to guard against 'creeping nationalisation' can fill gaps in
33
the financial markets caused by rapid sectoral or spatial change. A 
publicly-subsidised land renewal programme can provide societal 
benefits; factory-building in favourable locations may attract 
industry to ease the problems of areas suffering sudden employment 
decline. Promotion of the area concerned may bring to the investing 
public new information about its locational advantages. All in all,
the type of intervention provided by such an agency to 'ease the
tensions of economic change' would be 'very different from the
traditional socialist preoccupation with the virtues of state monopoly
7 fiand the evils of private enterprise.'
iii) Neomarxist and other related perspectives
This title refers to those theories which interpret the state's role 
in regional development as being geared to the assisting of capital in 
the process of accumulation or profit-making. In their most 
straightforward form, these ideas present regional development 
agencies as state-sponsored agents of economic restructuring. Their 
creation reflects the particular form of state intervention most 
beneficial to private capital during the current phase of economic 
development. Before the Second World War, state intervention was most 
commonly made through the municipal enterprise, such as the direct 
labour organisation, or the water authority, which ensured that 
private enterprise was supplied with essential infrastructural 
requirements. To follow the analysis of Minns and Thomley there then 
followed a period of nationalisation of leading sectors of the economy 
in order 'to provide low-cost material inputs for the production of
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manufacturing canmodities. In recent years, a modified form of
state enterprise, that of state shareholding has emerged, entailing 
less financial commitment from the state, and less frequent need for 
recourse to legislative sanction. Furthermore, the state does not 
have to become involved in the day-to-day running of the enterprises 
concerned. Minns and Thomley studied the equity portfolios of the 
HIDB and NIFC and concluded that their role is to provide, on a 
selective basis, the necessary inputs for the financial restructuring 
of viable private companies. Though the HIDB and NIFC were set up as 
part of a policy aimed at minimising the disruptive effects of 
regional unemployment disparities, the policies of the agencies, they 
conclude, 'are concerned chiefly with securing profitable schemes or 
enterprises, regardless of their regional location.'^® The drawbacks 
inherent in this analysis appear to be, firstly, that equity 
investment represents only a small part of regional development 
agencies' work, and secondly, that if their concern is primarily with 
the servicing of capital irrespective of spatial considerations, then 
it might be expected that in countries such as the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands, operations would not be confined to 'problem' 
regions.
Similar arguments have, however, been made to explain the regional 
significance of the agencies' activities. They have, as mentioned 
above, been associated with the trend toward selective, as opposed to 
automatic, assistance for capital locating in the regions, in that 
they have operated a policy of discretionary intervention, as Cooke 
has described it, intervening on behalf of the state in the economy of 
the region to provide adequate supply factors for inward investors,
35
such as financial and infrastructural assistance, local labour force 
quiescence, and state and private sector participation in new 
v e n t u r e s ^ T h e  creation of such agencies, according to this 
explanation, can only represent a temporary compromise between the 
interests of capital and those of organised labour, and thus in their 
operations, they express a dual or contradictory nature. They 
legitimise the process of state-supported economic restructuring, 
through special provision for depressed areas and vigorous promotion 
of the region as a location for mobile investment, whilst at the same 
time promoting efficiency, by way of increased productivity, the 
rundown of 'uneconomic' industries, and the reduction of wage-costs. 
Examples of this process can be seen in the granting by government of 
£48 million to the WDA to develop industrial sites in areas affected 
by its programme of steel plant closures, and the provision of £10 
million to the HIDB for economic development measures in the 
Invergordon district, following the closure of the local aluminium 
smelter. As Morgan remarks 'the WDA can, by its very being (including 
building and investing as an integral part of its being) legitimise 
the very pit closures, or steel shutdowns, or whatever, that its
o n
existence depends upon.'
In O'Connor's work, regional development agencies are portrayed as
symptomatic of a crisis of the State caused by its conmitment to the
81furtherance of capital accumulation . In order to carry out this 
function, the state must make certain expenditures. On the one hand, 
there are social expenses, such as welfare programmes, which are aimed 
at maintaining social consensus and harmony. On the other, there are 
social capital expenditures which can be subdivided into two
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categories, social investment, such as vocational training courses, 
which increase the productivity of individual workers, and social 
consumption expenditures, which encourage individuals to join the 
labour-force, and can take the form of pension schemes, or sickness 
benefits. However, whilst the state is providing these massive 
subsidies for private capital, the monopoly or meso-economic sector is 
absorbing the profits resulting from it. This creates a fiscal 
crisis, or structural gap between state revenues and state 
expenditures. The only way in which the state can overcome this 
problem is to increase its own efficiency, and encourage increases in 
monopoly sector productivity. This can be done partly through the 
mechanism of regional agencies which are already involved in the 
disbursement of large amounts of social capital, but which can 
encourage the monopoly sector to participate in such projects, and can 
attack both the finance and welfare problems of the modem sector by 
using the technology and capital-intensive methods developed by 
monopoly business. This particularly complex analysis has been 
founded upon the experiences of postwar American federal governments, 
and can be criticised for its underestimation of the ability of the 
state, in opposition to powerful interest groups, to limit its 
expenditures, and increase taxation revenues. However, many of its 
tenets have been adopted by Neomarxist academics in their studies of 
UK agencies.
iv) Decentralisation and devolutionary trends
It is a common assumption to link the establishment of regional
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development agencies to the process of devolution. In reality, much 
depends upon the structure of the organisation concerned, its 
accountability to central government, or alternatively to the regional 
electorate, its capacity to innovate or simply to react, and its 
source of funding. In Britain, regional development agencies can be 
said to be agents of the decentralisation of government, only in their 
inherent demonstration of regional identity. As will be discussed in 
greater detail below, they represented only an afterthought in the 
devolutionary programme of the 1974 Labour government, owing more, it 
was said, to 'pork-barrel politics' than to a genuine desire for
oo
constitutional change .
Nevertheless, a case can be made for the placing of regional 
development agencies within a general theory of the political 
disintegration of the nation-state; a theory which takes account of 
the political horse-trading mentioned above. The theory of internal 
colonialism was first presented as an alternative to the traditional 
'diffusionist' model of regional development, which has been mentioned 
in connection with social market theory®^. It was adapted from 
studies of Latin American States and applied to the countries of the 
'Celtic fringe' of the United Kingdom in a seminal work by Michael 
Hechter. In it he argues that these countries (Wales, Scotland, 
Ireland) have, over several hundred years, been subject to the 
economic and cultural domination of the English state. Economic 
differences between the English core-regions and the Celtic periphery 
can be explained by the continuing economic exploitation of the 
periphery, which manifests itself in the classic syndrome of a 
peripheral economy dependent on external markets, possessing a narrow
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economic base and suffering a high rate of external migration. The 
root of the relationship between core and periphery, however, is 
contained in the cultural division of labour, whereby members of the 
periphery are excluded from positions of power and responsibility in 
the core. This cultural discrimination perpetuates regional 
differences as manifested in language, religious observance and voting 
patterns.
It does not necessarily imply conscious discrimination against 
peripheral representatives as individuals, but, as the periphery is 
disadvantaged in terms of income, employment opportunities, housing 
and education, the average member of the periphery competes with his 
or her counterpart within the core at a disadvantage in many free- 
market situations. There may be attempts by the peripheral elite to 
attract new investment and other resources to disadvantaged regions, 
but the inevitable failure of such measures to achieve full regional 
parity will only serve to stimulate nationalist demands.
The only way in which the relationship can be balanced is by way of 
state intervention, which in turn is dependent upon a strengthening of 
the political power of the peripheral group. In the context of the 
UK, the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism in the late 
1960's and early 1970's can be said to have exerted pressure on the 
state to intervene to restore regional parity, and to change the 
distribution of national resources. The creation of the Scottish and 
Welsh Development Agencies can be interpreted as such a concession, 
which could be regarded as significant in view of the traditional role 
of the core capital, London, as supplier of credit and investment
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funds. Similarly, in Belgium, a revival of regional antagonisms, and 
consequently of the fortunes of separatist parties, preceded 
legislative moves to establish a network of regional development 
agencies.
Criticism of the theory of internal colonialism has centred upon the 
conditions which it predicates, namely that members of the periphery 
are discriminated against at high levels within the core, and that the 
peripheral economies exhibit the characteristics of dependent 
economies noted above. It has been suggested that the number of 
Scots, Irish and Welsh persons to be found in positions of seniority 
within English industry and government service cast doubt upon the 
first premise, whilst the diversified nature of the Scottish economy, 
to take one example, contradicts the second.
v) Corporatism
There occurred during the late 1970's an outpouring of theorisations 
on the corporatist nature of liberal democracies. Though academics 
could find no agreement in defining the concept of corporatism, much 
attention was focused upon the Labour government's National Industrial 
Strategy of 1975, of which regional development agencies were an 
important component.
Katzenstein describes corporatism as 'the voluntary co-operative 
regulation of conflicts over economic and social issues through 
highly-structured and interpenetrated sets of political relationships
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by business, the unions and the state, augmented at times by political 
parties.'®^ This principle of tripartite organisation was one upon 
which the governing assemblies and boards of regional agencies in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands were founded. According 
to corporatism theorists, under corporatism, representatives of the 
state, labour and employers, instead of competing for national 
resources through the pluralist system, agree to act together at 
national level to achieve certain goals. Labour and employers 
representatives are granted a share in government in exchange for the 
acceptance of wage restraint on the part of labour, and direct state
or
intervention in business on the part of employers . In the case of 
the Labour government of 1974-75, however, their ccmmitment to state 
intervention through planning agreements, and the taking into public 
ownership of leading sections of the economy was never fulfilled. 
Neither the National Enterprise Board nor the regional development 
agencies attempted to incorporate employer and trade union 
representatives in their decision-making processes, which were 
primarily responsive to the demands of the market.
As a result, the concept, outlined by Holland and discussed above, of 
government and the meso-economic sector of industry ccming together to 
undertake planned investment in the depressed regions was never 
brought to fruition. In the late 1970's, in the UK, the idea of 
incorporating the trade unions within the policy-making process was 
abandoned, and the government sought to reduce the visible presence of 
the state in the spheres of industry and employer/worker relations. A 
corporatist explanation of regional development agencies, therefore, 
appears more appropriate to the circumstances surrounding their
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formation than to their current operations.
vi) Regional development agencies' self-perceptions.
Finally, in this section, it may be helpful to consider the way in 
which the regional development agencies themselves perceive their 
functions, as expressed in the public pronouncements of their 
officers, and through analysis of the promotional and other material 
which they produce. One commentator, arguing from a Marxist 
perspective, has explored this theme in relation to the HIDB, and what
p / r
he refers to as their official discourse, or 'cultural practice .
He argues that official Board sources are used to disseminate a
particular set of views, which form a Board 'ideology1, and which put
forward certain specific interpretations of Highland history and
development. 'The HIDB presents its own role through official
discourse partly in traditional social-democratic and pluralist terms,
partly in more technocratic terms. Thus it is an arbiter between
conflicting social interests, though also an apolitical dirigiste
R7institution standing above regional society.
This use of technology'to override social and political conflict, and 
justify public policy, has also been noted of the Irish Industrial
oo
Development Authority . C G Morgan, using a similar approach to that 
of Geddes in examining the output of the WDA concludes that the 
ideology which it promulgates interprets Wales' economic status as a 
product of deterministic factors, and views Wales as a 'basis for
OQ
economic exploitation by different industrial sectors.
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As noted above, the UK agencies, fran their earliest days, emphasised 
that their investment function was primarily concerned with profit- 
making companies, that is, it was determined by market criteria. The 
late Ian Gray, when chief executive of the WDA, made this point in an 
article to which reference has already been made, in which he wrote 
that 'in deciding which projects to support we shall be considering 
both the likely return on capital, and the contribution the investment
qn
makes to the Welsh economy. Speaking in a similar vein concerning 
investment policy before the Wilson Committee in 1978, the then chief 
executive of the SDA, Lewis Robertson declared that 'we...do not 
interpret jobs as the only, nor even the immediately dominant 
consideration that we must have regard to. Though the agencies
tend to see themselves providing a complementary function to the 
private clearing banks, they do not totally exclude social criteria 
from their remit.
Nevertheless, Eurig cites an executive director of the WDA who 
describes the Agency as 'basically an industrial property developer, a 
kind of merchant bank-cum-investment house, and a major land 
reclaimer,' ^  an(j in an oft-quoted phase Ian Gray compared the 
Agency's investment policy to that of a 'rather adventurous merchant 
bank', a remark which echoes Hallett's description previously cited.
There is little evidence that the agencies regard themselves as part 
of a devolutionary process. They accept that their operations are 
conducted within a unitary political and economic structure, though 
the HIDB and DBRW (MWD) are frequently involved in performing advocacy 
roles on behalf of their respective regions. The WDA's Statement of
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Programmes and Policies argues that 'to a very large extent, the 
economic problems of Wales and those of the United Kingdom as a whole, 
and the main long-term issue in economic development is the same, 
namely the means by which the average level of efficiency and 
competitiveness of industry and services, particularly in overseas 
markets, can be increased.1 ^  Such statements lend support to the 
views of those who see the main role of the agencies as being the 
restructuring of industry as part of a national policy. Certainly, 
the agencies present one of their prime concerns as being 'to improve 
efficiency and competitiveness by encouraging modernisation and better 
methods of production.' ^  This is, in turn, related to the principles 
of selective intervention, outlined above; according to the SDA 1984 
Annual Report 'in close partnership with Scottish industry, the role 
of the Agency is to act as a catalyst. Its prime function is to 
ensure that the opportunities which exist in all sectors of the 
economy are grasped and developed.'^
It can be concluded that the UK agencies in their public 
pronouncements follow the lead of central government policy-makers in 
projecting their role as that of instruments of change, encouraging 
the restructuring of capital at a regional level, along the lines of 
the WDA's claim that 'the long-term development of the economy of 
Wales will depend essentially on the continuous generation of new 
businesses, products and processes, and the modernisation, expansion 
and adaptation of existing enterprises.'^
The Benelux agencies, possessing differing structures and functions, 
yet perceive their activities in similar ways to the UK agencies,
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though they place greater emphasis on representing regional interests. 
The Dutch agency, LIQF, puts forward its main responsibility as being 
'to promote and develop on its own initiative, all activities relevant 
to the industrialisation of the province of Limburg.'^®
Other agencies stress their functions in terms of the collecting and 
dispensing of information, and liaising with other organisations. 00M 
describes itself as 'a one-source, comprehensive information bank' and 
an 'independent, trustworthy and specialised mediator' between 
business and government.'^  Similarly, in Belgium, the SDRB 
advertises itself as 'the ideal intermediary between the various 
public authorities and private firms or individuals in need of 
assistance in economic or town and country planning matters.'^ T h e  
separatist pressures out of which regional development agencies in 
Belgium were created (sea above) may also have influenced their mode 
of operations in that they provide a focus for championing their 
region's cause. A representative of the GOM-Antwerpen has written 
that 'apart from studying and promoting regional economic growth, the 
GOM's also promote regional welfare in general...defending the 
interests wherever necessary of the regional ccmpanies, trade unions, 
institutions and local authorities.'^^ It may well be worth 
exploring in a subsequent chapter whether or not the stress which the 
Belgian and Dutch agencies lay on their impartiality and autonomy 
represents a real as well as a perceived difference between them and 
their UK counterparts.
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CHAPTER TVO
Regional Development Agencies - Literature Survey
Academic study of regional development agencies is at an early stage, 
reflecting the fact that their real growth did not take place in 
Western Europe until the mid-1970's. There is consequently not a 
considerable body of literature on the subject. Of general texts 
published, by far the most comprehensive is that edited by Douglas 
Yuill^ of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at Strathclyde 
University, and arising from the European Regional Development 
Agencies Project (ERDAP), carried out by the Centre, and funded by the 
Scottish Economic Planning Department (now Industry Department 
Scotland). A highly structured format is used to describe selected 
agencies from each of nine European Community countries; the 
descriptions are preceded by a general chapter drawing out particular 
areas of comparison. As the stated aim of ERDAP was 'to produce 
factual information on the operation and function of the main regional 
development agencies in the countries of the European Community , the 
work of Yuill and his fellow contributors is descriptive rather than 
analytical. Nevertheless, a number of points of interest are made in 
the opening chapter. For example, the great diversity of the agencies 
covered is noted; in almost all areas outlined, levels of expenditure 
and staffing, internal structures, and breadth of functions, cross­
national differences become apparent. Similarly, reasons for 
establishment tend to be country or even agency-specific. However, 
most agencies were found to be dependent on the state for the bulk of 
their budget, and accountable to a government ministry; this
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regardless of their relative location on the public/private sector 
continuum, which Yuill identified as another useful method of 
comparison. The major trend in the brief history of the agencies he 
considers to have been their policy shift from the attraction of 
inward investment to a greater concentration on the development of 
indigenous industry.
Also embracing the European dimension, but rather more broad in the 
scope of its subject-matter is Keyser and Windle's study of public 
enterprise in the EEC . In its six volumes, it details the extent of 
state activities in each of the European community nations. In a work 
of such range, regional development agencies are given only passing 
coverage. Their research is summarised in a report compared by 
Keyser, Stares and Windle^ for the Swedish Department of Industry in 
1978, in which the authors argue that regional development agencies 
'appear to reflect both a growing disillusionment with the results of 
generalised national policies of regional assistance and a response to 
the intensification of the problems of regional unemployment that
c
occurred since the beginning of the present recession.
The role of UK regional development agencies has been covered by 
Mawson and Miller in a paper on the emergence of local and regional
C.
economic development agencies in the 1970's .  They see regional 
development agencies as having been conceived as a flexible, non- 
bureaucratic response to a recognised special need (that of combating 
economic decline in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). They claim 
that regional development agencies reflected the general trend of 
regional policy toward selective assistance and indigenous industrial
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development. Despite their failure to fulfil certain expectations and 
a lack of resources sufficient to affect significantly the economic 
problems that they confront, Mawson and Miller believe that the future 
of such agencies is assured, because of the continuing economic 
difficulties of the regions they serve, and the potential adverse 
reaction to their abolition.
Butt Philip analyses UK regional development agencies with particular
7
regard to their long-term job-creation potential . However, his 
research was carried out at a time when the Scottish and Welsh 
Development agencies were still adjusting to their roles, which 
complicated the drawing of definite conclusions on performance. He 
does, nevertheless, put forward an argument that has become a major 
theme of subsequent studies, that 'politically, these bodies cannot 
afford to do too little or to lose too much money by trying to do too
Q
much,'0 whilst warning that little could be expected of them in terms 
of new jobs or industries for seme years to cane.
On the development of the agency, or non-departmenta 1 body, as part of 
the UK governmental system, C C Hood has attempted to devise a
Q
typology that embraces regional development agencies . He considers 
four sets of explanations for the growth of agencies, the most 
plausible of which he considers to be managerial theories and 
political theories. Managerial theories suggest that agencies are 
best equipped either to perform business-type tasks, tasks which 
require flexibility and initiative, or alternatively, routine tasks 
which can safely be allocated to non-elected bodies. Political 
theories have suggested that the agency can be used as a means of co­
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opting trade union and business support for potentially controversial 
interventions by the state (eg National Enterprise Board) or to carry 
out central government policy in the face of uncooperative local 
authorities. However, he concludes that there is no satisfactory 
single-factor explanation for the growth of agencies.
Scottish Development Agency
Much of the work carried out on the SDA has been primarily
i n  1 1  1 2
descriptive. Kirwan , Robertson and Hood and Young can be placed
in this category, though all have judgements to make on aspects of the
SDA's activities. Hood and Young provide an excellent view of the
Agency's work in each of Scotland's major industrial sectors. In an
introductory chapter, the Agency is described within the general
framework of industrial policy at the Scottish level, and at the
book's conclusion, a number of hypotheses are discussed with regard to
its future role. Hood and Young see the role of the SDA as being
"both the prime mover and the delivery mechanism for much of the
1 *3'Scottish dimension'" J of government industrial policy "an 
implementing and enabling body"^. They believe that the SDA would 
benefit from a reallocation of its resources away frcm area-specific 
urban projects into sectoral activity, and call for increased liaison 
between Industry Department Scotland and the SDA.
Industrial investment was described by Lewis Robertson, then Chief
Executive of the SDA, as "potentially the most creative, and possibly
1 Rthe most contentious" of the Agency's functions. Consequently, it 
has attracted considerable printed comment, including that of
53
Robertson himself, who described the purpose of industrial investment
as the improvement of the balance of the economy through the
encouragement of modem, science-based industry, whilst at the same
time modernising and restructuring traditional industry. Finnie has
emphasised the Agency's flexibility in investment and commitment to
working with the private sector, which can to sane extent 'shelter'
behind the Agency's willingness to support 'high-risk' projects. 
1 7However, Davies' has pointed out that the effect of Agency
investments on the problems of the Scottish economy can only be
marginal. He rejects the Agency's criteria for investment, arguing
that the stress given to commercial viability is paradoxical, as the
case for the setting-up of the SDA had been based upon the
inadequacies of the market. The SDA, he maintains, should use its
investment policy to pursue social objectives such as employment
creation, without aiming for a commercial rate of return. Similarly,
the Scottish TUC believes that the industrial investment role of the
Agency has not evolved as originally envisaged, that is, with a
commitment to intervention in order to regenerate the economy . The
SDA's view of their industrial investment policy, as it stood in 1978,
is outlined in minutes of evidence submitted to the Wilson Committee 
1 9 'in that year . The other area of great interest to those Wannop
described as 'agency-watchers is that of area projects, an aspect
of the SDA's work which has developed rapidly in recent years,
notwithstanding the lack of statutory direction relating to it. 
71Wannop sees this development, by which the SDA has agreed to co­
ordinate a set plan of industrial initiatives with other bodies, in 
specific localities, as part of a switch in the emphasis of regional 
policy at national level from new towns to the regeneration of
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existing urban sites. This argument is further developed in an
99article by Wannop and Boyle . Spatial priorities, they argue, were 
not evident in the early years of the Agency's operations, 
notwithstanding the Agency's co-ordinating role in the Glasgow Eastern 
Area Renewal (GEAR) project. Area projects resulted from the 
'failure' of investment policy and represented an opportunity for the 
government to respond to local pressures, whilst at the same time 
conforming with a general trend of transferring resources from 
regional to inner city initiatives. However, this argument is
90
specifically challenged by Gulliver , who believes that area projects 
were adopted by the Agency because they represented a better way of 
"delivering" Agency "products" such as factory space, infrastructural 
investment, and business advice.
The forerunner of area projects, GEAR, has attracted a considerable
amount of academic study. Much is critical (for example, Naim^,
Booth, Pitt and Money^, Orton^) arguing that the changes brought
about by GEAR have been cosmetic, or even that they would have
occurred without the SDA-co-ordinated programme, which they believed
owed much to the need for a political public relations exercise in the
27area. Others, such as Donnison have seen GEAR as an innovative 
urban renewal project, pointing the way for future inner-city policy.
90
Leclerc and Draffan state their intention to abstain from this
argument, and produce an 'article of record' but they clearly regard 
the project as a success.
9 9Likewise McDonald has written appreciatively of the SDA s 
environmental work as it relates to the Scottish 'townscape',
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describing it as 'the apotheosis of a long line of initiatives 
implemented by economic and physical planners in S c o t l a n d ' R i c h ^  
also talks of the SDA having 'a substantial beneficial impact' on 
Scotland's landscape. He notes, however, that available resources can 
in no way hope to tackle the remining problems in the field, and that 
momentum of expenditure on such work is slowing, and giving way to 
other heads of expenditure within the Agency's budget.
Hood and Young, Kirwan and Robertson all make the point that the SDA, 
after initial hostility from local authorities and the business 
community has now achieved a high degree of public acceptance. Hood 
and Young's judgement is that 'in its early years, the SDA was pushed 
into gaps which it was not equipped to fill and that even in more 
recent years there has been a temptation to try to fill too many gaps 
relative to available resources'.
Mention has already been made of the SDA's submission to the Wilson 
Committee, but parliamentary conmittees have also played a role in 
studying certain aspects of the Agency's work, including the House of
“3 *3
Commons Committee of Public Accounts , which scrutinises its annual 
reports and has investigated its industrial investment activities, and 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs^, which, 
during the 1979/80 parliamentary session, conducted an investigation 
into the promotion of inward investment in Scotland, and made 
recommendations concerning the SDA.
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Welsh Development Agency
As much of the academic work on the SDA has emanated from a single 
source, namely the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, the leading 
role in the study of the WDA appears to have so far been played by the 
Department of Town Planning at UWIST. Students of the department have
or o£
undertaken two major critiques of the Agency, by Morgan03 and Eurig, 
which will be discussed below. However, interest has been led by 
Cooke, frcm whose work both Morgan and Eurig derive the theoretical 
framework in which they set out their research. Cooke^, as mentioned 
above, locates the WDA within the strategy of state restructuring of 
the Welsh economy, in line with the demands of the international 
division of labour, and sets it in the context of the shift in 
regional policy toward 'selective' or discretionary aid to regional 
industrial capitals. This latter he regards as one of the immediate 
reasons behind the establishment of the Agency as combined with 
pressure from political interests, and the Labour Party's commitment
O Q
to a form of public sector planning. From this basis, Morgan00 
proceeds to study the type of firms assisted by the WDA, and concludes 
that they can be divided into two types - 'peripheral', small, poorly- 
unionised companies with low profits, low productivity and low output 
- and 'core', large, externally controlled companies with high levels 
of female employment. By encouraging these companies, he argues, the 
WDA is assisting the restructuring of the Welsh economy for the 
benefit of international capital by introducing changes in the 
production process, and increasingly, the 'exploitation' of labour. 
He supports this with data showing the low level of unionisation in 
Agency firms, their low multiplier effect and employment structures
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biased towards sectors of the labour market in which wages in Wales 
lag below average levels. The WDA, he concludes, is a capitalist 
development agency operating in regional space.
Much of Eurig1 s ^  work mirrors the above, but his conclusions, 
following a survey of the agencies' three main areas of activity, are 
on a practical rather than a theoretical level. He believes that the 
WDA has not created jobs in the areas of greatest need, has invested 
in the interests of capital restructuring rather than employment 
creation, and has neglected sectors which would help stem population 
flow from the coalfields. He suggests that the Agency be more 
realistic in the estimates of its own success, and that it should 
offer more aid to the service sector.
In a critical account of the WDA's formative years, Osmond^® adopts a 
different perspective frcm that of the "Cooke school", arguing that 
the Agency represents a classic colonialist response to 
underdevelopment and that it would lack the political will to carry 
out its task unless it came under the control of the Welsh Assembly.
The operation of the Agency's investment function has been described 
by the Agency in a submission to the Wilson Committee^ , and in an 
article by the late Ian Gray^, then the Agency's Chief Executive, who 
emphasises that the Agency's investment policy is based on ccmmercial 
criteria and eschews support for "lame ducks." This policy is 
criticised by the Wales TUC in evidence submitted to the Committee on 
Welsh Affairs in 1979 as "cautious and contained. The Wales IUC 
argues that the WDA has chosen the softer option of industrial
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landlord and property developer rather than fulfil its original 
commitments.
The Wales TUC evidence was submitted to the Committee on Welsh Affairs 
which conducted an important investigation into the role of Welsh 
government institutions in employment creation, to which many 
organisations and individuals submitted evidence. The Committee's 
report expressed fears that the WDA's work is being concentrated on 
areas affected by steel closures, and recommends that funds for 
industrial investment be increased, and that target rates on 
investment be reduced. A recommendation eventually accepted by the 
government was that the Development Corporation for Wales, an 
industrial promotion body comprised of representatives of business, 
the local authorities and trade unions, be wound up and that the WDA 
be given responsibility for the co-ordination of inward investment 
efforts in W&les.
The report shares Eurig's concern that relations between the Agency 
and other organisations involved in industrial development need 
improvement, and that responsibilities need to be more clearly 
defined.
Highlands and Islands Development Board
The HIDB is the oldest-established regional development agency in 
Britain and as might consequently be expected, has generated the most 
substantial corpus of literature.
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The most detailed consideration of the origins of the Board has been 
made by Thompson^ in a work on the Boards predecessor, the Highland 
Advisory Panel. The Board was set up under the terms of the 1965 
Highlands and Island Development (Scotland) Act and its powers 
expanded by a further Act of 1968. The scope of this legislation is 
covered by Henderson^.
The first attempt to assess rather than merely describe the work of 
the Board was made by Carter, who in a famous phrase accused it of 
being "a passive milch-cow"^. His argument was that with no 
comprehensive development policy the Board was reacting to the 
pleadings of interest-grcups rather than allocating resources on a
A Q
predetermined set of priorities. In a subsequent work , he expands 
his criticism by postulating that whilst the Board was attempting to 
solve the 'Highland Problem' by opening the region up to market 
forces, the very deprivation that it has been established to canbat 
has been caused by previous uncontrolled exposure to such forces. His 
views are supported by Geddes^ who sees the HIDB as a tool of the 
state designed to facilitate the market's demands for a concentrated 
workforce in the peripheral regions (hence the Board's early "growth- 
pole" strategy). Its role is to remove all obstacles to capitalist 
development in the area. Such criticism must be contrasted with the 
accounts of Spaven-^, a former employee of the Board who credits it 
with reversing the area's depopulation and providing local jobs for 
the community, and McGregor^, who, whilst arguing strongly for a 
development strategy based on flexible initiatives for the West, 
contends that the Board has learnt frcm experience, and improved its 
operations over time. He divides the Board's history up to 1979 into
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three periods, 1965-1970, 1971-1975, and 1976-1979, coinciding with 
the terms served by the Board's first three chairmen, and he points to 
the new directions taken by the Board in the latter period under 
Kenneth (now Sir Kenneth) Alexander. Alexander's strategy for the 
Board which includes a renewed attempt to tackle the land problem in 
the Highlands and a greater concern with the problems of the western 
parts of the region has been well-documented .
Recently, three detailed criticisms of the Board's work have appeared. 
Shucksmith and Lloyd^, in a paper analysing the HIDB in the light of 
the Invergordon aluminium smelter closure, contest that the Board, 
whilst remaining by the now-outdated regional policy perspectives 
which shaped its formation, has adapted well to criticism over time, 
for example, in moving away from its earlier preoccupation with large- 
scale manufacturing activity. Mackay's 1980 report for the Highland 
Regional Council*^ on the overlapping of public authority 
responsibility in the Highland Region took issue with the Board on 
several points including its commercial criteria for investment, the 
narrowness of its assistance, its centralised organisation and lack of 
contact with local firms, and the confusion of responsibilities 
between it and other Scottish organisations. The most comprehensive 
work on the HIDB is the history published in 1983 by another former 
Board employee James Grassie^, which gives a number of insights into 
the internal workings of the Board. He concludes that whilst it is 
difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Board as distinct from 
other factors such as North Sea oil, recent decisions such as the 
recruiting of foreign consultants to identify Highland entrepreneurs, 
and the setting up of a craft centre in a central as opposed to
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peripheral location have contradicted the Board's aims, with a 
consequent deleterious effect on staff morale. He argues further that 
the reasons for its continued existence are diminished by the 
improvements in the regional economy which have taken place since 
1965, and the Board's refusal to take up the issue of land, which 
Grassie believes, represents the central problem of the Highlands.
Concerning specific areas of Board activity, Bryden^ has written 
critically on the Board's agricultural policies, whilst Shucksmith and 
Lloyd ^  have attempted to locate the HIDB within a framework of rural 
planning in Scotland. One element of assistance for the more remote 
areas of the Highlands in recent years has been the community co­
operative scheme, instigated in 1977 following the success of a 
similar scheme in the West of Ireland. In 1984, a group of Irish 
academics visited the Highlands and produced a detailed report 
comparing the two programmes (Breathnach et al)^®. The conclusions 
drawn relate to potential improvements in the Irish scheme, but they 
are preceded by a favourable assessment of the promotion and operation 
of the Highland co-operatives. Capital investment forms a 
comparatively small part of HIDB work, though unlike the SDA and WDA 
it is able to give grants to private companies. Minns and Thomley^ 
have analysed the Board's equity investments and general investment 
policy up to 1976, and compared it with the record of the NIFC, which 
was in 1976 superseded by the NIDA. They contend that the success of 
the HIDB-invested companies compares favourably with companies 
unsupported by the state, and that the investment role serves the 
purpose of attracting private finance to companies which would fold 
without state support. Minns and Thomley's work is based on the
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premise that investments by bodies such as the HIDB and NIFC 
constitute shareholding, and represents the third instrument that the 
state has used over time to subsidise private capital, the first two 
instruments being municipalisation, the process by which local 
authorities in the nineteenth century took over certain public 
utilities, and nationalisation.
The HIDB's investment policy, along with other aspects of its
finances, has been scrutinised by the House of Commons Committee of 
finPublic Accounts . In 1985, this Committee reviewed the investment 
activities of the SDA, WDA and HIDB. The Committee recommended that 
the HIDB be given a series of targets by which its investment 
performance could be measured. Both Labour and Conservative 
governments had previously been opposed to the introduction of such 
targets in relation to the HIDB, because of the social aspect of its 
remit. The Committee was, however, concerned that the investment 
performance of all three agencies should be measured not just in 
financial terms, but against their statutory objectives.
Development Board for Rural Wales (Mid Wales Development)
The DBRW (which changed its name for promotional purposes to Mid Wales 
Development, MWD, in 1983) is the most recently - established of 
British mainland regional development agencies. Its creation, arising 
from the Mid Wales Industrial Development Association and the Newtown 
Development Corporation is documented by Broady^ , and its functions 
have been outlined by the Board in a memorandum submitted to the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Welsh Affairs^ and the House of Lords
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Standing Committee on the European Communities*^. The Board's 
achievement since its inception in the attraction to and pranotion 
within Mid Wales of manufacturing industry has been recorded by one of
CA
its employees, Grenville Jackson0 , in a paper which discusses the 
development of indigenous entrepreneurial talent within the area. 
However, the perceived preoccupation of the Board with manufacturing 
and economic development in the narrow sense has been criticised by a 
number of writers, who believe that the Board does not appreciate the 
nature of the area's problems. Mingay^, writing shortly after the 
Board had ccmmenced operations, referred to it as perpetuating old 
problems by preferring the manufacturing solution. Hedger00 calls for 
more "locally-based and differentiating policies", whereas John^ 
accuses the Board of being "centralist and paternalist", preferring 
narrow job-creation to the provision of opportunities to work. In 
contrast, the memorandum submitted to the Select Ccmmittee on Welsh 
Affairs**® by the Wales TCJC (mentioned above) ccmpares the work of the 
DERW favourably with that of the WDA, and declares that the Board has 
'effected a triumph against all the odds' in terms of low-cost job- 
creation and the attraction of industrialists to the area.
Northern Ireland Finance Corporation/Northern Ireland Development 
Agency/Industrial Development Board
McKie**^ in her study of development agencies in Ireland, both Northern 
and Southern, documents the origins and metamorphoses of the economic 
development organisation, now known as the Northern Ireland Industrial 
Development Board, as well as its small-business cou/iUrpart, the Local 
Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU). She sees the NIFC as a direct
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government response to the civil disturbances, and to the fear that 
they would irretrievably harm the economic fabric of the region. 
NIDA, the body that replaced it was modelled on the Scottish and Welsh 
agencies that had been introduced in Britain. It was in turn 
superseded by the IDB in an effort to challenge the "one stop shop" 
approach offered by the Republic of Ireland's IDA. McKie adds that, 
whereas these changes were occasioned by pressing practical demands, 
they also reflect a crisis-management style of government, the 
authorities' need to be 'seen to be doing something*. She concludes 
that the development agency, in whatever form it exists, is likely to 
play an important part in employment creation in Northern Ireland in 
the future.
Official support for a development agency strategy was given by the 
Quigley Report^. This describes the task of the then newly- 
established NIDA as 'critically important' and calls for the formation 
of a state manufacturing sector which would create 1500 jobs a year.
The investment policy of NIDA, and its predecessor, the NIFC, has been
71scrutinised by Minns and Thomley (see above) and contrasted with
that of the HIDB. They find the NIFC more willing to take majority
stakes in companies, and with more resources to invest, operating less
stringent criteria for investment, and offering a wider range of
assistance. However, by 1980, groups such as the Northern Ireland
77Economic Council (NIEC) ' were calling for the replacement of NIDA, 
I .FPU, and the Department of Commerce by a single Economic Development 
Authority. NIDA suffered damage to its public reputation through its
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involvement in the De Lorean car project. Fallon and Schrodes/J
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describe the difficulties NIDA encountered in first attracting, then 
exercising control over this large foreign investment which cost the 
British government an estimated £77m. In 1984, a report by the House 
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts'^ strongly criticised NIDA's 
role in the affair, and made several recommendations to the IDB 
concerning future conduct in such cases.
The IDB itself has been the subject of adverse judgements during its 
brief lifespan. Its original structure and guidelines for operation 
as given to it by the Secretary of State were disapproved of by the 
ICTU^ for various reasons, including the emphasis placed on 
'commercial' rather than 'economically-justifiable' investment, and 
the scope for ministerial and civil service interference in the 
activities of the Board. The Board was criticised in 1984 by the 
NIEC^ for failing to meet job-promotion targets, and not having 
developed a long-term industrial development strategy. In December 
1984 the Economic Development Committee of the Protestant-supported 
Northern Ireland Assembly published a report^ which includes 
recommendations on making the work of the IDB and LEDU more effective. 
Amongst these is the demand that a development strategy for the 
Northern Ireland economy be drawn up by a commission consisting of 
government departments, agencies such as the IDB, trade unions and the 
assembly itself.
National Enterprise Board/British Technology Group
This study is concerned primarily with the NEB in its regional role, 
such as evolved from 1977 onwards. However, the NEB as a whole
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figured prominently in Labour's National Industrial Strategy of 1975, 
of which the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies were also part. 
Hatfield^® has researched the origins of the NEB, in particular the 
path by which the state holding company concept, championed by Stuart
7Q
Holland'^ amongst others, made its way into the Labour Party election 
manifesto. The NEB's aims and functions are set out in a memorandum 
submitted by the Board in evidence to the Wilson Committee®®. Grant® ^ 
places the NEB in the context of changing industrial policy, whilst 
Stephen Young®® has dealt with its importance in terms of industrial 
planning. Grant®® considers the establishment of two regional boards 
in the North and North-West of England in 1977 to have been a 
political response to devolutionary pressures, which was not 
wholeheartedly supported by senior Board management. He sees their 
impact as having been limited, the NEB being more suited to the 
pursuit of 'efficiency and international competitiveness' than 
employment creation, and he concludes that they demonstrated the 
importance that politicians attach to regional aid. However, Guthrie 
and McLean contend that the claims of government ministers that the 
powers of the SDA and WDA were reflected in the regional role of the 
NEB were treated with scepticism in English development areas. Butt 
Philip®® makes the point that the NEB had no specific plans for the 
English regions, and that its efforts were confined to encouraging 
companies that it controlled to invest in these regions, and to 
supporting those companies already established with equity injections.
Qf.
An alternative proposition put forward by Mitchell is that the 
regional role developed as part of a process of disengaging the Board 
from the original aims of the state holding company as perceived by 
its creators. It also provided a means of fostering links with
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private sector finance, through the co-opting of local businessmen 
onto the regional boards, and the creation of capital funds for small
07
businesses in conjunction with private financial institutions. Parr 
argues that in its early years the NEB was of necessity, almost wholly 
concerned with the management of its 'transferee companies1 such as 
Rolls-Royce, and that this allowed only a limited amount of activity 
in other areas. He recommends that the financial base of the NEB 
should be raised in order to allow it to diversify into the regions, 
and that it should liaise more closely in providing venture capital 
with the NRDC.
Other UK Agencies
Descriptions of the work of other UK agencies referred to in this
00
study can be found in Mawson and Miller00. A history of the Co-
QQ
operative Development Agency up to 1982 is given in Rigge and Young0 . 
Butt Philipp has analysed the employment generation potential of the 
Development Commission and its implementing agency, COSIRA. COS IRA1 s 
aims and functions have been outlined in evidence submitted to the 
House of Lords Standing Committee on the European Communities^ .
Benelux Agencies
The available literature in the English language on regional 
development agencies in the Benelux countries is not extensive. This 
may be partly explained by their small size in comparison to UK 
regional development agencies, yet it is nevertheless surprising in 
respect of the considerable volume of work published on Belgian and
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Dutch regional problems (see below). Keyser and Windle have brief 
descriptions of certain agencies, outlining aims, functions and inodes 
of operation, whereas in Yuill^ the SDRW, NOM and the ARBED New 
Industries Department are extensively profiled. The work of the 
cellules of the SDRW is referred to in Pahlawan-Marten's^ discussion 
of support for small and medium-sized enterprises in Belgium. The 
Wallonian rural agency, the FRW, its aims, organisation and services 
have been outlined by Sottiaux^ in a paper for the European Centre 
for Work and Society. This concentrates on explaining the role of the 
development agent' in assisting local ccmmunity initiatives, a theme 
expanded by Curry^, who describes the rural regeneration programmes 
of the Wallonian Regional Ministry as pursued by the FRW, and draws 
lessons for similar work in the UK.
Luxembourg's approach to the onset of recession in the steel industry, 
embracing the Division Anti-Crise and its subsidiary Department 
d'Industries Nouvelles, is appraised in an article in the journal 
Management Today
Conclusions
As has been noted above, much of the literature on agencies has been 
of a primarily descriptive nature. However, from the works of those 
who have analysed the agencies' performance, several canmon themes 
have emerged. Firstly, it is clear that the size, structure and 
functions of individual agencies, whilst not being unique to each one 
cannot be predicted on a national basis, some differences being intra­
national rather than international. This does not preclude the
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extrapolation of general trends amongst European agencies, as Yuill , 
for example, has attempted.
Most of the agencies so far studied rely on government financial 
support in various forms, but the balance of public and private sector 
interests in their organisation and activities is not uniform. Even 
bodies such as the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies, funded and 
controlled through government departments, have encouraged, in recent 
years, the involvement of private companies in their operations. The 
importance of this public/private sector relationship is well 
illustrated in the arguments, outlined above, concerning the agencies' 
industrial investment role (arguments which also occur in relation to 
other functions in agencies which do not undertake investment). Thus, 
the agencies have been criticised on the one hand for being too 
cautious in their investment policy, and expecting too high a rate of 
return on investments (ie. a 'ccmmercial1 rate) and on the other, for 
wasting money on projects that are unlikely to attain profitability in 
the short to medium term.
The literature also reveals the difficulties of measuring the 
'performance' of any individual agency. Even the agencies themselves 
no longer appear to place much credence on job-creation figures (with 
the possible exception of the Northern Irish Agencies). Apart from 
the obvious problem of 'slippage', jobs expected from a project not 
materialising over the planned time-span, there is no accurate way of 
measuring whether or not jobs created by agency activity are 'new 
jobs' or are merely displacing workers in competing companies. In 
addition, if one chooses to utilise external measurements to analyse
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agency performance, such as population growth or unemployment decline 
within the region concerned, there is no way of calculating to what 
extent the figures are a product of agency operations. For example, 
favourable trends in the Highland economy over recent years have, it 
has been claimed, owed more to the discovery and development of North 
Sea oilfields than to the work of the HIDB. It is unlikely, 
therefore, in the light of research so far undertaken, that a 
completely satisfactory method of analysing agency performance, which 
does not rely on generalisations, can at this stage be constructed.
Public debate on the agencies, has, at its most fundamental level, 
focused on the role of such agencies within modem Western economies. 
It will be argued below that the manner in which many agencies conduct 
their operations has curtailed widespread public discussion on them. 
However, there has been criticism of the strategies pursued by 
agencies in pursuing the economic development of their region. Seme 
commentators have argued that agencies should increase support for 
indigenous companies, particularly in the service sector and pay less 
attention to attracting foreign manufacturing investment. 
Furthermore, there has also been considerable argument about the 
agencies' policies toward the various sub-regions they serve. Hence 
the SDA have been accused of favouring the Strathclyde region of 
central Scotland, whilst others have maintained that the WDA has 
acquiesced in the depopulation of the South Wales valleys. Finally, 
seme have gone as far as to question the whole 'modus operandi' of the 
agencies, such as those critics of the HIDB and DBRW who see them as 
attempting to foist a particular form of industrial development on an 
unwilling population. Neither is the trend confined to the rural
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development agencies, the WDA, for example, has been characterised as 
assisting in the 'disarticulation' of the Welsh economy, and its 
subordination to external control.
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UK Regional Development Agencies - A Brief Description 
The UK economic background
As one economic commentator has written recently 1 it would be 
generally agreed that the United Kingdom's economic performance in the 
post-war period can only be described as poor, at least by ccmparison 
with that of other industrialised economies' ^ . The United Kingdom can 
broadly be described as a commercial and manufacturing country, with a 
low proportion of workers engaged in agriculture, and an urbanised 
pattern of population settlement. The keys to its economic strength 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were its maritime 
location and sea-borne trade, its insularity and its energy reserves. 
However, in spite of or perhaps because of, its historic ascendancy as 
one of the world's leading trading nations, and the first to 
experience mass industrialisation, as well as the latter-day boon of 
North Sea oil, the British economy, as reflected in terms of growth, 
productivity, inflation and unemployment has not fared as well in 
recent years as have those of the majority of its Western European 
competitors (See Tables 1-4).
In ccmmon with these competitors, the UK has been presented with the 
problems of falling demand for the products of its major industries, 
lower production costs in the Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC's), 
and the rising costs of raw materials on the world market. However, 
in the UK in particular, price inflation (coupled with a fixed
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exchange rate) eroded export price competitiveness, and combined with 
wage inflation to increase production costs. The quadrupling of oil 
prices by OPEC over the course of a few months in 1973/4 also affected 
the UK more severely than most other Western industrialised nations, 
reducing its terms of trade by over 20% . Though both price and wage 
inflation in the early 1980' s were reduced from the levels of the late 
1970's, the failure to increase real output, variously attributed to 
lack of productive investment, failure to make innovations in the 
production process, and the continuation of 'restrictive practices' by 
organised groups of labour, has led to record levels of unemployment, 
(see Table 3).
It has been argued that the UK's joining of the European Community in 
1973 came too late for the country to reap the benefits of membership 
that had accrued to, for example, the Benelux countries, and that the 
UK's balance of trade was unfavourably affected by the sudden exposure 
to European competition^. Of particular importance to the UK regions, 
however, has been the attraction of foreign - owned enterprises to 
sites from which they can operate without being subject to EEC tariffs 
on imported goods.
Industrial policy
Industrial policy in Britain has evolved as a response to the economic 
problems outlined above. Whilst discussion is often couched in 
ideological terms, policy has tended to be related more to short-term 
goals, and decisions taken on a pragmatic basis rather than in 
accordance with a set of beliefs. Wilkes assimilates these two
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factors, 'partisan' politics and 'pragmatic' policies, in asserting 
that 'the pattern has been for each government during the 1970's to 
bring into office an ideological industrial policy that is highly pro- 
or anti-intervention in the market. After a period, consensual 
pressures and industrial circumstances have obliged a return to a more 
pragmatic and so-called ' mixed-economy' approach'^ „
If the creation of government machinery for its implementation is a 
necessary precondition of an industrial policy, then its birth in 
Britain can be traced back to the creation by Labour in 1964 of the 
Department of Economic Affairs, which was charged with the task of 
implementing a National Plan which projected future demand over a 
range of industries, based on an assumed overall growth rate for the 
economy^. This was a policy swiftly overtaken by events, in 
particular the balance of payments crisis of 1966, and in that year 
the Department of Economic Affairs was abolished. Responsibility for 
industrial policy, such as it was then, was handed over to the 
Ministry of Power, and the Board of Trade. In 1970, Mintech merged 
with the Board of Trade (BoT) to form the Department of Trade and 
Industry. However, prior to the General Election of February 1974, a 
separate Energy Ministry was created from it. The policy of breaking- 
up this large unit was extended by the incoming Labour administration, 
which separated the Departments of Trade and Industry, and created 
from them a new, third department, that of Prices and Consumer 
Protection. This was wound up by the Conservatives in 1979, and in 
1982 the Departments of Trade and Industry were once more amalgamated.
According to Grant and Wilkes, there are only a small number of
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microeconomic instruments of industrial policy available to the UK 
government. They list four: regional policy, selective assistance,
c
innovation policy and company taxation . The history of regional 
assistance is well - documented and will be referred to in detail 
below. Selective industrial assistance is dealt with in the UK 
primarily under the terms of section 8 of the 1972 Industry Act, and 
offered to commercially viable projects which are internationally 
mobile, or will lead to substantial improvements in performance or the 
introduction of new products. Innovation policy is an area 
particularly favoured by the Conservatives in recent years, despite 
their stated commitment to free-market economic solutions. 
Expenditure on general industrial research and development increased 
frcm £66m (at 1980 survey prices) in 1978/9, the last year of the 
Labour government, to £84m in 1979/80, and £108m in 1980/81 ^ . The use 
of company taxation as a means to stimulate industrial investment has 
taken the form of accelerated depreciation allowances against 
taxation. Also in 1966, the then Labour government introduced the 
Selective Employment Tax, designed to shift workers from 'non­
productive' service sectors into manufacturing industry. A variation 
on this type of measure, introduced by the 1979 Conservative 
administration was the Enterprise Zone scheme, which delineated 
specific geographic areas within the boundaries of which companies 
would be exempted from rates and development land tax (DCT), given 
100% allowance against corporation and income tax for investment in 
industrial or commercial buildings, as well as being exempted frcm 
planning controls and other government regulations.
Three of the above policy instruments were incorporated into the
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powers of the National Enterprise Board, established by the Labour
government in 1975, and covered in detail below. It was created as
part of an interventionist policy which aimed to regulate the economy
through the taking into public ownership of leading companies in a
number of industrial sectors, in order to promote restructuring and
the conclusion of planning agreements with other companies which were
to include forecasts of the companies' output, employment levels and
wage settlements®. In practice, few companies were taken over, and
only two planning agreements were settled, with the ailing Chrysler
(UK) car company, and the NCB. The principle of selective assistance
was, however, strictly adhered to in the form of large-scale financial
assistance to British Leyland and Rolls-Royce. The NEB also set up
regional Boards to encourage industrial development in the North and
North West of England. In 1981 it was announced that the NEB was to
merge with the National Research Development Corporation to form the
British Technology Group (BTG), and in the second term of the Thatcher
government, its new role was defined as the support of technological
innovation in industry. This change illustrates, as noted above, that
the Conservative governments of 1979 and 1984 were committed to seme
continued intervention in industry, in deed if not in thought.
Regional policy has remained in operation, despite modifications
(which some admittedly see as presaging its ultimate demise), as does
the 1972 Industry Act with its provision for sectoral and regional
assistance. Innovation policies have expanded, particularly those
applicable to small firms. However, it is undeniable that there has
i 9been, in the words of Grant a trimming of industrial policy , 
reflected in reduced expenditure on regional assistance, the cutting- 
back of subsidies to state-owned industries (e.g. BSC, NCB), and
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state-assisted companies (British Leyland), and the dismantling of the 
NEB. The government justifies this policy in terms of the need to 
reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), and a 
preference for macro-solutions to 'national1 economic problems; it 
maintains through its discourse, that it cannot initiate economic 
growth, only create favourable conditions for it.
Regional Problems and Policy
It has been argued both that regional inequalities are not
1 nparticularly great in the UK , and conversely, that unequal regional
development is so pronounced as to produce pressures which may result
in the fragmentation of the present British state . This dichotomy
of opinion may partly be explained through figures that show that
disparities in income are less across UK regions than in many other
European countries, but that unemployment is unevenly spread . In
the "synthetic index" of European regions compiled by the European
Commission and published in 1984, which calculates the relative
standing of 131 regions according to time-series data on unemployment
and gross domestic product rates, many UK regions are shown to be
1 3among the poorest in Europe (see Table 5) .
Nicol and Yuill identify three types of problem regions in modem 
Western European economies, the older industrialised region, the 
predominantly agricultural region, and of more recent importance, the 
congested region^. The United Kingdom possesses examples of all 
three types; areas such as South Wales, North East England and Central 
Scotland, where traditional staple industries such as coal, steel and
82
shipbuilding have been in long-term decline; mid Wales and the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland, rural areas whose problems have 
been raised by the reduction of manpower in the agricultural sector, 
and high levels of emigration; thirdly, inner-city areas on 
Merseyside, in Manchester and Inner London, where civil disturbances 
in 1981 highlighted the social and economic difficulties of central 
parts of large conurbations, from which industry has migrated in order 
to find space for expansion. In the case of Northern Ireland, one 
finds elements of all three types in one region with employment 
decline in the shipbuilding and textile industries, as well as the 
important agricultural sector, combining with the particular problems 
of urban decay in Belfast. If one- then adds to this the extra 
dimension of the effect of fifteen years of civil strife, it is not 
surprising that by the vast majority of economic and social 
indicators, Northern Ireland is by far the most deprived region of the 
UK (see, for example, Table 5).
The alleviation of regional disparities in the UK has been recognised 
as the responsibility of government for over fifty years, and dates 
back to the first Special Areas Act ^ 9 8 4 ^  There has also existed 
general political agreement about the areas that most needed 
assistance. In recent years, however, the situation has become more 
fluid as a result of two factors. Firstly, the government's desire 
to reduce public expenditure occasioned a diminution in the size of 
the areas eligible for regional aid in 1980. Secondly, the recession 
of the late 1970's and early 1980's, whilst affecting all regions to a 
degree, struck some with more severity than others, and did not 
conform to a traditional pattern, 'it had a sufficiently new
industrial composition to effect marked regional changes in the
distribution of large amounts of additional unemployment. It extended
the incidence of decline frcm 'peripheral' regions further in to most
15other regions, particularly the West Midlands and the North West
The spreading of high levels of unemployment beyond the traditionally
depressed regions has produced calls to widen the geographical base of
regional assistance, but conversely, has caused others to argue that
16such forms of assistance are no longer of value . Having covered the 
recent history of regional policy above, it would therefore be 
instructive to consider regional policies and incentives as they 
currently stand.
The basis of the present system of financial assistance remains the
1972 Industry Act, (notwithstanding modifications made to it by
subsequent legislation) which established regional development grants
for expenditure on new buildings, machinery and plant at up to 22% of
total cost in Assisted Areas, the amount being dependent on the status 
17of the area . These grants were available on a non-discretionary 
basis. The Act also provided for selective aid to Assisted Areas 
(known as section 7 assistance) for projects complying with specific 
criteria. Originally, these criteria were that the project assisted 
be 'viable', that it safeguard existing or create new employment, and 
that the greater part of funding for the project should come frcm the 
private sector. The 1979 Conservative administration added the 
proviso that the project should strengthen the regional and national 
economy, and that it should not have taken place without public 
assistance.
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In 1984, the automatic element of RDG's was removed, cost-per-job
limits imposed, and a two-tier grants system comprising Development
and Intermediate Areas was introduced. In the former, capital grants
are available at 15% of costs, and in the latter, companies are
eligible only for selective assistance. Capital grants must amount to
no more than £10,000 per job if more than 200 jobs are created.
Companies planning to create a large number of jobs at low cost (for
example, in the service sector) can claim £3,000 per job if this
18amounts to more than 15% of project-cost . The changes were expected
to bring about a reduction of £300m per annum in regional policy
expenditure by 1987/8. They reflect not merely a concern on the
government1s part to make regional policy more cost-effective, but, it
has been argued, fundamental lack of confidence in the relevance of
such a policy to national economic revival. The White Paper that
preceded the measures stated that 1 the government believe that the
case for continuing the policy is now principally a social one with
the aim of reducing, on a stable long-term basis, regional imbalances
19in employment opportunities, .
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Table 1 GDP trends, 1953-1979 (average annual percentage
changes)
1953-61 1961-73 1973-79
France 4.9 5.6 3.0
Germany 7.2 4.5 2.4
Italy 5.8 5.1 2.6
United Kingdom 2.9 3.1 1.3
Spain 4.7a 6.9 2.8
Austria 6.8 4.9 3.1
Belgium 3.4 5.0 2.3
Denmark 3.9 4.5 2.1
Finland 5.5 4.7 2.3
Ireland 1.8 4.3 3.6
Netherlands 4.6 5.2 2.5
Norway 3.4 4.3 4.4
Sweden 4.0 3.9 1.8




Source: A Boltho (ed.) 'The European economy:growth and crisis'
Table 2 Productivity trends (average annual percentage
changes)
























































OECD Europe 4.1 4.3 2.3 3.8
a GDP per employed 
b 1954-61 and 1954-79 
c 1951-61 and 1951-79 
d 1950-61 and 1950-79
Source: As Table 1, p22
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Table 3 Standardised unemployment rates 1981 -1983 
(by % of workforce)
1981 1982 1983
France 7.3 8.0 8.0
Germany 4.4 6.1 8.0
Italy 8.3 8.9 9.7
United Kingdom 10.6 12.3 13.1
Spain 14.0 15.9 17.4
Austria 2.5 3.5 4.1
Belgium 11.1 13.1 14.7
Finland 5.1 5.8 6.1
Netherlands 8.6 11.4 13.7
Norway 2.0 2.6 3.3
Sweden 2.5 3.1 3.5
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators December 1984
i
Table 4 Economic Performance Index 1974-80-^










1 The index score is calculated as follows:
real rate of GDP growth 
unemployment rate + inflation rate
Source: D. Mackay and W. Grant 'Industrial policies in OECD
countries: an overview' in Journal of Public Policy Vol 3 
no.1.
Table 5 Selected UK regions and the EEC synthetic index
Region:
a b c d
Northern Ireland 20.2 66 35 130
Dumfries and Galloway, 
Strathclyde
19.4 89 55 123
Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd 
and Powys
14.1 83 73 109
Mid and South Glamorgan 16.9 88 69 113
Borders, Central, Lothian 14.4 95 80 103
and Fife
a - unemployment level % 
b - Gross Domestic Product/population index 
c - Synthetic index, calculated frcm canpound of above figures 
d - Ranking out of 131 EEC regions, according to synthetic index
Source: 'The regions of Europe: second periodic report of the social
and economic situation and development of the regions of the 




Much criticism has been made of the relations between British banks
and industry, to the effect that the banks are not as well attuned to
the needs of manufacturers as are those of the UK's main industrial
competitors^. However, it can be argued that this merely reflects
the fact that the UK financial system has developed in a different way
to those of the other European nations with which it is often
21unfavourably compared . For example, the capital markets represent a
22particularly important source of funds for UK industry . Banks 
prefer to supply companies with short-term loan or overdraft 
facilities rather than commit themselves to equity investments, which 
their counterparts in West Germany, for example, frequently 
undertake^. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any evidence 
either that this policy conflicts with the demands of private business 
or that business has been constrained by non-availability of external 
finance^. Large-scale institutional shareholdings tend to be 
confined to organisations such as pension funds, insurance companies 
and investment and unit trusts.
In recent years, there has been a rapid development of those 
institutions that Kevin Wilson has categorised as 'specialist 
intermediaries1 , bodies that operate in both the pubic and private
sector, catering for the needs of industrial and commercial borrowers. 
For example, as will be shown below, regional agencies in the UK have 
undertaken the provision of long-term finance and venture capital, 
often in areas where the financial services sector is poorly 
developed. Public sector activity in this field can, in fact, be
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traced back to the creation in 1945 of the Industrial and Commercial
Finance Corporation (ICFC) and the Finance Corporation for Industry
(FCI) , which were established in a joint operation by the Bank of
England and the London clearing and Scottish banks; in the case of
ICFC its function was to provide loan and equity finance for small and
medium-sized companies, and that of the FCI to provide medium and
26long-term loans to larger industrial companies . In 1973, a holding 
company, Finance for Industry Limited (FFI) was formed to facilitate 
the acquisition of FCI by ICFC, and as a result of this change FCI 
altered its role from being a lender of last resort to the provision 
of long term finance on normal commercial terms.
The merger announced in 1981 of the NEB and NRDC brought together two 
public corporations which had previously been involved in the 
provision of finance on widely differing scales. The NEB's assistance 
to industry was based on sectoral as well as regional considerations 
(its investment policy is considered elsewhere in this work), whilst 
the NRDC provided finance for the development and exploitation of 
inventions. The role of the successor body, British Technology Group 
(BTG) is now confined to the provision of finance to encourage 
technology transfer. For exporters, the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department, a government department set up in 1919, provides export 
credit insurance.
In the private sector, Equity Capital for Industry (ECI) has been in 
existence since 1976, providing equity to smaller and medium-sized 
listed industrial companies, which are unable to obtain funds direct 
frcm the capital markets.
Of the regions which the UK agencies serve, Scotland alone has its own
independent financial sector. However, that independence is qualified
in that all three major Scottish banks have a link with one or other
of the London clearing banks. The Clydesdale Bank is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Midland, the Bank of Scotland is 35% owned by
71Barclays, whilst Lloyds has a 16% stake in the Royal Bank . The 
importance of the financial sector in Scotland, which includes retail 
and merchant banks, investment and unit trusts, brokers, and insurance 
companies, is illustrated by the fact that whilst in early 1960's it 
had some 45,000 employees, by the early 1980's it had 85,000^®. The 
presence of this strong financial services centre is a factor often 
referred to in discussion of regional development as related to 
Scotland, and agencies in other regions, as will be shown below, have 
acknowledged its significance in attempting to develop indigenous 
sources of capital. Cffvv‘~
The UK financial system has developed in a highly specialised manner.
Its characteristics appear to differ considerably from those of other
major European countries, yet this has not necessarily been to the
detriment of UK industry. The Wilson Committee's investigation into
the financing of industry concluded in 1980 that real investment had
not been unnecessarily constrained by shortages in the supply of
external finance^. However, it added that there was a need for
further public institutions to provide finance for small firms and




As the literature survey above has shown, agencies in the UK have not 
been at the centre of public debate on regional or industrial policy. 
The 1984 government review of regional policy, for example, made no 
reference to thenr . This may partly result from their separation 
from the main instruments of regional policy such as regional 
development grants which are administered through regional offices of 
the Department of Trade and Industry.
Of the agencies covered below, the HIDB was established in 1965, the 
NIFC, which predates the NIDA (1976) and the IDB (1983), in 1972, the 
SDA, WDA and NEB in 1975 and the DBRW in 1977: all by Acts of 
Parliament with the exception of the Northern Irish agencies, which 
were established by Orders in Council. Their activities span a 
turbulent period of British political history, as reflected in the 
changes in industrial policy which have taken place during this time, 
and that have been noted above.
In general terms, the State, which in the 1960's and 70's became 
increasingly committed to intervention in the private sector, is now 
pledged to reduce state regulation of the economy. The activities of 
the state holding company, the NEB, have been replaced by enterprise 
zone experiments, designed to free entrepreneurs frcm the 'dead hand' 
of state and local bureaucracy. As will be shown, these macro-level 
changes have had their effects on the agencies. However, it is their
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continuity under these circumstances which is particularly 
significant.
The role of agencies in the UK has officially been concerned with 
making economic activity within certain 'depressed' areas 'efficient', 
'profitable' and 'competitive' . As far as a ccmmon philosophy can
be discerned, it has been to concentrate on economic development, in 
the belief that once this has been achieved, other benefits will flow 
to the region concerned. Against this, it might be said that 
provision for social development has been made a statutory 
responsibility of the rural development agencies, the DBRW and the 
HIDB, but even in this respect, social development is often seen as a 
means of attaining economic development, for instance, by retaining 
services and recreational facilities within a community in order to 
attract investors and key workers to it.
The agencies are not encouraged to think of themselves as job creation 
organisations, but to act in general accordance with commercial 
considerations; this trend has become more pronounced in recent years 
under the Thatcher government. The only agencies which have powers to 
dispense financial grants are the HIDB, IDB and DBRW; the HIDB and 
DBRW operate in areas which have generally-recognised special economic 
problems, whereas the DBRW has been given grant-giving powers in order 
to compensate for the loss of Assisted Area status in 1982 over much 
of the region it cavers. Nevertheless, it has been argued that as the 
amount allotted to regional policy measures has diminished in real 
terms so the importance of the agencies to their respective regions 
has increased (see Table 6) and that this may in part explain the
greater acceptance of agencies in political and industrial circles of 
late which has been noted above.
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Table 6 Expenditure on RPA in Great Britainf 1974/75 - 
1982/83 (at 1982/83 prices)
Total RPA^ %Total RPA accounted for by:
Year Expenditure
(£m)
RDG's2 SFA3 REP4 SDA+WDA Other
1974/75 1348 45.0 7.7 32.8 _ 14.5
1975/76 1530 48.6 9.8 32.2 0.9 8.5
1976/77 1427 56.8 6.0 30.2 2.4 4.6
1977/78 883 77.6 8.8 0.6 6.3 6.7
1978/79 1010 66.4 16.5 - 9.2 7.9
1979/80 780 58.8 13.3 - 14.4 13.5
1980/81 872 67.1 9.7 - 14.7 8.5
1981/82 939 70.3 8.6 - 14.2 6.9
1982/83 912 * 75.6 9.5 - 10.2 4.7
'RPA -
2r d g -
3SFA -
fREP -  
5SDA & 
WDA -
regional preferential assistance 
regional development grants.
Selective financial assistance under Section 7 of the 
Industry Act.
Regional Employment Premium.
Expenditure by Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies 
on land and factories in Assisted Areas (excludes 
expenditure by SDA in descheduled areas of Scotland in 
1982/83).
Other - Includes expenditure by English Industrial Estates 
Corporation, HIDB and DBRW preferential payments under 
the Small Firms Employment subsidy 1977-80 and a number 
of other smaller iterns.
All expenditure figures are gross and include payments to 
nationalised industries.
Source: Department of Industry, reprinted in Regional Studies 




i) Purposes, functions and pavers
The SDA's remit, as laid down by statute in 1975 is broad. The 
statutory aims of the Agency are fourfold; the furtherance of economic 
development, the provision, maintenance or safeguarding of employment; 
the promotion of industrial efficiency and international 
competitiveness and the furtherance of environmental improvement^. 
Its original functions included the financing of industrial 
enterprises, the establishment and running of businesses, the 
provision and management of industrial premises, environmental 
improvement and the encouragement of industrial democracy in its 
companies. This last mentioned function was deleted by the 
Conservative government under the 1980 Industry Act as was a reference 
to the assistance of 'reorganisation' in industry. The act added in 
their place a commitment to promoting private ownership by the 
disposal of agency assets including shareholdings to the private 
sector^. The Scottish Development Agency Act 1975 gave the Agency 
power to acquire securities, to form companies and partnerships, to 
make loans and grants, and to offer guarantees, to acquire manage and 
develop land and to provide advisory services. However, in practice, 
the right to acquire land was limited by the absence of powers of 
compulsory purchase, and the right to make grants has not been 
utilised (excepting certain small grants to craftsmen), presumably due 
to financial constraints.
On a day-to-day basis, two of the Agency's major functions, investment
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and factory-building are carried on in accordance with guidelines laid 
down by the Secretary of State for Scotland, and agreed between the 
Agency and the IDS. These outline the areas in which the Agency 
should be operating and lay down the targets for rates of return on 
investments and factory provision. The Agency also has its own 
operating guide, the self-generated Corporate Plan, which is regularly 
revised and covers a rolling three year period. It sets specific 
targets for the number of jobs to be created, the number of outside 
projects to be attracted to Scotland, and the amount of factory space 
to be constructed. The Agency has to prepare annually a plan setting 
out its overall development strategy, which is discussed with IDS. It 
is also required to submit annually a 3 year expenditure programme for 
the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), which is scrutinised 
by the IDS and the Treasury. These measures suggest, as will be 
referred to below, that any change in Agency policy or expenditure 
patterns will be at the least, known of in advance by the government, 
and will more likely be approved of or even have been initiated by it.
ii) Control
The SDA is formally accountable to Parliament through the Secretary of
State for Scotland, and its activities have been periodically
investigated by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, and
36the House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs . The 
members of the Agency's board are appointed for renewable four year 
terms by the Secretary of State. The Agency's accounts are audited 
annually by the Comptroller and Auditor-General who reports to the 
Public Accounts Committee. The Agency's sponsoring department, the
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IDS (formerly the SEPD), is a department of the Scottish Office. It 
is through this department that the Secretary of State agrees 
guidelines with the SDA for the operation of its various functions and 
can issue directives. As has been shown above, the sponsoring 
department receives detailed expenditure plans annually from the 
Agency. Also, as a result of legislation in 1980, the Secretary of 
State can instruct the Agency to transfer holdings to him, or pay back 
Public Dividend Capital, which is one of its sources of government 
funding^.
iii) Budget (see also Table 7)
The bulk of the SDA1 s annual budget is provided for under the Scottish 
Office vote in the form of grant-in-aid (covering administrative 
costs, factory-building and land development), whilst Public Dividend 
Capital, which is used to finance equity investment, and borrowings 
from the National Loan Fund are received direct from central 
government. Grant-in-aid has first to be negotiated as part of the 
IDS budget; the IDS budget then has to be justified as part of the 
Scottish Office budget, and following this, the Scottish Office then 
has to argue the case for its budget with the Treasury. Grant-in-aid 
is therefore vulnerable to considerable 'trimming' at various stages. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the sources of funding are split 
according to function gives central government greater power to 
influence the SDA's relative expenditure on them. The Agency has also 
acted as agent for European Coal and Steel Community and European 
Investment Bank loans which can be offered at discounted rates of 
interest, to small businesses. The rest of the SDA's income is self­
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generated, by the selling off of shares and of factory stock, and the 
rental of property. The government sets a limit on the amount of 
‘finance outstanding by the Agency1, which has been amended by 
legislation and stood in March 1983 at £700 million^.
iv) Internal structure (see also Table 8 and Fig 1 )
There have been considerable changes in the internal structure of the 
SDA during its first decade of operation, reflecting not only changing 
policy emphasis but also practical adjustments the need for which have 
been established after experience of operating over time. For 
example, the discovery that investment staff were spending too much 
time servicing investments led to this responsibility being passed on 
to the Management Services Unit^. In 1981, an Industry Service Unit 
was established to offer advice on industrial relations and 
management, as was a New Ventures Unit to encourage the manufacture of 
high-technology products. By 1982, the Agency's initial structure of 
four directorates for finance, industry, environment and urban 
renewal, and two units for information and strategic planning had been 
revised to form seven departments, for finance and industry services, 
small business and electronics, estates and environment, planning and 
projects, area development, investment and marketing^®. These changes 
indicate a move toward greater specialisation, certain departments 
being made up of several divisions, and a more productive use of staff 
expertise. The Agency also staffs the associate organisation, Locate 
in Scotland (LIS), set up as a product of the rationalisation of 
Scotland's inward investment efforts, and the subsidiary company, 
Scottish Development Finance (SDF) Limited, the principal purpose of
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which is to act in an advisory capacity in investment decisions and in 
merchant banking activities. As at the end of March 1983, the SDA 
employed 732 staff, including employees of LIS and SDF Ltd^ .
The overall running of the Agency is in the hands of its Board of 
Directors, the members of which are appointed by the Secretary of 
State. During recent years, the SDA's Board has undergone changes in 
its membership which have meant that it has become more representative 
of private sector industry and finance. The Conservative government 
replaced the Agency's chairman, Sir William Gray and chief executive, 
Lewis Robertson, with Robin Duthie, chairman of the camping equipment 
firm Black and Edgington's and Dr George Mathewson, a director and 
assistant general manager of ICFC. Also, appointed in 1981, were 
James Gordon, the managing director of a commercial radio station, 
John McCracken, the regional director of IBM UK Ltd, a company with 
large-scale Scottish investments and Norman Macfarlane, the chairman 
of Macfarlane Group (Clansman) Ltd. These changes are tabulated in 
Table 8.
v) Expenditure
SDA expenditure patterns have been dominated by monies allocated to 
the construction and development of factories and industrial estates. 
Up to 1981/82 the proportion of total Agency expenditure spent in this 
area had not dropped below 50%. However, in recent years, Agency 
expenditure figures have proved hard to interpret due to the rise in 
activity associated with area projects, which have not been accounted 
for separately. Evidence of their importance, however, is given by
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Wannop, who notes that by March 31 1983 the Agency was managing an 
investment of £88 million in nine Area Development projects, in 
comparison with the £34 million it held in 725 Scottish businesses^. 
Writing in 1984, Stuart Gulliver, head of the Agency's Area Projects 
Programme, contends that 60% of the Agency's targettable resources are 
directed at area projects^.
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Table 7 SDA Source of funds 1976/7-1982/3
1976/7 1977/8 1978/9 1979/80 1980/1 19811 2 1982/:
Grant-in-aid 9275 31660 48091 58372 76941 76350 94010
' PDC' 2276 6742 2235 1220 1636 - 4580
NLF2 432 1623 2562 5318 866 - 2185
Total HM Govt 11983 40025 52888 64910 79443 76350 101626
ECSC 3 - - - - - 98 601
EIB4 - - - - - - 250
Capital
Receipts 744 1780 4015 5571 10777 10928 6012
Properties 637 1590 3522 4323 7151 5046 3492
Investment 107 190 493 1248 3626 5882 2520
Total 12727 41805 56903 70481 90220 87376 107638
^PDC = Public Dividend Capital
2NLF = National Loan Fund
ECSC = European Coal and Steel Community
4EIB = European Investment Bank
Source: SDA Annual Reports
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Table 8 SDA - -Changes in Board membership 1976/7 - 1982/3^-
B C D E F G H Total
76/7 - 3 3 5 1 6 2 - 11
77/8 - 3 3 5 1 6 2 - 11
78/9 - 3 3 4 1 5 2 - 10
79/80 - 3 3 5 - 5 2 - 10
80/1 - 2 2 5 2 8 2 - 12
81/2 - 3 3 6 2 8 2 - 13
82/3 — 3 3 6 1 7 2 — 12
'Board members have been categorised according to their present 
employment, or in the case of full-time members, their most recent 
employment outside of the SDA.
Source: SDA Annual Reports
Key
A = Central government
B = Local/regional government or other public institutions 
C = Public 
D = Employers
E = Financial institutions and other non-government organisations 
F = Private 





The then Secretary of State for Scotland, William Ross, opening the 
debate on the Second Reading of the Scottish Development Agency Bill 
in the House of Commons declared that 'the Bill is one of historic 
significance to Scotland, It is the first to confer on a Secretary of 
State for Scotland substantial powers in relation to Scottish 
industry'^ 4 m jn an important elaboration of the government's 
perception of the new Agency's role he went on 'the SDA marks the 
creation of a uniquely Scottish approach to industrial development in 
Scotland. What we feel is needed is a body whose main concern is to 
keep and create as many jobs in Scotland as possible - not just to 
make the fastest and biggest profits. It will have to take risks'^. 
The SDA shared the statutory purposes, functions and powers of the 
WDA, but the government seemed more prepared to emphasise its 
innovative capabilities and 'national' appeal, than it did with its 
sister Agency. This may have reflected the higher level of consensus 
in Scotland about the need for such an Agency. Despite the fact that 
Conservative MP's made the customary ritual noises about 'the 
extension of S o c i a l i s m ' and Nationalist MP's canplained that the 
Agency's powers would not be great enough, and that it would be 
subservient to Westminster, the Opposition withdrew its objections to 
the Bill, with the exception of the clause which gave the Agency power 
to set up industrial undertakings, and the SNP supported it, calling 
it ' a faltering step toward the right goal' ^ . The Highlands and 
Islands Development Board had been operating in Northern Scotland for
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ten years, and had built itself a fine reputation, despite its initial
critics, and in 1974, a major planning exercise on West Central
Scotland, had made specific recommendations about the setting-up of a
government-sponsored corporation which would be charged with bringing
about in d u s t r ia l re g e n e ra tio n ^® . The STifChad c a lle d  in  1971 fo r  th e
establishment of a Scottish Development Authority, and had pressed the
4Qdemand at subsequent congresses . This had been supported by the 
Scottish Council on a nominally non-party basis®®. In the words of 
the SDA's first chief executive, Lewis Robertson, 'the Agency has been 
talked about a great deal in Scotland for many years'®^. When formed, 
the SDA assumed the work of two public bodies, which had been 
operating in Scotland for some years, the Small Industries Council for 
the Rural Areas of Scotland (SICRAS), and the Scottish Industrial 
Estates Corporation (SIEC). In inheriting these organisations, the 
SDA inherited a staff of 472, and thus the emphasis of its early 
activities and expenditure was in a sense, predetermined.
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Table 9 SDA Expenditure 1976/7 -1981/2 (in £m )
76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82
£ % £ % £ % £ % £ % £ %
Industrial Investment 3.5 17.8 9.7 18.7 6.7 10.0 9.8 10.5 11.9 12.0 14.5 13.9
Factories and
industrial estates 14.6 74.1 25.8 49.8 36.2 53.9 48.4 52.1 52.7 53.0 61.8 59.2
Environmental 1.3 6.6 15.3 29.6 21.7 32.3 31.3 33.7 30.0 30.2 20.8 19.9
Other expenses 0.3 1.5 1.0 1.9 2.6 3.8 3.4 3.7 4.8 4.8 7.3 7.0
Total 19.7 100.0 51.8 100.0 67.2 100.0 92.9 100.0 99.4 100.0 104.4 100.0
Source: SDA Annual Reports
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Fig 1 SDA Internal Structure (as in March 1983)
Board of Directors
Chief Executive








Small Business Division 
Electronics Division
Factory Policy Division Property Services
Division
Building Division Land Renewal
Division
Planning and Projects (40)— Corporate Planning
Economic Services
Industrial Programme Development 
Area Programme Development 
Industrial Development Projects 
Health care and biotechnology projects
Area Development (46)
i




Locate in Scotland (Associate organisation) (15)
Source: SDA Annual Report 1983.
'Figures in brackets denote number of staff.
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b) Industrial Investment
After it had dealt with the initial cluster of prospective investment 
projects attracted by the opening of a new source of finance, it 
became clear that the SDA's industrial development role would be 
considerably more limited than had been envisaged by certain of the 
interest groups that had pressed for its creation. The SDA considered 
that the demand for loan capital was well met by private financial 
institutions, and that its role should be to provide equity for small 
companies which could not raise capital on the open market, and to 
intervene to bring about management changes in companies which would 
normally be refused financial support from the private sector because
n
of their perceived management deficiency .
The pattern of SDA expenditure over the ten years of its operation 
reflects the policy described above, with expenditure in money terms 
(though not in real terms) rising steadily, but as a proportion of 
expenditure as a whole falling off sharply frcm the levels of the 
first two years in 1978/9, and only slowly recovering in later years. 
In its Annual Report for 1979 the Agency attributes this decline to 
three factors, the limitation of staff numbers, the speed of take-up 
facilities by companies, and the underlying trends in the UK economy, 
plant closures, poor productivity and industrial disputes . The 
willingness of the Agency to intervene in companies to correct 
management defects had the consequence of overburdening the investment 
staff, a problem which had also been experienced by staff at the HIDB. 
The Report noted that some of the Agency's investments 'require a 
great deal of supervision and hence management time, and the Agency's
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investment team has had to devote much effort to company guidance or 
reorganisation to ensure long-term viability and job security. 
Inevitably, this preoccupation with what are essentially advisory and 
management functions has placed constraints on existing staff who have 
had less time to devote to possible new investments'^. The Agency 
subsequently undertook a restructuring of the Industry Directorate in 
order to transfer the bulk of 'aftercare' work on investments to the 
Management Service Unit. In September 1979, the Guardian reported 
that 'government ministers have been concerned that the Agency's 
investment function has been taking a disproportionate amount of the 
time of its staff. This is detrimental to other responsibilities such 
as overseas promotion, factory-building, and clearance of derelict 
land'55.
Therefore, the SDA partly explained the contraction of their 
investment activity by the fact that their staff were unable to cope 
with all their cases. SDA chairman, Robin Duthie, appeared to hold 
the government responsible for this, and in particular, the Civil 
Service Department. In evidence to the Committee on Scottish Affairs, 
he said 'it irks me as an industrialist that somebody who knows very 
little about the organisation of the SDA should be in a position to 
tell us what kind of organisation we are not allowed to have'
In 1981, as mentioned above (section iv), the Agency established 
Scottish Development Finance Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary, on the 
Board of which sat representatives of the Agency and of private sector 
financial institutions, whose task was to advise on investment policy, 
and on individual investment decisions, and to offer post-investment
110
advice to companies. In recent years, the Agency has increasingly 
acted as an investment broker, putting together equity packages in 
concert with bodies such as ICFC and the industrial banking off-shoots 
of the Scottish clearing banks, such as Clydesdale Finance and Royal 
Bank of Scotland Developments. It has been suggested that the Agency 
shares about 60% of its investments with other financial institutions, 
but that the rest of its projects carry too many risks to be supported 
by traditional sources of finance^. The Agency's renewed commitment 
to its investment function expressed by the increased activity of 
1982/3 has involved a restructuring of the investment portfolio. 
According to Agency figures, the number of investments inthe 
portfolio increased by 33% during 1982/3, whilst the value of the 
portfolio rose by 42% over the same period. However, 60% of the 
Agency's investments are for sums of £200,000 or less, and in firms 
employing 100-200 people^®. Furthermore, in 1983, the Agency had only 
one subsidiary company (excluding the non-trading SDF Ltd) compared 
with seven in 1978 and only one individual investment greater than £1m 
compared with five in 1980. The changes made in 1980 to the 
Guidelines to the Agency issued by the Secretary of State affected the 
industrial investment function in that it was relegated to a secondary 
role in the Agency's operations and the investment portfolio was 
required to provide a commercial rate of return. The average return 
on capital invested, which was running in 1978/9 at a negative rate, 
-14.3% had, by 1982/3 been improved to a positive return of 2.8%, 
though throughout the SDA's history, investment returns have been 
brought down by the losses on a small number of target companies. For 
example, the return of - 14.3% in 1978/9 could have been turned into a 
positive return of 5%, if three companies, Inveresk Research,
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Stonefield Vehicles and Redpath De Grott had been removed fran the 
portfolio. Similarly, in 1981/2, the actual return on investment was 
12.7%, but was reduced to 2.8% because it proved necessary to 
establish provisions against potential losses amounting to £1.3m.
The SDA's investment role in Scotland remains considerable, its 
investment expenditure being comparable with that of ICFC in
CQ
Scotland . It has also defined its aims in this area; to provide 
equity and loan assistance to smaller companies but primarily to act 
as an instrument by which such companies can attract private sector 
finance.
c) Factory provision
The extent to which the early history of the SDA's activities had been 
dominated by factory provision can be gauged by its planned 
expenditure programmes. In July 1977 Edward Cunningham, the Agency's 
Head of Strategic Planning, told a conference of the Regional Studies 
Association that the Agency expected to distribute its resources up 
until 1982 'about one third to factory building, a little less than 
one-third to urban renewal and environment, and somewhere over one- 
third to industry investment'^. In the 1981 Report, the Agency's 
plans for the following three years anticipated that two-thirds of 
total expenditure (66%) would be allocated to sites and premises, 
17.5% to environmental improvement, and 12.5% to industrial 
investment. By 1981/2 factory provision was already taking up 55% of 
total expenditure. It has been mentioned above (section vi a) that 
the Agency inherited the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation,
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which has given it a strong organisational ccmmitment to the function, 
and which is expressed in the continued employment of 368 staff in the 
Estates and Environment Department in 1983, over half the Agency's 
total complement of staff. However, the lack of demand for industrial 
property in a period of deep recession, and the consequent surplus of 
Agency property, has influenced the SDA to conduct a review of its 
factory provision function. This has resulted in a diversification 
away from the construction of traditional advance factories to the 
provision of bespoke factories to order, particularly in relation to 
inward investment projects, and the development of small workshops. A 
large proportion of factory-building now takes place in conjunction 
with the area projects (46% of new advance factory completions in 
1982/3). The Conservative government has also introduced target rates 
of return for the Agency's factory-building function, and relaxed the 
guidelines which had previously prevented the Agency from letting its 
premises for warehousing and service industry use. 1982/3 also saw 
the first example of joint Agency and private sector investment in a 
factory development, at Ayr Harbour Estate .
d) Environmental improvement
Having absorbed on its establishment the Derelict Land Unit of the 
Scottish Office, the work of environmental improvement and land 
renewal has formed a significant part of the Agency's operations, both 
in physical and financial terms. The function is potentially 
attractive in that it is relatively free of controversy, and helps to 
build the Agency's profile 'on the ground'. Originally, as in other 
fields, the Agency found itself reacting to the plans of other bodies,
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in this case the local authorities, but over time it has begun to 
initiate proj ects and to co-ordinate the activities of a range of 
public organisations. Thus, the Agency's spending on environmental 
work grew more than tenfold in real terms between 1975 and 1978, with 
a large proportion of projects being undertaken in Central Scotland, 
where the legacy of industrial dereliction was largest. However, with 
the emergence of area projects as major consumers of Agency 
expenditure and manpower, and the reinvigoration of the industrial 
investment function, the environmental budget has been squeezed (the 
budget was reduced by approximately 30% in 1981/2) and is likely, as 
is the factory function, to become more closely integrated with area 
development.
e) Area project development
The SDA's involvement in area development can be traced back to 1976 
when it was given a co-ordinating role in the GEAR (Glasgow Eastern 
Area Renewal) project by the Scottish Office. GEAR was a project to 
improve the social and economic fabric of the eastern inner city area 
of Glasgow, involving four principal participants, Glasgow District 
Council, Strathclyde Regional Council, the Scottish Special Housing 
Association, and the Agency. However, it was widely perceived as a 
response to political problems facing the then Labour government,^ 
and the Agency was reluctant to extend its role into areas not 
strictly concerned with economic development^. At its commencement, 
GEAR was a project without precise objectives or any financial or time 
limits. Subsequently, in 1979 and 1980, the Agency was asked to lead 
two 'Task Forces' involving local authorities and private businesses,
1 1 4
to stem economic decline in the Gamock Valley and Clydebank, areas 
that had experienced the closure of large-scale manufacturing 
operations, and were in receipt of special government aid. It would 
appear to have been the comparative success of these operations that 
led the Agency to instigate its own series of area projects, on a 
model previously employed in the United States^. These projects, in 
many respects, represent the antithesis of GEAR in that they are 
embodied in detailed agreements drawn up at the corrmencement of the 
projects by all parties concerned, and outlining the financial 
commitments of each over a fixed period of time, at the fulfilment of 
which the Agency withdraws from the area. Each project is entered 
into only after extensive preliminary study of the area to identify 
existing business facilities, and potential fields of expansion, and 
involves the setting up of a project team, including Agency staff, in 
the locality to monitor and encourage development. The Agency has 
also helped prepare and fund a number of 'self-help' area initiatives, 
co-ordinated by local indigenous bodies, customarily an enterprise 
trust.
As mentioned above (section v Expenditure), area projects now consume 
a significant proportion of the Agency's total resources. Over £88 
million had been spent by March 1983 on nine Area Projects,and the 
Agency estimates an expenditure of £200m on current projects over 
fifty 'project-years'^ . However, Agency policy is not to increase
the number of projects in which it is involved? new projects will only 
be entered into following withdrawal from others^®.
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f) Inward Investment
The SDA has an obligation under the Guidelines given to it by the
Secretary of State to promote Scotland as a location for industrial
investment from abroad. However, it initially found its role
difficult to define in the context of the other Scottish bodies
involved in similar work, for example, the local authorities, New Town
Development Corporations and the Scottish Council (Development and
Industry). The latter is a body controlled by a Board made up of
representatives of local government, private business and trade
unions, the efforts of which toward attracting investment and
promoting exports were, at one stage, financially assisted by the
Agency^. However, in 1977, an agreement was reached by which the
Council's inward investment activities would be gradually assumed by
the Agency, which had established offices in New York, San Francisco
and Brussels by 1979. However, the Select Committee on Scottish
Affairs, which investigated the attraction of inward investment to
Scotland in the 1979/80 parliamentary session, was critical of the
Agency's promotional work, and recommended that its separate presence
abroad be merged with existing consular activities, and that it
concentrate on co-ordinating contact with potential inward investors
70once they have arrived in Scotland, but without any extra powers . 
The report aroused controversy in that it was thought to be expressing 
the traditional hostility to the SDA of the Scottish Conservative MP's 
who dominated the c o m m i t t e e ^ . The government rejected the 
Committee's recommendation that the SDA's overseas offices be closed, 
and, instead, established a new body, Locate in Scotland, acting as an 
associate organisation of the SDA but run jointly by the SDA and
SEPD^. LIS was delegated to act as the focal point of all Scottish 
inward investment promotion, and provision was made for it to report 
direct to government, through a Steering Group, chaired by the 
Secretary of State and comprising a junior minister, two senior civil 
servants, and the Chairman and Chief Executive of the Agency. LIS 
claims to have attracted 78 projects in the first two years of its 
existence, amounting to investments worth £420 million .
g) Planning
The SDA began its operations with a separate Strategic Planning Unit, 
which in 1981 became the Planning and Projects department, 
incorporating the functions of corporate planning, industrial 
programme development, area programme development and industrial 
development projects, with emphasis on the health care and 
biotechnology industries. In 1979, the Agency published a five-year 
Corporate Plan, which was based on selected industrial growth sectors, 
such as electronics. In 1981, it published its plans for allocation 
of capital funds over the subsequent three years, and also produced 
reports on the health care and biotechnology industries, two sectors 
which the Agency had identified as being ones in which Scotland 
possessed certain advantages, and had potential for long-term job 
creation. Of late, this trend toward industry-wide reviews has 
continued with further studies of the printing and publishing, 
forestry products, oil and gas, and textile and knitwear industries, 
carried out in co-operation with representative bodies in the 
industries concerned.
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The importance of strategic planning as an Agency function has 
increased with the expansion of work on area projects. Not only is 
there a need for planned development in the chosen areas, but the act 
of selecting areas for development involves planning on a wider 
geographical scale. The first eight area projects for example were 
all concerned with 'brown field' or traditional urban sites. There 
have perhaps understandably been ccmplaints from areas such as North 
East and South West Scotland that they are being neglected in favour 
of the central Scottish industrial belt.
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Welsh Development Agency
1. Statutory purposes functions and powers
The statutory authority of the WDA is derived from the Welsh 
Development Agency Act 1975, which, as it was drawn up in conjunction 
with the Scottish Development Agency Act of the same year (see above) 
bestows the WDA with purposes, functions and powers almost identical 
with those listed above in connection with the SDA^. The agencies 
share identical aims, and their functions only differ in that the WDA 
has the additional responsibility of promoting Wales as an industrial 
location, though in practice, the SDA also acts in this capacity. The 
changes which the government introduced after 1979 to the SDA's
functions and powers also applied to the WDA, as did the changed
Guidelines introduced in December 1979. In 1977, the WDA published 
'Statement of Policies and Programmes', which defines the WDA's role 
in relation to seven broad programmes:
a ) Industrial investment
b) Advisory services to enterprise
c) Small business development
d) Promotion and publicity
e) Provision of industrial sites and premises
f) Industrial infrastructure
g) Environmental improvement
It also laid down planned expenditure targets for a five year period 
to 1981/2, which reflected the Agency's commitment in paragraph 48 of
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the document that 'development of the industrial investment programme 
will have the WDA's priority for the next few years'
ii) Control
The WDA is formally accountable to Parliament through the Secretary of 
State for Wales, its sponsoring department being the Welsh Office. 
Its activities have periodically been subject to the scrutiny of the 
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, and the House of Commons 
Committee on Welsh Affairs^. The members of the Agency's Board are, 
like those of the SDA, appointed on renewable four-year terms by the 
Secretary of State. The Agency's accounts are audited annually by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General, who reports to the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee. The Secretary of State, through the Welsh 
Office, issues Guidelines for the day-to-day running of the Agency, 
which in turn submits to the Welsh Office expenditure estimates. The 
Secretary of State also has the same powers to issue directives to and 
transfer capital and holdings from the Agency as listed above in 
connection with the SDA.
iii) Budget and source of finance (see also Table 10)
The WDA is funded similarly to the SDA, through grant-in-aid, Public 
Dividend Capital (on which dividends can be paid) and borrowings from 
the National Loan Fund (on which interest is due). Like the SDA, it 
has made use of low-cost ECSC and EIB loans, and has in recent years, 
had significant return from the sale of property and investment 
assets.
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Table 11 W DA Expenditure 1976 /7 - 1982/3
76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83
£ % £ % £ % £ % £ % £ % £ %
Industrial Investment 0.3 1.4 4.7 13.9 4.5 9.3 2.5 4.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.1 5.7 7.1
Factories and 
industrial estates 13.0 59.1 14.1 41.7 25.9 53.4 38.7 64.3 59.9 72.3 66.3 70.4 46.2 57.2
Environmental 1.7 7.7 6.3 18.7 8.1 16.7 7.7 12.8 9.3 11.2 11.2 11.9 10.4 12.9
Other expenses 7.0 31.8 8.7 25.7 10.0 20.6 11.3 18.7 13.6 16.4 15.7 16.6 18.4 22.8
Total 22.0 100.0 33.8 100.0 48.5 100.0 60.2 100.00 82.9 100.0 94.2 100.0 80.7 100.0
Source: WDA Annual Reports
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Table 10 WDA Source of Funds 1976/7 -1982/3
1976/7 1977/8 1978/9 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/3
Grant-in-aid 11698 18616 33395 45127 65122 73984 53700
Public Dividend Capital 14 1766 3063 907 94 1052 1635
National Loan Fund 256 3000 1978 2445 421 1492 977
ECSC 491 251
European Investment Bank - - - - - - 303
Sale of assets etc. 676 1196 983 1034 1605 3754 5675
Investment and loan 
receipts - 2 1024 1128 961 956 1132
DLT reserve - 6 178 - - - -
Other 2899 1516 - - - - -
Total 15543 26102 40621 50641 68203 81729 63673
Source: Extracted from WDA Annual Reports
iv) Internal Structure (See also Table 12 and Fig 2)
Until 1983, the Agency*s basic internal structure had been unmodified
since its inception, canprising three divisions for 'construction and
development1, 1 industry and investment', and 1organisations and
operations'. However, in that year, reorganisation took place and
four divisions were created. Construction and development functions,
mainly concerned with factory provision and land renewal, were taken
up by an Operations division; the work of the old Organisation and
Operations Division was divided between the Services Division, which
also took on the small business advisory service from the Industry and
Investment Division, and the Marketing and Corporate Planning
Division, which became responsible for industrial promotion. The
remit of the Industry and Investment Division remained broadly
unchanged. Also in 1983, the government created an associate
organisation of the WDA, WINvest, to carry out similar functions to
those of LIS in Scotland, namely the co-ordination of inward
investment activity in Wales. This superseded the old system under
which the WDA had subsidised a body of businessmen, trade unionists
and local authority representatives, the Development Corporation for
Wales, to carry out promotional work overseas. In 1982, the Agency
launched its own venture capital subsidiary, Hafren Investment
Finance, the directors of which were senior Agency staff and Board
members (see below, Investment). In 1984, a further associate
organisation, WINtech (Wales Innovation and Technology) was
established ' to encourage businesses in Wales to profit from new
77
technology and to act as a link between industry and university . 
The Agency also reorganised its geographical activities into 8
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regional offices, each under the direction of a regional manager.
In the light of the growing private involvement in the Agency's 
operations, it is apparent that a number of changes have taken place 
in the membership of the WDA Board, which is appointed by the 
Secretary of State. During the period from 1 January 1976 to 31 March 
1982, six new members were appointed to the Board, to replace those 
whose contracts had not been renewed. Dividing the backgrounds of 
Board members into three broad categories; private sector, public 
sector and trade union, it can be calculated that 4 members of the 
original board came frcm the private sector, four from the public 
sector and two frcm the trade unions. The eleventh Board member, Lord 
Parry of Neyland, described by the Agency as 'a writer and
7ftbroadcaster' , could not be so readily categorised, and seems to have 
been appointed in order to provide geographical representation for 
Pembrokeshire and South-West Wales. Using the same three categories, 
by March 1982 private sector representation had increased from four to 
seven, that of the public sector had declined frcm four to three, and 
there remained one trade union representative. Of the six new 
members, Stephen Gray, who became chairman in 1980, had been manager 
of Shotton steelworks under both private and public ownership, but had 
resigned from BSC to join a firm of industrial management consultants; 
Douglas Badham and Dr Leslie Morgan represented the Development 
Corporation for Wales and the DBRW (MWD) respectively; Hugh Rees, a 
chartered surveyor and estate agent was a director of the Abbey 
National Building Society and a former Conservative MP; Donald Walters 
was a deputy managing director of Chartered Trust Ltd. and Chairman of 
the Welsh Conservative Party since 1977, and Robin Herbert was the
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Private Union Other Tota
1976/77 - 4 4 2 2 4 2 1 11
1977/78 - 4 4 2 2 4 2 1 11
1978/79 - 5 5 2 2 4 2 - 11
1979/80 - 3 3 3 2 5 1 - 9
1980/81 - 3 3 3 3 6 1 - 10
1981/82 - 3 3 3 3 6 1 - 10
1982/83 1 1 4 4 8 1 m 10
Source: WDA Annual Reports
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Figure 2
Welsh Development Agency - Internal Structure (as at 31/3/83)
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Unit
Construction Land Operational Estates 
reclamation planning services
Source: WDA Annual Report 1982/8
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chairman of the merchant bankers, Leopold Joseph Holdings, a director
of the National Westminister Bank, and a prominent Welsh landowner.
Though the composition of the board was never intended to represent
local community interests, in its original form it did reflect a
tripartite division of responsibility between government, employers
and trade unions. The current predominance of private interests on
the board is a product of the Conservative government's desire to see
79greater private. sector involvement in the work of the Agency .
v) Expenditure (see also Table 11 )
The expenditure patterns of the WDA since it commenced operations on 
1 January 1976 have, like those of the SDA, been dominated by 
expenditure on factory construction and industrial site development. 
These patterns have not conformed to the projections referred to above 
( (i) statutory purposes, functions, and powers) in the 'Statement of 
Policies and Programmes', which envisaged 31% of total expenditure 
being allocated to a combined programme of industrial investment, 
small business support, and industrial promotion, 44% to the provision 
of industrial sites and premises, and 25% to land reclamation and 
environmental improvement®®. In fact, as the table of actual 
expenditure shows, only once over the first seven years of the 
Agency's operations did expenditure on investment rise above 10% of 
total annual expenditure. This was in 1977/78, the same year that 
expenditure on factory provision dropped below 50% of total 
expenditure, for the first and only time so far. However, the 
financial years 1981/2 and 1982/3 have seen a decline in expenditure 
on factory provision and land renewal in real terms, and a
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corresponding rise in monies allocated to industrial investment, and 




Unlike the SDA, the WDA was not formed as a result of continuing 
pressure for such an authority in Wales. It has already been noted 
above (Chapter 1) that immediate demands came from Welsh Labour 
backbenchers, concerned that the government's commitment to a Scottish 
agency should be extended to Wales in order to outflank nationalist 
politicians at the October 1974 election. Indeed, it had been the 
nationalist party Plaid Cymru alone of the major parties that had 
previously called for a Welsh economic development authority, e.g. in 
1970, in its 'Economic Plan for Wales'®^. The Wales TUC (established 
in 1974) and CBI (Wales) were involved in discussions with government 
over the structure and operating criteria of the Agency, though both 
expressed concern over its eventual composition, the CBI (Wales) 
opposing its powers to take equity in companies,®^ and the Wales TUC 
believing it to be under-financed®'*. In addition, Welsh local 
authorities feared that it would encroach upon their activities®^. 
The Secretary of State for Wales addressing the House of Commons on 
the Welsh Development Agency Bill stated that 'in the short-term the 
proposals for an Agency cannot be of direct help'®® though his deputy 
called the WDA 'an imaginative proposal which can contribute speedily 
and effectively towards the creation of a better and more secure way
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of life for all the people of Wales'®®. However, the then Shadow 
Secretary, Nicholas Edwards described the WDA as a 'Frankenstein's 
monster' and an 'extension of Bennery in Wales'®^. On the 
commencement of its operations the WDA took over the work of the Welsh 
Industrial Estates Corporation and the Derelict Land Unit of the Welsh 
Office. In 1977, it absorbed the Welsh division of CoSIRA, on the 
formation of the DBRW.
b) Industrial investment
In its first years of operation, the Agency's industrial investment 
role was considered by some to have been operated too cautiously, 
particularly in comparison with that of its sister organisation, the 
SDA, which it was pointed out had created eighteen wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in its first three years, whilst during the same period 
the WDA had only established one majority holding®®. Others have, 
however, challenged this, arguing that industrial investment by the 
WDA has merely been diversified amongst large numbers of smaller 
companies, which nevertheless represent high-risk investments®^. It 
has further been suggested that the combination of a number of 
investment failures, in particular that of P Leiner Ltd., a £2m Agency 
investment, and the advent of a Conservative government, keen to 
reduce industrial investment to a secondary role in the WDA's 
activities, brought about a cut-back in expenditure on the function. 
By 1981/2, industrial investment was running at approximately 1.0% of 
the total Agency budget, which in itself, represented an upturn from 
the previous year, 1980/81, when only £100,000 (or 0.1% of total 
expenditure) was invested. During the period 1976/9 industrial
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investment equalled 9% of total expenditure, whilst in the three years 
1979/80 to 1981/2 it amounted to only 1.5%. These figures would 
appear to suggest that the decline in the industrial investment role 
has been due to the revision of government guidelines to the Agency 
under the Conservative administration. As the WDA's 1980/81 report 
states 'the government now regards the Agency's investment role as 
complementary to other functions', and has imposed upon it ' a duty to 
dispose of investments as soon as practicable' as well as requiring it 
to 'refrain from making an investment if private sector funds can be 
found to be a v a i l a b l e ' i n  addition, in November 1981, the 
Secretary of State issued a revised financial duty for industrial 
investment which requires the Agency to aim to achieve over a five- 
year rolling period a cash return at least equal to the cost of 
government borrowing over the same period. A target is also agreed 
annually between the Agency and the Welsh Office, and expressed as a 
percentage of the total of National Loan Fund loans made to the Agency 
and outstanding Public Dividend Capital. All this has obviously had 
the effect of narrowing the Agency's investment criteria and reducing 
its ability to provide the higher risk capital which was its 
originally-stated intention. Yet there is evidence that this failure 
to invest in Welsh enterprises pre-dates the change of government in 
1979. In its Statement of Policies and Programmes published in 1977, 
the Agency declares that 'development of the industrial investment 
programme will have the WDA's higher priority for the next few 
years'91, and in its first Annual Report, 1976/7, that its role in 
respect of investment ' is seen as particularly important in providing 
equity, loan or loan guarantee assistance to smaller, and medium sized 
enterprises and particularly in higher-risk situations'9^. In
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accordance with this policy, the Agency projected in the Statement 
that 31% of total expenditure over a five-year period would be spent 
on industrial investment and related activities. However, during the 
financial year 1978/9 actual expenditure on industrial investment fell 
to 9.5% of total expenditure, or £4.5m, a drop in money as well as 
percentage terms frcm the previous year. It would, therefore, seem 
fair to conclude that the relatively small amounts of money spent on 
industrial investment in recent years have not resulted solely frcm 
policies introduced by the Conservative government.
An understanding of the Agency's policy with regard to the investment 
function is central to any understanding of the history of the 
organisation as a whole, but such policy has proved difficult to 
define. As an example of this, one can contrast two statements made 
by the late Ian Gray, then Chief Executive of the Agency; the first 
made in evidence to the Wilson Committee in 1978 that 'as the years go 
on, I do not expect we will hugely increase our physical spending on 
premises. I think we will tend to produce about the same volume of 
building and engineering works ancillary to it, although it will cost 
more even on moderate inflation. But in the investment field, my 
colleagues and I on the board have very much in mind a substantial 
increase in the investment figures'^. Two years later, before the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, he stated that 
'the view of the Board would be that it (investment) is still an 
important function. But from the very beginning, we have in practice 
operated investment with very few exceptions....very much more as a 
complement to. the building and civil engineering function than 
otherwise' However, with the publication of a five-year corporate
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plan in 1984, it would appear that investment in private industry will 
once again become a key element in WDA strategy. This view is 
supported by developments such as the creation, in 1982, of a wholly- 
owned WDA subsidiary, Hafren Investment Finance, to provide high-risk 
projects, particularly in high-technology fields, with venture capital 
support up to £100,000. In the following year, the directors of 
Hafren were given responsibility for a further fund, Superhafren, 
which was able to make investments of up to £500,000. In 1985, the 
Agency established in conjunction with the private Development Capital 
Group, the Welsh Venture Capital Fund, geared to support investment 
projects by unquoted companies requiring between £25,000 and £500,000 
and drawing its capital frcm Welsh local authority pension funds and 
City institutions.
The package nature of the WDA's new investment role has been 
illustrated by the financial arrangement made with the Parrot 
Corporation, an American company, which in 1984 announced plans to 
establish a fully-integrated floppy disk manufacturing operation in 
Cwmbran, Gwent. This investment decision was the result of a 
financial support package drawn together by the WDA, which, as well as 
subscribing to £1m of the new company's equity issue, persuaded the 
Legal and General Assurance Society (£700,000), CIN Industrial 
Investments (£700,000) and Commercial Union (£300,000) to participate, 
which, combined with £300,000 put up by the company's management team, 
provided the company with security for a £2m loan for the purchase of 
plant and machinery. Regional development grants, and Welsh Office 
financial assistance made the total investment up to £7m, excluding a 
£2.25m, 57,000 sq. ft. factory which the Agency guaranteed to provide.
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In an extreme form, the Parrot case shows the Agency operating an 
expansive investment policy, whilst at the same time conforming with 
the government's desire to introduce the private sector into the 
activity. In this case also, investment and factory building 
functions are drawn together in the provision of a single package, a 
trend to which the Agency caimits itself in the 1984 Corporate Plan.
Ironically, one year after this pioneering 'syndicated' investment was 
made, the company had to be bailed out by further capital injections, 
amid much acrimony amongst investors concerning the WDA's role in the 
deal. The matter was the subject of police and parliamentary 
investigation.
c) Factory provision
The function that has absorbed the chief share of Agency expenditure 
during its period of operation (£264.1m during the financial years 
1976/7 - 1982/3, or 62.5% of total Agency expenditure over this 
period) has been that of the provision of factories and industrial 
estates. In its evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Welsh Affairs in 1980 the Agency described it as its 'strongest and 
most effective means of providing opportunities for employment' ^ . By 
means of five general programmes of factory construction, and five 
special programmes in the steel towns of Newport, Port Talbot, Shotton 
and Ebbw Vale, the Agency completed, in its first five years of 
existence seme 2 million sq. ft. of factory space, as well as another 
1 million sq. ft. which had been started by the Welsh Industrial 
Estates Corporation. The building of advance factories as a means of
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industrial development has not been without controversy in the past, 
particularly in the 1960's, when many lay vacant, and similar problems 
have affected the WDA programme, which has been carried out during a 
period of recession. In 1982, for example, 15.2% of WDA factory space 
was reported as standing vacant^. The risks inherent in this field 
of activity have also been illustrated by the outcome of a project to 
develop a 400,000 sq. ft. bespoke factory for Hoover in Merthyr, begun 
in 1978. This represented the Agency's largest single factory 
investment, £10 million in total, but although Hoover honoured its 
contractual obligation to take up the factory, the company could not 
afford to expand into it. By 1984, the Agency had appointed 
professional consultants to find appropriate customers for the 
property, in a redeveloped form. It had also reduced expenditure on 
factory provision, and altered the emphasis of its programmes from 
speculative advance factory development to the provision of small 
workshops and 'made-to-order' facilities, such as those provided for 
the Parrot Corporation (see above, b) investment).
d) Environmental improvement and land renewal
The WDA took over responsibility for environmental work in Wales from 
the Derelict Land Unit of the Welsh Office and the function has 
accounted for £54.7 million, or 13.0% of the Agency's total 
expenditure in the years up to and including, 1982/3. The extent of 
industrial dereliction in the South Wales Valleys has meant that the 
bulk of activity has been concentrated in the South-eastern counties. 
33.5% of programme expenditure over the first five years of the 
Agency's operations was spent in Gwent and 29.5% in Mid Glamorgan.
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However much of the essential safety work relating to coal-tips has
now been completed, and the Agency appears likely in future to scale
down expenditure on environmental projects, whilst integrating them
into broader industrial development 1packages*. Indeed, this process
has already begun, and its effects felt in areas such as the Rhondda
Valley where in 1984, work came to a halt on 25 of the 38 land
reclamation projects being carried out in the valley by the WDA in
conjunction with Rhondda Borough Council, as a result of the Agency's
Q7reduction in grant allocation^'.
e) Inward Investment
As mentioned above (iv, internal structure) the Agency originally 
carried out its statutory responsibility *to promote Wales as a 
location of industrial development*, by subsidising the work of the 
Development Corporation for Wales, a body directed by representatives 
of local authorities, businesses and trade unions, whose functions 
included organising promotional tours and maintaining offices abroad. 
However, this arrangement was severely criticised by the House of 
Commons Select Committee an Welsh Affairs, which considered the DCcW 
to be unaccountable, in respect of the public money it received from 
the WDA and local authorities, and inefficient, in that its presence 
caused confusion in the minds of potential investors^®. With the need 
for a * one-door* approach in mind, the WDA set up WINvest as a wholly- 
owned subsidiary, combining the overseas promotional and marketing 
activities previously carried out by the DCoW and the inward 
investment responsibilities of the Welsh Office and WDA. WINvest *s 
early successes have included the attraction of Ccmdial Comnunications
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and Parrot Corporation to South Wales, and a Swedish pulp mill to the 
North.
f) Planning
The problem that the Board of the WDA faced, when it met for the first
time in January 1976, was how the Agency should fulfil its statutory
functions, which necessitated significant involvement in the Welsh
economy, without alienating local interest groups. After the meeting,
the Board's chairman, Sir David Davies, whilst assuring the Press that
the Agency was not in the business of rescuing 1 lame ducks1, was also
reported as stating that one of the first aims of the Agency would be
to draw up an economic and industrial strategy for Wales as a context
99for spending its budget . Planning of this nature accorded well with 
the trend toward selective rather than blanket regional assistance, 
which was operating on a national scale through clauses 7 and 8 of the 
1972 Industry Act, and through the National Enterprise Board's policy 
of assisting specified industrial sectors. Sir David argued that 
regional planning was necessary because 'money alone would not solve 
the problem. It has to be channelled in the right direction'^®. 
However, despite its apparent importance, by the end of the year, the 
WDA had conceded its strategic planning role to the Welsh Office. The 
Agency's chief executive, Ian Gray, stated that 'even if we wanted it, 
it would not be practicable for us to produce an economic plan for 
Wales. So many elements in such a plan would be totally outside our 
control'^01. Instead, a three-way split of planning responsibility 
was introduced between the Welsh Office, local authorities and the 
WDA. The county councils were to produce overall land use and
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transportation strategies which were to be co-ordinated by the Welsh
109Office, and industrial strategies, to be co-ordinated by the WDA . 
This was reported as resulting in confusion and delay. The county 
authorities complained that they had been given no overall context 
within which they could place their ideas for development. Some were 
even refusing to draw up plans until after local elections in the 
following year, and those who had submitted them to the Welsh Office 
were informed that it would take a minimum of two years to adjudicate 
them'u . One structure plan which was produced in 1976, that of South 
Glamorgan, described the need for planning at an all-Wales level. fIn 
the absence of an up-to-date regional plan, the potential for dispute 
between authorities in South Wales is heightened. South Glamorgan 
needs clearer guidelines on what sort of jobs it should be aiming for, 
and how far resources spent accommodating some categories of 
employment e.g. dispersed civil servants pre-empt resources that could 
be spent elsewhere in the county e.g. on attracting new manufacturing 
jobs for redundant steel workers. Problems such as these can only be 
resolved when there is a clearer definition of the role each part of 
South Wales is expected to play in the regional economy* In
January 1977 the Agency produced its own 'Statement of programmes and 
policies' referred to above but it was stated in the introduction that 
it was ' not intended to be an economic or industrial plan for Wales'. 
Though it did contain a breakdown of planned expenditure over the 
period 1977/78 to 1981/82, this proved to be of limited relevance to 
the actual levels of expenditure, and the Agency has subsequently 
given only the most general forecasts of its expenditure plans and 
priorities.
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In 1984, however, the Agency published a five-year corporate plan to
outline priorities for the Agency in developing tourism, building up
financial institutions and encouraging private industry through
injections of capital. It also planned to integrate functions of land
reclamation, factory building, investment in companies and business
advisory services into a single package. Geographically, the Agency
identified three distinct areas for development; prime development
sites such as the South Wales M4 corridor and the area along the A55
in North Wales; a second tier of outer urban areas, especially the
South Wales Valleys, and rural areas, where the Agency believes' that
10Sthe emphasis should be on self-help .
Complaints frcm particular regions of Wales about the inequitable
distribution of WDA funds across its area have been corrmon. Dyfed
County Council, for example, criticised the lack of WDA activity in
10fiareas of the county outside the operational boundaries of the DERW , 
and the Newport MP Roy Hughes on one occasion described the assistance 
offered to his constituency by the WDA as a 'fleabite compared to that
1 07
given to surrounding areas' . In fact, over the first five years of 
the WDA's operations, approximately V 3  of all advance factory 
completions were in Gwent (33.8%)., compared with 13% in South 
Glamorgan and 4.5% in Dyfed (where the DBRW has its own separate 
construction programme). There are also disparities in the regional 
distribution of industrial investment. For example, between 1976 and 
1981, net investment by the Agency in South Glamorgan was more than 
£2.8m, in Mid-Glamorgan, £2.2m, and in West Glamorgan, £174,000. 
Calculating investment per head of population on 1981 figures this 
amounted to £7.76p per person in South Glamorgan, £5.86p in Mid
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Glamorgan, and 79p in West Glamorgan. The forecast of additional 
employment resulting from these investments amounted to 340 in South 
Glamorgan, 624 in Mid Glamorgan and 21 in West Glamorgan, a ratio of 1 
job per 1115 of the population in South Glamorgan, 1 per 589 in Mid 
Glamorgan and 1 per 6438 in West Glamorgan. Although there are 
factors which prevent a completely equitable distribution of 
resources, such as the comparative lack of investment projects in 
rural areas, the preponderance of environmental hazards in the 
industrial South, and the lack of land available for factory-building 
in densely-populated areas, the WDA does not appear to have planned 
its expenditure on a geographical basis, but to have developed a 
regional focus only when directed to do so by central government, as 
with the BSC emergency programmes.
NXFC/NIDA/ IDB
1. Statutory purposes, functions and pavers
The Northern Ireland Finance Corporation was created in 1972,
following the recommendation of the Caimcross study group in the 
108previous year . Under the provisions of the 1972 Northern Ireland 
Corporation (N.I) Order, the fundamental objective of the Corporation 
was 'to assist the economy of Northern Ireland by preserving the 
essential fabric of industry and commerce', and 'helping to establish 
an improved industrial structure upon which a sounder economy could be 
d e v e l o p e d ' T h e  NIFC had the power to provide financial assistance 
to companies in the form of equity and generally aimed to improve the 
profitability and efficiency of industry with a view to increasing 
employment levels, notably in growth industries. It concentrated its
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efforts on manufacturing industry and seme related service sectors. 
There was no limit to the level of equity which the NIFC could take in 
a ccmpany.
The NIFC was superseded in 1976 by the Northern Ireland Development
Agency (NIDA) which was established under the terms of the Industries
Development (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. It was modelled on the
Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies that had been formed in the 
11 n
previous year , and had the aim 'of strengthening industry in
111Northern Ireland for the improvement of the economy' . It was given
powers to start wholly or partially-owned new companies, to aid 
existing companies through the acquisition of equity or the granting 
of loans, or by the provision of business advice, and to assist in 
marketing either at home or overseas. The Department of Commerce was 
granted the power to direct the Agency to invest in particular 
c o m p a n i e s ^ N I D A ' s  activities were subject to guidelines issued by 
the DOC, and in 1980, these were revised, abolishing NIDA's duty to 
undertake rescue work at the behest of the DOC, and its commitment to 
furthering industrial democracy in its firms.
In 1982, the Departments of Commerce and Manpower Services in Northern 
Ireland were merged to form a new Department of Economic Development 
(DED). Simultaneously, under the provisions of the Industrial 
Development (Northern Ireland) Order 1982, NIDA was merged with the 
Industrial Development Organisation of the Department of Commerce to
1 1 o
form the industrial development arm of DED . Because the IDB is 
constituted as an arm of a government department rather than an 
independent body, it is, in statutory terms, an advisory board. The
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Chief Executive is legislatively answerable to the Minister 
responsible for DED. Nevertheless, the IDB incorporates the powers 
and functions of NIDA and deals with all matters relating to 
industrial development, the promotion of inward investment, and job 
creation, in Northern Ireland. The day-to-day running of the Board 
accords with Guidelines issued by the Minister of State. These 
Guidelines stated that the IDB should draw up a strategy to encourage 
and stimulate industrial development in Northern Ireland. The Board 
published a short term strategy in March 1983, in which it set itself 
three main objectives:
i) to increase job promotions from 3,500 in 1982/3 to 10,000 by 
1985/6 with an immediate objective of 5,000 job promotions in 
1983/4.
ii) to promote in 1983/4 3,000 jobs from home industry, and 2,000 
from inward investment.
iii) to strengthen companies so that the number requiring rescue will 
decline from year to year*' ^ .
In addition to the functions which it took over from NIDA, the IDB 
also assumed responsibility for the provision and management of 
industrial sites, previously undertaken by the Department of Commerce, 
and for the administration of government grants of selective financial 
assistance.
ii) Control
As a result of the imposition of direct rule from Westminster in 1972, 
agencies in Northern Ireland have tended to be more strictly 
controlled by government departments than their counterparts in Great 
Britain. This trend has been accentuated by the establishment of the 
IDB within the structure of DED. Previous to this, the agencies 
submitted their accounts, audited by the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General for Northern Ireland, to the Department of Commerce, but 
unlike the British agencies they did not cane before the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts. Like NIDA, the IDB is governed 
by operating guidelines prepared for it by the Minister of State 
responsible for industrial development. The agencies' performance has 
been reviewed periodically as part of reports on broader subjects, 
such as those compiled by Quigley (1976)^^ and Kidd (1982),^^ but 
has not been the subject of extensive investigation. However, in 
1984, NIDA's involvement in the disastrous De Lorean car project was 
scrutinised by the Committee of Public Accounts, and the Economic 
Development Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly has, in the 
first year of its activity, taken evidence from the IDB.
iii) Budget
The IDB is financed through the Department of Economic Development 
which in turn derived its funding from the budget of the Northern 
Ireland Office. Its predecessor, NIDA, provided for it equity and 
loan investments through Public Dividend Capital and loans frcm the 
Consolidated Fund, with funds for administrative costs and capital
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expenditure being derived from the Department of Commerce. The 
Department was also bound to provide for any expenses incurred by NIDA 
in carrying out DoC directives to participate in the 'rescue1 of 
ailing firms. The NIFC was similarly financed.
iv) Internal Structure (see also Fig 3)
The work of the IDB is carried out by eleven divisions, grouped into 
three sectors, covering inward investment, heme industry, and corporate 
services (see Fig 3). Of the four divisions of the inward investment 
sector, three are concerned, in various ways, with promoting Northern 
Ireland overseas, the International Marketing, Inward Investment and 
Public Relations Departments. The fourth, Corporate Finance, analyses 
all applications for financial assistance from local or overseas 
companies, and in this sense, overlaps with the work of the Home 
Industry Sector, which operates two Business Development Divisions to 
assist established businesses with information, advice and finance, a 
Marketing and Trade Support Division, which assists home-based 
companies in marketing and selling their products, and an Investment 
Management Division, which monitors IDB - invested companies, and runs 
the Rescue Unit, which identifies and where judged possible assists, 
companies in financial difficulties. Each sector is under the charge 
of a senior member of the IDB staff. The IDB's Board of Directors has 
twelve members, each appointed by the Secretary of State. Of the 
original members appointed in 1982 nine were drawn from private sector 
business, two from trade union organisations and one from higher 
education.
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Both NIDA and NIFC were similarly operated under the control of 
government - appointed Boards of Directors.
v) Expenditure
In its first seven months of operation (ending March 31 1983), the IDB 
would appear to have spent a gross figure of £71.5m, which would 
roughly equate with suggestions at its inception that its annual 
budget was to be approximately £100rn^. The bulk of this expenditure 
figure (£49.6m or 69% of expenditure) took the form of grants, either 
capital grants for new plant and machinery, employment grants or 
interest relief grants. Just over £10m was invested in companies by 
way of equity (£1.1m) or loan (£9.0m) assistance, whereas £6.9m was 
spent on factory-building and industrial site development.
The expenditure of NIDA and the NIFC was in contrast, concentrated on 
the provision of investment finance. NIDA's expenditure, for example, 
whilst being considerably lower than the overall annual budgets of its 
Scottish and Welsh sister agencies involved a greater deployment of 
financial resources for investment purposes, than that spent by the 
SDA and WDA. However, expenditure figures were inflated by the 
commitment of £17.75m to the De Lorean sports car project, which 
represented approximately 35% of the Agency's accumulated expenditure 
in its first five years' operation.
The NIFC, in four years, invested only one-third (£16.5m) of the 
nominal £50m with which it had been originally endowed. This 
reflected a 'drying-up1 of viable projects, particularly in the latter 
part of its existence.
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The NIFC was created in 1972, following the recommendation of the
the
Caimcross Study Group inAprevious year (see above). It had reported
that a special institution should be set up to provide substantial
financial resources to the private sector of industry, arguing that
there was a danger that the inward investment momentum, generated in
the 1960's, would be lost because of the cumulative effect of civil 
1 70unrest . This, it considered, justified Northern Ireland being 
treated as a special case for government aid.
NIDA was widely perceived to have been created as part of the Labour 
government's Industrial Strategy in conjunction with the National 
Enterprise Board, Scottish Development Agency and Welsh Development 
Agency^ ^ . It came into being against a background of a government 
report prepared by a team of civil servants for the Northern Ireland 
Secretary on the state of the province's economy. The Quigley Report 
painted a gloomy picture of future prospects unless there was a 
cessation of civil unrest, an upturn in business at a national level, 
and increased regional incentives. It recommended more vigorous State 
activity to make industry in the North more competitive in relation to 
the Republic, and to create 1 ,500 jobs per annum in state-owned 
businesses'^.
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The formation of an Industrial Development Board to supersede NIDA in 
1982 as part of a shake-up of government institutions concerned with 
industrial development might seem surprising in view of the fact that 
a government review of such institutions in 1980 had endorsed the then 
existing divisions of responsibility. However, in the interim period, 
considerable lobbying for a unified development agency with 
comprehensive development functions had taken place, particularly by 
the Northern Ireland Economic Council (NIEC) and the Northern Ireland 
Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions [(NIC) (ICIU)]^^. 
There was also discontent in political circles at the comparative 
failure of NIDA to attract investment in relation to its rival 
organisation in the Republic, IDA. This discontent was accentuated by 
the embarrassment surrounding the failure of the De Lorean sports car 
project. The IDB was thus created in an attempt to match the much- 
vaunted 'one-door approach' provided by the IDA^^.
b) The agencies' activities
i) NIFC
As has already been described, NIFC's activities concentrated upon the 
provision of financial assistance to private industry. This was 
developed in a number of contexts, such as 'rescue operations' of the 
type illustrated by the 100% acquisition of Ben Sherman Ltd., an 
ailing textile company, and on an industry-wide scale, the 
establishment of new companies in order to restructure a specific 
industrial sector, as for example, in the case of steel stockholders, 
C. Walker and Sons Ltd. However, by March 1975 there had occurred a
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net loss of 120,000 jobs amongst the 27 companies in which it had 
invested, and its annual operating deficit, despite the comparatively 
small nature of the investment portfolio, was approaching £0.5 
million^.
ii) NIDA
NIDA's terms of reference for investment were considerably more
circumscribed. It was only to take part in Rescue1 operations at the
expressed behest of the Department of Commerce, which would finance
any subsequent investment. All other investments were to be dealt
with on a strictly commercial basis, and were to yield a 'reasonable
return' ^ 26. n i d a, however, did inherit 33 companies from the NIFC, 9
of which were either in the hands of the receiver, or in the process 
1 97of liquidation . In 1978, the government, through the Industries 
Development (Northern Ireland) Order, wrote off £7.5m of the Agency's 
losses, which stemmed almost entirely from the liabilities inherited 
from the NIPC1 . In its first five years of operation, NIDA invested 
£41m in Northern Irish businesses, but as mentioned above, a 
considerable proportion of this figure was taken up by the acquisition 
of 17,757,000 £1 redeemable preference shares in De Lorean Motor Cars 
Ltd. New guidelines issued by the Secretary of State in December 1979 
required 'the Agency to make every effort to involve maximum 
participation by the commercial banking sector and other private 
sources' in investment projects^^, but the special problems of the 
Northern Irish economy appear to have been recognised in that unlike 
other agencies, it did not have to meet official target rates of 
return on its investments. During this period, the Agency became
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particularly active in its other industrial functions, such as the 
encouragement of joint ventures, or 'business marriages', of marketing 
efforts, and of product-related research and development. However, by 
31 March 1981, the accumulated deficit on the investment portfolio had 
reached £18.5m 130^ only four of the Agency's thirty-seven 
investments were in liquidation, but considerable difficulties were 
being experienced with the De Lorean project. When, in December 1981 
the UK government refused to renew its loans to the company, which 
consequently went into receivership, the NIDA investment in De Lorean 
represented approximately 35% of its total expenditure on investment 
since its inception in 1976.
iii) IDB
The breadth of the IDB's activities can be shown by reference to the 
above section on its internal structure, which reveals a network of 
eleven divisions, grouped into three sectors which cater for the 
attraction of inward investment, support for heme industry and the 
provision of corporate services.
Unlike other UK agencies, the IDB is able to provide grants to 
industry, and administers selective financial assistance in the form 
of capital, employment, interest relief and other grants. This 
arrangement is designed to be particularly helpful to potential inward 
investors. Indeed the field of inward investment represents perhaps 
the most controversial area in which the IDB operates. This is 
because the failure of projects such as De Lorean, and the 
difficulties associated with the development of the Lear Fan aircraft,
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have served only to increase political demands for inward investment. 
Consequently, the IDB have placed considerable emphasis on this 
function, establishing in 1983 a group called the Northern Ireland 
Partnership, comprising representatives of banks, chambers of 
commerce, trade unions and academic institutions, the purpose of which 
is to use 'non-professionals' to promote the image of Northern Ireland 
as a suitable industrial location abroad. Political pressure on the 
IDB to achieve positive results in the area mounted when it was 
announced that only 550 jobs had been promoted through inward 
investment in 1983/4 out of a target figure of 2,000^.
Unlike other UK agencies, the IDB administers selective financial 
assistance schemes for the government, which differ considerably from 
those available in Great Britain. This means that they can be 
negotiated as part of an overall investment package. In order to 
develop contact with industry the IDB has established a client 
executive of field officers each responsible for a number of companies 
in a particular sector of industry. Each of the 400 manufacturing 
companies in Northern Ireland which employ more than 50 personnel are 
covered by the scheme, through which information about the services of 
the IDB can be disseminated, and assistance and advice can be given to 
companies wishing to expand. As well as offering advice on marketing 
and overseas trade, the IDB has established a division with special 
responsibility for monitoring the performance of invested companies. 
Incorporated in this division is the Rescue Unit, which provides 
short-term finance to companies experiencing severe financial 
difficulties, pending a full review of the company's prospects. If 
this review comes to a favourable conclusion, on the basis of
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canmercial judgements, then long-term aid will be arranged. In the 
first seven months of its existence, the IDB had handled 30 rescue 
cases, ten of which had received long-term assistance, and five 
temporary help^^.
The IDB also became aware of the lack of indigenous financial 
institutions in Northern Ireland capable of supplying investment 
capital to industry. However, it was reluctant to be a participant in 
such a fund, and when in May 1984, the announcement was made of the 
setting-up of Northern Ireland's first venture capital fund, Northern 
Ireland Venture Capital, it was revealed that the funds would be 
operated in conjunction with two private companies, Electra Risk 
Capital and Global Investments Trust^
Unlike its predecessors, the NIFC and NIDA, the IDB has responsibility 
for the provision of industrial sites and premises, and the management 
of all property inherited from the Department of Commerce. Of the 
5,500 acres of land involved in this transfer 2,500 were unallocated, 
in March 1983; and overall approximately 12% of the floorspace in the 
Board's portfolio was either vacant or awaiting s u r r e n d e r ^4. As with 
other agencies, the government is encouraging the IDB to involve the 
private sector more closely in the industrial property sector.
As has been been mentioned above, the IDB published in March 1983, a 
short term strategy which listed three immediate aims concerning job 
promotion and the strengthening of Northern Irish industry. The 
Strategy outlines four areas upon which the Board's activities should 
be centred, support for hane industry, the attraction of 'profitable
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companies' from overseas, the building up of Northern Ireland's image 
as an industrial location, and the provision of competitive incentives 
for industry to invest in the area. The guidelines issued to the 
Board by the Secretary of State gave it responsibility for producing a 
long-term strategy also, and the Board's failure to do so in the first 
eighteen months of its existence drew adverse comment from the 
(NIC)ICTU, amongst others, it being felt that that the drawing-up of 
such a strategy was being hampered from within by disagreements 
between IDB employees and civil servants m  the DED' .
HIDB
i) Statutory purposes, functions and pcwers
The HIDB was established under the terms of the 1965 Highlands and 
Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965 , and its powers extended
three years later by the passing of the Highlands and Islands 
Development (Scotland) Act 196 8 ^ ”7. its purpose, according to the
1965 Act, was 'assisting the people of the Highlands and Islands to 
improve their economic and social conditions' and 'enabling the 
Highlands and Islands to play a more effective part in the economic 
and social development of the nation' .
Its functions were to be directed toward 'preparing, concerting and 
promoting, assisting and undertaking measures for the economic and 
social development of the Highlands and Islands' 139^ powers
conferred upon it included the power of compulsory purchase, the 
construction of buildings and provision of services, the power to make
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grants and loans and to advise those engaged in business. It was 
originally thought that the Act gave the Board powers to take equity 
investment in Highland companies, but legal opinion advised that 
purchase of equity shares might be considered 'ultra vires'. Hence, 
in 1968 the government introduced legislation which gave the Board 
power to form or promote a company, and to acquire, hold and dispose 
of any stocks and shares, which were added to those provisions in the 
1965 Act which had given the Board powers to acquire and carry on 
businesses.
The 1965 Act gave the HIDB responsibility for a geographical area
covering the seven 'crofting' counties of Argyll, Caithness,
Inverness, Orkney, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Zetland, and this
area was extended in 1975 under the Highlands and Islands Development
(Scotland) Act 1975^® to include the county of Naim, the District
of Cromdale, the Burgh of Grantown-on-Spey and the Islands of Arran
and Bute. In 1979 the islands of Great and Little Cumbrae were
1 41further added by way of similar legislation .
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ii) Control
The Board is formally accountable to Parliament through the Secretary 
of State for Scotland. It is also subject to directions of a general 
character from the Secretary of State for Scotland, though in practice 
these have never publicly been issued. Its accounts are audited 
annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General and presented to the 
House of Cannons Public Accounts Committee which in turn can make 
recommendations concerning the HIDB's activities'^. The Board is 
also regularly asked to submit evidence to House of Commons Select 
Committees, when enquiries are being conducted in fields relevant to 
the Board's work such as the attraction of inward investment, or rural 
transport services^
The Board was originally supervised by the Scottish Office's 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS), though in 
1968 this responsibility was transferred to the Scottish Development 
Department (subsequently, the SEPD, and latterly, the IDS). Under the 
1965 Act, provision was made for the establishment of a Highlands and 
Islands Consultative Council, made up of representatives of various 
professions, interest groups and local authorities in the region, 
which meets regularly to discuss matters relating to the Board's 
activities, to conment on the Board's policies, and to proffer advice 
on the basis of these deliberations.
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iii) Budget (see also Table 13)
The Board is financed by grant-in-aid borne on the vote of its 
sponsoring department, which is annually topped up by receipts from 
its own activities, such as loan repayments and the sale of assets and 
investments. In the first seventeen months of its existence, up to 
March 1967, the Board spent approximately £860,000^^, whereas in 
1982/3 it received over £27.5m in grant-in-aid alone^^. However, in 
the following financial year, 1983/4, the government cut approved 
expenditure by 2% or £578,000, as part of its policy to restrict the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The 1984/5 'core' budget 
for the Board is £26.7m. To this there is added £30m for the special 
EEC-assisted Integrated Development Programme for the Western Isles; 
and £3.5m being the final tranche of a special £10m package to 
alleviate problems arising from the closure of the Invergordon 
smelter.
iv) Internal structure
The internal operations of the HIDB are overseen by a Board of four 
full-time executive members (including Chairman and Deputy Chairman) 
and three part-time members, all appointed by the Secretary of State 
for Scotland for a normal term of five years. The four full-time 
members have direct responsibility for the Board's eight functional 
Divisions, which are Policy Research, Legal, Administration, 
Fisheries, Industrial and Business Development, Finance and Management 
Services, Tourism, and Land Development.
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v) Expenditure
The main items of Board expenditure are (as at 31/3/83) grants, the 
acquisition of shares and loans, commissioning of research surveys and 
publicity, salaries and administration and projects and development 
schemes. The largest single item of expenditure would appear to be 
the dispensing of grant assistance, under the terms of Section 8 of 
the HIDB Act. When the provision of loan and share agreements is 
added to this total, it can be shown that the HIDB has approved over 
£175 million in financial assistance in the ten years to 1983 (at 1983 
prices). The spread of this assistance between the various sectors of 
economic activity is shown in Table 14.
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1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83
10400000 12700000 17432000 20021000 22942000 27216000
2400567 2915069 3496193 3692776 4344869 5161567
12800567 15615069 20928193 23713776 27236869 32377567
Source: HIDB Annual Reports
Fig 4 HIDB Internal Structure 1984






















Source P. Breathnach et al *Aspects of rural development in the 
Scottish Highlands and Islands', St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, 
1984.
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Table 14 HIDB expenditure by function and selected case types 
1974 - 83 (at 1983 prices)
Grants (£) Loans and Shares (£)
Land development 8 911 650 14 395 096
of which: Farm development 4 232 865 10 365 471
Horticulture 669 484 732 670
Fisheries 10 688 633 29 835 748
of which: Fishing boats 2 685 109 25 518 080
Fish fanning 7 169 508 3 095 022
Manufacturing and processing 19 517 553 24 499 974
of which: Fish processing 4 107 155 3 530 695
Boatyards and marine engineering 877 647 1 671 667
Crafts 1 675 683 2 081 205
Construction 2 961 312 3 190 091
Tourism 34 545 277 15 040 569
of which: Hotels 14 595 035 6 902 157
Other tourist accommodation 11 188 260 5 359 098
Catering 1 940 607 1 035 293
Recreation and Tourist Amenities 6 487 477 2 724 673
Other Service Industries 6 264 819 5 935 137
Total 82 889 244 92 896 615
Figures relate to assistance approved by the Board, not payments. 
Source: HIDB 18th Annual Report 1983
Table 15 HIDB expenditure 1982/3______ (£000)
1982/3
Grant assistance 8,717
Equity and loan investment 6,321
Research and publicity 2,582
Salaries and administrative costs 3,754
Projects and development programmes 3,188
Total 24, 562
Source: HIDB 18th Annual Report 1983.
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Table 16 Sectoral Distribution of HIDB Financial assistance, 1965-80
(£m) 1965-70 1971-75 1971-80
Manufacturing 32 24 24
Tourism 29 32 29




Construction 11 9 4
Non-economic 2 2 -
 ^ At 1980 prices.
Source: Shucksmith and Lloyd 'The HIDB, Regional Policy, and the
Invergordon closure1.





Grants 3,513 1,728 1,905 4,383 11,529
Loans 1,196 993 1,966 1,542 5,697
Shares 210 50 253 451 964
IDP-Grants - 9 21 - 30
Loans - - 1 - 1
Total 4,919 2,780 4,146 6,376 18,221
% 27.0 15.3 22.7 35.0 100
Source: HIDB internal document.
159
The Board also dispenses social development grants in amounts no 
greater than £15,000 per case. Up to 1973 the Board was not allowed 
to spend more than a total of £50,000 per annum on such grants, which 
assist local community groups in a variety of projects. However, by 
1983, this limit had been increased to £500,000. Indeed, according to 
the HIDB's eighteenth annual report, financial assistance for social 
projects approved in 1983 amounted to £517,000.
The Board took over responsibility for factory-building and management 
in the Highlands and Islands at the time of the creation of the 
Scottish Development Agency in 1975/6. It has since then become an 
increasingly important function of the board, and constitutes the 
principal expenditure category under the Board projects' budget head.
vi) History
a) Origins
The history of government economic intervention in the Highlands of 
Scotland is a comparatively long one, dating from the Napier 
Commission set up in 1883 to study the conditions of crofters, which 
resulted in special legislation for the area. This was followed by 
the establishment of the Crofters Commission, the Hilleary Committee, 
the Congested Districts Board, and the Taylor Committee . It was 
not, therefore, surprising that when the then Secretary of State for 
Scotland, William Ross, introduced the bill providing for the creation 
of the HIDB to the House of Commons, he should refer to the Highlander 
as 'the man on Scotland's conscience' .  The proposal for a Highland
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development authority appears to have been first put forward by the 
Scottish Liberal Party in 1928, which requested that a Highland 
Development Commission be set up to co-ordinate the efforts of 
public departments and 'to prepare and to carry into effect a 
comprehensive scheme for developing the full resources of the 
Highlands'^®. In 1936, the Highland Development League, an all-party 
body called, at its first Annual Delegate Conference, for the 
formation of ' an administrative or central board for the Highlands1. 
In the immediate post-war period the demand for an executive agency 
which could promote industrial development was made by the Scottish 
Council (Development and Industry) and the Highlands Advisory Panel. 
In 1953 the Scottish Trades Union Congress issued a Memorandum in 
favour of a Highland Development Corporation modelled on the New Towns 
Corporation, and the idea was expanded at subsequent STUC conferences.
In the early nineteen-sixties, the Labour Party established a special
committee to prepare a Scottish policy for a future Labour government.
Chaired by Judith Hart, its main recommendation with regard to the
1 49Highlands was the setting up a development authority , and this was 
brought to fruition in 1965 by the Wilson government elected in the 
previous year.
Reaction to the Bill which provided for the establishment of the HIDB
was mixed, ranging frcm complaints by Conservative MP's about the
1 qo
'Bill's pure Marxist ancestry' and its 'irrelevant, unnecessary and
damaging Socialist doctrine'^51, descriptions of it as 'a measure,
which, if properly applied, paves the way for revolutionary change in
1 52the seven crofting countries . To many in the Highlands, however,
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it represented the fulfilment of a demand which, as shown above, had 
been pressed for many years.
b) Policy
Whilst the Board was not, for a considerable period, prepared to draw
up a public strategy document, its operations in its early years were
geared to the attraction of investment to designated population
centres, 'growth-poles', which, through expansion would, it was
believed, stimulate the economic life of outlying areas. However,
though seme mobile investment projects were attracted to areas such as
the Moray Firth, the recession of the 1970's reduced the overall
percentage of such projects available for attraction. More
fundamentally, the approach was resented by those who saw it as
discriminating geographically against the more remote western areas,
and sectorally against non-manufacturing projects. Gradually,
therefore, the Board has turned to the encouragement of small business
in a wide variety of commercial activities. Its 1982 Corporate
Strategy (published 17 years after the Board's formation) states that
the Board 'rejects the adoption of any rigid strategy based on
1concentrating investments in growth areas and key settlements . 
The strategy gives priority to 'the more remote and socially fragile 
areas in the islands and peripheral mainland areas '*'54, ancj commits 
the Board to decentralising its staff and delegating greater 
responsibility to them. It also gives support to a broad-based 
sectoral strategy, with priority given to developing natural-resource 
based industries.
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c) Financial assistance to business
The largest single component of the Board's budget is used to 
stimulate capital investment by canmercial enterprises through the 
provision of grants, low-interest loans and equity funding. This 
assistance is entirely discretionary, and is used to support projects 
that, without Board capital, would not have gone ahead, or would have 
done so only on a reduced basis. Assistance is available for almost 
any form of commercial activity, though most goes to small firms, 
indicative of the established industrial structure in the Highlands. 
An analysis of the total grants and financial incentives offered by 
the Board between 1971 and 1978 at 1978 prices showed that, of 3318 
cases approved, 45% involved a grant equivalence of less than £3,000, 
and only 1.3% involved more than £100,000. In 1983/4, over 75% of the 
cases approved for grant/loan assistance called for sums of less than 
£10,000 from the Board.
Unlike other agencies the Board has never been expected to cover the 
cost of its investments, presumably because of the social as well as 
economic nature of its remit. Its largest investment loss was that of 
the Lewis Stokfisk fish-drying factory which went into receivership in 
May 1982. The Board had previously acquired a 75% stake in the 
company, a pioneering venture in conjunction with a Scandinavian 
country, which aimed to encourage the exploitation of fish stocks off
the West coast, and its investment was worth £3.2m^. In fact, the
is
Board s investment policyAthat financial assistance should supplement 
and not supplant investment by individual developers or financial 
institutions, and therefore, most entrepreneurs are expected to
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provide at least 50% of total project cost themselves. The Board had 
equity investment in 83 companies at the end of the 1982/3 financial 
year, the total value of its equity investments being £3,728,000. The 
amount set aside as a provision for loss on these investments was 
£1 ,550,000, representing approximately 41% of total. These figures 
suggest that the Board is supporting a comparatively large number of 
small companies, with a potentially high risk of failure, a condition 
endemic to manufacturing in a region such as the Highlands.
In 1981, the Board, in conjunction with ICFC and the Bank of Scotland 
established a venture capital fund, Highland Venture Capital, and 
engaged an American firm of consultants, Venture Founders Corporation, 
to seek out prospective entrepreneurs and projects on which the fund's 
capital could be employed . This latter action is said to have 
caused resentment amongst the Board's own staff, an attitude which 
seemed justified when after eighteen months work, the sole project to 
have come to fruition was in conjunction with an entrepreneur who had 
been assisted financially already by the board, and with whom it had 
been working for at least four years. The contract with VFC was not 
renewed, but Highland Venture Capital continued.
The opposite extreme of the Board's business development activities is 
reflected in its support for community development co-operatives in 
the Western Isles and other remote areas of the Highland region^
The CDC scheme emanated from Ireland, where co-operatives had 
proliferated, particularly in the Gaelic-speaking areas, since the 
early 1970's. The Board offered to match funds raised by any 
community interested in establishing multi-functional co-operatives.
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By March 1983, the Board had assisted 16 co-operatives, 15 of which 
were operational, providing 50 full-time, and 150 seasonal, part-time 
or outwork jobs.
c) Factory provision
The second largest component of the Board's budget behind financial 
assistance is that devoted to the construction and maintenance of 
factories. The Board has not, however, operated as an industrial 
landlord on a scale comparable to agencies such as the SDA and WDA. 
It assumed the function only in 1976, and has concentrated its 
programme on the provision of small factories and workshops for lease 
to small businesses. A combination of factors including low market 
rents, high building costs and the scarcity of suitable land have 
precluded the involvement of the private sector in this field, and the 
HIDB therefore have the responsibility of either financing a firm 
through grants and loans to construct its own premises, or undertaking 
construction itself. The Board has constructed some 300 factory units 
since 1976, and in recent years, has provided bespoke as well as 
advance factories. In the financial year 1983/4, 77 units were 
constructed, forming 155,200 sq. ft., at a cost of £5.6m.
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d) Inward investment
The Board's approach to the attraction of inward investment has been, 
as with factory provision, low-key. Indeed the two areas are, in one 
sense, linked, as was pointed out in evidence to the Select Committee 
on Scottish Affairs, which in 1979/80 was investigating inward 
investment in Scotland; 'we do not build advance factories generally 
speaking in the islands, because we do not expect many footloose firms 
to locate manufacturing projects in the islands'^®. Before the same 
Committee the HIDB chairman stated that 'the nature of the Highlands 
and the potential of Highland development is not necessarily suitable 
to the kind of inward investment which, for example, the Scottish 
Development Agency, and the Invest in Britain Bureau, are chasing 
throughout the world '159^ H e  a r g U e ( j that there were dangers in 
attracting short-term employment in the form of external projects, in 
that they might take away labour from low-income but secure jobs such 
as those in fishing and knitwear. Since 1981, all inward investment 
promotion in Scotland has been under the control of the SDA associate 
organisation, Locate in Scotland, and visits by Board staff to 
overseas companies are regularly arranged under its auspices.
e) Land development
Board assistance to Highland agriculture has already been covered, in 
its main form, above, as it takes the form of financial assistance 
under Section 8 of the 1965 Act. Of grants and loans to agriculture 
one-third now relate to land development, and it is this area of the 
Board's activity, or lack of it, that has provided controversy over a
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number of years. In particular, arguments have centred on the problem 
of what the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands in 1964 called 
'under-used and in some cases grossly misused land in the 
Highlands1 . In 1965, the Secretary of State for Scotland speaking
of the right of compulsory purchase, which was intended to be used by 
the Board as an instrument of land reform, declared that 'anyone who 
denied that power is suggesting that the Board should not function 
effectively at all'^. However, during the course of the Board's 
early operations it became clear to staff that the powers were 
inadequate to the task which the Board wanted to undertake, for 
example, acquiring a large estate to demonstrate progressive land use 
techniques. The power of compulsory purchase was derived from the 
1947 Acquisition of Land Act, which meant that the Board was endowed 
with roughly the same powers in this respect as a local authority. 
They were suited to the acquisition of small plots of land in 
connection with infrastructural provision rather than the transfer of 
thousands of acres of land from private to public ownership. Legal 
counsel accordingly advised the Board, it was reported, that it 
'lacked the clout to take on anything tougher than the odd parish 
council'162^ Board's second Chairman, Sir Andrew Gilchrist did
not at first acknowledge that compulsory purchase should be employed 
by the Board, and even when later the inadequacy of the provisions 
were acknowledged by him,, he considered it to be a waste of time to 
canvass the then Conservative government for further powers . His 
successor, the Labour appointee, Sir Kenneth Alexander, was more 
appreciative of the need for new measures. He argued that 'an 
obstructive landlord can affect the development aspirations of 
tenants....we see instances of gross under-utilisation of the land,
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leading to a loss of jobs and livelihood to local people; in these 
circumstances we must consider intervention, if necessary by 
acquisition'^^. Alexander approached the Scottish Office and was 
apparently given the impression that an application for the extension 
of the power of compulsory purchase would be received favourably, and 
that it would not be necessary to go through the time-consuming 
process of a test-case in the courts to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
present provisions'^. Subsequently, the Board submitted, after 
consultations, details of amendments to existing powers to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland in February 1978. In June 1978 they 
were returned to the Board with a request that further consultations 
take place100. A revised version of the amendments was re-submitted 
to the Secretary of State in December 1979. It was not until over a 
year later, on May 7 1980 that the new Conservative Secretary of 
State, Sir George Younger, announced in the Commons that the 
government had refused the Board's request, on the grounds that its 
original powers had not as yet been exercised.
The Board encourages effective use of land through its provision of 
loans, often supplemented by grants to farmers with projects aimed at 
increasing productivity or efficiency. However, so long as the Board 
does not possess effective powers of compulsory purchase to be used as 
a 'last resort' landlords can carry on inefficient or anti-social 
practices.
However, 1982 saw the launching of a £20m EEC-backed Integrated 
Development Programme in the Western Isles, with a three - man project 
team being based permanently to disseminate information on the types
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of assistance available under the programme, predominantly in 
agriculture and fisheries167. The Board is also supporting efforts by 
the NFU and local authorities to secure EEC aid for an Agricultural 
Development Programme (ADP), covering the whole of the Board*s area.
f) Social development
The Board is charged with a statutory responsibility to improve social 
and community facilities. Its aim in this may be economic, in that it 
wishes to attract and maintain a balanced population, capable of 
supplying a flexible workforce, but it is empowered to give grants for 
the purposes of social development. Such grants are used to extend 
and top up the programmes of local authorities, the Sports Council, 
the Scottish Education Department, and other funding bodies. In 1983 
the Board's expenditure an such grants was limited to £500,000, and 
the size of each individual grant to £15,000. The typical type of 
project aided would be the renovation of a village hall, or the 
improvement of local sports facilities, but in the 1980's increasing 
attention has been paid to the promotion of the Gaelic language.
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Development Board for Rural Wales/Mid Wales Development
i) Statutory purposes, functions and powers
The Development of Rural Wales Act 1976^®® which established the 
Development Board for Rural Wales (DBRW) can be seen to have been in a 
number of respects modelled on the statute which had established its 
predecessor in the field of rural development, the HIDB. The DERW's 
aim is the promotion of the economic and social well-being of the 
people of the Mid Wales area, which is designated as the districts of 
Ceredigion in Dyfed, Meirionydd in Gwynedd, and the three districts of 
Powys, Brecknock, Montgomery and Radnor. Its general function is to 
'prepare, concert, promote and undertake measures for the economic and 
social development of the area, and in particular, for the development 
of any area of a new town or new town situated within the area* ^
The Board's duties include keeping under review all matters relating 
to the social and economic development of Mid-Wales, preparing and 
sutmitting to the Secretary of State proposals for social and economic 
development, carrying out approved proposals, and carrying on the 
functions of a Development Corporation in relation to any new town 
within its area.
The powers granted to the Board under the terms of the Act include:
i) the acquisition and disposal of land or other property.
ii) the carrying-out of building and other operations.
iii) the provision of services for any land or other property.
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iv) the provision of finance to local authorities and others for the 
taking of economic and social development measures,
v) to act as agent of the WDA in providing finance and services for 
business.
170vi) to acquire and carry on industrial undertakings .
The Board also has powers of compulsory acquisition of land similar to 
those of the HIDB, and certain rights to information on businesses and 
land.
ii) Control
The Board is formally accountable to Parliament through the Secretary 
of State for Wales. It is required to prepare a report on its 
activities annually, to be submitted to the Secretary of State. Its 
annual accounts must be submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, who then submits them to the House of Cannons Committee of 
Public Accounts. As stated under Section 3 of the Development of 
Rural Wales Act, the Board must submit proposals for development 
projects to the Secretary of State for approval. Eleven such projects 
were approved in the 1982/3 financial year. The Secretary of State is 
also statutorily required to approve any disposal of land, provision 
of finance or industrial undertaking acquired and carried on by the 
Board. In the case of the provision of financial assistance, the 
Secretary of State must also gain the approval of the Treasury. The 
original Act placed a financial limit to the Board's operations of 
£25m, with provision for this to be raised by the Secretary of State 
to £40m, without parliamentary approval. However, the limit was
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raised to £100m under the 1981 Industry Act^ ^  .
iii) Budget
The funding of the DERW is more complex than other UK agencies. It 
receives Exchequer advances in the form of grant-in-aid, and 
borrowings from the National Loans Fund. Grant-in-aid is supplied 
through the Welsh Office vote, whereas National Loans Fund monies are 
received direct from the Exchequer. However, the Board is also in 
receipt of long-term loans from the Secretary of State. These loans 
have been advanced originally under the New Towns Act 1965 (to the Mid 
Wales Development Corporation) and the Development of Rural Wales 
Act, and are repayable over 60 years by equal half-yearly instalments. 
The Board also receives subsidies and grants from the Secretary of 
State in respect of its housing activities payable under the terms of 
its founding Act, and under the 1980 Housing Act the Board maintains a 
Housing Account separate frcm its main accounts. In 1982/3 the budget 
approved for the Board was £6,974,000^^.
iv) Internal structure
In 1982/3 the Board had eleven members, appointed by the Secretary of 
State, and a permanent staff of 92, five of which constituted its 
senior officers, namely the Chief Executive, Marketing Director, 
Development Director, Finance Officer and Secretary. In 1982, an 
Economic Development Unit was established within the Board's 
Development Department to support sectoral and regional development 
within the Board's area.
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v) Expenditure
In its early years of operation, the activities of the Board were 
dominated by its responsibility for the development of Newtown. In 
the financial years 1977/8 and 1978/9, Newtown accounted for 60% of 
the Board's total expenditure^^. During the same period assistance 
to industry in the form of loans, and the provision of factory space, 
accounted for 46% of total expenditure throughout the Board's area, 
and the provision of housing, primarily for key-workers near 
industrial developments made up 34%. By 1980/81, however, expenditure 
on industrial development had risen to 60% of total, and the 
proportion spent within Newtown had fallen to 40%. Total expenditure 











The idea of a rural development agency appears to have been first
canvassed at the end of the Second World War in pamphlets published by
the Welsh Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru”* However, in 1967, when
the Agriculture Act provided for the establishment of rural
development boards to co-ordinate public services, provide
recreational access, and create commercial fanning units in two areas,
the Northern Pennines and Mid-Wales, the outcry against such a measure
in Mid-Wales was so powerful that whilst a Northern Pennines Rural
Development Board was established in 1969, its counterpart for Mid-
17fiWales never came into being' . The DBRW established ten years after
the Agriculture Act resulted from an amalgamation of the Mid-Wales
Industrial Development Association, a promotional body formed by the
five old local authorities of the area in 1957, and the Newtown
Development Corporation, which was set up in 1967, under the provision
of the 1965 New Towns Act to take charge of the development of
Newtown, Powys^^. The officers of CoS IRA which had prior to 1977
been active in the area were transferred to the WDA, to carry on their
work in rural areas outside the Board's boundaries. The Labour
Party's 1974 manifesto had committed a future Labour administration
to the creation of a 'unified statutory authority' in order to prcmote
'a new initiative to use and develop the social fabric and economic
1 7  ftresources of rural Wales to the full' . However, the formation of 
countrywide - development agencies in Scotland and Wales in 1975 
seemed to some to have removed the case for a district rural agency in
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Wales. Considerable concern was indeed, expressed during the reading 
of the Development of Rural Wales Bill that there would be a confusion 
of functions between the Board and WDA. The then Shadow Secretary of 
State for Wales, Nicholas Edwards, stated that he believed the
1 7Q
structure of the Bill to be 'fundamentally unsound . However, the 
much smoother path that the Bill enjoyed, from its introduction to the 
House of Cannons to its implementation in the shape of the DBRW, than 
that encountered by the Agriculture Act, ten years previously, would 
suggest that the measure had attained a broad consensus approval 
within the area concerned.
b) Strategy
As already noted, the DBRW was formed as result of an amalgamation 
between the two local industrial development organisations, MWIDA and 
NDC. These bodies had themselves been heavily influenced by the 
planning strategies instigated by the new Welsh Office in the late 
1960's, and the broad theme of this strategy was passed on in time to 
the DBRW. MWIDA had been set up to introduce new industry to the area 
and improve rural amenities as a means of reducing unemployment. The 
NDC came about in order to supervise the development of a new town in 
the Upper Severn Valley, that would stimulate other parts of the 
region. In 1964, a Welsh office working party had published a report 
'Depopulation in Mid Wales' that reccnmended the development of a 
dozen small towns in the region as 'growth towns'^®. The DBRW's 
policy has clearly followed this pattern. In March 1978 it published 
a policy statement which set out its commitment to geographic 
planning. The statement defined certain geographical categories -
175
Newtown, Growth Areas, Special Towns, Key Towns and Villages, in which
support is to be concentrated. This policy has been instigated,
according to the Board, because funds were not sufficient to make any
significant impact if spread evenly over the whole region, and
'because there was strong evidence that the development of strategic
179towns brought benefits too for the surrounding communities . 
c) Activities
Financial assistance for industry is generally provided by the Board
as an agent for the Welsh Development Agency. The Agency offers a
Loan scheme as well as equity funding, and the services of Hafren
Investment Finance. Selective financial assistance under the Industry
Act 1972, which can be provided to companies investing in Assisted
Areas, was effectively removed from many of the enterprises served by
the Board in 1982 when the government stripped much of the Mid Wales
region of 'Assisted Area' status. However, by way of compensation,
the Secretary of State for Wales provided £350,000 to be dispensed
directly by the Board in the form of a Mid Wales Development Grant to
projects which create or maintain employment, and involve expenditure 
1 80on fixed assets .
As well as offering financial assistance, the Board has, from its 
inception, pursued a vigorous policy of providing factory space for 
potential investors. Construction work was originally focused on 
Newtown. Of the 44 units constructed in its first two years of 
operation, 27 were in Newtown. However, by March 1983, the Board's 
factory portfolio consisted of 292 units only 98 of which (33.6%, or
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34.2% of factory space) was located in Newtown. In canmon with other 
agencies, the Board is becoming increasingly involved with the 
construction of bespoke or 'made-to-order' factories, and the 
importance of this role was emphasised in 1984 when it was reported 
that an important factor in the decision of the Laura Ashley group to 
site a £7m expansion project at Newtown, rather than in Holland, was 
DBRW's willingness to construct a 130,000 sq. ft. factory for the 
company within two years^ . At the end of the 1982/3 financial year 
38 of the Board's factory units (13%) were unoccupied, and a further 
15 (5.1%) were undergoing renovation.
The Board also services local industry through the provision of 
business advice and marketing support. Within Newtown it has 
constructed houses for key-workers, and can offer low-cost 
accommodation through housing subsidies provided by the government. 
Its industrial promotion work has been conducted an a comparatively 
modest scale, concentrating on representation at industrial and trade 
fairs, and advertising plays such as the 'Mid-Wales Experience' train, 
which visited English cities during 1982/3, promoting Mid-Wales as an 
industrial location. The Board has also been involved in sponsoring a 
First Division football match, a professional show-jumper, and the 
Welsh National Opera Company. In 1983 responsibility for all 
industrial promotion activities in Wales was assumed by the associate 
organisation of the WDA, WINvest. In the previous year, the Board had 
for promotional purposes adopted the name 'Mid-Wales Development'.
The Board has a statutory commitment to encourage social, as well as
182economic development in Mid-Wales . However, like the HIDB, its
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support for social development is expressly linked to its central aim 
of encouraging economic development. One of the Board's criteria for 
supporting a social development project is that it 'must be 
complementary to the Board's economic development programme'. Over 
the six years of its operations up to 1982/3, social development 
grants have accounted for an average of 3.3% of the Board's total 
expenditure. The Board also offers a public authority grant to local 
authorities and statutory undertakings to assist in social and 
economic development projects.
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Local Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU)
Established under the terms of the 1971 Industries Development
1 8 4(Northern Ireland) Act , LEDU originally had the following 
objectives:
a) to pranote employment in existing small business enterprises by 
encouraging better exploitation of manufacturing and marketing 
opportunities, and a more effective use of resources, by 
providing selective financial assistance, factories and sites for 
the building of factories, and acting in an advisory capacity.
b) to encourage the setting up of new enterprises.
c) to foster craft industry by taking measures to improve standards
188of quality and design .
LEDU was established as a company limited by guarantee, without share 
capital, and sponsored by the Department of Commerce (now the 
Department of Economic Development). It is issued with operating 
directives by its sponsoring department, one of which is that it 
should deal only with businesses employing less than 50 staff. In 
1980 its remit was extended from the manufacturing sector and 
predominantly rural areas into the service sector, and the Belfast 
inner-city area.
LEDU has the ability to offer a package of grants as well as 
commercial and technical advice to a client. Generally, an
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entrepreneur is asked to contribute only 20% of start-up capital, 
though in some cases the figure can be as low as 12%. The difference 
is made up by LEDU (who will not normally contribute more than 50% of 
total costs) and the client's bank. In expanding its services to all 
commercial sectors, LEDU has taken over the Department of Trade and 
Industry's small business counselling service and has adopted the 
title of ' the small business agency for Northern Ireland'. It does 
not, however, offer finance on a universal basis, and specifically 
excludes projects in markets which are already well-supplied.
The Agency has a board of directors consisting of a chairman and nine 
other directors, all of whom are part-time and are drawn from the 
business community. Likewise, 90% of LEDU's 71 staff (1983/4 figures) 
are drawn from an industrial or commercial background. Four of the 
Unit's directors act as chairmen of the Area Panels which are drawn 
from local business communities and, which vet applications for 
financial assistance. Like the IDB, LEDU operates a team of client 
executives to liaise with and advise local firms. The Unit claims to 
have promoted 11,171 jobs in the first ten years of its existence, and 
another 7,821 in the following three years up to 1983/4. In this 
latter year, it claims to have promoted 3,658 jobs, more than the 
figure claimed by the IDB.
LEDU expenditure has risen considerably in recent years, in line with 






Administrative Costs* 1,060,000 1,314,000
Total 5,980,000 8,724,000
* Includes advertising, publicity and promotions







National Enterprise Board (NEB)/British Technology Group (BTC)
The National Enterprise Board, established in 1975, under the terms of 
the Industry Act, was a state holding company, conceived in an 
opposition policy document in 1972 00 and based on similar bodies 
operating in Continental countries, such as the Swedish Statesforetag, 
and the Italian IRI^®^. One of the aims of the Board was to provide 
direct assistance for the regions. The White Paper which preceded the 
Bill stated that the NEB would 'have a responsibility on its (the 
government's) behalf to create employment through commercially sound 
public enterprises and joint ventures with private enterprise in the 
areas of high unemployment' 190. However, the Industry Act itself did 
not give the Board a specific role in regional development, its 
statutory purpose being threefold; the development or assistance of 
the economy of the UK, or any part of the UK; the promotion in any 
part of the UK of industrial efficiency and international 
competitiveness and the provision, maintenance or safeguarding of 
productive employment in any part of the UK1 ^  . Furthermore, the 
commercial criteria by which the Board was obliged to operate, made 
investment in the regions less likely because of the greater risks 
involved, and consequent demands on staff-time. The 'rescue' 
operations in which it soon became involved, in particular British 
Leyland and Rolls-Royce, mainly affected traditionally prosperous 
areas such as the West Midlands and the South West.
The NEB's first action in regional investment was the creation of two 
regional offices, for the North and North West, based in Newcastle and
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Liverpool, each manned by a regional Director. This had been set out 
in the government's draft guidelines for the NEB, which also stated 
that the Board was to make 'appropriate arrangements' to ensure that 
' in considering the expansion of an existing operation or the 
development of a new undertaking, the NEB examines the case for 
location in an area of high unemployment with a particular intent to 
site the development if possible in such an area11 9^. At this time, 
there was much concern in the English regions that they were not being 
given central resources on the scale allocated to Scotland and Wales 
through their development agencies. There was even a private members' 
bill put before the House of Commons which provided for the setting up
-I Q O  _____
of English development agencies' . In response to this, the then NEB 
chairman, Lord Ryder stated that 'most if not all of the advantages 
claimed for development agencies can be achieved equally well by more 
effective collaboration by the various agencies in the Region (in this 
case, the North), and the NEB is well placed to bring this about'19 .^ 
In answer to a suggestion by MP Barry Jones, of the Public Accounts 
Committee, that northern English MP's were envious of the Scottish and 
Welsh agencies, Sir Peter Carey, Permanent Secretary at the Department 
of Industry stated that the English regions had 'got what the Agencies 
have not got and that is an arm of the NEB operating in the Northern 
Region, and in the North-West'195. He added that 'what has happened, 
for example, in the Northern region in relation to unemployment shows, 
in fact, that far from falling behind they have kept up really 
remarkably well in the difficult circumstances of the recession'195.
The NEB aimed to strengthen the regions' industrial bases not through 
setting up its own companies, or through finance of 'greenfield' or
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'start-up' projects, but through partnership with 'well-meaning 
existing companies in the private sector'. However, this approach was 
to be criticised in that it did not appear to be as fLexible as that 
of the Scottish and Welsh agencies. There was also opinion in the 
regions that the NEB, with its comparatively small staff, was too 
preoccupied with the probleiis of its large-scale holdings to give 
proper attention to the assisted areas. The transferee companies, or 
'lame lacks' as they became known, accounted for the vast majority of 
NEB expenditure, British ueyland and Rolls-Royce being the recipients 
of 88.7% of the Board's total expenditure up to 31 December 1979^^. 
On top of this, proposals for investment from the regional directors 
had to be remitted to the Board in London for approval.
In the light of these criticisms, the government created, in 1978, two 
regional Boards for the North and North-West . The Boards were 
chaired by the existing regional directors, with members drawn from 
local industry aid the trade unions, and had power to invest amounts 
of up to £500,000 in a company, without reference to the parent Board. 
However, the chairman of the North of England Development Corporation 
criticised the Board's action as not having taken into consideration 
the potential contributions of local organisations'...the government 
has chosen to create yet another nominated body responsible to London, 
not to the people of the region, with no elected representatives of 
the region on the Board'
Nevertheless, through their state-owned companies and other 
investments the NSB had a considerable effect on the regional 
economies; in 1978, these companies accounted for 30,000 jobs In the
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north and north-west regions, or 10% of the total NEB workforce, and 
at the end of 1979 17 of the 30 small companies in the NEB's portfolio 
were located in the English regions^^.
The NEB's links with the private sector in the regions predate the 
coming to power of the Conservative administration in May 1979. In
1978, a joint venture with the Midland Bank established Newtown 
Securities (Northern) Ltd. to make available unsecured loans to small 
companies, and in February 1979 an advisory body for small companies, 
Sapling Enterprise Ltd., was set up, under the joint ownership of the 
NEB and a firm of management consultants, Collinson Grant
Ofll
Associates*^ . The Conservative government came to power in 1979, 
determined to cut back the activities of the NEB^U . The Industry Act 
of 1980 reduced the Board's powers, in that it removed the statutory 
obligation to advance state ownership, and imposed strict financial 
requirements on its investment functions. £100m of its assets were 
sold off to the private sector, on the order of the government, and 
responsibility for the affairs of BL and Rolls-Royce were transferred 
to the Department of Industry. The Board was therefore restricted to 
three main areas of operation: encouraging high-technology ventures 
(such as Inmos, which was persuaded to invest in an assisted area) 
helping small businesses, and developing industry in the regions. 
There remained confusion over the Board's regional role. Sir Arthur 
Knight, appointed as chairman in succession to Sir Leslie Murphy in
1979, was quoted as expressing uncertainty as to what the Board could 
do in the regions. 'The problem has been around for 50 years or more 
and has taken up a lot of public money. I'm thinking about what
OAT
difference the NEB can make' . He envisaged an expenditure of £25m
185
in the regions over the following three years, an extremely small 
amount in comparison with development agency expenditure.
In 1980, Sir Keith Joseph installed two northern businessmen, both
'active in the affairs of the Confederation of British Industry1 as
chairmen of the regional boards^^. In 1981, it was announced that
the NEB was to merge with the National Research Development
Corporation to form the British Technology Group, though the two
bodies would remain statutorily independent until at least 1983^u .
The new management structure includes a specialist division covering
regional investments; however, these investments are likely to be on a
small scale, and concerned mainly with technological industry. A
further indication of the trend of regional investment activity within
the BTG was given in March 1982, when the Board announced the setting
up of two small business investment companies, with funds of
approximately £2m each, to be run in partnership with private sector
interests, and based on Merseyside and in the South-West^^. The aim
of the companies is to concentrate on small businesses in growth areas
of industry, and thus to attract private capital. In the case of the
South-West, the Western Enterprise Fund was set up with £900,000 from
the NEB and £100,000 from the private firm of Dartington and Co., with
207another £1m anticipated frcm other private sector sources . The 
development put in seme doubt the future of the two regional boards, 
which by March 1982, had only 19 investments between them^O®, and had 
invested only £8m in regions up to that year. Of the 18 investments 
outstanding at 31 st December 1981, 15 were in manufacturing, 2 of 
which were in receivership or liquidation, and 3 were venture capital 
organisations^^. This poor record might be partially explained by
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the fact that the regional boards were required to offer finance at 
commercial rates, and having none of the infrastructural powers of the 
development agencies, they offered few facilities that commercial 
institutions did not- It has also been argued that the Board never 
received funding on a large enough scale to carry out its regional 
investment role- Mitchell comments that 'the funds available for new 
initiatives were always limited1^ T h e  Board itself, however, did 
not, publicly, regard funding as the problem. The then Chairman of 
the NEB, Leslie Murphy, told the Wilson Committee in 1978 that he 'did 
not regard the NEB as being short of finance- If we find very good 
things to invest money in I would not hesitate to go to the government
9 1  1
for more, and I think I would get it'z . It is this argument which 
prompts Mitchell to the conclusion that 'given the Board's operating 
criteria, it was a lack of suitable opportunities rather than a 
shortage of funds which ultimately restrained the NEB'212.
It would seem clear now, however, that under its new political 
masters, the NEB, as part of the BTG, will be required to finance new 
investment through selling off its other assets. BTG received only 
£10m from the government in 1983/4, as opposed to £25m in the previous
91 o
year . The chairman, Sir Frederick Wood, had unsuccessfully pressed 
the government, which was reviewing the operations of the Group, to 
offer it a £100m lump sum. The government's refusal, which would 
appear to be instrumental in Sir Frederick's decision to leave BTG, 
indicates that it has decided to curtail the group's equity investment 
activities, and force it to concentrate on technology transfer work. 
It can be argued that this would have deleterious effects on the 
regions, which wish to attract labour-intensive enterprises as well as
187
high-technology ventures.
In December 1983, the government White Paper on Regional Industrial
Development commented that 'the regional investment role of the
British Technology Group is relatively minor and is concentrated on
smaller firms. The need for this may be expected to diminish in the
future as private sector agencies beccme better able to fulfil the
need for the kind of equity investment which it is designed to
m e e t ' T h e  White Paper concludes that BTG 'should not maintain a
191 ^regional investment role .
It was revealed in January 1984 that attempts were being made to
devise a private sector alternative to the regional boards, as the
investments held were considered too fragile to return immediately to
the market^ 6. it was also reported that the Northern Region TUC,




Below are outlined brief descriptions of three of the most prominent
91 ftEnterprise Boards established since the county elections of 1981 .
They represent both local authorities' desire to act positively in the 
light of rising unemployment, and their anxiety to circumvent the 
effects of the Conservative government's attempts to curb local 
authority spending.
i) Greater London Enterprise Board (GT.EB)
GLEB is a company, limited by guarantee, which became operational in 
March 1983. Its principal objective is to preserve and enhance job 
prospects in the Greater London area, and to this end it aims to 
intervene in the private sector, to develop the public sector's role 
in the economy, and to promote economic democracy.
GLC councillors are responsible for the appointment of Board members 
and the Chief Executive, and the Board is subject to operating 
guidelines issued by the GLC. The Council also draws up an annual 
funding agreement which details spending plans, and the policy 
framework within which the Board is going to work. Representatives of 
the GLC attend all GLEB Board meetings. The Board has 70 staff, 
allocated to five divisions, sector strategy, investment, area and 
property, structural planning and new technology. The Board is able 
to offer equity and loan assistance, and to acquire property and land 
for industrial purposes. The Board writes into each financial 
agreement clauses guaranteeing union recognition, compliance with the
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health and safety laws, equal pay structures and similar conditions. 
In its first year of operation, it approved £31.6m of investments. A 
corporate strategy has now been established for 1984/5, detailing 
industrial sectors to which priority will, in future be given. GLEB 
claims to have preserved or created over 2000 jobs in its first year 
of operation, and plans have been made for it to continue operating 
after the abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties in 1986. 
The future funding of the Board will provide a difficult problem for 
the Secretary of the Environment.
ii) West Midlands Enterprise Board (WMEB)
The WMEB is a company, limited by guarantee, which was established 
early in 1982, with an initial grant from West Midlands County Council 
of £3.5m. The Board 'is concerned with investment in local unquoted 
manufacturing companies through the provision of long-term equity and 
loan finance in the context of expansion, financial restructuring, 
management buy-outs, and mergers and take-overs'219. The Board has 
twelve members, eight councillors and four unpaid directors. Control 
is exercised by the dual membership of the Board and the County 
council's Economic Development Committee, which is vested in certain 
elected members. The Board also has to submit a quarterly report to 
the Economic Development Committee, and Economic Development Unit 
staff are present at Board meetings. The Board has a staff of ten, 
and by the summer of 1984 had received £8.4m in grants from the County 
Council. It has a policy of not offering more than 50% of the 
financial costs of any one project. Invested companies must sign a 
planning agreement before finance can be extended. By the end of the
1 90
1983/4 financial year, the WMEB had made 20 investments in 18 separate 
companies, totalling £5.2m. The Board had also established a 
subsidiary fund for finance capital to which the County Council had 
contributed £2.5m, and contributions had been drawn from 5 London 
borough superannuation funds. The Board does not operate a specific 
sectoral strategy but is prepared to play a pro-active role in 
liaising with local industry, and seeking out investments.
iii) West Yorkshire Enterprise Board
WYEB is -an independent canpany, limited by guarantee, and established 
in late 1982. Its objectives are to strengthen the local economy, to 
preserve existing jobs and to provide for the development of new ones. 
It is controlled by two boards; the first, the primary board, consists 
of twelve councillors, made up in a ratio of 2:1 in favour of the 
ruling party on the County Council. The second board acts in an 
advisory capacity and comprises five voting directors, all elected 
councillors, including the leaders of the three main groups on the 
council, and five non-voting directors, three senior officers of the 
Board, a representative of the Midland Bank, and a trade union 
representative. There is no formal reporting mechanism back to the 
County Council, control being exercised solely by the elected members. 
The Board can offer assistance from £10,000 up to £400,000, though 
funds are generally used to 'top-up* private sector investment. 
Conditions of investment include that the investment must remain in 
the County, that the company complies with employment legislation, and 
that trade unions be given full rights of representation. However, 
the Board does not pursue a sectoral strategy, for fear that this
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would increase the risk of financial loss by concentrating investments 
in particular industries. By June 1984 twenty firms had been assisted 
by the Board, at a total investment cost of £2.5m.
Other organisations, operating on similar lines to the above, include 
Lancashire Enterprises Limited, established by Lancashire County 
Council, and the Merseyside Enterprise Board. There are also four 
English regional development organisations, non-elected bodies made up 
of representatives of local authorities, trade unions and businesses, 
which exist to promote their respective regions as industrial 
locations, and which, under the Conservative government have received 
increased funding^O. Government grants to these organisations in 
1983/4 were as follows (1982/3 figures in brackets)^ 21 .
(£000ls)1983/4 1982/3
North of England Development Council 850 I250)
North West Industrial Development Association 260 (230)
Yorkshire and Humberside Development Association 163 (70)
Devon and Cornwall Development Bureau 110 (60)
The government's decision to increase suddenly the financial resources 
of these long-established bodies (NQRWIDA, for example, is over fifty 
years old) is ostensibly to make their position more comparable with 
that of the Scottish and Welsh development agencies. However, it has 
been argued that what the government intended was to channel local 
authority sponsored economic promotion through these bodies, in order 
to establish the local authority's role in economic development, as
192
favoured by the government, as removing 'bureaucratic' obstacles to 
company expansion, within their respective localities . This was 
the approach outlined by the Bums Committee inquiry'^, and runs 
contrary to the attitude adopted by the Labour-controlled councils 
mentioned above in connection with the establishment of enterprise 
boards.
The government has also looked favourably upon the burgeoning growth 
of local enterprise agencies in the UK. Despite the similarity of 
name, enterprise agencies and enterprise boards are separated by 'a 
wide political g u l f '2^. Enterprise agencies are 'business 
development organisations in which a number of firms in an area form a 
corporate identity through articles of association with the objective 
of helping small businesses to start up and help existing local firms 
to prosper'225. Their work is primarily demand-led, in comparison 
with the pro-active stance of the enterprise boards, and their 
philosophy owes much to the views of those who see econcmic recovery 
as being stimulated by the small business sector. It has also been 
suggested that they reflect an attitude of 'noblesse oblige' on the 
part of large companies. A recent survey of enterprise agencies 
conducted by their umbrella organisation Business in the Community 
showed that nearly 50% of the agencies resources were derived from the 
private sector^^. others maintain that it is in the long-term 
interests of such companies to reduce costs by off-loading manpower 
and premises onto the small business sector, which in turn can provide 
a valuable source of sub-contracting work. It is this lcw-cost, self- 
help type of initiative which is attractive to the present 
Conservative government. Alternatively, the Enterprise Boards can be
193
expected to form the basis of any remodelled regional policy produced 
by a future Labour administration.
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Regional development agencies in the Benelux Countries 
Benelux - the economic background
In relation to the economic geography of Europe, the countries of 
Belgium and the Netherlands and Luxembourg are in an extremely 
favourable position. They form part of a population heartland, the 
Lotharingian axis, which stretches from the Cote d'Azur to the Dutch
-I
coastline , and provides a massive domestic market. Parts of Belgium 
and the Netherlands providing coal and natural gas, figure in the Home 
Energy Production Zone , which stretches from the hydro-electric power 
producing Alpine zone of South-East France and Italy, to the North Sea 
littoral, whilst all three countries lie within the Heavy Industrial
o
Triangle , which denotes the principal area of industrial activity in 
the EEC, and contained , in 1976, 95% of coal production, and nearly 
60% of steel making capacity.
All three countries were thus favourably positioned to take advantage 
of post-war economic conditions. Willy van Rijkeghem states that the 
three economies have developed similarly since the war, with per 
capita income in each having reached $10,000 by 1979^, reflecting 
high levels of wages and industrial production. However, general 
comparisons over a period of years mask certain disparities. For 
example, since the war, whilst per capita income has doubled in 
Belgium and Luxembourg, it has tripled in the Netherlands. In the 
1950's, Belgium's economy was one of the slowest-growing in Europe,
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partly because investment was still being channelled into traditional 
economic activity and, in particular, Belgium's colonial territories®.
The interrelationship of the economies of the Benelux countries dates 
back, in terms of formal agreements, to the economic union between 
Belgium and Luxembourg in 1920®. In 1944, the London Convention laid 
the foundations for the Benelux customs union, which came into effect 
in 1948. This resulted in the lifting of all tariff barriers within 
the borders of the three countries, and the raising of common external 
tar iffs.
The formation of the European Economic Community in 1 958 was
*7
particularly beneficial to the Benelux countries . They became 
attractive as a location for foreign investors wishing to gain access 
to the new European market. During the period 1960-67, a total of 
more than 300 new foreign firms were established in Belgium, of which 
over 50% were American-owned. For the manufacturing sector alone, 
foreign investment accounted for a third of total gross investment, 
and for half of net investment between 1960 and 1972®.
The recession of 1973/4 brought to an end a period during which the 
Benelux countries had experienced the full benefits of European 
economic integration, though of the three economies, that of the 
Netherlands was best placed to withstand it, because of its reserves 
of natural gas. However, in the ensuing years, labour productivity 
and gross national product in Belgium and the Netherlands increased at 
nearly the same annual average rate, though unemployment and inflation 
were both higher in Belgium^. The Dutch used their virtual self­
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sufficiency in energy to hold down its price, and therefore contain 
inflation, but, by the end of the decade, the rate had converged with 
that of Belgium^. Belgium's higher unemployment rate during this 
period is, according to van Rijkeghem, accounted for by its higher 
female participation r a t e .  However, by December 1982, it was 
running at 14.7%^, and the annual OECD survey was predicting static 
or declining living standards for Belgians for a number of years . 
In 1981, the budget deficit accounted for nearly 13% of the country's 
output, and this has led the Centre-Right coalition of Christian 
Democrats and Liberals to introduce a series of measures designed to 
reduce the public sector borrowing requirement by 50% in four years** ^ .
Belgium - Industrial Policy
Since the royal decree of 14 October, 1959, which established the 
Belgian Office of Economic Planning, National Plans, 'five-yearly 
indicative socio-economic development programmes of a qualitative 
n a t u r e ' ^  have been issued by the government. In 1970, the 
Organisation of the Planning and Economic Decentralisation Act, 
changed both the nature and the status of the five-yearly plans. They 
became more detailed (regional and sectoral) and budgets were 
included, and they became binding on public authorities and public 
enterprises, and on private firms which entered into planning 
agreements with the government . However, as was the case in the 
United Kingdom in the mid-70's, such agreements were seldom concluded 
(only two made by the end of 1976, with Siemens and Phillips)^ and, 
as Keyser and Windle have commented, 'the Central Plan has not 
influenced the Belgian author it y to any great extent... the planning
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1 ftprocess is largely provisional and had up till now, no impact.'
The large amount of foreign investment in Belgium (see above) has 
resulted in political pressure on the government to stimulate 
indigenous industrial development. There are a number of public 
financial institutions which provide finance for industrial 
investment, including the General Savings and Retirement Fund (Caisse 
Generale d'Epargne et de Retraite), the National Company for 
Industrial Credit (Societe* Nationale de Credit \  1'Industrie - 
SNCI/NMKN) and the National Investment Company (Societe Nationale 
d'Investissement - SNI/NIM).
The SNCI provides credit for the transformation and modernisation of
1 9factories, and the development of new products . It has an 
agreement with the ccmmercial banks whereby it alone handles loans of 
over BF1 Om, whilst the banks deal with loans of less than EF5m. The 
SNI, founded in 1962, to stimulate 'the foundation, the reorganisation 
and the extension of enterprises', and to promote public economic 
initiative, carries out its functions through participation in risk- 
bearing capital. In 1976, it was converted into a state holding 
company, which can establish state controlled companies. Though it 
has increasingly been called upon by the government to assist certain 
companies in difficulties, approximately 60% of SNI participations 
concern newly-established enterprises. SNI participations are, in 
principle, temporary, and holdings of over 80% of share capital 
require the approval of the Council of Ministers. Though originally 
financed by both public and private shareholders, the SNI is now 
wholly owned by the government, which appoints the members of its
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Board.
Another important aspect of state industrial policy in Belgium is its 
involvement in pricing. A Price Commission (a tripartite body made up 
of employers, employees and consumers) advises the Minister for 
Econanic Affairs, who is responsible for pricing policy and has the 
power to set maximum prices, and to freeze them.
However, as Keyser and Windle point out, in their study of Belgian 
public enterprise, 'the Belgian government has never tried to 
implement a large-scale nationalisation programme of industry or 
commerce'^. It has only shown itself willing to intervene under 
certain specific conditions. For example, in the case of public 
transport and of mail services, intervention was based on the concern 
that particular goods and services should be produced at the lowest 
possible cost, and that this could only be achieved in these instances 
through state support. It has acted to support sectors and individual 
companies in difficulties where it considered the national interest to 
be at stake (through the potential loss of employment, or of a 
particular product). This support has generally been channelled, in 
recent times, through the SNI, but it has also involved the SNCI, and 
the government itself, for example when private companies have been 
taken into public ownership.
Belgium - Regional Problems
The regional problems of Belgium manifest themselves not only in 
econanic but in cultural terms, as represented by the language-line
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which runs across the country to the south of Brussels. To the north
of this line lies Flemish-speaking Flanders, encompassing the
bilingual metropolitan area of Greater Brussels, and to the south lies
French-speaking Wallonia. Belgium shares the problems of other
European nations in that it contains areas suffering from high
unemployment and high migration, but on top of this is superimposed at
the policy-making level, the language question. Historically, the
Wallons represented the dominant section of the population, reflecting
the pre-eminence of the French language as an administrative and
cultural medium. In the nineteenth century, the WalIonian economy
prospered, based as it was on the coal-fields of the Sambre-Meuse
valley and the related growth of heavy industries such as steel-
making. In contrast, Flanders was an agricultural area, 'a stagnant
peasant economy', and the Flems, at law as well as in practice were
001 second-class citizens . However, in the last fifty years, the two 
areas have experienced a complete reversal of fortunes. Since the 
early 1930's, Wallonia's population levels have remained almost 
static, whilst those of Flanders have grown by approximately one 
million . The Flemish-speaking community now makes up 55% of the 
total Belgian population, whilst 32% live in the French-speaking area, 
and 11% in bilingual Brussels^. The traditional industries upon 
which Wallonia's prosperity was built have been shedding manpower at a 
high rate. In the provinces of Liege and Hainault, unemployment in
nc
the coal industry declined by over 90% during the period 1953-73 .
The staple industries of the Wallonian economy remain iron, steel and 
metal manufacturing, whilst in contrast the Flemish provinces have 
made 'fairly dynamic progress'^ since the war. Estimates were made 
in 1975 that 75-90% of foreign industrial investment in Belgium was
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77going to Flanders, and the Greater Brussels area .
This stark regional difference in econanic performance has produced
social tension, for example in recent disputes over job-losses in the
steel industry. Another instance occurred in the wake of the
recession of 1958, in which Wallonia suffered through the loss of
rolling-stock production and the contraction of the coal industry,
under pressure from cheap American coal. The crisis prompted the
government to introduce a programme of measures designed to stimulate
investment in new industries, coupled with a package of fiscal
28measures and expenditure controls'. Public service workers struck
against these deflationary restrictions and their action quickly
received support from other sectors of industry in Wallonia, until the
government was faced with what amounted to a general strike in the
province. The movement foundered, however, on its inability to
mobilise workers in Flanders, which led many Wallonian politicans and
union leaders to the conclusion that 'there could be no progress for
the labour movement in the area whilst Wallonia remained tied to the
79concept of a unitary Belgium . In his analysis of the episode,
Carney argues that it was the presence of a 'politically conservative
labour reserve in Flanders which was essential to the modernisation
of the Belgian economy in the 1960's, and led to a diversion of
investment away from the traditional industries of Wallonia to the
developing ones of Flanders. Thus, the Flanders economy grew at twice
the rate of that of Wallonia in the 1960's, and in 1967 per capita
81income m  Flanders exceeded that of Wallonia for the first time . By 
1970 unemployment in Wallonia was approximately double the level of 
Flanders (5.0% as cctnpared with 2.6%), whilst in 1979 it was still
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significantly higher (13.6% as compared with 10.9%)^.
However, it would be an over-simplification to present the regional 
problems merely in terms of an expanding north and declining south. 
Just as Flanders has depressed areas, so Wallonia1 s economy is not 
uniformly depressed. The two poorest provinces are Limburg in the 
north, and Luxembourg in the south, both with only 78% of average 
income, whilst Liege, the principal Wallonian city, has, largely as 
a result of its excellent communications links, 'already adapted to a 
large extent to the decline in coal-mining, and has bright prospects 
for the future1 ^ . It remains the third richest province in Belgium,
O C
after Brabant (containing Brussels), and Antwerp^ . Likewise, 
important questions of physical planning revolve around the 
development of the so-called 'Brussels-Antwerp growth axis'. Brussels 
has grown enormously since it became the effective administrative 
centre of the EEC, and some 200,000 people commute daily to the city 
frcm areas as far away as the Ardennes^. Coupled with the expansion 
of Antwerp as an international port, and the presence of a third 
industrial centre in Ghent, this area constitutes Belgium's 'golden 
t r i a n g l e a n d ,  as urbanisation pushes northwards, ccmmentators have 
spoken of a 'Middengebiet' area of five million inhabitants, 
stretching frcm Brussels to the north of Amsterdam^®. Just as Dutch 
planners have regulated the growth of the Randst ad with its 
' greenheart', so their Belgian counterparts will need to balance the 
growth of the northern metropolitan conurbation against the 
deindustrialisation of other parts of the country.
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Regional Policies
Regional problem areas were first recognised by the government through 
the Regional Expansion Law of 1959, though those areas designated were 
primarily agricultural, covering about 15% of the population^ . 
Assisted areas had to have one or more of the following 
characteristics:- high permanent unemployment, heavy out-migration, 
large socially or economically unsettling commuting movements, and an 
actual or impending decline of important economic activities. 
However, the measures associated with their special status were so 
marginal that they provided little incentive for companies to invest 
in them, rather than anywhere else in the country. Subsequently, in 
1966, these zones were superceded by regions in industrial decline, in 
particular those dependent on the coal and textile industries, which 
were termed Zones of Economic Reconversion and Development. These 
included the west of West Flanders, the south of East Flanders, the 
north of Hainault and the area around Liege, as well as much of North 
East Belgium, and covered 35% of the population. The regional 
differential within existing incentive measures was increased, and a 
new capital grant was introduced, as were fiscal concessions, of which 
the main element was accelerated depreciation.
In 1970, new criteria for the designation of problem areas were 
introduced including the presence of serious structural unemployment, 
abnormally low standards of living, and slow economic growth, but the 
actual areas remained much the same, whilst being divided into two 
categories - Category I Development Zones were those mainly industrial 
areas designated in 1966, and Category II Development Zones were the
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mainly agricultural areas designated in 1959 and dropped in 1966. In 
all, the areas now covered 42% of the population. The existing 
incentives were increased and the sectoral coverage of incentives 
extended to particular service industries. In September 1971, a plan 
to create assisted areas in 41 of the 44 administrative districts of 
Belgium was vetoed by the European Commission as being too wide- 
ranging for regional policy purposes. Whilst negotiations took place 
over the Commission's counter-proposal of assisted areas in 28 
districts, the 1970 legislation remained in force. Indeed, changes to 
the composition of assisted areas were not finally approved until 
198240.
One of the most important developments in relation to regional policy 
was the increased demand for decentralisation of decision-making, 
which has been mentioned above in the context of the 1960/61 Wallonian 
strike. As early as 1959, the Regional Expansion Law had included 
provision for the establishment of 1 interccmmunales de developpement 
econcmique' (local econanic development councils), whose aim was to 
promote the economic development of their own area through the 
attraction of investment, and which had the power to buy land and 
lease it to industry at cheap rates. In 1961, the Flemings finally 
achieved equality at law for their language, through legislation which 
also defined the 'language line'. The work of a government 
commission established in 1963 to examine Belgian central institutions 
and which called for extensive decentralisation was recognised in the 
Regionalisation Law of 1970, which provided for:
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i) regional econanic councils (conseils econcmiques regionaux - 
CER's), one each for Flanders (CERF), Wallonia (CERW) and 
Brabant (CERB). Each had 50 members drawn from the national 
parliament, the provincial councils, and employers' and 
employees' organisations. They had the power to advise and to 
make recommendations.
ii) The Bureau for Industrial Promotion (Office de Promotion 
Industrielle - OPI), a national research body which seeks out 
viable projects for private industry, and was to be administered 
by the CER's.
iii) Central Economic Planning Office (Bureau de Plan) made up of a 
central division, a sectoral division and three regional 
divisions. The regional divisions consisted of appointees of 
the relevant CER's.
iv) Regional development companies (societies de develops^ment 1 
regionale - SDR's) to be set up by provincial councils with the 
following aims - to study econanic development in the region, to 
outline the particular needs of the region, to advise and co­
ordinate within the region the sectoral activities of the 
national five-year plan, and to provide investment finance for 
industrial projects where sufficient funds could not be had from 
the private sector41. Seven SDR's were established, one in each
of the provinces of Flanders, and one each for Brussels and 
Wallonia. The Wallonians chose to have one large agency, rather 
than separate ones for each province, because their economic
2 1 2
base was relatively homogeneous, and because, whilst Flanders 
already had five mini-SDR's in the form of local economic 
councils, Wallonia did not have these at a provincial level.
The law of 8 August 1980 extended the devolution of power to regional 
institutions, through the vesting of sole authority in certain matters 
to community councils ((communautes) and regional councils (regions). 
Both councils are sub-divided into a Council and an Executive, and in 
Flanders the ccrnmunity council carries out the functions also of a 
regional council. The ccrnmunity councils have responsibility for 
particular cultural and educational matters, whilst regional councils 
have responsibility for broader policy areas. These areas are those 
of :-
i) urban and regional policy
ii) the environment
iii) rural renewal and nature conservation
iv) housing
v) water
vi) economic policy (with the exception of that which relates to the
coal, shipbuilding, packaging, textile and iron and steel




xi) local government institutions
x) applied research
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Within the limits of their remit, the powers of the councils are 
exclusive, but a dual system of legal controls is exercised over them 
by the legislative section of the Council of State, and higher 
authories such as the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Court of 
Arbitration. Defalque argues that, at present, the regions have great 
political weight in that, even in areas outside their competence, 
central government dare not act without first consulting them, thus 
delaying the decision-making process, whilst, conversely, the councils 
are under no obligation to inform central government of their 
decisions^. The position has been aggravated as a result of the 
legislative elections of the autumn of 1981, in that the ccrnmunity 
council and regional council are dominated by the Socialist party, 
which is opposed to the central government coalition, headed by Prime 
Minister Wilfred Martens, which is made up of Christian Democrats and 
Liberals. However, the government remains committed to a transfer of 
financial resources to the regional authorities, despite its overall 
policy of reducing public expenditure.
Developments in regional economic policy which have taken place 
recently have included a measure giving special financial aid to small 
and medium-sized companies in 1978, and the introduction of a number 
of tax-free enterprise zones (T-zones), within the boundaries of which 
companies will, for a ten-year period, be exempt from a range of 
taxation measures^.
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Belgium - Industry and Finance
In recent years there has been considerable expansion in Belgium in 
the field of financial intermediaries functioning to supply medium and 
long-term credit to Belgian industry and canmerce. According to a 
recent survey of European banking, a number of these organisations 
have been created in the public sector, reflecting on the part of the 
government 'a concern to fill a gap left by the private sector which 
alone cculd not bring about the transfer of funds from the econanic 
agents with a surplus to those with a deficit'^.
One such organisation, the Societe^ Nationale de Credit a 
l'lndustrie/National Maatschappij voor Krediiet aan de Nijverheid 
(SNCI/NMKN) was actually established as far back as 1919 with the 
objective of granting medium or long-term loans to Belgian industrial, 
agricultural and canmercial enterprises in order to stimulate the 
transformation and modernization of industrial plant, the 
establishment of new enterprises and the reorganisation of public 
enterprises. However, in 1968, the State concluded an agreement with 
the SNCI/NMKN whereby the latter was charged with the execution, on 
behalf of the State, of credit operations with regard to companies in 
severe financial difficulties, and without recourse to alternative 
sources of credit. It also maintains a 'gentleman's agreement' with 
the financial institutions (both public and private) according to 
which the market for credit to industry is split. In principle the 
SNCI provides credits of more than BF(Belgian Francs) 10m, and the 
banks provide credits of less than BF5m (1975 figures)^.
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The Societe Nationale d'Investissement/Nationale Investerings 
Maatschappij (SNI/NIM) was founded in 1962 as a semi-public company. 
The preamble to the Act which established it stated that 'our country 
needs a financial institution which will, together with the private 
sector, provide and assist industrial development in particular among 
small and medium-sized enterprises'^. A further Act of 1976 
transformed the SNI/NIM into a public holding company, the State 
buying up all private shareholdings. The SNI/NIM has two main 
objectives, to stimulate in the interest of the Belgian economy, the 
foundation, the reorganisation or the extension of enterprises and co­
operatives, and to promote public econanic initiative. The operations 
of the SNI/NIM can include the taking up of shares, the issuing of 
bonds and contracting of loans. It is also asked by the State to 
intervene to help companies in difficulties, sometimes in conjunction 
with the SNCI^.
Regional investment companies were established in Wallonia in 1979 and 
in Flanders in 1980. The Wallonian company, the Societe' Regionale 
d ' Invest is sement de Wallonie (SRIW) was originally established under 
the control of the central government, but responsibility was 
transferred to the Wallonian Regional Executive under the laws of 
August 1980. Reflecting the difficulties experienced in finding an 
acceptable compromise concerning the regional government of Brussels, 
no investment company for the area was established until 1984.
The investment companies have the obj ectives of developing private 
enterprise within their respective regions, promoting the regional 
economy through public initiative, and assisting the regional
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48executive to implement regional industrial policy . To this end, the 
investment companies can make equity investments in companies, set up 
companies, acquire industrial property, and administer grants 
available under the economic expansion laws. Their capital is derived 
from the budgets of the regional executives, and also from the 
Industrial Renovation Fund (F.R.I/F.I.V) set up in 1978 by the central 
government to assist industrial reconversion projects and companies 
involved in technical innovation. In 1980 the capital of the fund was 
made directly available to the regional investment companies on the 
condition that they satisfied certain investment criteria.
As well as investing capital on their own initiative, the investment 
companies also maintain separate portfolios on. behalf of their 
Regional Councils. Investments in this latter category are more 
likely to take the form of 'rescue missions' in connection with more 
mature or declining local industries. As will be shown, the 
establishment of the regional investment companies has had a 
considerable effect on regional development agencies in the Flemish 
and Walloon regions: in Wallonia, the SRIW at first assumed the 
investment portfolio of the SDRW, and then in conjunction with the 
Wallonian Regional Executive took over the rest of its 
responsibilities, the SDRW subsequently being wound up. It may well 
transpire that the regional investment companies will eventually come 
to resemble more in their structure and operations, the UK regional 
agencies than do Belgian agencies at present.
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Societe De Developpement Regionale De Wallonie - SDRW
i) Statutory purposes, powers and functions.
Provision for the establishment of regional development 
agencies in Belgium was first made under the Regionalisation 
L a w  of 1 970 , as par t  of the b r o a d e r  m e a s u r e s  of 
decentralisation which formed the main part of this 
legislation^. According to the statute, each agency was to 
be constituted as 'un organisme de droit public, dote de la 
personality civile.' Their purposes were to be fourfold:
a) to carry out a general study on the concept and promotion of 
econcmic development
b) to carry out a specific study on the needs of the particular 
region
c) to fulfill a general advisory and co-ordinating role in 
respect of the various sectoral activities outlined in 
Belgium's five-year econcmic plan
d) to support industrial projects where sufficient funds are 
not available frcm the private sector^
The Royal Decree of 16 September 1973 laid down details of 
central government control over the agencies (see below, 
'Control'), whilst the statutes of the SDRW were approved, and 
the details of how its aims were to be carried out contained in 
a further decree of 17 December 1973^.
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Control
Upon its establishment the SDRW was made formally accountable 
to the Belgian parliament or 'conseil des ministres', and the 
King, who is constitutionally responsible for the signing and 
enforcement of legislation. In practice, supervision was 
exercised by the Ministere des Finances (Ministry of Finance), 
but as the SDRW became less reliant on central government for 
funding, so its control diminished.
Under the terms of the Royal Decree of 16 September 1973 a 
Government Commissioner has the right to attend meetings of the 
Administrative Council of the SDRW, in the capacity of an 
observer. There is also a Finance Inspector who is responsible 
for checking the SDRW's accounts. This officer reports to the 
Government Commissioner.
The constitutional changes of 1979-80 brought the SDRW under 
the direct control of the Wallonian Regional Executive, 
devolving as they did responsibility for a whole range of 
activities, including regional and economic policy, from 
central to regional government. This had the effect, for 
example, that equity funding of enterprises by the SDRW which 
had previously been approved and financed by the central 
Ministry of Finance, was taken over by the Regional Executive, 
which was empowered to instruct the SDRW to invest in 
particular companies through 'missions deleguees'.
The other main aspect of the SDRW's work, the 'cellules', or 
units, could be initiated by either central or regional 
government, which awarded the SDRW a fixed term contract to 
carry out certain specified tasks, and provided a budget to 
cover the period agreed. Each of the cellules were monitored 
by a ' comite^ d 'acccmpagnement'.
As well as its external accountability, the SDRW in its 
operations was also answerable to its supreme governing body, 
the General Assembly, a feature which will be discussed below 
('internal structure').
iii) Budget and source of funds (See also Table 1)
In the later years of its activity the funds of the SDRW were 
derived from four main sources. It had received an initial 
starting capital of 9m Belgian Francs from the five provinces 
which make up the Wallonian Region and it continued to receive 
an annual grant from the province of Brabant. The legislation 
prescribing the SDRW's staff limits also made provision for 
annual labour subsidies from the State to be granted to cover 
the cost of wages. Central and regional government funded the 
cellules according to the terms of the contract made in each 
individual case. Finally, the SDRW was also able to draw 
credits frcm a National Parallel Credit Fund, which according 
to a distinctive Belgian compromise was established to 
distribute funds to Wallonia in proportion to funds disbursed 
by the central government for the development of the Flemish
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port of Zeebrugge. Equity activities, before being transferred 
to the S.R.I.W, were funded firstly by central, and then, 
after 1979, by regional government. The SDRW also negotiated 
two special loans (dotations octroyees) from the State in 1976 
and 1979 to enable it to overcome temporary financial 
difficulties.
As can be gathered from the preceding caiments, the budget was 
to a large extent determined by the modes of funding, because 
different SDRW functions were covered by different sources of 
finance, such as the 'cellules1 and 'missions delegu^es'.
iv) Internal Structure (See also Fig. 1)
As mentioned above, the staffing levels of the SDRW were 
determined by Royal Decrees. This was initially established at 
12 by a Decree of 15 October 1975; it was increased to 50 on 3 
March 1977, and 116 on 1 July 1980. The staff was also 
supplemented by unemployed workers recruited on government- 
funded schemes.
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TABLE 1 SDRW - Annual Subsidies and Grants
1979 1980 1981
Labour subsidy from the State 64,900,000 69,700,000 67,900,000
Subsidy from province of Brabant - 1,099,312 1,143,068
Research grants for 'cellules' 148,887,899 121,695,947 134,125,905
Parallel credit funding 3,891,102 3,845,482 6,952,742
Special subsidy frcm MEURA 517,241
Variation of stocks of Products
in the proces of manufacture - - 402,178
TOTAL 218,196,242 196,330,741 210,523,893
MEURA - a private company in which the SDRW held equity.






























Research and Finance 
Division
1. MTC Unit - Unit for the management of technical contracts ('Cellule de 
Gestion des Contracts Technologiques')
2. TPSME Unit - Unit for the technological promotion of small and medium 
sized enterprises ('Cellule de Promotion Technologique dns Entreprises 
independantes')
2 2 2
Overall responsibility for the running of the SDRW rested with 
the General Assembly, which was made up of 32 members, 16 
designated by the provincial councils, on a geographic basis, 
and eight each from representatives of trade union 
organisations, and eight from representatives of industry and 
agriculture. All members are appointed on a four-year 
renewable mandate. The General Assembly customarily met only 
once a year to receive the SDRW's annual report, to elect its 
president, and to nominate the members of the 'Administrative 
Council'. It could, however, be summoned to meet in emergency 
session.
Responsibility for the management of the SDRW fell to the 
Administrative Council, a 16 member body, nominated by the 
General Assembly, and mirroring its representative composition, 
namely eight members nominated by the provincial councils, and 
four each from trade unions, and representatives of industry 
and agriculture. Its practice was to meet fortnightly in order 
to superintend the administration of the SDRW.
Day-to-day management of the SDRW was, however, carried out by 
a third tier of organisation, known as the Executive office, 
and consisting of the President and Vice-President of the SDRW, 
the General Administrator and the Secretary-General. This 
committee reported to the Administrative Council.
The final tier of internal control was represented in the 
Techinical Council, a group made up of one representative of
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each of the eleven Wallonian 1 intercomnunales', four members of 
the SDRW's Administrative Council, and two representatives of 
the CERW (Conseil Economique pour la Region Wallonie). This 
body had the task of monitoring the joint research projects of 
the SDRW and the 1 intercommunales1.
Beneath the executive structure, the operational units of the 
SDRW were divided into two main sections: the 'core' divisions, 
which were directly responsible to the higher management of the 
SDRW, and the 'cellules', existing on fixed-term contracts, 
funded by either central or regional government.
v) Expenditure
The level of SDRW expenditure is particularly difficult to 
gauge on an annual basis, not least because money was allocated 
to the 'cellules', for example, to cover a number of years, the 
exact time period varying, according to the nature of the 
contract. Moreover, as the Societe carried out functions on 
behalf of both central and regional government, who funded 
these activities accordingly, the SDRW 's expenditure figures 
may not give an accurate picture of the scale of its 
operations. Figures taken from successive Annual Reports 
suggest that the Societe's expenditure (excluding that of the 
'cellules') may have amounted annually to no more than £3m, the 




The reasons for the establishment of the SDRW and other 
agencies in Belgium are generally perceived as being twofold; 
the need to reform and decentralise Belgium's central 
institutions^, and the recognition that the traditional
CO
regional policy methods were no longer effective . A special 
ccmmision was set up in 1963 to investigate the possibility of 
transferring power from national government to the regions. 
Its report and recommendations led directly to legislation in 
1970, which recognised the existence of three distinct 
linguistic communities*^. However, the legislation also 
altered the nature of economic planning. in Belgium. It 
established the Bureau de Plan (Central Planning Office) which, 
with its regional divisions was to be responsible for the 
compilation of a five-year plan, which was to be binding on 
public authorities and public companies. Regional economic 
councils (CER's) were also formed in each linguistic region, 
comprising members of the national parliament and the 
provincial councils. The plan, which had originally been 
introduced in 1959, was therefore to contain a more precise 
regional and sectoral emphasis and was to be drawn up by 
broader consultation at a more local level. It is in this 
context that the provision for the establishment of Sdr/gom's 
(societe de developpement regional/ gewestelijke ontwikkelings 
maatschappij) was made, with the specific requirements that 
such bodies carry out studies on the economic development and 
related needs of their region, and that they 'fulfil a general
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advisory and co-ordinating role in respect of the various 
sectoral activities outlined in Belgium's five-year economic 
plan1 (See above, 'statutory purposes, functions and 
powers'.)
Wallonia opted for an sdr at a regional rather than a 
provincial level, apparently because it was felt that economic 
problems of a relatively homogenous nature were common 
throughout Wallonia, and that the most appropriate way to 
canbat them was at a regional level. This decision was taken 
by the provincial council on the recommendation of the CERW, 
responsibility for the setting up of sdr/goms having been 
placed in the hands of the provincial councils by the Royal 
Decree of 17 September 1973. However, it was not until 1976 
that the SDRW became fully operational. According to the 
central government, the SDRW was categorised as 1une 
institution de transition', a transitional institution, 
facilitating the devolution of economic power from a national 
to a regional level, and the winding-up of the organisation was
C C
debated from an early stage of its history3 0 . The 
constitutional reforms of 1980 devolved responsibility for 
economic matters, amongst other activities, to the regional 
executives. These bodies also assumed control of the regional 
investment companies established in 1978, and in January 1981 
the SDRW's investment portfolio was transferred to the SRIW. 
On 30 June 1983 the SDRW was formally dissolved, and its staff 
reallocated to other regional institutions. Below, a brief 
description is given of the activities it carried out during 
the eight years of its existence.
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Financial assistance to enterprises
The SDRW was initially able to take equity shareholdings in 
companies; these generally took the form of 'missions deleguees', or 
interventions ordered by central government. However, the SDRW was 
able to submit proposals for investment to the Ministry of Finance for 
approval. By the end of 1980, prior to the transfer of its holdings 
to the SRIW, the Societe had built up a portfolio containing twenty- 
five companies, valued at 393 BF (Belgian Francs) or approximately £5m 
sterling-^. After the constitutional changes of 1980, it carried out 
for a brief period 'missions deleguees' for the Wallonian Regional 
Executive.
The only form of financial assistance that the SDRW was offering to 
private industry immediately prior to its abolition was that provided 
fay the Unit for the Technological Promotion of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, in the form of loans to technologically-innovative 
businesses. These loans consisted of either repayable advances or 
debentures, and in 1981 , 95.5 M BF were loaned to 13 companies^®.
Research activities
Seen in an overall light, the work of the SDRW was particularly biased 
toward research and information-gathering operations for the benefit 
of government and industry, and this trend was accentuated by the 
transfer of the investment function in 1981. Three core departments, 
Research and Finance, Regional Policy, and Social Affairs were heavily 
involved in research work, as were a number of the 'cellules'. As
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well as helping to co-ordinate the implementation of the five-yearly 
plan, the SDRW was also involved in compiling it through its work on 
an inventory of social and economic needs in the region. It also 
prepared work for the Regional Economic Plan (Plan Regional 
d 1Amenagement du Territoire Wallon - PRATW). It published various 
maps on the regional breakdown of agriculture, social services, land 
use and other factors in Wallonia, and undertook considerable sectoral 
research in areas such as natural resources, energy and transport. 
The Social Affairs Division was active in researching standards of 
health care, education and training, and facilities for the disabled, 
amongst other social needs. Sane of this work was released to the 
public but its primary purpose was to be transmitted to regional and 
national government.
The 'Cellules1
As explained above, the cellules constituted a distinct part of the 
SDRW structure for, whilst they were administered by the SDRW, they 
were established and funded, and their remit defined, by either 
central or regional government.
Most prominent amongst them was the Housing Unit. Housing was 
originally a function directly administered by the SDRW under the 
terms of a Convention signed by the Societe and the State in December 
1977, the aim of which was to lower the cost of housing in Wallonia 
and revitalise canmercial activity in the regional housing industry. 
The Unit, however, which assumed responsibility for housing under the 
terms of the * Convention1 in 1979, concentrated on building with
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experimental materials and new architectural designs. As a result, 
only a small number of properties were constructed, at a cost which 
was not below normal market prices.
The Unit for the Technical Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises was established in 1979, with the aim of creating 
employment in technically-innovative small and medium-sized 
businesses. Its main function, the provision of loan capital to such 
companies, has been dealt with above (See 'Financial assistance to 
companies').
Under the terms of a Royal Decree in 1974, responsibility for the 
treatment of both domestic and industrial waste was given to the 
regional government, and as a result a Unit was established within the 
SDRW to undertake research and generally advise the regional 
authorities on the subject.
The Urban Heating Unit was formed in 1977, initially to undertake 
research into urban heating systems. In 1980 the Wallonian Regional 
Executive put the Unit in charge of introducing a developed system to 
five sites in the region, in conjunction with the 'communes' (district 
authorities).
The Unit for the Management of Technical Contracts was directly 
responsible to the Regional Executive. It was set up in 1979 to carry 
out the function of administering and monitoring all industrial 
research and development contracts made between the regional executive 
and commercial enterprises in Wallonia. It also undertook studies
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into research and development on behalf of the regional government.
Societe de developpement regional de Bruxelles - SDRB
I
i) Statutory purposes, functions and powers.
Provision was made for the establishment of the SDRB, as with 
other SDR/GOMS, in the legislation concerning planning and 
economic decentralisation of 15 July 1970^. Its statutes were 
subsequently embodied in the Royal Decree of 16 July 1974^. 
The Societe" is therein classified as an 'organisme de droit 
public dote^ de la personnalite civile', and its statutory 
responsibilities combine the functions of a regional 
development agency as laid down by the 1970 legislation, and 
those of a local economic development council (interccmmunale 
de developpement econcmique). The former, as detailed above in 
the section on the SDRW, include the compiling of an inventory 
of regional needs, the transmission to the regional economic 
council of information useful to the elaboration of the 
regional plan, property operations, and public economic 
initiatives. The latter is a general function which permits 
the SDRB to advise the public authorities and other relevant 
parties on all matters relating to 'amenagement du territoire1, 
roughly speaking, regional or territorial policy, within the 
Brussels agglomeration. Legislation in 1922 had originally 
allowed for the formation of intercommunales, or groups of 
ccmmunes which came together to provide ccmmon services for the 
areas within their responsibilities. The Economic Expansion
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Law of 18 July 1959 made provision for the formation of 
intercommunales to deal with problems of economic development, 
but because of the problems of the bilingual Brussels community 
in finding agreed structures of government and representation, 
no such organisations were formed in the city. Thus, central 
government gave the SDRB responsibility for those matters 
which are in Flanders and Wallonia handled by intercommunales 
de developpement econcmique. In this way, as will be seen, the 
SDRB has developed differently to other sdr/goms in Belgium.
In order to carry out its function, the SDRB, which according 
to legislation constitutes 'le seul organe d 1 execution de la 
politique economique regionale sur le territoire de 
1'arrondissement administratif de Bruxelles-Capitale'^  (the 
sole implementing body concerning regional economic policy in 
the Central Brussels area), was granted various powers 
according to the 1974 statutes. These include the power to co­
ordinate public and private sector bodies in promoting social 
and economic development, to take 'positive action1 to 
accelerate or amplify any public or private investments 
envisaged in the five-year plan, to buy, sell, let and equip, 
houses, business premises, and land, and if necessary, to 
acquire these by means of compulsory purchase.
ii) Control
The operations of the SDRB are regulated by three main
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statutes, the law of 1 5 July 1970, the law of 1 March 1922 
relating to interccmmunales, and the Economic Expansion Law of 
18 July 1959. It is also subject to government control under 
the terms of the Royal Decree of 16 September 1973 discussed 
above in relation to the SDRW. The General Assembly of the 
Societe itself appoints a company auditor (reviseur 
d 1 entreprise) who reports not only on the annual accounts, but 
also on the management of the Societe by the Administrative 
Council. The Brussels region does not as yet have a structure 
of self -government as the other linguistic regions do, and the 
SDRB is therefore responsible to a Regional Ministry, set up 
within the framework of national government.
iii) Source of funds. (See also Table 2)
Under the law of 15 July 1970, the SDRB receives an annual
subsidy from the budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
It also raises money through commercial channels with the
permission of the Finance Minister. These loans can be backed
by guarantees from the state, the province, the city 
authorities, or the communes. The Societe's initial capital 
was originally subscribed by the communes of the city, and the 
province of Brabant, to the sum of 5,700,000EF.
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TABLE 2 SDRB - Source of Funds 1981 and 1982
1982
Financing of running costs (Initial)
Operating grant from the Region 25,000,000
Operating grant from the Province 15,700,000
Grant from the Region in lieu of 92,711,000
inherited functions
Capital subsidies for activities 4,000,000
carried out on behalf of the Province
Own funds 36,292,788
Total 169,703,788


























The Societe's governing body, the General Assembly, is made up 
of 96 members, elected for renewable terms of four years. 16 
members are provided by the Brussels section of the provincial 
council of Brabant, 32 by the joint committee of the conference 
of burgomasters and the Metropolitan College (la Carmission de 
contact entre la Conference des bourgmestres de l1Agglomeration 
bruxelloise et le college de 1'agglomeration de Bruxelles) with 
at least one representative from each of the 19 communes, and 
24 by the employers' and trade union organisations. The 
Assembly must meet at least twice a year, being convened by the 
Societe's administrative council, the members of which it 
elects. The Administrative Council consists of 24 members and 
carries out the general management of the Societe, using 
extensive powers including that of framing its internal rules. 
The Societe's president and administrator-general are appointed 
by the Administrative Council, which also chooses two vice- 
presidents. The president presides over meetings of both the 
General Assembly, and the Administrative Council. The 
president, administrator-general, two vice-presidents and eight 
members of the Administrative Council, six from the local 
authorities group and two from that of the employers and trade 
union organisations, appointed by the Council itself, form its 
Executive Committee.
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The Societe itself has five Departments, covering general 
services, financial and economic planning, technical services, 
regional policy and housing, and company support, and employs a 
staff of 27^. Like the SDRW (its Wallonian counterpart) the 
SDRB administers a number of units (cellules) which are 
entrusted with specific tasks by government such as the 
Brussels urban heating unit (cellule chauffage urbain 
bruxellois) and the technology unit (cellule technologie). In 
1984, only one cellule or 'mission deleguee' was still 
operating, the urban heating unit.
The SERB also operates, in conjunction with local universities, 
two ' commissions mixtes1, composed of representatives of the 
SDRB, and academic and administrative staff of the University, 
which meet to discuss economic projects of common interest.
v) Expenditure (See also Table 3)
As with the SDRW, the expenditure of the SDRB is, to a large 
extent, dictated from year to year by the nature of its 
funding, which is. often linked to a specific function carried 
out by the Societe. For example, an annual subsidy is received 
for the payment of staff salaries, and the 'cellules' are 
financed by the Regional Executive. The manner in which the 
SDRB presents its accounts makes the calculation of annual 
expenditure totals, according to individual budget heads and 
overall expenditure, extremely difficult. In 1981, sums 
expended on investment, acquisition and development of land and
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buildings, infrastructure and urban renovation, and the 
repayment of loans, amounted to 278,740,000EF (£3.7m). If one 
adds to this, running costs, financial charges, and loan 
repayments, at 1 80,627,382BF (£2.4m), then total 1981 
expenditure amounts to 459,367,382EF or £6.1m^. During 1981 
and 1982, the emphasis on expenditure changed from the 
acquisition of land and buildings, to the development of 
industrial sites and the renovation of industrial buildings. 
This is reflected in the projected budget for infrastructure 
and renovation projects in 1982, which amounted to 
217,000.000 BF (approx £3m) compared with an expenditure of 
16,300,000EF (£0.2m) under that head in the previous year.
vi) History
The functions which the Societe carries out can broadly be 
divided into four categories:
a ) Planning
- the co-ordination of regional development plans to take 
in the needs of local economic interests
- the provision of information relevant to the formation 
of the plan to the regional executive, including an 
inventory of local needs.
b) Infrastructural provision
- the provision, servicing and management of industrial 
sites for businesses, including special sites for
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scientific research
- maintenance of an inventory of unoccupied buildings.
c) Business support
- information service for businesses concerning 
administrative requirements and means of financial 
support
- liason between businesses and financial institutions
- instigation of industrial projects, if necessary, in 
collaboration with the OPI (Office de Promotion 
I n d u s t r i e l l e ) and the SNI (Societe National 
d 'Investissement)
- participation in 1 rescue missions1, through membership 
of the special purpose committee, established by the 
Secretary of State for the Regional Economy to help 
business concerns in difficulties
- talcing equity investment in private companies
- bringing together companies with converging interests.
d) Urban renovation
- technical assistance toward urban renovation
- co-ordination of certain urban renovation projects
At the local level, the Societe is engaged in implementing the 
regional plan through 'commissions de concertation' which 
operate in each commune, and adjudicate on the right to proceed 
with projects which do not accord with the primary function of 
the area, as designated by the Plan.
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As mentioned above, the SDRB compiles an inventory of the 
region's needs for the Five-year Plan, in close collaboration 
with the C.E.R.B and the Bureau du Plan.
With regard to its role in the provision and maintenance of 
industrial sites, the SDRB pursued, up to 1982, a vigorous 
policy of acquisition and fitting out of industrial land and 
property. By that date, the Societe had acquired 94 hectares 
of land, 37 of which it was managing on behalf of the state, 
and 35 hectares of which was then occupied. The SDRB has not 
merely stuck to the construction of standard advance factories, 
but has diversified with the creation of science parks and 
common industrial properties for small businesses. SDRB 
property appears to be in considerable demand and tenants for 
the properties have to be approved by the Administrative 
Council. The Societe has a list of criteria which such 
companies must meet, which include the creation of a specified 
number of jcbs per hectare of land leased. It does not sell 
property, and has the power to make ccmpulsory purchase of land 
adjoining existing businesses in order to prevent them having 
to leave the Brussels conurbation if they should wish to 
expand.
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TABLE 3 SDRB Expenditure 1981
BF
Investments 4,015,000
Acquisition of land and buildings 228,425,000
Infrastructural provision and 16,300,000
renovation
Repayment of loans 80,536,411
Running costs 130,090,971
Total 459,367,382
Source: SDRB annual reports.
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The SDRB does not give financial assistance to companies, save 
in extreme circumstances. In 1982, the Societe had one 
investment in a company manufacturing medical apparatus, 
CELEBQR, (8mEF), which was taken in conjunction with the SNI, 
in view of the important nature of the company in relation to 
the Brussels economy, but its policy then was to abstain from 
further investment pending the establishment of the SRIB. The 
Societe can, however, offer advice and information to companies 
on all the available assistance from both national and regional 
authorities, and can assist in the location of suitable 
industrial premises, and the arrangement of financial support. 
Over the first eight years of its operations, the Societe 
claims to have had such contact with over 1800 firms^.
Flemish GOM's (Gewestelijke ontwikkelingsmaatschappij)
In the following section, the five Flemish GOM's will be dealt with
together. They are:
GOM Antwerpen (GOMA)
GOM voor We s t-V laanderen (GOMWV)
GOM voor Oost-Vlaanderen (GOMOV)
GOM voor Vlaams-Brabant (GOMVB)
GOM Limburg (GOM-L)
i) Statutory purposes, functions and pavers.
Provision was made for the establishment of sdr/goms, as 
mentioned above, under the terms of the law of 15 July 1970 
relating to economic planning and decentralisation*^. The law 
gave authority to provincial councils to establish the 
agencies, and in Flanders a GOM was formed in each province. 
Their tasks were:
a) The general study, conception and promotion of economic 
development in their province.
b) Compilation of an inventory of the needs of the region, and 
passing on information relevant to the drawing up of a 
regional plan.
c) Right to make proposals to the private sector and the 
government and to co-ordinate proposals relating to the 
promotion of economic activity, physical planning, and other 
activities relating to the Regional Plan.
d) Acceleration or encouragement of public or private 
investment embodied in the Plan by compulsory purchase, 
developing, letting or selling property or taking any other 
form of action.
e) Execution in its own right or on behalf of the national 
government, provinces or municipalities of all compulsory 
purchases, and public works of a technical character.
f) Initiation of projects in conjunction with private sector, 
GIMV or NIM66.
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As well as having the power of canpulsory purchase, the right 
to deal in property, and to advise public and private bodies in 
matters relating to regional development, the GOM's were also 
able to invest in local companies. However, this power was 
superceded by the advent of the GIMV (Gewestelijke 
Investeringsmaatschappij voor Vlaanderen), which took over the 
investment portfolios of the GOM's in 1981.
ii) Control
As with other sdr/gcms in Belgium, the operations of the GOMs 
are regulated by the laws of 15 July 1970 and 17 September 
1973, the latter making provision for the appointment of two 
officials, a Government Commissioner and a Finance Inspector to 
supervise the activities of each GOM. The GOMs act in 
accordance with the wishes of the Flemish Regional Executive.
iii) Source of Funds (See also Table 5)
The bulk of the GOMs funding takes the form of a State 
allowance to cover running costs, provided for by the 1970 
legislation. This is presently administered by the regional 
executive. The GOMVB, for example, received 23m. francs or 
approximately £300,000 in this way in 1981, together with a 
grant from the province of Brabant of 3.7m francs (approx. 
£50,000) and sundry other incane amounting to 2.9m francs 
(approx. £40,000). Its total income in that year, including 
the balance brought over from the previous year's activities
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was 38m francs or approximately £500,000 . Similarly, the
GOM-L had an income of 33m francs (£450,000) in 1982^.
iv) Internal structure (See also Table 4 and Fig 2)
The governing structures of the five GOM's are of a uniform 
nature, each comprising a General Assembly (Algemene 
vergadering), a Board of Directors (raad van beheer) and a 
Board of Commissioners (College der Commissarissen). 
Membership of all these bodies is divided equally between on 
the one hand representatives of the public sector such as 
provincial and municipal councillors, and staff of 
intermunicipal institutions, and, on the other, representatives 
of the private sector including employers from industrial, 
trade, and agricultural organisations, and representatives of 
employees' organisations. The General Assembly usually meets 
two or three times a year to receive the GOM's Annual Report 
and to discuss the GOM's overall policy. The Board of 
Directors is composed of members of the General Assembly and 
meets between three and six times each year. Similarly, the 
Board of Canmissioners meets periodically through the year to 
act in a supervisory capacity in relation to the activities of 
the GOM. The Board is composed of a small number of members of 
the General Assembly, supplemented by the GOM's auditor, and 
the state-appointed Government Commissioner and Finance 
Inspector, who all sit in an advisory capacity. The overall 
management of the GOM is carried out by a Management Committee 
(Directiecomite), which is also made up of General Assembly
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members fran public and private sectors, and customarily meets 
once a month, or every other month. The GOM's therefore make a 
clear distinction between the policy-making, supervisory, and 
implementing structures of their organisation. This latter 
function is carried out by staff whose position, pay and 
function is strictly determined by statute. At present, no GOM 
can employ more than 22 staff, though methods have been 
developed to circumvent this rule (See Chapter Five).
v) Expenditure (See also Table 5)
The expenditure patterns of the GOM's are extremely difficult 
to chart, given that they do not print accounts in conjunction 
with their annual reports. A rough picture can however be 
deduced fran an analysis of their sources of funding, for as 
with the SDRW and SDRB, studied above, there is a close link 
between income and expenditure. The bulk of the GOM's 
expenditure is absorbed by 'werkingskosten', or running costs, 
which are partly paid for by the regional authority under the 
terms of the 1970 legislation. In the case of the GOM-Limburg, 
for example, running costs amounted to 32,008,870 francs, 
depreciation on property, materials and buildings accounted for 
930,536 francs, and investment costs 1,134,000 BF^®. The 
figures suggest that approximately 50% of the expenditure of the 
GOM's consists of staff salary payments.
244
vi) History
Unlike their counterparts in Wallonia, the Flemish provincial 
councils decided to establish five separate GQM's, one for each 
province, rather than a single unitary body covering the whole 
region. This decision was influenced in part by the existence 
of provincial economic councils in each province, which had 
been established in the late 1950's and early 1960's (the 
earliest, the Limburg Economic Council was established in 1954) 
as semi-private associations studying and promoting the 
economic growth of the province,, the latter mainly by the 
attraction of foreign investment. The GOM's took over the 
activities of these Councils in certain provinces, though in 
others, such as Limburg, the Council continued to operate 
alongside the GOMs.
Despite their small complements of staff, and limited budgets, 
the GOMs have involved themselves in a wide range of 
activities, whilst primarily concentrating on research and 
information work. To illustrate this, an outline of functions 
is listed below, drawn from a perusal of the annual reports of 
two of the agencies:
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GQM-Limburq^^ GOM West Vlaanderen^
i) Research at macro and 
micro-level
ii) Encouragement of 
technological 
innovation








vii) Provision of housing
viii) Development of tourist 
facilities 
ix) Development of agriculture 
x) Management of waste 
xi) Improvement of public 
transport
i) Research
ii) Support for national 
and regional 
planning
iii) Advice to the 
private sector 
on regional economic 
matters








viii) Environmental and 
ecological 
assistance
ix) Development of 
tourism
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However, the GOMs are not able to devote large-scale staff or
financial resources to the majority of these functions. As an
example, one might quote the technology transfer and promotion of
joint ventures service offered by the GOM-L. This operates through a
system whereby interested local companies contribute fees to a GOM-L
fund, until sufficient capital has been accumulated to pay for the
GOM-L's engineer to travel to a trade fair in the United States or
Europe, at which he endeavours to arrange the client companies with
7?suitable foreign partners .
Similarly, the GOMs role in the attraction of foreign investment has 
been run down in the recent past as a consequence of the establishment 
in 1983 of FIOC (Flanders Investment Opportunity Council), an all- 
Flanders body on which the GOMs and their provincial authorities are 
represented, and which has responsibility for the co-ordination of all 
investment promotion emanating from Flanders.
As mentioned briefly above, the Flemish investment organisation, GIMV, 
assumed responsibility for the investment functions of the GOMs under 
the terms of an agreement concluded in 1981 between the GIMV, the GOMs 
and the Flemish Executive. The GOM's have however, retained the 
right to make investments in exceptional cases.
The GOMs have also placed considerable emphasis on broader development 
activities, embracing areas such as the provision of housing, the 
improvement of public transport and the building up of regional 
infrastructures. In these fields, their role is that of advice and 
advocacy rather than implementation; in the field of housing, for
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example, the GOM's prepare, in conjunction with social housing 
associations, lists of projects to be carried out by the private 
sector which are submitted to the Regional Executive for approval.
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TABLE 4 Governing Structures of the QOM's - number of representatives
Algemene Raad Van College van
Vergadering beheer commissarissen Directieoomite
GOM
Antwerpen 83 46 10 -
GOM Vlaams 81 41 9 18
Brabant
GOM Oost- 87 53 13 13
Vlaanderen
GOM West- 95 37 9 15
Vlaanderen




Internal Structures of the GOM West-Vlaanderen
Policy-making
General Assembly _____ 
(Algemene Vergadering)





Board of Commissioners (Kollege van Kanmissarissen) 
Government Conmissioner (Regeringskcmmissaris) 























Source: QDMM promotional material
250
Table 5
GOMVB - balance-sheet 1981 and 1982
Income 1981
Balance carried over 8,910,259
from previous year
State labour subsidy 23,000,000
Grant from province of Brabant 3,704,868
Sundry income 2,930,600




Provision on investments 1,108,450
Total expenditure 33,504,580
Balance 5,041,147













Netherlands - Industrial Policy
Since the war, the Netherlands has been considered one of the most 
prosperous countries in Western Europe. It suffered comparatively 
greater infrastructural damage than Belgium during the Second World 
War, and its economy benefited in the post-war years from a planned 
reconstruction which as a consequence of wage restraints, made the 
country, for a period, 'a low-cost island1 in later years, 
however, economic trends became more homogeneous throughout Benelux, 
and currently, whilst inflation in the Netherlands is running at one 
of the lowest levels of EEC countries (annual rate of 4.2% in the 12 
months up to and including December 1982)^ unemployment has increased 
to levels not previously experienced during the post-war period. A 
recent OECD survey an the Netherlands (January 1983) states that it 
can no longer be considered a 'low unemployment economy'^, with 11.2% 
of the labour force out of work (Nov. 1982 figure). The survey adds 
that 'the high personal and collective living standards which have 
been so characteristic of the Netherlands are being jeopardised by the 
need to support a rapidly growing share of people without work‘d .  
This statement presumably refers to the extent of social security 
provision in the Netherlands which Tinbergen has described as 
'somewhat too generous'^. Unemployment benefits amount to more than 
80% of previous income in the first year and then 75% in the second. 
In 1975, the Netherlands was allocating a greater proportion of its 
gross national product to public expenditure than any other major 
industrialised nation^. The present Christian Democrat-Liberal 
Coalition government consequently has, as its major aim, a reduction 
in the public sector borrowing requirement to bring it in line with
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the EEC average
As in other European countries, state intervention in industry 
increased in the Nether lands during the seventies. In 1972 the 
government established NEHEM, the Dutch Restructuring Company^. This 
body originally acted in an advisory capacity, recommending changes at 
a sectoral level of industry to government, but in 1975 it was 
resolved that it should receive a proportion of the budget of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs with which it should assist companies in 
difficulties^9. The government also has a controlling stake (50.3%) 
in the National Investment Bank, which provides capital for 
industry*^. Keyser and Windle refer to it as 'mainly a policy 
instrument of the state, used to stimulate investment, exports and 
certain regions and to improve employment conditions'^. This Bank 
and the Dutch Bank for the Middle Classes (NMB) which concentrates on 
credit for small and medium-sized enterprises 'play an important role 
in the sector policy of the government... by providing credit for 
investment to undertakings whose existence or expansion is in danger 
due to a lack of finance'^. The NIB also has close links with the 
regional development agencies, in particular, NOM, where a board 
member of the Bank was initially working as a part-time director. The 
NIB itself can be directed by government to provide equity funding for 
strategic companies.
As many public enterprises in the Netherlands operate on the basis of 
a limited liability company, the dividing line between 'public' and 
'private' is more vaguely drawn in the context of the Dutch economy 
than it is in certain others. Nevertheless it has been suggested that
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in the Netherlands 'public enterprises have a substantial influence on 
several sectors of the e c o n o m y ' T h e  activities of state 
institutions, in the form of the regional development agencies, in 
tackling the problems of economic structure have not been without 
precedent, in that the state has been involved for some years in the 
provision of industrial credit.
Regional Problems
The initial post-war difficulties of the regions concerned structural 
unemployment in areas such as Drenthe (in South-East Drenthe, the 
unemployment rate in 1950 was 15.5%)®^ whilst nationally the 
Netherlands experienced lew levels of unemployment. This structural 
unemployment was mainly due to a loss of manpower from agricultural 
activities. There were also problems of planning concerning the 
growth of the Rands tad, the 'Ring City', a semicircular development 
encompassing Amsterdam and Utrecht in the north, and the Hague and 
Rotterdam in the South. This was expressed In 1956 by a government 
report 'The West and the Rest of the Netherlands' which, as its title 
suggests, was concerned that the unchecked development of the Randstad 
was undermining the economy of other areas of the country®^. It 
called for a policy of decentralisation to be instigated. The rundown 
of traditional industries, such as coal and textiles, also had serious 
effects in regions which were heavily dependent upon them as the main 
employers of labour.
There can thus be established three types of problem regions which 
post-war governments in the Netherlands have faced:-
254
i) Predominantly rural areas with declining agricultural 
employment and an insufficient industrial base (ie Drenthe, 
Zeeland)
ii) Areas dominated by a single traditional industry (South 
Limburg, Tilburg)
iii) Congested area around the Randstad.
Lapple and van Hoogstraten note in their study of regional development 
in the Netherlands that "a clear shift has taken place in the economic 
structure of the northern and the southern provinces, in the sense 
that textiles, leather and footwear, and timber and furniture are 
becoming more important. This involves branches of industry which can 
be characterised as weak, in respect of both their labour productivity 
and the number of job s^.
Regional Policy
The initial post-war measures in this field were designed to overcome 
the pockets of structural unemployment mentioned above. By 1951, nine 
Development Areas had been designated, and these qualified for 
infrastructural provision, and financial incentives were offered to 
companies prepared to invest in thern^. Subsequent policy became 
closely related to physical planning, in that it was influenced by the 
'West and the Rest' perspective, the desire to make optimum use of the 
country's land surface by drawing development out from the Randstad in 
radial lines. This idea was first expressed in the 1948 report 'Hie 
Development of the West Nether lands' which envisaged this growth 
talcing place along the main transport routes, and separated by wedges
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of open land8®. The policy was supported in later years by the First 
and Second Reports on Physical Planning (1960 and 1966).
In 1959, the coverage of the Development Areas was increased to almost 
50% of the land surface of the Netherlands, whilst the province of 
South Limburg was designated a Reconversion Area in 1966, following 
the decision to rundown the local coal-mines. Tilburg was similarly 
designated in 1968, an area of Noard Brabant, which was suffering from 
the decline of the textile industry8^ . The trend of expanding the 
number of designated areas was reversed in 1971 when the government 
reduced the coverage of such areas to the Northern Development Area 
(Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe and part of Overijssel) and the 
Reconversion Area of South Limburg, which represented 30% of the 
country*s land mass and 17% of its population. The official 
explanation of this reversal in policy was that government support 
should be concentrated within this comparatively snail area, because a 
self-sustaining process of growth had been initiated in the other 
assisted regions.
The measures which have been applied to development areas in the 
Netherlands have generally taken the form of infrastructural provision 
and financial incentives for industry, the latter being applicable to 
specified development nuclei within problem regions. The original 9 
development areas contained 36 development nuclei or grcwth-centres, a 
number which had been increased to 44 by 1959^8. In order to control 
this growth, which arose mainly from political considerations, and 
which was believed to be weakening the effectiveness of the policy, 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs introduced a distinction between
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primary and secondary nuclei. In 1971, under the provisions which cut 
back the coverage of the development areas, aid was made available 
throughout South Limburg, without reference to development nuclei, 
whilst 28 nuclei were designated in the Northern Development Area. In 
recent years, more nuclei have been identified outside the problem 
regions, making firms which choose to locate in them eligible for 
capital grants, and illustrating the political pressures which tend to 
disrupt the planned application of regional policy by central 
government.
In 1978 a national investment incentive was introduced in the form of
the WIR (Wet Investeringsrekening)^. it contains a specific regional
element in that on top of a basic national premium a special regional
allowance is made available in parts of the Northern Development Area
and South Limburg. Nevertheless, it remains an example of how
regional policy in the Netherlands is of secondary importance in
relation to national economic policy. Regional incentives are far
Q 0fewer than in most other EEC countries^*, only two being of 
significance, the regional element of the WIR and the investment 
premium (IER), a capital grant of up to 25% of eligible fixed capital 
costs available to projects of a 'regionally exporting character', 
which are starting up or expanding in designated development nuclei or 
in South Limburg. Despite this low level of government support for 
regional development, studies of its effectiveness have reached 
generally favourable conclusions. One such study concluded that 
'regional policy could tentatively be regarded as having been 
effective in roughly half of the Dutch assisted areas'^, whilst 
another argued that 42% of the net increase in employment in the
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Northern Development Area between 1960 and 1967 could be attributed to 
the effects of regional policy9 .^ This latter, however, also 
suggested that 'the relative effectiveness of regional grants had 
declined in the 1970's9 .^ F J Gay suggests that regional policy in 
the Netherlands has been more successful than in Belgium because, 
without having to strike a political balance between two contending 
communities, it has paid closer attention to physical planning9**. The 
3rd Report on Physical Planning (1974), reflecting the importance of 
such provisions in a country with the highest population density (363
Q * 5
persons per sq km) of all OECD countries, altered policy from the 
earlier emphasis on radial lines of development emanating from the 
Rands tad, to a spreading of population to underdeveloped areas, with 
the consequent need for indigenous economic growth within these areas. 
Therefore, in 1974/5, three regional development agencies were 
established, in the Northern Development Area (NOM-Noordelijke 
Ontwikkelings Maatschappij - The Northern Development Company), in 
Limburg (LIOF-Liraburgs Instituut voor Qntwikkeling en Financiering - 
Limburg Institute for Development and Finance) and in Overijssel (OOM 
- Overij sselse Ontwikkelings Maatschappij - Development Company for 
Overijssel), and these were followed by agencies in Gelderland and 
Ncord-Brabant9®.
All the agencies have a general responsibility for strengthening the 
socio-economic structure of their region and reducing local 
unemployment, but only two, NOM and LIOF can offer any form of 
financial support to industry. The agencies constitute, under Dutch 
law, limited liability companies, and their shares are held by 
national, regional or local government. They have had to operate in
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unfavourable economic circumstances frcm their inception. Not only 
were levels of domestic investment reduced by the onset of the 
recession, but policy to control the growth of the Randstad, which 
inevitably favoured underdeveloped areas as a consequence, was 
weakened by a drop in the metropolitan area's population by 2% between 
1972 and 1975^. This indicates a breaking-down of the traditional 
base of regional policy, the 'West and the Rest' concept. Some 
commentators have argued that the Randstad development is simply 
shifting eastwards to become the New West^^, but Lapple and van 
Hoogstraten argue that to continue to perceive the problem of uneven 
regional development purely in terras of the (New) West and the Rest is 
to use too broad a criterion to grasp the processes of uneven 
development^  ^ .
Netherlands - Industry and Finance
The commercial banks in the Netherlands provide a wide range of credit 
facilities for the business sector, as do the agricultural credit 
banks (rabobanks) ^ ^ . The principal suppliers of long-term finance 
for industry and commerce are semi-public bodies. The National 
Investment Bank (De Nationale Investeringsbank -NIB), and the Dutch 
Bank for the Middle Classes (Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank - NMB) for 
example, both provide credit for investment to undertakings whose 
existence or expansion is in danger due to lack of finance.
The NIB provides equity investment, loans and guarantees, seme of 
which are underwritten, and on occasion, specifically requested by the 
state. The state has a majority share in the NIB, and the bank itself
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is mainly a policy instrument of the state, used to stimulate 
investment, production for export, and the economies of depressed 
regions. In this latter respect, the bank co-operates with agencies 
such as NOM, where a board member of the Bank was originally one of 
the two part-time directors of the organisation. The NOM also uses 
the expertise of the Bank for financial and economic investigations, 
and the management of its own investments.
The Netherlands Participation Company (De Nederlandse Participatie
Maatschappij - NPM) was formed as an offshoot of the NIB by the Bank
in partnership with a number of industrial investors, and provides
1 03equity investment on a temporary basis .
In 1972 the State established the Dutch Restructuring Company with the 
aim of improving the structure of industry*^. Its functions included 
the promotion of sectoral studies, the provision of advice to firms, 
and acting as an intermediary between firms and financial 
organisations. In 1975, the government expanded NEHEM's role to give 
it part of the annual budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
greater financial independence, and a responsibility to give 
assistance to companies in difficulties. In 1983, a new central 
government organisation, Maatschappij voor Industriele Projecten 
(Company for Industrial Projects) was created in order to offer risk 
capital to the private sector^.
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Noordeliike OntwiMcellncrsmaatschappil - NOM
i) Statutory purposes, functions and powers
The NOM was established by the Dutch government in 1974 as a 
private limited liability company. Its shares are held by the 
state through the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The remit of 
the NOM stems not from legislation, but from Articles of 
Incorporation published on 19 March 1974. These endow the NOM 
with the statutory aim of improving the socio-economic structure 
of and employment in the Northern Netherlands, which is defined 
as comprising the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe and 
parts of Overijssel (Overijssel was removed from the NDM's remit 
in 1984). Clause Three of these Articles outlines the NOM's 
purposes as:
i) stimulating the establishment of new enterprises in the 
region and participating in the share capital of new and 
existing firms.
ii) making contacts with enterprises both within and outside
the Netherlands to stimulate interest in the North of the
Netherlands as a possible future location.
iii) assisting firms which are interested in locating in the
region by means of information, advice and mediation.
iv) developing initiatives that support economic activities in 
the North*®®.
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To carry out these tasks, the NOM has the power to take 
investment in companies, subject to certain criteria laid down 
by the government and discussed below [see ii) Control]. The 
NOM has the capability to acquire and dispose of land and 
property, but in practice, this power has only been exercised in 
exceptional circumstances. Its work tends to be concentrated on 
research, information and advisory work for both government and 
private industry.
ii) Control
The NOM is accountable to the Dutch State through the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, which owns all the shares of the NOM. 
Control is therefore through the exercise of shareholders"
(
rights, such as under Clause 2 of the Articles of Incorporation, j
which stipulates that the management of the NOM needs the 1
approval of a meeting of shareholders before proceeding with
equity investment or borrowing money. In practice, therefore,
these decisions require the approval of the Minister of Economic
Affairs. According to an agreement made between the NOM and the
Dutch State concerning equity investment by the NOM, the
minister will only sanction projects which conform to certain
broad requirements, including that the project be located in
the Northern Netherlands, that its size should at the minimum be
equivalent to the minimum applied to projects eligible for the
main regional investment incentive, the IPR, and that it should
make a contribution to the local socio-economic and employment
107position, whilst having good prospects of viability . The
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financial relations between the NOM and the state, which are 
covered in a separate agreement (Financierings-en 
Garantieovereenkorast), will be dealt with in a subsequent 
section [(iii) sources of funds].
The NOM's Board of Directors (Raad van Canissarissen), which is 
responsible for supervising the internal management of the 
organisation, is appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
and contains representatives from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance.
Management staff are appointed by the Minister of Economic 
Affairs who also has the right to suspend or dismiss than.
iii) Source of funds
The funding of the NOM is closely linked with the control 
exercised over the organisation by the State. It is controlled 
by a Financing and Guarantee Agreement made between the NOM and 
the State. According to its terms the Minister of Economic 
Affairs fixes a 'ceiling* each year for the amount which the NOM 
can raise through loans guaranteed by the State. NOM can, 
therefore, raise loans up to this set amount under state 
guarantee on the capital markets, or in exceptional 
circumstances, directly fran the State. The State also sets a 
ceiling on the NOM's current account, which is meant to provide 
for its short-term needs, the rest of the capital raised from 
external loans being set aside to cover the costs of NOM
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investments^^8.
As well as guaranteeing the NOM's raising of capital on the open
market,, the State pays the organisation's annual operating
costs which include staff salaries, expenses, and the cost of
promotional and information services. In 1983, these costs
109amounted to 6.476m Dutch guilder .
Until 1983, the investment activities of the NOM have made 
negative returns each year. These 'exploitation losses' it was 
agreed in 1974 should be liable to be claimed back from the 
State by the NOM in the case of extreme financial difficulty. 
However, these losses have steadily mounted year by year 
representing in 1982 a claim on the State of Dfl 194,498,000, 
though 1983's more favourable results reduced the figure 
outstanding to Dfl 172,488,000^^.
iv) Internal structure (See also Fig. 3.)
The senior authority within the NOM is the Board of Directors 
(Raad van Commissarissen), which in 1983 consisted of 13 
members, appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
drawn from representatives of the four provinces in which the 
NOM operates, employers' organisations, and the Ministries of 
Ecanonic Affairs and Finance. Trade union organisations were 
originally represented on the Board but withdrew in 1977 after 
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Beneath the Board of Directors is a Commission of Delegates 
(Caimissie van Gedelegeerden), a three-man Commission consisting 
of the chairman of the Board, and provincial and employers' 
representatives. This has not operated, in practice, and the 
task of supervising NOM's activities, which it was created to 
fulfil, has been carried out instead by the Board of Directors. 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has also established an 
'adviescollege' (college of advice), consisting of 
representatives of Northern municipalities and of local 
companies, whose role is to provide advice for the Board of 
Directors, and maintain links between the NOM and the people of 
the area it serves.
Since its inception in 1974, seven departments have evolved 
within the overall operating structure of the NOM. The original 
'core' sections are the Staff Affairs and Organisation 
Department, the Product Development and Innovation Department, 
the Attraction of Industry Department, and the Corporate 
Research and Advice Department. The Research and Information 
Department was set up to give support to the latter two 
departments through the collation of economic and other data. 
Following the growth of equity investment in local companies, 
an Equity Participation Management Department was establishes, 
followed in 1978 by a Financial and Economic Department which 
evaluates equity participation proposals.
The NOM currently employs 31 staff, the majority of which are 
recruited direct from industry*^ .
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v) Expenditure (See also Table 6)
Annual expenditure figures are not reproduced in NOM's annual 
reports. However, figures extracted from profit and loss 
returns published in the NOM's accounts indicate that a 
relatively small but constant part of NOM expenditure is 
consumed by salaries and other operating costs, whereas the bulk 
of outlay is spent on the provision of equity participation and 
loan finance. Expenditure on equity and loans is also more 
prone to fluctuation frcm year to year.
The State guarantees the year-on-year expenditure of the NOM by 
placing a 'ceiling' on the amount that the organisation can 
raise in State-guaranteed loans on the capital markets. This 
'ceiling* was originally set at Dfl 75,000, but, by 1983 had 
been extended to Dfl 525,000.
The NOM's annual operating losses have been considerable and 
reached a peak in 1982 (the year of the Magnesia write-off, see 
below) of Dfl 103m, though in the following year they were 
reduced to Dfl 30m.
vi) History
When the NOM was established in 1974, it took over the work and 
absorbed the staff of the ' Industriali satie Bureau Noorden des 
Lands' (Industrialisation Bureau for the North of the Country-
267
IBN). The IEN had been formed by the government in the late 
1960's to combat the special economic problems of the area, 
which was affected by a decline in employment in both the 
agricultural and textile industry sectors. Its main functions 
were the attraction of industrial investment, and support for 
ailing indigenous industries. However, the IBN was not 
empowered to offer companies financial support, and it was the 
desire for an agency with greater powers in this respect which 
led to the creation of the
The NOM commenced operations at a time when the economies of 
Western Europe were entering into recession, and it was 
initially involved in 'rescue' missions, the provision of equity 
finance, on a reactive basis, giving advice and financial 
support to local companies in need of restructuring. Only 
gradually did it develop a more planned approach to its task of 
regional economic regeneration, through the broadening of its 
departmental structure and the elaboration of predetermined 
criteria for investment.
The N3M prefers to take minority investments in firms which as 
well as being ccmmercially viable, have innovative potential in 
terms of their product or production processes. That the NOM 
takes these factors seriously into consideration when evaluating 
a prospective investment is emphasised by the fact that 14 of 
the 30 possible participation cases which it investigated in 
1983 were eventually r e j e c ted^Details of the NOM's 
investment portfolio are contained in Table 7.
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The NOM has, in the past, divided its activities into four 
categories for the purpose of analysis. The first of these is 
those activities concerned with new establishments, or more 
precisely the attraction of industry. These include promotional 
and publicity work, the utilising of overseas agents in 
countries such as Japan and the USA, the dissemination of 
information concerning the availability of land and industrial 
property, the nature of the labour market, and the social and 
economic infrastructure of the region, and in certain cases, the 
provision of equity and/or loan finance.
The second category, that of development projects, includes 
those companies which the NOM attempts to aid through the 
promotion of technology transfer deals, and joint ventures. The 
NOM has been active in seeking to introduce new processes into 
the industry of the region through the acquisition of patents, 
and co-operation with technically-advanced companies overseas. 
This is felt to be a particularly important factor for small and 
medium-sized companies, which predominate in the Northern 
Netherlands, and generally, cannot afford to maintain their own 
independent research and development capability.
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TABIE 6
NOM Expenditure Patterns - 1979-1983
(FIf000) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Salaries and social 2,528 2,775 2,855 3,292 3,081
security
Operating costs 2,449 2,654 3,782 2,859 3,395
Interest charges and 15,919 22,196 25,993 26,226 28,323
financing costs
Provisions 44,868 18,354 29,764 80,463 5,868
Total 65,764 45,979 62,394 112,840 40,667
Sources: NQM Annual Reports 1979-1983, Profit and Loss Accounts
LIOF Expenditure Patterns - 1979-83 (estimated)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
(FI,000)
Total Operating costs 3.9 5.1 5.9 7.6 7.4
Financial charges 2.0 2.4 3.4 10.3 11.0
Investment costs 17.0 9.6 34.0 9.9 7.2
Total 22.9 17.1 43.3 27.8 25.6
Sources: LIOF Annual Reports
270
TABUE 7
NOM Investment Portfolio 1979-1983
19791 1980 1981 1982 1983
Number of investments 28 28 33 27 23
of which:
Majority holding 12 15 15 15 13
(over 50%)
Minority holding 16 13 18 12 10
(50% or less)
Value of investments 209,283 168,586 182,282 120,240 166,186
(fl,000)
Enployment in 5,236 5,465 4,784 3,792 3,576
invested companies
1 - as at 31st December each year
Source: NDM Annual Reports.
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The NOM offers advisory services to companies all over the 
Northern Netherlands, but it monitors most closely those in 
which it has made investments. It can also put companies in 
contact with government institutions, financial organisations 
and companies interested in technical co-operation, and can give 
direct advice on financial, marketing and technical matters. 
The NOM can also, in exceptional cases, arrange for specialist 
managers to be seconded to companies on a temporary basis.
Finally, as mentioned above, the NOM has been from its 
inception, active in investing in companies. It has used this 
tool to attract new industry, to promote industrial research and 
development at a local level, and to reorganise existing 
industry. Trends in investment by the NOM have tended, in 
recent years, to reflect those apparent in other agencies, 
namely a reduction in the size of the investment portfolio, both 
in terms of the number of companies invested in, and the value 
of the investment portfolio. This may, in part, reflect 
government concern to involve the private sector more closely in 
this activity (co-financing) and the political consequences of 
the writing-off of f 62.5m of the NOMfs investment in Magnesia 
International and Noordelijke Zoutwinning B.V. in 1982, but it 
could also be due to the establishment of a national government 
risk-capital organisation, MIP. (See above - Netherlands - 
Industry and Finance.)
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nv Industriebank LIOF (Limburgs Instituut voor Ontwikkelincr en 
Financiering)
i) Powers, Functions and Purposes.
LIOF is an independent company founded in 1975 on the initiative 
of the government, but bounded by the legislation customarily 
applying to all Dutch companies. Under the terms of its 
Articles of Incorporation it was given a general responsibility 
for the co-ordination of all industrial development in 
Limburg** ^ ^ . Its main task is to promote and develop, on its own 
initiative, all activities relevant to the industrialisation of 
the province of Limburg. A secondary role is to give advice and 
support, whenever requested, to existing industries and public 
authorities on all aspects of trade and commerce.
These tasks are to be carried out by the following methods :
a) stimulating initiatives leading to the establishing of new 
enterprises, in the industrial, services and administrative 
sectors;
b) creating interest for establishing industry throughout the 
province, as well as expanding present enterprises;
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c) giving guidance to firms shewing interest in establishing in 
Limburg, and stimulating existing enterprises by means of:
- giving information and advice
- intermediating with requests for investment grants 
and other subsidies;
d) management of industrial sites in Limburg;
e) lending credit to, giving guarantees for and participating 
in, share capital of existing and new enterprises which 
offer econanic perspectives and which improve the labour 
situation in Limburg;
f) giving assistance which leads to the lending of credit by a 
third party to enterprises listed under e) above;
g) the performing of any operations which in any way are 
connected with the above.
The remit of LIOF extends over the whole of the province of 
Limburg, the Netherlands* most southern province.
ii) Control
LIOF is not formally amenable to central government control, 
being accountable, as a limited liability company, to its 
shareholders. In the case of LIOF its shares are split three
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ways between the central government, which owns 34%, the
provincial government, which also owns 34%, and a group made up
of social and economic bodies, the municipalities, chambers of
commerce, banks, and various other institutions, which own 
11632% . Two representatives of central government sit on the
LIOF Board of Directors (Raad van Ccmmissarissen) but they can
117and have been outvoted by the five other directors . Central 
government also undertakes to guarantee the raising of capital 
by LIOF on the open market, up to an agreed limit, which, in 
1984, stood at Dfl 250m.
iii) Source of funds
The LIOF is financed in a manner similar to its sister agency,
the NOM, notwithstanding the difference in their ownership
structures. The bulk of the LIGF1 s expenditure is financed by
raising capital on the open market guaranteed by either the
national or provincial government. In 1983 the national
government guaranteed Dfl 20.5m in long-term loans arranged by 
118the LIOF1 . The national government also pays the bulk of the 
LIOF's annual operating costs, which in 1983, amounted to 
Dfl 7.4m. (National and provincial authorities pay the sum of 
LIOF's operating costs minus arry income from investments.)
iv) Internal Structure (See also Fig 4)
As a limited liability company, the overall control of the LIOF 
rests with the Board of Directors (Raad van Ccmmissarissen),
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which is made up of seven members,, two of whcm represent the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The 
Board has responsibility for the taking of all major policy- 
decisions, including the approval of investment projects. It 
also approves the annual report and accounts. The Board 
receives advice from an advisory board (Raad van Advies), which 
is made up of representatives of central and provincial 
government, employers and trade union organisations, social and 
economic institutions, and the banking sector.
The staff of LIOF work under a managing director, and until 1985 
operated in four departments, reflecting the major functional 
responsibilities of the LIOF: the attraction of industry, 
provision of finance for industry, industrial advice and 
encouragement of innovation. In February 1985, the internal 
structure of the LIOF was reorganised according to two 
divisions, Finance, and Development, in order to assist the 
launching of projects and innovative processes on the LIOF's own 
initiative^ ®.
The number of staff employed by the LIOF, as at 1st April 1984, 
was 26^ 0.
v) Expenditure
As with the NOM, gross expenditure figures for the LIOF, sub­
divided by function cannot readily be extrapolated from its 
annual reports. Operating costs, which include salaries,
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interest charges, depreciation and promotional and advisory 
costs, have risen steadily from Dfl 1.2m in 1976 to Dfl 7.4m in 
1983^ .  Financial costs, of which the chief item consists of 
interest charges, constituted in 1983 f 11m, whereas the 
provision of equity and loan finance to industry accounted for 
Dfl 7.2m. The total expenditure of the LIOF in 1983 can thus be 
estimated at f 25.6m, or approx. £6.1m. However, this figure 
would appear to represent a drop from the levels of previous 
years, in particular with respect to the amount spent on 
industrial investment, which in 1981, for example, totalled 
Dfl 13.8m in equity finance, and Dfl 20.2m in loans.
vi) History
The LIOF was formed in 1975 to take over the work of the 
Industriebank Limburg, the Economic Department of the Eccnomic 
Technological Institute Limburg (ETIL) and the Foundation for 
the Economic Development of South Limburg (SEOL). It was 
created by government initiative out of the reorganisation of a 
local industrial credit bank, the Industriebank, which had 
itself been established as far back as 1935^^, and in this way 
it acquired its unusual shareholding structure, which takes the 
form of a three-way split between central government, the 
provincial authority, and the original Industriebank 
shareholders, who include representatives of central government, 
of local political groups and of social and economic 
institutions^^. The industrialisation of the province of 
Limburg had been centred upon its coal-raining industry, and the
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economic difficulties of the area derive frcm the decision of 
the Dutch government in 1965 to run the coalfield down to 
closure. This programme was completed in 1975, and the 
establishment of the LIOF in the same year represented an 
attempt to instigate a new phase of economic development in the 
province involving the diversification of the industrial 
base** 24 #
As the original departmental structure of the LIOF suggested, 
its activities have generally revolved around four functions, 
the attraction of industry, the provision of finance to 
companies, the provision of advice and the encouragement of 
innovation. In order to promote Limburg as a favourable 
industrial location, the LIOF maintains three offices abroad, 
staffed by 1 foreign acquisition representatives1 ^ 5  ^ These are 
based at Atlanta and Los Angeles in the United States, and 
Tokyo in Japan. In encouraging investors to locate in Limburg, 
the LIOF produces promotional material giving information on 
various social and economic aspects of the province. It is also 
able to act as a broker to guide the investor through the 
installation of his/her project, and to liaise with relevant 
institutions concerning such matters as the availability of 
government grants and of industrial property. In the latter
respect, the LICF, though not involved in the construction of 
factories, is empowered to acquire and develop existing factory 
sites, and co-ordinate industrial parks.
The LIOF has also been able to offer various financial
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facilities both to incoming investors and indigenous companies. 
The most significant of these is equity investment, which the 
LIOF makes in the case of special projects which are likely to 
make a definite contribution to the improvement of employment 
opportunities in the province. All such investments include a 
1 buy-back1 option which is designed to ensure that the LIOF's 
commitment will be of a temporary nature and that the 
independence of the company concerned will be safeguarded. At 
the end of 1983, the LIOF's portfolio was made up of 28 
companies, 6 of which represented investments of more than 50%, 
employing 7,350 personnel^*’. However, this figure is 
considerably distorted by the inclusion of 5,500 employees at 
the Volvo car plant at Helmond, LIOF having a 3% stake in Volvo 
Car B.V., the Dutch subsidiary of the Swedish car firm. LIOF 
can also offer subordinated loans and assistance toward the 
long-term lease purchase of land and buildings. Apart from 
giving direct financial assistance, LIOF acts as a mediator 
between individual entrepreneurs and the government concerning 
the 'Special Financing* regulation, a scheme whereby companies 
may obtain credit from the NIB backed by a government guarantee, 
and as an advisor to the government on the issuing of guarantees 
to banks giving credit to snail and medium-sized enterprises in 
Limburg. LIOF also acts as the instrument in the Limburg area 
of the Haagse Contact Group (Hague Contact Group), a caimittee 
made up of representatives of the Ministries of Finance, 
Economic Affairs and Social Affairs, the NIB and the NEHEM which 
is responsible for the allocation of funds, on a regional basis, 
in accordance with national social and economic policies^?.
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As well as monitoring its own investments, the LIOF is able to 
offer advice to local business on matters such as accountancy, 
financial organisation and management. It is also responsible 
for advising the provincial government on matters concerning the 
preparation of the national government's four-yearly regional 
development plan, the provincial government being formally 
involved in the consultation procedure which precedes the 
drawing-up of the plan. The LIOF is also closely involved in 
the encouragement of technological innovation, and research and 
development at company level, and itself promotes joint 
ventures, acquires patents and conducts feasibility studies into 
new products and processes.
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ii) Interview with P Niessen, Jan 1985.
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Development agencies in other parts of the Netherlands: GOM
(Gelderland), 00M (Overilssel) and BOM (Brabant)
These three agencies are considerably smaller in terms of staff and 
financial resources than either the NOM or the LIOF. Of the three, 
BOM was formed as recently as 1984, to work in the province of 
Brabant, and in view of its comparatively brief existence, will not be 
discussed further.
OQM
The OOM was established in 1975, following complaints from the 
province of Overij ssel that it was suffering unfairly in economic 
terms, in comparison with the neighbouring areas of the Northern 
Netherlands, which enjoyed development status, according to central 
government regional policy . The shares of the OQM, which like the 
NOM and the LIQF is constituted as a limited liability company under 
Dutch law, are 100% owned by the provincial authority . It is 
funded by subsidies from the provincial and national authorities, the 
latter through the Ministry for Economic Affairs. In 1982,. the 
provincial subsidy amounted to Df1.75m and the national subsidy 
Df1.67ra. Total expenditure was in the region of Dfl3.5m (£830,000), 
of which approx. Dfl2.5m, or 70%, was made up of running costs,
' apparatskosten1 .
The OOM is governed by a Board of Directors (Raad van Ccmmissarissen), 
which is comprised of 15 members, including representatives of central
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and provincial government, trades union and employers' organisations, 
financial institutions, and the ETIO (Economic and Technological 
Institute for Overijssel). COM's functions include the attraction of 
inward investment, the promotion of technical innovation, the 
provision of support and advice to new and existing enterprises, and 
the provision of capital to industry. In 1982 its investment 
portfolio was made up of 5 equity investments to the value of 
Df1,995,000, and 4 loans to the value of Dfl875,500. Of the 5 equity 
investments, 4 are guaranteed jointly by the provincial authority and 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and one by the province alone. M l  
are minority holdings. Of the loans one is guaranteed by both the
provincial authority arri the MEA, and 3 by the province alone.
The staff of the OQM in December 1982 numbered 15.
OQM
The province of Gelderland has a controlling 51% stake in the share 
capital of GOM which operates, as other Dutch agencies, as a limited 
liability company. The GOM's operations are subsidised by both the
provincial authority and the national government, through the MEA. In
1981, the total subsidy received amounted to Df1946,215, divided 
equally between the two contributors^  ^  • The GOM1 s work is divided 
into six areas: finance, investment, advice and management support, 
product and production development, exports, and sectoral development.
In 1981 the GOM had six employees.
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Table 8
Dutch regional agencies - comparative financial and staff resources








The comparatively small land area of Luxembourg (2,587 sq k m ^  _ .
approximately the size of Wiltshire) makes it difficult to analyse in 
the same context as the two nations to which it is joined in eccnanic 
union, Belgium and the Netherlands. The strength of the Luxembourg 
econoray has been built on its iron and steel industry, which, despite 
attempts to diversify the country* s industrial base, still, in 1980, 
employed 12% of the country*s workforce, and accounted for 15.5% of 
GDP.
As Keyser and Windle have noted * in the years previous to 1975 
unemployment was virtually non-existent in Luxembourg* ^ 4. indeed, 
the main impediment to the continuing growth of the economy was 
perceived to be the small size of the available workforce. Riley and 
Ashworth were able to write that * in spite of the obvious prosperity 
of Luxembourg, the future is clouded by the acute shortage of 
labour*^®®. In fact, * in 1975 Luxembourg was hit by the severest 
economic crisis since the Second World War*^®®, a crisis which 
affected it more severely than other countries because of its 
dependence on steel, demand for which cannodity plummeted. Since 
1975, Luxembourg has had to face problems of economic recession which 
it had not previously experienced. Unemployment which was in that 
year 0.2% of the active population had risen by 1982 to 1.4% with 
inflation running at 10.8%^ ®®, higher than in both Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Consequently, the Luxembourg government has became mare 
involved in industrial policy, and, in particular, in attempts to
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alleviate unemployment. Initially, a partial employment scheme was 
introduced, whereby the State pays a percentage of the average income 
of those workers laid off when demand is low. Special public work 
projects were instigated (travaux extraordinaires d'interet general) 
such as the restoration of public buildings, and the construction of 
roads and bridges, and, since 1979, the government has made up 15% of 
the difference between the average wages formerly received by 
steelworkers, and the market rate for their redeployed jcbs^.
The government has not been particularly active in the manufacturing 
sector in the past, choosing to create nationalised enterprises in 
areas concerned with the generation of public goods and services (eg 
transport, water). Though the need to diversify industrial growth was 
recognised as far back as the late 1950's, efforts to attract foreign 
investments, were, if effective, nevertheless of an 'ad hoc' nature. 
A Board of Economic Development was formed, mainly on the initiative 
of the then Grand Duke's brother, Prince Charles, and the American 
businessman, J Gurley*^. These two man undertook a promotional tour 
of the USA in the early 1960's, which attracted some 30 companies to 
Luxembourg. Following this success the Board ceased to meet until 
1977 when it was revived, to consist of 40 to 50 government officials, 
members of the Chamber of Commerce, employers, managers and foreign 
investors. They do not meet as a body, but provide hospitality for 
visiting entrepreneurs, promotional facilities in the USA, and a full­
time administrator to deal with advertising and contacts.
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Regional Policies
Riley and Ashworth, when analysing the dispersal of new employment in 
Luxemburg comment on 'the absence of a regional problem in the 
country''^. However, Yuill et al., speak of 'regional disequilibria1 
between the primarily agricultural northern and eastern regions, and 
the industrialised south and west* ^ . Industrial incentives were 
first introduced under the General Frame Law of 1962, and expanded in 
1967 and 1973^^. The two main concessions involved are a capital 
grant and tax relief. There are no spatial restrictions on their 
application, but 'aided projects must both comply with the 
requirements of general country planning, and be conducive to the 
expansion and improvement of the economic structure of the Grand 
Duchy, or to the better territorial distribution of economic 
activities'^^. The maximum capital grant amounts to 15% of eligible 
investment, but this averages out much lower in practice, whilst the 
tax concession is generally used as a topping-up measure. Yuill et al 
state in their study of regional incentives in Western Europe that 
'the key feature of the Luxembourg incentives is their low value'^^, 
and they conclude that 'the overall impression one has of the 
Luxembourg package is that it reflects a lack of enthusiasm for 
incentive policy and that incentives are offered primarily because 
they are available in neighbouring countries''146. This ±s probably a 
reflection of the relative prosperity of the Luxembourg economy during 
the period when other European countries were evolving regional 
strategies. It may, in the light of continuing economic recession, 
prove necessary for the Luxembourg government to provide stronger
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financial encouragement for both domestic and foreign investors.
Luxembourg - Industry and Finance
Over the course of the last 20 years, banking facilities in Luxembourg 
have expanded, reflecting the liberal, low-tax regime predominating 
in the country. There is for example, no central bank as such, the 
banks being regulated by a Banking Commissioner assisted, since 1971 
by a 'Conseil de Control!des Banques1, representing the banking 
community^^. Certain of the functions that would normally be 
associated with a central bank (such as clearing) are carried out by 
the Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat (CEE)^®. It also acts as a lender of 
medium and long-term financing to the private and public sector.
Unlike in Belgium and in France, Luxembourg banks are incorporated as 
'banques mixtes'^^. No distinction is made between clearing banks, 
merchant banks and investment banks. However, even in Luxembourg, the 
State has found it necessary to form a public company to provide 
capital for industry, in this case, the Societe Nationale de Credit et 
d'Investissement (SNCI),. which was established in 1977 with the aims 
of modifying the country's economic structure, preserving full 
employment, and reducing the extent to which the Luxembourg economy is 
dependent on foreign investment^. To further these aims, the SNCI 
can provide medium and long-term loans, and take equity in any given 
company, with that company's consent. Equity participations must not 
exceed 49% of a company's capital, or 10% of the SNCI's funds, without 
government approval^^. The SNCI tries to split financial
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responsibility for each investment project equally between the 
applicant company, the banks and the state. The Board of the SNCI 
has 9 members, three each from employers* and trade union 
organisations, and three representatives of government ministries, 
namely Finance, Economic Affairs, and Foreign Trade and Foreign 
Affairs. Legislation expected in 1985 will give the SNCI greater 
powers to regicnalise the government’s industrial diversification 
policy by offering capital incentives of up to 25% of capital costs on 
new investment projects in certain designated areas^^.
ARBED: Division Anti-Crise: Industries Nouvelles
Luxembourg's major steel producing concern and largest employer, the 
multinational Arbed corporation, has, as well as the government, taken 
a serious interest in the problems of unemployment. In 1977, a 
tripartite committee was set up to deal with these problems, upon 
which Arbed was represented'* ^ . The Committee was responsible for 
further legislation in December 1977, giving the government powers to 
stimulate growth and employment. For its part, Arbed established a 
Division Anti-Crise (Anti-Crisis Division) to deal with the needs of 
redundant steelworkers, a development which has similarities with the 
creation of BSC (Industry) Ltd in the UK. In April 1978 Arbed set up 
the New Industries Department as an extension of the activities of the 
Anti-Crisis Division, with the aim of attracting foreign investment to 
Luxembourg, and assisting the establishment of such projects in the 
Grand Duchy.
289
Arbed1 s New Industries Department is accountable only to the company1 s 
internal management and has no formal connection with the government, 
although its relationship with government departments has been 
described as 'a very close one1. Its budget is allocated by Arbed, 
and it can take advantage of the expertise of Arbed staff in other 
departments. However, it has only three full-time staff. Though a 
wholly private concern, the New Industries Department carries out many 
of the function of the Dutch and Belgian State-owned agencies, though 
on a much smaller scale. It can provide information for foreign 
investors, can put them into contact with financial institutions, 
government departments and the like, and publicises the attractions of 
Luxembourg abroad, particularly in America. It offers management 
advice and is even able to lend or transfer permanently members of its 
own managerial staff.
The supportive services which the New Industries Department can offer, 
taking advantage of the facilities that it has at disposal *are 
considerable... this is where the main strength of the department 
l i e s ' T h e  Department can help with planning, the supervision of 
site preparation, recruitment and training of staff, use of the Arbed 
sales network for related products and of its quality control 
facilities, and can carry out research for companies. At present, the 
Department can also provide infrastructure such as factories, land and 
housing, all of which have become surplus to company requirements in 
recent years. These facilities, are not, however, particularly well- 
sited, and as Arbed1 s stock is run down, this function will in all 
likelihood be absorbed by the government, which is already building
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industrial estates
The New Industries Department's initial activities concerned the 
promotion of Luxembourg as a location for industrial investment, but, 
since the rejuvenation of the Board of Economic Development, the 
emphasis has switched to servicing the investor 'an the ground* in 
Luxembourg. There is no regional aspect to the New Industries 
Department's remit, which is to promote Luxembourg as a location for 
foreign investment, to evolve strategies for securing that investment, 
and to provide practical help to investors wishing to establish 
projects in Luxembourg .
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Regional Development Agencies - Powers, Functions and Aims
Having described the agencies, their structure and experience, in seme 
detail, it is now necessary to attempt to draw out the similarities 
and dissimilarities which exist between agencies operating both in 
different regions of the same country, and in different countries. 
The framework of this study will consist of an analysis of a series of 
distinct areas, each covering a particularly key part of the agencies 
nature, structure or activity. In the following section, four central 
aspects of the nature of each respective agency are discussed, their 
powers, functions, objectives and resources.
i) Powers
In studying the powers of the agencies, it is hoped that, as a result, 
a greater understanding might be gathered of the potential impact that 
regional development agencies might be expected to have on problems of 
economic development in the regions which they serve, and that it 
might be possible to trace whether such powers as they do enjoy have 
been reduced, expanded or remained the same over time. In this 
context, one of the most significant variables affecting the regional 
development agencies in this study is the extent to which individual '
M U .  or fffivate — L i. j
in the form that they are understood in the present study (see belcw), 
are more amenable to measurement when transmitted to a statutorily - 
constituted agency from a higher governmental authority, than when
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they are embodied in a private organisation. In the United Kingdom, 
such powers are laid down in the Acts of Parliament under the terms of 
which the agencies were established. However, in examining the powers 
of an independent limited liability company, such as those agencies 
operating in Holland, conclusions have to be more generalised, and 
relate to the company's Articles of Incorporation and to the powers 
prescribed within the limits of Dutch commercial law. This is not to 
say that both public and private agencies do not wield what
4
sociologists call 'effective' power , which may bear little relation 
to statutorily-ordained authority. For example, the first chairman of 
the HTDB, Prof. Robert Grieve, was widely credited with persuading the 
then Labour government in 1966 to locate a nuclear power station at 
Dounreay on the north coast of Scotland . However, this type of power 
is not readily measured, and will not be considered at this present 
stage. It is with more formal concepts of power, bound up with issues 
of autonomy, and independence from central or regional government, 
that this study will deal, in a subsequent section.
As stated above, in the case of UK agencies, powers are derived from 
statute, either parliamentary Acts, or, in the case of the Northern 
Ireland agencies, Orders-in-Council. Similarly, the Belgian agencies 
derive their powers from a statute promulgated in 1970. The Dutch 
agencies, however, though established on the initiative of central 
government, do not possess statutory authority, but function as 
independent limited liability companies. The British and Belgian 
agencies therefore fall into that category of bodies, which has come 
to be referred to as quasi-autcncmous nan-governmental organisations, 
or quangos, 'appointed public agencies established by statute or
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ministerial decision to perform executive tasks in place of central 
departments or elected local authorities: the non-departmenta1 
appointed public agency1^ .
a) Financial Assistance
The right to acquire shares in companies and to offer loans, is a 
power which was common to the majority of agencies at their inception. 
Of the five UK agencies, only the DBRW (MWD) does not possess the 
right to invest directly; it acts as an agent for the WDA. The seven 
Belgian agencies were all empowered to make equity investments, but 
this power was subsequently transferred to regional investment 
companies, established in each of the three major linguistic 
communities. In the Netherlands, only the NOM and LICfF initially 
undertook equity investment, but not having been constituted under any 
statutory authority, the other agencies were free to assume this role 
at a later stage.
The power to give aid, in the form of financial grants to companies, 
individuals, and organisations is not as widespread. In the UK, it is 
most developed in the case of the IDB, which can offer selective 
financial assistance to offset the costs of capital investment, 
interest charges on debts, wages, rent and research and development. 
These powers are the result of a transfer to the IDB of 
responsibilities previously directly administered by government 
departments (this assistance is dealt with in other regions of the 
United Kingdom by the Department of Trade and Industry), and reflect 
the special constitution of the IDB as an executive arm of the
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Department of Economic Development. It is therefore, more closely- 
linked to central government administration than other UK agencies. 
Similar grants are administered in the region by LEDU, the small 
business agency.
The HIDB is empowered to give discretionary grants and loans to 
projects that will contribute to the economic and social development 
of the region, subject to certain conditions such as the viability of 
the project, the amount of investment made by private sector sources 
in it, and the additional employment which would result from it.
Since 1982, the DBRW (MWD), has been able to offer grants to 
companies, setting up or expanding in the ncn-assisted areas within 
its remit. It also offers a social development grant and a public 
authority grant which can be utilised by statutory authorities for 
social or economic purposes. The Scottish Development Agency may make 
grants with the approval of the Secretary of State, to special 
projects, and the Small Business Division can also offer small grants 
to craftsmen. The Welsh Development Agency does not in practice make 
grants to individual projects or companies, though like the SDA, it 
has statutory authority to do so. In all UK cases, the dispensing of 
grants is subject to strict central government regulation.
In the Benelux countries there are no agencies that offer grant 
assistance. Agencies in Belgium have no statutory authority to 
dispense grants, and whilst there is no theoretical impediment to 
those in the Netherlands and Luxembourg so doing, in practice they 
have not done so.
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b) Land
Powers which relate to the acquisition of land represent another area 
in which differences exist between UK and continental European 
agencies. In the Benelux countries, the SERB alone has the statutory 
power to acquire land, and this either by agreement or by compulsory 
purchase.
In other parts of Belgium, the provision of industrial land is the 
responsibility of 1intercommunales de developpement economique', 
groups of communes, provision for the establishment of which was 
contained in the Regional Expansion Law of 18 July 1958. However, in 
Brussels, the 19 communes have been unable, for political and economic 
reasons, to operate in this manner. Thus, in matters relating to 
housing and construction, the SERB was given the power to acquire, 
give away, exchange or let land and buildings, with the objective of 
improving the economic, urban and social environment, within the 
framework of the development programmes of the regional plan, and of 
regional policy in general^. This was supported by the power to 
undertake compulsory purchase, which was included in the planning and 
economic decentralisation law of 15 July 1970, which was in turn 
derived from a law of 26 July 1962, relating to compulsory purchase 
'in the cause of the public good'^ . The SERB also has the power of 
compulsory purchase in relation to land adjacent to existing 
companies, onto which that company wishes to expand.
Both the Dutch agencies and the New Industries Department of AREED are
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technically able to acquire land in the same manner as other 
commercial companies operating in their countries, that is by 
agreement. However, Dutch agencies have not, in practice, acted as 
providers of industrial sites, a role which is carried cut in the 
Netherlands by the provincial authorities, whereas the only activity 
of the New Industries Department, in this field, has been to lease 
land which is part of the steel company's redundant property stock.
A perusal of the relevant statutes relating to British agencies would 
appear to indicate that they are better equipped to operate in this 
area than are the Benelux agencies. The WDA, for example, is 
empowered in relation to derelict land in need of renewal or 
improvement, 'after consultation with such local authorities and other 
bodies as appear to the Agency to have an interest, themselves to 
acquire the relevant land by agreement or compulsorily1 ^ . However, 
both this, and its general power to acquire land either by agreement 
or compulsory purchase, is governed by the provisions of the 1946 
Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) Act, which was 
introduced to allow local authorities to acquire small plots of land 
for specified purposes. The pcwers of the SDA, HUB and DBRW (MWD) 
are identical in this respect, and their weakness has been revealed by 
the HIDB in their unsuccessful efforts to tackle the problem of the 
misuse and underuse of private land in the region (see section above 
on HIDB, history, land development). As touched on above, the powers 
of the WDA and the SDA in relation to the improvement of the 
environment and the clearance of derelict land derive from 
responsibilities which they inherited from units within the Welsh and Jj^ 
Scottish Offices.
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The UK agencies also have powers to build, which are not confined to 
land which they own themselves. The Scottish and Welsh Development 
Agencies took over the responsibilities of the Industrial Estates 
Corporations in their respective areas, whilst in Northern Ireland, 
the IDB acquired the responsibility from the old Department of 
Commerce; previous industrial development bodies, such as the NIPC and 
NIDA, had not had this power. The contrast with the Benelux agencies 
in this respect is even more stark than in relation to land, for 
though it has been shown above that the SERB exercises considerable 
power in relation to the provision of industrial land in Brussels, it 
does not normally take part in the construction of industrial 
premises. However, it does have the power to involve itself in such 
activity, and in recent years has financed the development of business 
centres and ccmnunal factory units. Other Belgian agencies do not 
have the authority to build factories. In Flanders, a recent scheme 
to construct a number of business centres, to be used by start-up 
ventures, has necessitated the creation of a separate company to 
undertake the work'7.
Apart from these specific pcwers, the British agencies, the SDA, WDA, 
DBRW, HIDB and the NEB have *catch-all1 or necessary and proper 
clauses, as Henderson terms them®, giving them a general power to act 
in pursuit of their objectives and functions, such as clause 2(3) of 
the SDA Act which states that 'the agency may do anything whether in 
Scotland or elsewhere which is calculated to facilitate the discharge 
of their functions, or is incidental or conducive to their 
discharge'^. However, as Henderson has pointed out, though such
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clauses limit 'the risk that any activity may be ultra vires1 ^ , in 
the specific case of the HIDB, the pcwer of its 'necessary and proper* 
clause was not considered sufficient to justify the taking of equity 
shareholdings by the Board^ ^ • This particular case is also 
significant in that it resulted in a strengthening of the Board's 
powers by legislation subsequent to the passing of the original 
founding statute. It was discovered, soon after the establishment of 
the Board in 1965 that its founding Act had not invested it with 
adequate powers to acquire equities. As a result, an amending Act was 
passed in 1968, indicating that the relevant clause of the original 
Act included the power to form or promote a company, and to subscribe 
to, acquire, hold and dispose of any stocks and shares. As with other 
agencies that followed it into existence in the UK, it should be noted 
that the Board was not given the power to make compulsory purchase of 
shares, the directors of the invested companies being required to 
consent to any such acquisition.
In a later case, the EBRW (MWD) was empowered in 1982 by the Secretary 
of State for Wales to offer discretionary grants to manufacturing and 
service industry projects arising both inside and outside Mid Wales. 
Previously, the Board had had power to dispense grants only to public 
authorities and other statutory bodies for social and economic 
purposes. This new power was introduced in order to compensate the 
Board for the government's removal of Assisted Area status from 
certain parts of Mid Wales, and could be utilised only in those areas.
There have also been instances of the powers of agencies being reduced 
by statute. For example, the 1980 Industry Act, introduced by the
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Conservative administration elected in the previous year, as well as 
reducing the ceilings on the borrowings of the NEB, SDA and WDA which 
had been set by the previous Labour government, removed the powers of 
the SDA and WDA to furnish technical assistance in countries outside 
the UK, and to offer selective financial assistance^. Previously, 
the Secretary of State could direct the agency to exercise, on his or 
her behalf, powers to offer selective financial assistance under 
Section 7 of the 1972 Industry Act. However, these powers had not, in 
practice, been exercised by either agency; the most important changes 
in their mode of operation were carried out, not through legislation, 
but by financial constraint and the issuing of guidelines by the 
Secretary of State which regulated the agencies1 activities in areas 
such as equity investment and factory construction. Equally, in 
Belgium, significant alteration in the role of the agencies took place 
without recourse to legislation. Such alterations have generally 
resulted in a narrowing of the agencies* operational scope, such as the 
change, by which the regional investment companies took over the 
agencies' investment functions; more recently, the Flemish GOM's 
relinquished their separate promotional campaigns, and agreed to carry 
out the attraction of inward investment through a single investment 
board, upon which they are individually represented, FIOC. (Flanders 
Investment Opportunity Council)^.
Having been unable to discern any cannon pattern in the accretion or 
diminution of powers available to the agencies, it is nevertheless 
worth regarding this aspect of their structure in an historical 
context. The UK agencies were originally considered to be important 
in that they were perceived as possessing considerable powers of
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direct intervention in the economy, whilst at the same time 
maintaining a degree of autonomy frcm central government, Macallum 
refers to the HIDB as having an * unprecedentedly wide range of 
powers'whilst the creation of the SDA and WDA was described by one 
contemporary ccranentator as marking the beginning of a new era in 
regional policy^. With the benefit of hindsight these pronouncements 
can be seen to have been based an false expectations concerning the 
operating methods of the agencies. They were bom into predominantly 
hostile economic and political environments, and were therefore never 
likely to attempt to exercise their powers to the full extent, being 
more concerned to temper their interventions to the mood of regional 
opinion-formers. Sir William Gray, former chairman of the SDA between 
1975-79, interviewed for the purpose of this research, said that one 
of his main aims had been to make the Agency acceptable to all 
sections of the community, and, therefore, able to survive a change of 
government^.
Nevertheless, whilst arguments will be presented below concerning 
their accountability and level of independence from government, the 
agencies have continued to disburse considerable sums of government 
money to industry in the regions, and to intervene in the market, 
whether by means of investment, factory construction or land 
development, without overt government interference in their day-to-day 
activities. The vague phrasing of their enabling statutes left their 
mode of operation in the hands of Board members and senior staff of 
the agencies themselves, or of the Ministers and civil servants of the 
overseeing departments. An early instance of this decision-making 
process in action, the decision of the WDA not to pursue the drawing-
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up of an economic plan for Wales, has already been noted (see above, 
Chapter Three). This would also help to explain the seeming paradox, 
one of the intentions of this study it was to investigate, namely the 
transformation of the agencies in political terms from potential 
instruments for the public direction of industry in the regions, to 
ready tools for the opening-up of this same industry to the free play 
of market forces, without the government having to resort to anything 
but the most minor adjustment in their founding legislation. 
Similarly, an incoming Labour government could be expected to 
encourage the existing agencies to pursue a more interventionist 
public-ownership oriented strategy, without having to alter 
significantly the legislation which already stands.
The position in the Benelux countries is somewhat different. As 
outlined above, only the Belgian agencies derive their powers from 
statute; the other bodies, whilst maintaining links of varying 
strength with government, remain legally independent from it. 
Nevertheless, de Wit and Walker have observed a similar phenomenon to 
that described above, in relation to British agencies, affecting the 
NOM. Pointing out that the adverse economic circumstances into which 
it was thrust in 1974 were bound to influence its operations to some 
degree, they argue that 'in its initial stages, it was essential that 
the NOM acted both energetically and cautiously ... caution was ... 
necessary because of the absence of any precedent for the NOM's 
activities'^. They go on to describe the NOM's field of activity and 
conclude that its remit is 'very general and that the NOM's management 
has substantial latitude in its interpretation of the remit' 
Similarly, Yuill and Allen, writing on regional incentives in Belgium,
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remark of 1 regional development companies' that 'their status has been 
the subject of intense debate, and in keeping with this, their 
activity has been modest..' ^
In the case of the UK agencies, the powers awarded to them by 
government, were not in themselves new. The antecedents of UK 
regional development agencies created during the last twenty years 
have been already covered in Chapter One. However, it is worth noting 
again that the powers granted to the agencies to stimulate economic 
development in the regions had been previously utilised in the field 
of regional development. For example, the power to make discretionary 
grants and loans was reflected in the earliest manifestations of 
government regional policy, the Special Areas and Special Areas 
(Amendment) Acts of 1934 and 1937^. These Acts gave powers to the 
Commissioners, one for England and Wales, and one for Scotland, to 
'initiate measures for the economic development and social improvement 
of the distressed areas' ^ . The 1937 Act established a Special Areas 
Loan Advisory Committee, which advised the Treasury on giving loans to 
large undertakings in the Special Areas, and complemented the Special 
Areas Reconstruction Association, which had been set up in the 
previous year by the Bank of England to provide loan capital for small 
businesses in these areas. In 1945, government in conjunction with 
the clearing banks, established the Industrial and Commercial Finance 
Corporation (ICPC) and Finance Capital for Industry (PCI) to supply 
capital to redevelop British industry, the former with a particular 
regional bias. In the same year, under the Distribution of Industry 
Act, responsibility for the dispensing of grants and loans was 
concentrated in the Treasury, which was to be advised by a new
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Development Areas Treasury Advisory Ccmmittee. Other powers relating 
to regional industrial development were conferred by this Act upon the 
Board of Trade, which was to take over the role of the Special Areas 
Commissioners. They included the power to build factories in 
Development Areas (another new term for the Special, formerly 
Distressed, Areas), to provide for basic public services, to reclaim 
derelict land, and to make loans to the industrial estate companies, 
which were operating as non-profit-making organisations in the 
Development Areas^. The pre-war Commissioners had been responsible 
for the construction of trading estates (such as the one at Treforest 
upon which the WDA established its original headquarters). The 
development of industrial land and factory-building, functions which 
play an important role in the activities of the regional development 
agencies, were regularised under the authority of three Industrial 
Estates Management Corporations for England, Scotland and Wales, 
through the Local Employment Act 1962^. In Scotland and Wales, these 
bodies continued to operate until the creation of the Scottish and 
Welsh Development Agencies in 1975, whilst the English body remains 
active as the English Industrial Estates Corporation.
Bowers relating to environmental improvement and land reclamation were 
previously exercised directly through units within government 
departments such as the Scottish and Welsh Offices. As pointed out 
above, the power of compulsory purchase was derived from an Act of 
1946 relating to the powers of local authorities, and its 
unsuitability to the nature of the agencies" tasks has been reflected 
in the fact that they have never employed it. Greater powers, in 
respect of land acquisition, were granted to the New Town Development
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Corporations under the New Towns Act of 1965^, and to the Rural 
Development Boards under the Agriculture Act of 1967^ • It can, 
therefore, be ventured that the creation of regional development 
agencies in the UK did not entail the bestowal upon them of powers any 
greater than those which had previously been employed by government in 
this field. That which is significant is that these powers had never 
before been concentrated in appointed agencies, operating outside the 
normal departmental structure of government.
Tracing historical precedents for the powers vested in the Benelux 
agencies is not as profitable a form of analysis as it is in relation 
to UK agencies, because, as has already been demonstrated, the powers 
of the Benelux agencies are not as extensive as those of their UK 
counterparts. Similarly, much of the relevant background has been 
covered in the introductory chapter. However, the available 
information does suggest that, as with the UK, the novelty of their 
creation lay not in the nature of their powers, but in their 
concentration in a regional, quasi-govemmental authority. The 
spatial nature of the agencies, their regional coverage, is 
particularly important in the context of the Benelux countries as they 
have, until recently, operated highly centralised systems of 
government. In Belgium, as we have seen, regional development 
agencies were introduced in 1970 as one of the first stages of 
economic decentralisation, which itself made up part of the process 
known as the 1 Reform of the State'.
Fitzmaurice has commented that 'until the Reform of the State, Belgium 
was an extremely centralised state in that even the most minor acts
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and decisions of the Carmines and provinces were almost all subject to 
annulment by the central government....^6' Likewise, both the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg operated highly centralised regional 
incentive systems, which reflected the unitary nature of their 
governmental structures. Nevertheless, there has been activity in 
these countries in the field of regional development prior to the 
establishment of the agencies. In Belgium, for example, the immediate 
post-war years saw the formation of the Conseil Eoooomique Wallon and 
the Ecananische Raad voor Vlaanderen as a result of local initiatives 
but without funds or powers^. The first 1 intercommunales1, or 
agglomerations of communes which join together to provide common 
services, were formed under legislation of 1922^ 6. However, in 1959, 
regional policy legislation made provision for the creation of 
'intercommunales* dealing specifically with regional economic 
development (societes intercamuinales de developpement econanique), 
and empowered to attract investment to their areas, through the 
acquisition and development of industrial sites and factories. At a 
national level, the Belgian government established the Societe 
Nationale d'Investissement in 1962 with power to make equity and loan 
investment in companies which could not obtain finance fran other
oq
sources , but its role as a state holding company and initiator of 
regional projects was not developed until the mid 1970's.
In the Netherlands, as early as 1934, the economic problems of the 
regions had been recognised by the establishment of the private 
Development Canpany for Zuid-Limburg, which gave loans and other forms 
of credit to local companies^6. Nationally, a National Investment 
Bank was created after the Second World War to provide loans, credit
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and guarantees to companies partly on its own account, partly 
guaranteed, by the State, and partly at the request of the State. In 
the Northern Netherlands, the Industrialisatie Bureau Noorden des 
Lands (IBN) was established in the late 1960's with power to promote 
the area as a location for inward investment, and to advise existing 
business in the area.
In Luxembourg, measures to promote regional development were not a 
concern of government prior to the recession of the 1970's, and this 
was reflected in the absence of organisations with powers toward this 
end. It was not until 1977 that the government established the 
Soci^te Natianale de Credit et d'lnvestissement (SNCI) to provide 
equity and loan investment to private industry^.
The countries of Belgium and the Netherlands have, therefore, a 
history of government intervention at the regional level designed to 
encourage economic development. The creation of regional development 
agencies has involved the granting of various powers to these regional 
bodies, seme concerning control over investment funds and land. Such 
organisations do not have any direct parallel in the history of 
regional economic development in these two countries. However, the 
relationship of these organisations to their respective governments 
differs considerably between them.
The overall picture, therefore, which emerges at the conclusion of 
this section, is one of agencies operating within a novel framework of 
regional organisation, with a comparatively broad range of potential 
if vaguely - defined powers, which have tended to be employed, with
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considerable caution and restraint. This restraint can be attributed 
to three main factors: the desire, as newly-founded organisations, to 
gain the acceptance of economic and political interests, the control 
over operations exercised by central or regional government, and the 
limitations imposed by the shortage of both human and financial 
resources. In the following section, the relationship between powers 
and functions exercised in practice will be explored, and conclusions 
drawn concerning the relative breadth of functions carried out by 
agencies in different regions and countries.
ii) Functions
The functions performed by the regional development agencies covered 
in this study can be divided into a number of distinct categories, as 
has been done in the table below, where functions are segregated into 
those which concern the provision of information and advice, 
infrastructure, fiscal and financial aid and miscellaneous services. 
The table shows that it is the British agencies which appear to 
operate the broadest range of functions, and approximate irost closely 
to the model of a comprehensive regional development agency. The 
determination of functions ultimately rests in the British agencies 
not with the founding statutes, which are often vaguely-worded, but 
with senior agency board members and staff, in conjunction with their 
sponsoring government department. For example, in the case of the 
SDA, the evolution of area projects to the point where they had 
absorbed an expenditure of £88m up to March 1983^ ,  has been achieved 
without specific statutory authority. The degree of influence which 
the sponsoring or supervisory department exercises over the activities
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of the agencies will be dealt with at length in a subsequent chapter. 
It is sufficient to note at this stage that the guidelines issued to 
the SDA by the Scottish Office in 1979 laid down the principal 
functions of the agency (industrial promotion and the attraction of 
inward investment, the provision, letting and the management of sites 
and premises for industry, and environmental improvement work) and 
declared that the function of industrial investment should be used as 
a complement to these functions^. The Guidelines also state that the 
government 'will determine in consultation with the Agency what 
proportion of the funds to be provided is to be used for the 
industrial investment functions.
Of the five main regional agencies operating in the United Kingdom, 
(WDA, SDA, IDB, HIDB and MWD) all carry out their own factory-building 
programmes; only the small business agency, LEDU, and the regional 
boards of the NEB do not carry out this function. Of this five, all 
but MWD, which in this instance, operates as an agent of the WDA, can 
provide equity and loan investment. The MWD, HIDB, IDB and LEDU 
administer and carry out grant schemes to aid industry, though only 
the IDB and LEIXJ are directly linked into the regional grant system. 
Both the SDA and WDA are responsible for land reclamation and 
environmental improvement, the SDA having taken over, on its 
establishment, the Derelict Land Unit of the Scottish Office, which 
grant-aided local authorities to carry out projects, and the WDA its 
counterpart in the Welsh Office. Their responsibility covers the 
whole of Scotland and Wales respectively, and therefore, the HIDB and 
MWD do not participate in this area. In Northern Ireland, land 
reclamation functions are still directly administered by government.
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As noted above, the comparative table of functions demonstrates that 
the British agencies possess the widest range of functions. Fran a 
list of 24 functions, it can be seen that the SDA is involved in the 
provision of 18 of them, or 75% of the total, the WDA 15(62.5%), the 
IDB 17(70.8%), the HIDB 18(75%), and the DBRW 13(54.2%). Each of 
these five UK agencies carry out more functions than any of the 
European agencies under study. Closer scrutiny of the table reveals 
that the areas in which the European agencies lag so far behind their 
UK counterparts are those concerning infrastructural provision and the 
dispensing of fiscal and financial aids, more particularly the 
provision of land and of equity and loan investment. Interestingly, 
the fact that the SDRB carries out the functions of an 
1 intercanmunale', as well as those statutorily endowed upon other 
regional development agencies, is reflected in that in carrying out 12 
of the 24 listed functions it ranks above all the other European 
agencies studied, and 3 of the smaller UK agencies, COSIRA, LEDU and 
the regional boards of the NEB/BTG. Also ranked highly is the New 
Industries Department of ARBED, owing to its capacity to provide 
industrial land and factories from the redundant stock of the giant 
steel-ccrapany. However, the table may be deceptive in this respect in 
that the factories and houses which can be let as surplus to ARBED's 
requirements are old and not particularly attractive to new investors. 
As with land and industrial estates, their availability is limited, 
and with the completion of the rationalisation of the Luxembourg steel 
industry it may be anticipated that these functions will no longer be 
carried out. The Dutch agencies represented by the largest of their 
miriber, the NOM, rank very low In the light of the fact that unlike
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their Belgian counterparts they provide equity and loan capital. This 
may reflect their more commercial mode of operation, which means that 
they do not involve themselves in areas such as planning and the 
provision of social infrastructure.
UK agencies, in the main, have statutory functions set out in their 
founding legislation. Both the SEA and WDA each have 9 functions, 
which are discussed above in the descriptive sections. Similarly the 
DBRW (MWD) was given, under the terms of the Development of Rural 
Wales Act 1976, five specific duties relating to an overall general 
function. In Belgium, the agencies were entrusted with four main 
functions under the provisions of the 1970 law of economic planning 
and decentralisation, these were, the preparation of studies to help 
formulate and promote economic development, the preparation of an 
inventory of their social and economic role in respect of the various 
social and economic activities of the region, with a view to executing 
the five-yearly regional plan, and the provision of financial aid to 
industrial projects. In the Netherlands, the NOM, according to its 
articles of incorporation, is entrusted with four duties, the 
stimulation of new and existing enterprise, if necessary through 
equity participation, the stimulation of interest in the area as an 
industrial location, the provision of information and advice to 
potential investors, and the development of initiatives which support 
economic activities in the area.
As has been shown to be the case in relation to the statutory powers 
of the agencies, their functions, as documented either in statute, or 
with regard to privately-constituted companies, in founding articles,
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have not been altered greatly during the period of their existence. 
The Belgian agencies no longer carry out their investment function, 
nor do the Flemish GOM's engage in the attraction of inward 
investment, but these changes have taken place without recourse to 
alteration of the functional responsibilities laid down in their 
founding statutes. In the United Kingdom, the newly-elected 
Conservative government made minor alterations to the statutory 
functions of the NEB, SEA and WEA which were embodied in the 1980 
Industry Act^. In all three cases these included the deletion of 
their duty to promote industrial democracy in organisations under 
their control, and the inclusion of a new duty to promote the private 
ownership of interests in industrial undertakings by the disposal of 
securities and property held by them or their subsidiaries. A 
reference to promoting the reorganisation of an industry or 
undertaking of an industry was also deleted, as was the NEB's function 
of extending public ownership into profitable areas of manufacturing 
industry.
These changes, in themselves, have not had a significant effect on the 
activities of the agencies. The clause concerning industrial 
democracy, for example, had never been implemented, and the deletion 
of a phrase permitting the agencies to promote the reorganisation of 
industry, whilst continuing to permit them to promote its growth, 
modernisation or development would appear to be of more academic than 
practical interest. It might, therefore be asked, what relationship 
do statutory functions bear to the everyday operations of the 
agencies? Examples have been given above to show that certain of the 
agencies activities have developed outside the intention of their
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original statutes, such as the creation of regional boards of the NEB, 
It has also been stated that decisions as to the prioritising and 
funding of the functions generally rest with the senior staff of the 
agencies, and the government departments to which they are 
responsible. However, it should not be assumed that these officially 
enunciated functions have no bearing on their decisions. The Belgian 
SDR/QOM's were, for example, entrusted with four primary functions 
under the terms of the 1970 legislation which made provision for their 
establishment; as noted above, econonic research, the compilation of 
an inventory of socio-economic need, the implementation of aspects of 
the 5-year plan, and the provision of financial aid to industrial 
projects.
With the exception of the last-mentioned function, which was 
transferred from the agencies upon the establishment of regional 
investment companies in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia, their present 
activities revolve, to a considerable extent, around the functions 
listed above, and emphasise the closeness of their relationship with 
government, in that two of the functions constitute acts of 
information-gathering on behalf of the state, and the third is 
concerned with the implementation of government policy, albeit one 
formulated on the basis of broad consultation. The agencies are, 
indeed, involved in activities not specifically sanctioned by these 
regulations, such as the provision of technical and marketing 
assistance for local businesses, and the pursuit of schools/industry 
liaison. Nevertheless, the functions which it carries out in 
practice, as represented in Table 1, could all be said to fall within 
the (admittedly broad) parameters laid down by the enabling statutes.
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Similarly, the Articles of Incorporation of the NOM entrust it with 
four duties, the stimulation of new and existing enterprise, if 
necessary, through equity participation, the stimulation of interest 
in the area as an industrial location, the provlsicn of information 
and advice to potential investors, and the development of initiatives 
which support economic activities in the area. The tasks are still 
reflected in the activities and structures of the present-day NOM, as 
the table above shows, though the degree of latitude in interpretation 
to which the last-quoted function is open may reduce the import of 
this observation.
As indicated above, the statutory functions of the British agencies 
have generally been laid down with greater explicitness than the 
statutory powers earlier discussed. Following the amendments 
introduced by the 1980 Industry Act, the WDA's founding statute 
instructed it to carry out a list of functions which included the 
promotion of Wales as a location for industrial development, the 
provision of finance for industrial undertakings, the establishment 
and/or carrying on of industrial undertakings on its own initiative, 
the provision and management of industrial sites and premises, the 
reclamation of land, and the redevelopment of the environment, and the 
promotion of private ownership of its holdings. Remembering that the 
bulk of WDA expenditure is annually disbursed on factory construction, 
equity and loan investment, land reclamation and environmental 
improvement, and industrial promotion, then it would be fair to 
conclude that the work of the WDA remains intimately related to the 
functions ordained for it in the Welsh Development Agency Act of 1975.
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The pattern that has thus far emerged, therefore, is one of regional 
development agencies operating cautiously, with somewhat ill-defined 
powers, carrying out tasks which have been, in the main, prescribed by 
legislation. To run the risk of over-simplification it might be said 
that the agencies were told what to do, though not how they were going 
to do it, or what they were doing it for, for not only were their 
powers vaguely-defined so also were their aims. These aims, or 
statutory purposes, are the subject of analysis in the next section of 
this chapter.
iii) Aims
The aims of regional development agencies tend to appear in statutory 
form in the most general terms. The DBRW (MWD), for example, was 
established under the terms of the 1976 Development of Rural Wales Act 
'for the purpose of promoting the economic and social well-being of 
the people in the area of Wales for which it is responsible under this 
Act*3®. The purpose of the NOM is similarly expressed, in its 
Articles of Incorporation, as being 'to improve the social and 
economic structure of the Northern Netherlands and to improve 
employment opportunities'^7. The Scottish and Welsh Development 
Agencies' statutory aims are more detailed, if not mare immediately 
discernible in intent, they being 'the furtherance' of the economic 
development of their respective regions, 'the promotion of industrial 
efficiency and international competitiveness, the provision, 
maintenance and safeguarding of employment, and the improvement of the 
environment'38. The difficulties that such aims present to the
3 2 0
economic or political analyst are not merely that their import is 
unclear, (there would, for example, be marry differing views as to what 
might constitute and 'improvement* in the social and economic 
structure of a given area as there would be if one attempted to reach 
a widely “accepted definition of * industrial efficiency*) but that as 
objectives they are not measurable against any short or medium-term 
gauge of performance. Of the agencies under study, only the IDB and 
LEDU have set for themselves specific targets concerning job 
promotion. In the case of the IDB these job targets were first 
included in the Board's * short-term strategy for industrial 
development 1 ^ , published in March 1983, which also contained details 
of the IDB*s * mission' to play a leading role in the industrial 
development of Northern Ireland, to promote and aid the maintenance of 
viable businesses, to secure long-term jobs, to encourage the 
expansion and competitiveness of the existing industrial base, to 
bring new enterprise and investment to Northern Ireland, and to 
improve the image of the Province as an industrial location. The 
IDB's overall corporate objective; as stated in the Medium-Term 
Strategy published in May 1985 is 'to maximise continuing employment 
opportunities in manufacturing and tradeable services' ^ .
The HIDB, in its aims, reflects the duality of government regional 
policy, prevalent at its inception, for it combines, in the Highlands 
and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965 'the purpose of assisting 
the people of the Highlands and Islands to improve their economic and 
social conditions' with that of 'enabling the Highlands and Islands to 
play a more effective part in the economic and social development of 
the nation'^. This twin aim was bom of the view that government
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regional policy was not merely socially justified, in that it aimed to 
raise the economic standards of depressed areas of the country to 
levels more comparable with its more prosperous part, but that the 
exploitation of the natural resources and utilisation of the pool of 
unemployed labour that these depressed regions contained would serve 
to increase Gross National Product and relieve pressure on the 
'overheated* labour markets of the Midlands and the South-East of 
England. The Board, was, after it had commenced operations, to make 
specific commitments concerning the maintenance of the population in 
what it termed 1 the true crofting areas'^, but no such specific 
objectives were embodied in its statutes, and the majority of agencies 
have similarly been most reluctant to set for themselves objectives 
which can be subjected to empirical measurement.
It should, at this point, be noted that the SDA. and WDA. both have 
year-on-year targets for financial return set for them by government 
on their factory-building and investment functions, but these 
performance criteria are of a different nature to the overall purposes 
studied here, and so will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
In the case of the UK agencies, statutory purposes are intended to 
describe the ends to which the powers ascribed to the agencies may be 
put, and are likely therefore to be framed in the form of 
generalities, so as to avoid unnecessarily constraining their 
activities. Such has been the pattern of legislation governing other 
quasi-govemraental organisations in the past. If, therefore, aims and 
objectives are not to be expounded in detail in legislation, it is to 
be expected that they should be published at an early stage in the
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agency's operational life, in the form of a corporate strategy or 
policy document. However, some agencies have been slow to make public 
the programme to which they are working. The SDA, for example, 
formulated its Corporate Plan in 1979, almost four years after it had 
ccramenced operations. This Plan was followed in 1981 by a Forward 
Strategy, which projected a forward expenditure pattern for a three- 
year cycle and cited the SDA's objectives as being 'to assist in the 
realisation of opportunities arising fron the development of Scottish 
entrepreneurship, to support growth sectors, to promote technology and 
to assist in the regeneration of local e c o n o m i e s ' T h e  Strategy, 
which included generalised job targets, was approved by the Secretary 
of State, and published in the Agency's 1981 Annual Report.
The WDA produced a 'Statement of Policies and Programmes', in January 
1977, which gave an interesting insight into the attitude of the 
agency to the concept of forward planning, and the setting of targets 
and objectives. 'Since the WDA have full responsibility for only part 
of the economic development activities in Wales, it is not realistic 
for the WDA to prepare a broad economic or industrial 'strategy' or 
'plan' for Wales... For the same reasons it is not realistic for the 
WDA to set broad targets for themselves, such as the achievement of 
certain levels of employment or incomes, or the achievement of certain 
environmental standards in Wales. It is possible to set targets for 
achievement only in specific terms in relation to particular WDA 
programmes'^. Reflecting this cautious philosophy, the Agency's 
document makes only the most general reference to the aims it hopes to 
achieve, expressing the belief that its 'activities will make a 
significant contribution towards meeting the pressing need for new
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employment in Wales during the next five years'^. The Statement did, 
however, contain an estimate of the WDA's expenditure programme over a 
five-year period, broken down by activity. The Agency's continued 
reticence to issue such projections may partly be explained by the 
fact that these figures proved wildly inaccurate. In July 1984 the 
Agency published a five-year corporate plan. This gave renewed 
emphasis to catalytic investment in private industry and to the 
presentation of the previously separate WDA operations of land 
reclamation, investment, factory construction and business advice as a 
package. It also presented a strategy of different development 
policies for different parts of Wales, dividing the region into three 
areas: prime sites bordering main roads, such as the M4 coastal strip 
in South Wales, outer urban areas such as the South Wales valleys, and 
rural areas under its remit, such as the old county of 
Pembrokeshire^.
In the first full year of its operations, the DBRW (MWD) published a 
'Policy Consultation Document' setting out its iinnediate objectives; 
this was followed in 1979 by a 'Board Policy Statement', which 
received the formal approval of the Secretary of State. The 
Statement, which was widely regarded as an extension of the 'grcwth 
centre' strategy which had previously been pursued by the Newtown 
Development Corporation and Mid Wales Industrial Development 
Association, laid down that the Board's aim was 'to increase the 
population of Mid Wales a) by creating conditions (jobs, houses, 
quality of social life) that attract young people to remain in the 
area, b) by attracting persons (including expatriates^ to move into the 
area, emphasis being put on those with skills and business
3 7A
aspirations.1 It further identified 23 points for the concentration 
of growth, including *Growth Towns1, 'Special Towns' and 'Key 
Towns' .^.
Interestingly, the Board's antecedent, the first British rural 
development agency, the HIDB, did not for many years make public its 
corporate strategy. Its two statutory objectives as described above 
were of a general nature, and as Grassie has pointed out1 no attempt 
was made to quantify these targets. Using them, therefore, as 
yardsticks by which to judge the Board's work is fraught with 
difficulties'^. However, senior Board members did not feel it 
appropriate to publish development plans or strategy documents, 
apparently for fear that this might lead to false expectations 
concerning the Board's ability to alter the state of the Highland 
economy. Thus, the development of Board strategy since 1965, and the 
significant changes which have occurred in it during this period, have 
been reflected only through statements made in Annual Reports. One 
such statement which was noted above, and which appeared in the 
Board's First Annual Report was that 'No matter what success is 
achieved in the Eastern or Central Highlands.... the board will be
judged by its ability to hold population in the true crofting
  149areas' .
However, in 1982, the Board finally conceded the validity of the 
points made above, and published in its 17th Annual Report a corporate 
strategy. 'Hie Board's remit to develop the area economically and 
socially is a very wide one, and does not in itself help to identify a 
plan of action. We therefore have to translate our broad objectives
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into priorities that are appropriate and timely1^ .  The strategy goes 
on to outline for the Board the following goals : 'to increase 
employment opportunities, to increase incomes, to retain population, 
especially in areas where reduced levels would put community services 
at risk, to increase the long-term capacity of the Highlands and 
Islands to develop and make a greater contribution to the national 
economy, and to improve social and community facilities1 ^ . General 
aims are then presented in six separate development sectors, land, 
business and industry, fisheries and fish farming, tourism, transport 
and communications, and social and community development. However, no 
specific targets for expenditure or job promotion are included.
As already mentioned, the IDB published a ‘Short-Term Strategy and 
Summary of Aims and Initiatives1 in March 1983, seme six months after 
it had commenced operations. As well as the 'mission* quoted above, 
the Board set itself three firm objectives, to increase job promotions 
from 3,500 in 1982/3 to 10,000 by 1985/6, with an immediate objective 
of 5,000 job promotions in 1983/4, to derive 3,000 of the 1983/4 job 
promotions from home industry, and 2,000 from inward investment, and, 
more generally, to strengthen companies so that the number requiring 
rescue will decline from year to year. It also set out broad aims in 
four distinct areas of activity, the development of home industry, the 
encouragement of inward investment, the improvement of Northern 
Ireland's image overseas, and the promotion of incentives to industry. 
The document was not well-received in Northern Ireland, being 
considered by many unimaginative and insubstantial (one interviewee 
remarked that the press release accompanying it had been longer than 
the strategy document itself). Nevertheless, it contained a
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commitment by the IDB 1 in due course to develop and publish a more 
detailed and longer-term s t r a t e g y * I n  fact, it was not for another 
two years, that the IDB was to release to the public a medium-term 
strategy, and the delay caused angry reaction from amongst other 
bodies, the Northern Ireland Economic Council and the Northern Ireland 
Canmittee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, (NIC) ICHU. The NIEC 
chairman, Sir Charles Carter, lamented in October 1984 that 'the IDB 
still has not worked out a properly developed strategy for action. I 
am frankly disappointed that after two years it is still impossible to 
get out of them anything but the most woolly statements as to what 
their strategy really is'^. Earlier, in March 1984, the Northern 
Ireland officer of the ICTU, Terry Carlin, had written to the then 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, stating that the 
(NIC) ICTU 'shares the concern and criticism which has been voiced by 
others . •. .About the present unhappy situation in relation to the lack 
of progress in the formation of an effective industrial development 
strategy1^ .  The position of the IDB in this respect represents an 
amplification of the dilemma which to some extent affects all the 
agencies. To publish a strategy involves making decisions over 
priorities, and is therefore bound to arouse hostility in certain 
quarters; moreover, the publication of job targets and expenditure 
projections provide a measure by which the future performance of the 
agency can be judged. The staff of the IDB have been subject to 
criticism from the media, politicians, and interest-groups for failing 
to meet the jcb-prcmotion targets set out in the Short-Term Strategy. 
However, they have equally been criticised for being unable to produce 
a longer-term strategy, which, if it was to have value, would have to 
include some listing of sectoral and geographical priorities, and
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further statistical targets
Conversely, Northern Ireland*s other development agency, LEDU, which 
concentrates on the promotion of business enterprises employing 50 or 
less staff has heightened its profile and improved its public image 
generally as a result of its success in meeting job promotion targets. 
In 1981, a White Paper by the Secretary of State, entitled ‘Framework 
for Action*, gave LEDU responsibility for the promotion of small 
businesses throughout Northern Ireland, and set it a target of 12,000 
job promotions over the five year period from 1981 to 1986. As LEDU 
had promoted only 11,000 jobs in the previous ten years* of its 
existence, this was considered an ambitious target. However, in the 
four years to the end of the 1984/5 financial year LEDU promoted 
11,830 jobs each year, breaking the annual target that it had set 
itself, and falling only 170 jobs short of the Secretary of State * s 
five-year target, with the final year of activity still to come. 
According to LEDU*s 1984/5 Annual Report 'the formulation of this 
ongoing strategy with the commitment to achieving job targets has 
helped to create a sense of challenge among the LEDU Board, Area 
Panels and the staff. It has also led to a more effective use of 
LEDU's resources and the introduction of a number of new job-creating 
initiatives' .
Taking an overall perspective, UK agencies have, it seems, been 
reluctant to translate their broad-based statutory objectives, with 
their attendant ambiguities, into published strategies, with 
measurable goals. In recent years, however, corporate planning as an 
internal function of the agencies appears to have developed to the
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point where a majority of them have felt able to make a public 
statement of general aims. Only in Northern Ireland, has the process 
been carried so far as to encompass specific targets for job- 
prcmotions, with varying results for the agencies concerned. These 
firm commitments may be considered a symptom of the need for 
government to be seen to be making economic progress in a region 
which, on any chosen measure of social or economic health, is more 
deprived than any other in the UK.
The Benelux agencies do not have their aims delineated in the same 
manner as their UK counterparts. Their founding statutes and articles 
of incorporation tend to refer rather to tasks, or 1 missions1, which 
are sometimes difficult to distinguish from those responsibilities 
which would in relation to UK agencies be termed * functions *. 
However, the picture which emerges from this study of aims or 'tasks* 
is, in many respects, a familiar one, of generalised goals and 
unquantified alms. To take the Dutch agencies, for example, *LIQF*s 
main task is to promote and develop, on its own initiative, all 
activities relevant to the industrialisation of the province of 
Limburg'55, and that of its sister agency, NOM 1 is to improve the 
social and economic structure of the North of the Netherlands, and to 
improve employment opportunities'5^. These commitments more closely 
resemble the objectives of the UK agencies than anything that can be 
found in the Statues of their Belgian counterparts, which were given a 
number of 'charges*, the primary one being the 'investigation, 
planning and promotion of regional economic activity'55. This lack of 
precision concerning aims is probably best exemplified in the case of 
the SERB, the administrative council of which, reported in 1983 that
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'that which constitutes without doubt if not a 'mission1 properly 
speaking, but the very foundation of the Societe's existence, is the 
contents of the first paragraph of the fourth article of the statutes 
which specifies that 'the Societe is the sole implementing body for 
regional economic policy within the area of the administrative 
arrondissement of Bruxelles-Capitale'^ . Unfortunately, for the 
analyst of the structures of such agencies, a clause of this nature 
cannot be classified as a statutory power, function or purpose, 
containing, as it does, elements of all three.
The objective of the New Industries Department, established as part of 
the Anti-Crisis Division of the ARBED steel company have been 
documented as 'the promotion of the creation of new employment 
opportunities, and the furtherance of diversification within the 
national economy' ^ . It is interesting to note that this remit makes 
no mention of any regional aims; indeed, the objectives would appear 
to be closely tied to the immediate problem of the steel company 
itself: the re-employment of the large numbers of ARBED workers made 
redundant as a result of labour-shedding programmes, and transferred 
onto the government's public works scheme. Hie public objectives of 
the state holding canpany, SNCI, do not encompass regional development 
either, they being 'to support investment or export operations which 
are in the general interest of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg'^ •
In the main, the Benelux agencies do not have the staff resources to 
develop corporate planning functions in the way that sane UK agencies 
have done. None of them operate a strategic plan. However, this does 
not mean that they conduct their activity on a completely 'ad
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hoc1 basis. The Belgian agencies, for instance, are each involved in 
the preparation of regional inventories which are passed on to their 
regional governments and transmitted into the Five-yearly regional 
economic plan. It is this plan which to an increasing extent, 
provides the framework for their activities. It is also important to 
point out that the establishment of clearly-defined objectives may not 
be as essential for the smooth running of the Benelux agencies as it 
may be for their UK counterparts, because agencies such as the NOM and 
SERB have governing structures which allow for the discussion and 
determination of overall policy decisions to be taken in a forum 
distinct frcm that which carried out the day-to-day running of the 
agency. There is therefore, through the provision for democratic 
representation in these agencies, a strong policy-making impetus 
built into their structures, which appears to offer safeguards against 
the agency drifting along without organisational goals. It may be 
useful to note that it is those agencies where representational 
structures are most developed (the Belgian agencies) whose statutory 
objectives appear most ill-defined.
iv) Conclusions
Whilst the preceding discussion has tended to demonstrate that canmon 
trends within the agencies are not always easy to discern, certain 
conclusions may be drawn from a study of the agencies* powers, 
functions and aims. Firstly, it would appear that the UK agencies 
have both wider powers and functions than their equivalents in the 
Benelux countries, though, in common with those Benelux agencies, they 
have exercised their powers, and carried out their functions in a
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circumspect manner, reflecting the unfavourable nature of the 
economic, and to a degree, political environment into which they were 
bom.
The powers with which these agencies were endowed were not necessarily 
new, in that many of them had previously been exercised by central 
government, or by other government organisations involved in the 
promotion of economic development, but their concentration in this 
particular form of regional organisation, only indirectly controlled 
by government, was, in all the countries under study, a novel 
development. The powers and objectives of the agencies, whether set 
down in statute or published elsewhere, were often vaguely-defined. 
The documenting of the functions which the agencies were to pursue was 
more precise, though the role of these publicly-declared functions 
appeared to be that of setting the parameters of the agencies" 
activities, as opposed to determining policy. This latter role was, 
in the case of the UK agencies, principally the responsibility of 
senior Board members and agency staff, whereas in relation to the 
Benelux agencies, it was more often determined through their internal 
representative structures. These representative structures, which are 
particularly well-developed in the Belgian agencies serve, together 
with the greater involvement of agencies in the Benelux countries, to 
compensate for their lack of activity in the field of corporate or 
strategic planning, an area in which UK agencies have, in recent 
years, become increasingly active.
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v) Resources
The role of resources (in the sense here used being both financial and 
human) in determining the nature of an agency is a fundamental one. 
It is because the availability of such resources plays an important 
part in relation to the aspects of the agencies which have previously 
been discussed in this chapter that it is appropriate here to consider 
the comparative distribution of resources between agencies. A 
particular agency may be endowed with a variety of statutory powers, 
entrusted with a range of functions, and given far-reaching aims, but, 
without capital or staff it does not possess the means with which to 
carry them out. Similarly, the amount of resources that the state is 
prepared to release to an agency (for, as will be shown later, all the 
agencies in this study are either directly or indirectly funded by 
government) may constitute a better indicator of the type of role that 
the agency is expected to play than that afforded by its founding 
legislation. For example, when the legislation establishing the HIDB 
was first published, hopes and fears were expressed about its 
potential for bringing about ‘revolutionary change* in the areas 
within its remit. However, when it subsequently became clear that the 
government would commit only a relatively small budget to the Board* s 
charge, commentators were able to predict that the impact of its 
activities would be considerably less far-reaching than had been 
thought. The resources of the agencies, therefore, as measured by the 
amount of funds to which they have access annually, and by the 
complement of staff which they are able to employ, may serve as a 
significant determining factor in the make-up of their operations.
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As is clearly shown in Table 2, four of the agencies stand above the 
rest in terras of their financial and staff resources (this calculation 
excludes the NEB/BIG, which spends only a small part of its budget on 
an explicitly regional basis), these being the SDA, WDA, IDB and HIDB. 
Their dominance can be expressed statistically in that they account 
for 86.8% of the total funds available to those agencies included in 
the table, and 82% of the total staff (once again excluding the 
NEB/BTG on the grounds that it is not possible to disaggregate figures 
for its regional activities from those of its main nationally-based 
operation). So small is the resource-base of those agencies not 
included in the table (four Flemish and two Dutch agencies) that their 
inclusion would, for example, only reduce the proportion of funds 
appropriated by the four largest UK agencies to an estimated 86% of 
the total, and the proportion of staff to an estimated 78%.
a) Financial resources
These agencies all operate within the UK, and like the other agencies 
in the table, receive the bulk of their funding from the state, though 
recently, receipts from the sale of assets, have become a significant 
source of income (£10 .3m for the SDA in 1983/4 and £6.7m for the 
WDA*^). Disagreement between agency and government over funding is 
not easy to discern, the negotiating procedure for departmental 
budgets in the public sector being closed in nature, but public 
discontent did arise when as a result of government cuts in public 
expenditure in the 1980/81 financial year, the WDA's budget was 
reduced by £9m^, and again in 1983 when concern was expressed in 
Parliament that the HIDB would run out of funds before the end of its
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financial year^. In more general terms, there was also opposition in 
some quarters to the setting , through legislation, of financial 
limits on the total borrowings of UK agencies from government .
However, the impression gathered from interviews with the staff of UK 
agencies is that they have not felt financially constrained in their 
activities, and this viewpoint is summed up by Grassie in relation to 
the history of the HIDB up to 1982, when he states that 'the board did 
not suffer in general from a lack of finance; indeed it was able on 
occasion to secure additional resources. Like other agencies, of 
course, it suffered at times of restricted public spending but its 
camion experience was to find it was in danger of not spending its 
total approved budget'^. The problem of budget shortfall appears to 
be a common one for UK agencies and relates to the system of resource- 
allocation practised by the Treasury, which will reduce the amount 
given to an agency in grant-in-aid for the forthcoming year by the 
amount left unspent in the previous year. As Grassie points out, this 
generally leads to a scramble for projects in the closing weeks of the 
financial year, and in July 1985, the Comptroller and Auditor General 
in his report to the SDA's 1984/85 accounts censured the Agency for 
making payments to housing associations amounting to nearly £5,000,000 
in the final month of the financial year. The payments were made 'in 
advance of need' and before conditions for the payments of the grant 
had been met, the clear implication being that the Agency had wanted 
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Dutch agencies are allowed by government to borrow capital on the open 
commercial markets under State guarantee up to a specified limit, 
which is determined annually. Like the Belgian agencies they operate 
with resources which are far more restricted than their UK 
counterparts, though as has been shewn above, their spending powers 
are not as wide-ranging. The Dutch agencies are constituted as 
private limited liability companies, having their own share capital. 
In the case of the NQM, this consists of 1,000 shares of 1,000 Dfl 
each, giving the agency a share capital base of approximately 
£250,000^. The LIOF has a capitalization value of 3 million Dfl, 
consisting of 12,000 shares worth 250 Dfl each7®. The shares are 
divided into two categories, A and B, ownership of the former being 
confined to the Dutch state, the province of Limburg, municipal 
authorities within the province, and other bodies corporate. 
Likewise, the Belgian SDRW, though constituted under Belgian law as a 
private limited liability company but as a 'public body with civil 
character' received 9 million BF of starting capital frcm the five 
provincial authorities whose territories fall within or partly within 
the Wallonian region^. The SDRB's initial capital, subscribed by the 
19 communes of Brussels, and the province of Brabant, amounted to 5.7 
million BF^, and that of the GOMVB to 10.5 million BF^. For their 
day-to-day needs it appears that the Belgian agencies rely on annual 
subsidies frcm provincial and regional authorities, the negotiation of 
which are carried out on an ad hoc basis in contrast to the UK 
agencies, whose financing is determined according to short and medium- 
term projections made by the agencies in consultation with central 
government. In this way, the UK agencies can generally predict with 
seme degree of precision the amount of finance that will be available
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to them in a given year, whereas the Belgian and Dutch agencies 
receive finance frcm government authorities in proportion to actual 
sums spent (in effect, retrospective payment), and therefore operate 
in a climate of greater financial uncertainty. This topic, together 
with others concerning the financial arrangements which govern the 
operations of the agencies, will be dealt with in the following 
chapter.
b) Staff resources
It has been argued that as important in the carrying out of economic 
development work as the availability of finance, is the availability 
of personnel. Interviews with staff of the agencies have tended to 
suggest that there are areas of the agencies* work, particularly in 
the UK, where the main constraint on activity is not lack of finance, 
but inability to provide sufficient staff (for example, area projects, 
and * hands-on* venture capital investments). Though limits imposed by 
government on the recruitment of staff are most obvious in relation to 
the smaller Belgian agencies, those agencies with comparatively large 
staff complements have also been critical of them. Moreover, the 
figures relating to the staff numbers of the larger UK agencies are, 
in a sense, misleading, because their employment forces have not been 
built up from scratch, and have not, consequently, been deployed 
according to the wishes of the agencies. When the SDA, for example, 
was created, it inherited between 470 and 480 staff from various pre­
existing bodies such as the Scottish Industrial. Estates Corporation 
(SHC), the Small Industries Council for the Rural Areas of Scotland 
(SICRAS), and the Derelict Land Unit (DLU) of the Scottish Development
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Department (SDD), each with their own statutory functions which they 
were to continue to carry out under the new authority of the agency. 
As a result of this, the SDA was considerably inhibited in using its 
comparatively large workforce to carry out the tasks which it 
considered carried the highest priority. As the Chairman of the SDA 
stated in evidence to the Select Ccranittee cn Scottish Affairs in 1980 
'it seems a nonsense to have a situation where we are given a budget 
of something like £80 million to spend in the SDA, and we are not 
allowed to create the organisation structure which we deem as an 
agency board to be essential to carry out that function properly1^ .  
The agency operates within a staff ceiling laid down by government, 
which, according to sources within the Agency, has actually been 
reduced over time"^. In 1984/5 the Agency carried out a major 
reorganisation of its staffing structure, concentrating on the 
property division, which, formed around the nucleus of the SIEC, had 
previously accounted for almost 50% of the Agency's total staff 
resources. As a result, staff numbers were reduced over the course of 
a year frcm 733 to 649, a reduction of 11.5%, and the proportion of 
staff employed in the Property and Environment Division of the Agency 
frcm 47.3% of the total to 23.7%^. Hcwever, despite this reduction 
in staff numbers, the cost of wages and salaries increased over the 
period by 1 .9%, which, combined with the fact that the number of 
employees in the agency's top salary bracket of £30-35,000 rose during 
the year from 1 to 5, suggests that the Agency's intention of reducing 
staff numbers was to enable the introduction of a performance-related 
system of remuneration for senior staff. Without the reduction in 
staff, it is to be presumed that the government would not have agreed 
to the salary increases which the introduction of a system of this
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nature entailed.
Referring once again to Grassie* s account of the HIDB, he provides a 
useful summary of the staffing difficulties which it faced, which 
could equally be applied to the other UK agencies. Of the HIDB he 
writes 1 it was subject to major controls over the only resources it 
had, its staff and its budget. Initially, it could not hire anyone 
not even the lowliest clerk, without the approval of DAFS (Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, Scotland). Through time this regulation 
was relaxed but even now, the board cannot appoint of its own accord, 
staff to its most senior ranks. In essence this meant from the 
beginning that Scottish Office decided not only hew many staff the 
board should employ, but also, in terms of salary, what its quality 
should be*77.
Restrictions on staffing levels within Belgian agencies are, however, 
even more strict. The numbers which can be employed, both in total, 
and on each grade, are determined by statute, and in the case of the 
Flemish agencies have remained unaltered since their creation. The 
SDRW, however, whose original staff-limit was set by a decree of 15 
October 1975 at 12, had it increased to 50 under the terms of a decree 
passed in 1977, and subsequently to 116, under a decree of 1 July 
19807®. The increase authorised in 1980 was to cope with the growth 
of work resulting frcm the establishment of a number of 1 cellules* 
within the Societe which were themselves created for the purpose of 
research, through agreements with the Wallonian regional executive. 
The difficulties that the SDRW has experienced with staffing can be 
illustrated by reference to the following example. The report of the
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Societe's auditor to the General Assembly on the Societe's accounts 
has over a period of years, made ocmment on the fact that the Societe 
did not have a proper system of internal audit, or of monitoring the 
investments in its portfolio. However, when the SDRW attempted to act 
on the first of these reconmendations by appointing a member of staff 
experienced in auditing procedure, the regional executive refused to 
authorise the Board to offer a fixed-term contract in connection with 
the post. When the Societe applied for authority to engage someone to 
take responsibility for the control of its investment portfolio, this 
was similarly refused by the Regional Executive. Flemish agencies 
have also experienced extreme difficulty in maintaining staff levels
7Q
commensurate with the breadth of their activities . One body, the 
GOM-L, has attempted to circumvent the staff ceiling by utilising 
staff nominally employed by the Limburg Economic Council (LEC), an 
advisory body established in 1951, which now shares the offices of the 
GOM-L*^. The staff of the LEC operate under provincial rather than 
regional control, and are, therefore, not affected by the statutes 
which govern the personnel of the GOM-L.
Control over the number of staff employed by the Dutch agencies is 
exercised by the public authorities, who are responsible for the 
payment of wage-bills. In the case of the NOM, all operating’ costs 
(appartaatskosten) are paid by central government under the terras of a 
F i n a n c e  a n d  G u a r a n t e e  A g r e e m e n t  (F i n a n c i e r i n g s - e n  
Garantiesvereenkomst). Thus, though they are constituted as private 
limited liability companies they tend to operate under the same 
constraints as agencies in both the UK and Belgium. The staff of the 
NOM, to take one example, whilst being increased from 15 at its
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inception to 31 by 1979, shewed no further increase by the end of 
198381.
vi) Summary
The chapter has set out to make a comparative analysis of regional 
agencies in relation to four central aspects of their constitution. 
It has shown that significant differences exist between the various 
agencies in relation to their powers, functions and resources, though 
in a fourth area studied, it has been established that they appear to 
share roughly similar aims, concerning the social and economic 
development of their respective regions. The chapter establishes that 
the UK agencies have wide-ranging powers, particularly in relation to 
the provision of equity and loan finance, the acquisition of land and 
the dispensing of grants, which many of the Benelux agencies do not 
share. Similarly, the UK agencies operate a breadth of functions, the 
diversity of which is matched by only one of the Benelux agencies, the 
SERB. Four of the UK agencies sire also in receipt of financial and 
human resources which far exceed those available to their Benelux 
counterparts. However, as is pointed out above, a camion trend has 
been discerned amongst all the agencies in the study towards caution 
in the exercise of powers and the carrying out of functions, which, it 
has been suggested, can be attributed in part to the uniformly 
unfavourable economic and (to a lesser extent) political climate into 
which they were bom.
It has also been argued that the powers with which these agencies were 
endowed were not new, marry of them having previously been exercised by
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central government, or other governmental organisations, in promoting 
economic development, but that their concentration in this particular 
form of regional organisation, which was only indirectly controlled by 
government, did represent a novel development.
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Regional development agencies-f inanoe, structure and control
Having discussed in the previous chapter the broad constitutional 
aspects of regional development agencies' character, it is necessary 
to consider now other factors which affect their day-to-day operation. 
The first of these factors, that of finance, has already been referred 
to briefly, in the context of the scale of financial resources 
available to the agencies. In this chapter, the financing of each 
agency will be analysed in order to ascertain the sources from which 
funding is derived, the methods and conditions of payment, and the 
relationship between agency and donor which is consequently 
engendered. Closely related to the provision of finance, in that one 
of its prime objectives is the oversight and effective control of 
financial expenditure, is the internal decision-making structure of 
the individual agency. The second section of this chapter will deal 
with the different types of internal structure in operation within 
the agencies, and will seek to ascertain where in these structures lie 
their main directing forces, those which exercise authority over 
overall policy, and over day-to-day activity. In conclusion, a wider 
perspective on control of the agencies, drawing on the examples of the 
preceding sections, will be attempted. The section will also enquire 
as to the existence of structures which allow scope for the views of 
the inhabitants of regions which the agencies serve to be expressed in 
relation to agency activities. Leading on from this, consideration 
will be given to the extent to which agencies are (centrally or 
regionally) directed from above (by government), from below (through
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the community), or are able to operate independent of outside 
influence.
i) Finance
As has been shown in the previous chapter, financial resources 
constitute an important factor in determining the composition of the 
agencies* operations. Agencies without access to adequate funding 
may, for example, be confined to an advisory rather than a pro-active 
role in economic development. Of equal significance, however, is the 
source from which finance is derived, for this may influence the 
manner in which the finance is used by the agency itself, and may 
affect its activities in areas which may, superficially, appear nan- 
related. For example, an agency which draws revenue from the sale of 
factories it has erected, may be reluctant to build in areas of 
economic and social deprivation where an adequate market price cannot 
be obtained for its product.
As the descriptive passages in Chapter Two have shewn, the funds of UK 
agencies are, in the main, drawn from central government. In the case 
of two of the larger agencies, the SDA and WDA, the bulk of funding 
takes the form of grant-in-aid, received through the budgets of their 
sponsoring departments, supplemented by Public Dividend Capital (which 
is used to finance equity investments and is negotiated directly 
through the Treasury) and borrowings from the National Loans Fund. 
Other smaller sources of finance for these agencies in recent years 
have included the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). Both these organisations have
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utilised the SDA. and WDA as agents for the disbursement of loans to 
companies within their respective regions. However, the amounts 
involved have, as yet, been comparatively small (see Table 1).
The agencies* only other significant source of income is from their 
own capital resources. In 1984/5, for example the SDA sold off £17m 
worth of property and realised a capital profit of approximately 
£800,000 an the sale of investments in two companies^ . In the same 
year, the WDA raised £11.5m from the sale of premises and land to 
tenants and institutional investors, and from other property 
transactions . The increasing importance of these self-generated 
funds has resulted from the desire of the state to reduce the real 
value of its contribution to the agencies* budgets as part of its 
general policy of public expenditure restraint, and its consequent 
encouragement of the selling-off of property and investment assets. 
The industrial investment guidelines issued by the Scottish Office to 
the SDA in December 1979 state that * in general, the Agency should 
seek to dispose of shares which it holds at the earliest practicable 
time consistent with its statutory purposes * ^ . This policy has had at 
times spectacular results for the agencies, as when the WDA sold its 
£100,000 interest in Bio-isolates pic, a Swansea-based biotechnology 
company, whose shares had been floated on the Unlisted Securities 
Market (USM), for £1.19m^ . For these agencies, however, government 
funding remains the largest single source of income, as is the case 
with the smaller agencies, who do not possess the stock of rentable 
property or marketable assets which the larger agencies do.
Most UK agencies have to bargain for their allocation of central funds
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fran the Treasury through their sponsoring departments. For example, 
the SDA has to draw up an overall budget for the forthcoming financial 
year under separate expenditure heads, which must be argued for as 
part of the annual budget of the Industry Department Scotland (IDS). 
The IDS must then justify its part of the overall Scottish Office 
budget, and finally the Scottish Office must bargain with the Treasury 
for its share of the monies allocated to the central government 
spending departments. As has been pointed out above, this leaves 
considerable scope for ‘trimming* of the Agency's budget at various 
stages. Added to this, the government can exercise financial control 
of the agencies' expenditure in a number of ways. Firstly, it applies 
overall borrowing limits which are laid down in statute, and by which 
the agencies must abide. In practice, these limits have been amended 
upwards whenever an agency appeared likely to breach them, but they 
acquired at least symbolic significance when they were revised 
downwards in 1980 by the incoming Conservative administration. The 
government controls the agencies' expenditure plans both short and 
long-term, through the Annual Estimates, and the Public Expenditure 
Survey (PES) (See below). It is also clear that the sponsoring 
department has influence in determining expenditure between the 
various functions carried out by the individual agency. This can be 
illustrated by reference once more to the industrial investment 
guidelines issued by the Scottish Office to the SDA, which state that 
'the Government for their part will maintain arrangements for the 
exercise of budgetary control and oversight of the Agency's activities 
and in particular will determine in consultation with the Agency, what 
proportion of the funds to be provided is to be used for the 
industrial investment functions' ^ .
350
A useful picture of the degree of control exercised by a sponsoring 
department over an individual agency is provided by Grassie in an 
appendix to his book on the HIDB, in which is printed a copy of a 
letter written by the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEED, now 
IDS) to the HIDB, setting out its offer of grant-in-aid for the 
financial year 1981/2^ . This shows that grant-in-aid is allocated by 
the department annually, according bo individual budget heads. The 
prior approval of the sponsoring department is required for any 
expenditure on a new service, or for any new long-term commitments. 
The department requires the Board to submit monthly figures showing 
the previous month's expenditure, annual accumulated expenditure, and 
the balance of grant-in-aid outstanding, as well as a record of all 
new commitments made in the form of grants and loans during the 
previous month, and the resultant accumulated commitment. (It is 
required that copies of these figures be submitted in triplicate). 
Estimates of expenditure for the succeeding financial year beginning 
1st April have to be submitted by the end of the preceding September, 
as should revised estimates of both the current year's expenditure, 
and the balance likely to be outstanding at the year-end. Grassie 
claims that it was to restrictions and conditions such as these that 
the former Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael 
Noble, was referring, when in a Speech on the second reading of the 
Highland Development (Scotland) Bill which established the Board he 
alleged that 'this Board has not got one tooth, but the Secretary of
17State for Scotland has got a most ferocious set of snappers' .
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Source: SDA, WDA Annual Reports.
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Government planning of the expenditure of UK regional development 
agencies is a complex subject, but as mentioned above, mainly concerns 
two systems, the EES and the Annual Estimates, The EES is designed to 
plan public expenditure for several years ahead, and makes comparison 
with levels of expenditure in previous years at constant prices. The 
Annual Estimates govern the amount the Agency can actually spend in 
cash terras in the forthcoming financial year, and consist of a net 
total, which sets out the maximum capital which the Agency will 
receive directly from the government in the year, and the gross total 
which represents the maximum that the agency may spend in that year 
(taking into account its own receipts from rental of factories, income 
on investment, and other sources). The totals are subdivided into 
expenditure heads, and can be increased or reduced during the year 
only with government authorisation. The Annual Estimates are each 
year subject to parliamentary approval.
In Northern Ireland, the method of funding the two regional 
development agencies differs from the procedure described above. The 
budgets of both the IDB and LEDCJ are determined by the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, according to the priority given at the
Q
time within the department to the industrial development function0. 
Other UK regional bodies
The NEB's overall activities were financed by a combination of Public 
Dividend Capital and borrowings from the National Loans Fund, the 
latter being subject to interest payments. However, within the NEB's 
budget, which was dominated by expenditure on ailing multi-plant
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companies such as Rolls-Royce and British Ley land (88.7% of total NEB
expenditure up to 31st December 1979)^, it is not possible to
calculate precisely what proportion was allocated to regional
investment. The regional boards established in 1977 in the North and
North-West regions were given an initial capital of £0.5ra each. It
has been estimated that they spent only £8m in their first six years 
1 oof operation* , but in recent years, exact figures became more 
difficult to calculate as the Board pursued a policy of establishing 
investment funds in various parts of the country in conjunction with 
private financial institutions. (For example, funds have been 
established in Devon and Cornwall, in conjunction with Dartington and 
Co, and on Merseyside, in conjunction with Collinson Grant).
Regional enterprise boards have, in the main, derived finance from the 
councils which established them. These grants have been made under 
Section 1 37 of the Local Government Act 1972 which enables local 
authorities to spend the product of a 2p in the pound rate 'in the 
interests of their area or any part of it or all or some its 
members'^. This money is then generally spent by the Board in 
accordance with the economic development and employment policies of 
their sponsoring council. In the case of the Greater London 
Enterprise Board (GLEB), an annual funding agreement is reached with 
the Greater London Council (GLC), which specifies the broad areas of 
spending and includes the policy framework and priorities for GLEB's 
work . However, the Boards have faced twin difficulties threatening 
their financial security during the short period of their operational 
lives. The first is that the 2p rate alone cannot provide sufficient 
long-term finance for the Boards to implement the kind of plans that
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would have any more than a marginal effect on the high unemployment 
regions in which they work. The second is that the governments 
legislation abolishing the metropolitan county councils in 1986 would 
wipe out this sole source of finance. (The Boards themselves, as 
independent limited liability companies, are not to be abolished under 
the terms of the legislation). These problems have forced the Boards 
and their sponsoring councils to search for alternative sources of 
finance. The West Midlands Enterprise Board, for example, has 
established a development capital fund to which not only the County 
Council, but London Transport and the superannuation funds of five 
London boroughs have subscribed. In 1985, GLEB began to experience 
serious funding difficulties after control over GLC expenditure had 
been taken over by the Department of the Environment, which refused to 
disburse the outstanding £20m of its 1985/86 budget. GLEB intends to 
arrange Section 137 assistance from the 32 London boroughs to be drawn 
upon after the winding-up of the GLC, but it appears unlikely that 
Conservative-controlled boroughs will be willing to sanction support 
for an organisation whose work tends to be concentrated upon the 
economically most deprived parts of London, parts which are generally 
controlled by non-Conservative administrations.
Benelux agencies
The financing of Belgian regional development agencies appear to be 
similarly elaborate. Hindley and Walker, writing in 1982 of the SDRW 
which has since become defunct, cite six sources of funds for its 
activities, its own capital resources, a labour subsidy from the 
state, project-related subsidies, direct loans frcm the state, funds
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for 1 cellules1, and parallel credits^. To illustrate the diversity 
of these funding arrangements, each will now be briefly considered.
i) Own capital. As noted in the previous chapter, Belgian regional 
development agencies each received starting capital drawn frcm 
various public sources, primarily the provincial authorities.
ii) Labour subsidy. Each agency receives a subsidy frcm the state 
(since the constitutional changes of 1980, this subsidy has, in 
the case of the Flemish agencies, been dispensed by the Flemish 
Regional Executive) to cover the cost of the staff numbers 
employed under the terms of legislation governing the agencies.
iii) Project-related subsidies. These ‘assigned projects1, as they 
became known, were investments which the agencies were 
instructed by central government to make, the costs of which it 
also paid. When they oomnenced their operations, the agencies 
were free to make investments at their own discretion, though 
application for funds to support such investments had to be made 
to the Ministry of Finance. Central government set an upper 
limit each year for the total level of funding available to the 
agencies for this purpose. Within this overall total, a subtotal 
was determined for each region, proportionate to its surface 
area, and the income tax revenue received frcm its population. 
When the constitutional changes of 1980 came into force, 
responsibility for the designation of 'missions deleguees1 was 
transferred to the Regional Executives, but shortly after this, 
the agencies ceded their role in the provision of equity and
356
loan investment to the newly-established regional investment 
companies.
iv) Direct loans. In exceptional circumstances, the agencies have 
been able to contract loans directly frcm the State, to cope 
with large-scale coranitments which overstretch their normal 
resources. In the case of the SDRW these loans were made 
available on an interest-free basis, coupled with a ten-year 
repayment 'holiday1.
v) Funds for 'cellules'. An important part of the SERW's activity 
took place through 'cellules', or research units which were set 
up on fixed-term contracts either by central government, or by 
the Regional Executive. Whilst these 'cellules' were 
administered by the SDRW, their operating costs were paid in 
full by the sponsoring government body. Similar 'cellules' are 
administered by the SDRB on behalf of the Regional Ministry.
vi) Parallel credits. The SDRW was able to draw funds from the 
National Parallel Credit Fund, a fund which was established to 
provide finance for use in Wallonia in proportion to the sums 
being expended on the development and modernisation of the 
Flemish port of Zeebrugge. For each BF2 of assistance given to 
the Zeebrugge project, BF1 is paid in the form of parallel 
credits to Wallonia. During its lifetime, the SDRW drew from 
this fund to support the work of the 'cellules' and to subsidise 
equity investments.
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Partly because of the diversity of its funding, and partly 
because its capital requirement tended to be met only after 
expenditure had been made, the financial position of the SDRW, 
in comparison to the UK agencies studied above, was never 
secure. It was regularly hampered by delays in payment; for 
example, whilst it began operations in January 1976 it did not 
receive any state assistance for its equity investments for 
twelve months^. Similarly, funds to support equity projects 
undertaken during 1977 were not paid out until 1979.
Dutch agencies are constituted as private limited liability 
companies under Dutch law. They each have access, therefore, to 
capital raised by the original issue of their shares, though in 
the case of both the NDM and the 00M these shares are 100% owned 
by public authorities. Moreover, the capital raised frcm these 
issues has been small in terms of the agencies* overall budgets 
(1m Dfl, or approximately £250,000 in the case of the NOM and 
200,000 Dfl, or approximately £50,000 in the case of the OOM). 
Dutch agencies derive the bulk of their funds from loans 
contracted on the commercial markets under state guarantee. By 
underwriting these loans the state can therefore exercise 
control over the agencies* expenditure. The limit an the NDM*s 
annual expenditure is determined by the difference between the 
cumulative loan ceiling set by agreement between the agency and 
the government, for that financial year, and the total sum of 
loans already contracted under state guarantee up to the end of 
the financial year^. Actual expenditure is determined by the 
level of loans raised in that financial year an the commercial
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markets. The operating costs of the NOM, which include 
salaries, pensions and administrative overheads, are paid by the 
national government, whereas those of the LIOF are paid jointly 
by the national and provincial authorities (over and above the 
amount earned by the LIOF on its investments). Both the 00M and 
GQM receive direct public assistance in the form of subsidies 
from the central government (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and 
the provincial authorities; these authorities have also been 
involved in the joint guaranteeing of investments.
In Luxembourg a specific budget is set aside in the financial 
provisions of the ARHED steel company for the running of the 
ARBED New Industries Department^. Though this budget ceiling 
is not inflexible, company policy during the economic recession 
of the late 1970*s/early 1980's has been to adhere to budget 
wherever possible. Revenue gained from any of the Department's 
operations (such as the lease of factory-sites) is not retained 
separately. In its work, the New Industries Department draws 
frequently upon the resources of other departments, both within 
the company, and internationally within the group, and it is, 
therefore, not possible to give an accurate financial costing of 
the Department's activities. However, financial control rests, 
indisputably, with the general management of ARHED.
With the exception of ARBED, the agencies described in this 
study are primarily funded by government authorities. Those 
bodies such as the NOM and LICF, which are able to raise capital 
on the open market, are subject to limits on their borrowings
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inposed by government through the regulation of loan guarantees.
Even ARBED1 s New Industries Department cannot be said to be
completely free frcm government influence over its financing,
since the Luxembourg State now holds approximately 20% of
ARBED*s sharestock. The use of public money involves the
acceptance of conditions imposed by government, as has been
shown above with regard to the HIDB. In the case of UK agencies
both overall expenditure and expenditure by function is closely
regulated by and subject to the approval of relevant government
departments. The provision of government finance also tends to
involve the recipient body in time-consuming regulatory
procedures, which can affect various aspects of their work. For
example, UK agencies are required to make public tender every
17time they wish to use outside consultants for research work'. 
Similarly, a report prepared for the Highland Regional Council 
in 1979 accused the HIDB of being 'too bureaucratic and 
caimercially-minded' in dealing with applications for financial 
assistance^. The Board's approach in this matter is, however, 
subject to arrangements made by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, which strictly regulate the type of concern which can 
be assisted, and the procedures which must be followed when 
dispensing aid.
It can be argued that governmental control over the financing of 
UK regional development agencies has been increased since they 
were first established. Investment failures such as Lewis 
Stokfisk (HIDB), StonefieM (SDA), P Leiner (WDA), and De Lorean 
(NIDA) have each resulted in parliamentary investigations
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carried out by the Committee of Public Accounts (GOPA) ^ . 
These, together with the regular OOPA reports on the agencies* 
annual accounts, have produced recommendations for change in the 
financial practices of the agencies. It was a CDPA report, for 
example, which first recommended the adoption of performance- 
related criteria against which the agencies1 investment and
on
property functions could be analysed . Other reocfimendatians 
have been made by the Comptroller and Auditor-General who also 
conducted an investigation into the investment activities of 
three of the main agencies, the SDA, the WDA, and the HIDB^.
The concept of financial control must be viewed in a slightly 
different context with regard to agencies in the Benelux 
countries. In Belgium, for example, whilst regional 
development agencies receive government funding through the 
Regional Executive, in the case of the Flemish GQMs, or through 
the Regional Ministry, in that of the SDRB, their constitutions 
provide for a system of political control through representative]/
a
governing structures, which do not exist in the UK. Moreover, ^ 
Flemish GOMs are not involved in high-risk financial activities 
such as equity investment and factory development. Finally, a 
large part of government assistance is provided in the form of a 
labour subsidy, a set figure laid down in legislation, and 
related to authorised staffing levels. These factors, together 
with the consideration that the overall sums involved are 
proportionately far less than those of UK regional development 
agencies, suggests that there is potentially less scope for 
government regulation of the agencies* financial activities.
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In the Netherlands, the position varies again, as regional 
development agencies are constituted as private limited 
liability companies, not directly linked to government. In 
respect of certain agencies, such as the 104, the government may 
still retain control over financial provisions through a 
majority (in this example 100%) shareholding, but where the 
government has only a minority stake, control may be of a more 
limited nature, exercised mainly through its power to set the 
ceiling on loan guarantees.
ii) Structure
At the managerial level UK agencies are, in general, organised 
functionally, on the basis of operational and supporting departments, 
each under the supervision of a senior member of staff reporting to a 
Chief Executive, who in turn, reports to the Board of Directors. For 
example, the HIDB departmental structure is divided into four 
operational divisions, which implement policy on the ground: 
fisheries, industrial and business development, land development and 
tourism. These divisions are complemented by four supporting 
divisions, whose services can be utilised across the boundaries of the 
implementing divisions, and which carry out the important internal 
functions of the Board: administration, finance, legal, and policy and 
research. These eight divisions are each under the immediate control 
of their divisional head. However, structures do not always rigidly 
conform to the model outlined above. For example, in recent years the 
SDA and WDA have both created divisions which comprise both
362
operational and supporting departments, finance and property
management in the case of the former, administration and business
*
advisory services in that of the latter . There are also anomalies at 
senior staff level. Whilst all the agencies operate a system whereby 
divisional heads report to the senior staff member, only in the cases 
of the SDA and WDA, where the member is the Chief Executive, does he 
have a seat on the Board of Directors. In respect of both the HIDB 
and MWD, where the senior staff member is the Board Secretary, as well 
as the IDB where he is the Chief Executive, the individual concerned 
has no seat on the board. The Board of Directors usually has a 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman, appointed by the relevant Secretary of 
State, rather than elected by the Board members, who are themselves 
appointed on fixed-term contracts by the same authority. Appointments 
to the Boards of the IDB and the LEDU are formally the responsibility 
of the Head of the Department of Economic Development, though press 
reports indicate that appointments are in practice made by the 
Secretary of State. The role of the Boards of the agencies, and in 
particular, their changing composition, will be discussed below.
Certain UK agencies have attempted to introduce a measure of 
administrative decentralization within their organisations, involving 
varying degrees of delegated authority, and farms of geographical 
structure. In 1983, the HIDB extended its number of area offices to
* The WDA's internal management structure has subsequently been 
revised once more, returning to a pattern conforming with the 
operational/support divide.
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ten, and empowered individual directors and designated senior staff to 
make decisions concerning investments of up to £25,000. The WDA, in 
April 1984, introduced a system of eight regional offices, each run by 
a Regional Manager responsible for all Agency business operations 
within their localities, including the investment, within defined 
limits, of funds in local companies. LEDCJ operates a network of 4 
area offices, supervised by area panels which cannot sanction 
investments, but can make recommendations to the Central Board of 
Directors, which includes the four area panel chairmen. In April 1984 
the SDA opened a 1 multi-function1 office in Aberdeen to serve the 
Grampian region, and to provide a countrywide service for the oil and 
gas industry. However, though it was by 1984/5 operating sixteen 
other offices outside Glasgow, these do not represent any structured 
form of decentralization, being made up of a variety of area project, 
task force and estates offices, and snail business units, each serving 
different sectoral or spatial needs. Prior to the winding up of its 
regional investment role, the NEB/BTC had established two regional 
investment boards and five regional enterprise offices in the English 
Assisted Areas. The offices were given a considerable measure of 
delegated authority, though their activities were co-ordinated through 
the NEB/BTG' s regional division in London. In particular, the 
regional investment boards had the power to approve new investments up 
to a value of £500,000^, and were able to make reocmnendations to the 
NEB/BTG Board on investments above that figure, and generally advise 
the Board on matters of importance within their regions. However, 
bearing that latter most point in mind, it is significant that they 
did not have the power to intervene in the cases of the large NEB/BTG- 
owned companies which operated in their region.
364
There exists an inherent tension within the structure of UK agencies 
between the demands of a civil service and a business organization. 
The traditional argument for organisation along civil service or 
bureaucratic* lines is that it strengthens accountability and 
therefore provides for greater public control of the agencies. 
Moreover, many of the agencies* function have been inherited from 
other government bodies; their closeness to government is most notably 
expressed in the operation of the IDB within the Department of 
Economic Development. However, one of the main intentions behind the 
establishment of the agencies was in order that they could implement 
economic initiatives, more quickly and flexibly than traditional 
government organisations. Consequently, the SDA has always emphasised 
the entrepreneurial outlook of its staff, and in 1984 became the first 
agency to introduce a special performance-related salary scheme for 
its senior staff^. Interviews conducted during this research 
indicate that this conflict between 'entrepreneurial* and 
'bureaucratic' values and methods of organisation is never far beneath 
the surface within the agencies. Occasionally it breaks put into the 
public arena, as in July 1985, when members of the IDB were reported 
to be 'angry' over the appointment of a career civil servant to the 
post of IDB Chief Executive, a move, which according to a national 
newspaper, 'reasserts tight civil service' control over a body 
initially intended to be 'largely autonomous and entrepreneurial, and 
to bring industrial and commercial expertise to a task previously 
handled by civil servants'"^. The dilemma of the Thatcher government 
has been to encourage the agencies to take up an ' entrepreneurial' 
approach, without surrendering its political control over their
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activities, particularly in the field of investment, where the 
Conservatives had, in opposition, been so strongly opposed to what 
they saw as financial mismanagement and the squandering of public 
money. Its approach to this problem can be seen in the manner it has 
handled appointments to the boards of the agencies since 1979.
Though the boards of the agencies were never constituted on the basis 
of rigid tripartite representation, the aim of proponents of the 
agencies was to establish at their head, a broad spectrum of economic 
interests. Board members were, when first appointed, (in 1975 in the 
case of the SDA and WDA) drawn from industry, finance, local 
government and the trade unions. However, as has been shown in an 
earlier chapter, if one measures the representation of these four 
categories on the agency boards through frcm 1976 to 1985, a pattern 
of change is evident. In 1976, the SDA1 s board comprised 5 members 
drawn from industry, 1 from finance, 3 frcm local government and 2 
frcm the trade unions. By 1985, 7 members were from industry, 1 from 
finance, 3 frcm local government and 2 frcm the trade unions. Turning 
to the WDA, in 1976 its first board was made up of 2 members from 
industry, 2 from finance, 4 frcm local government and 1 frcm the trade 
union movement. (One other board member, Lord Parry of Neyland, does 
not fit easily into any of the above categories, and was appointed, 
apparently, because of his public connections with the Pembrokeshire 
area). By 1985, the board*s composition was 2 members frcm industry, 
5 frcm finance, 3 frcm local government and 1 frcm the trade unions. 
If, therefore, a broad distinction is made between on the one hand 
those board members frcm a commercial or private sector background, 
and those from a local government, trade union or public sector
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background it can be calculated that the private/public sector ratio 
an the SDA board has increased frcm 6:5 to 8:5r and that of the WDA 
board frcm 4:6 to 7:4. It must be stressed that Board members do not 
perceive themselves to be acting in any representative capacity. 
Certainly, trade union representatives an both the SDA and the WDA 
boards do not discuss policy or Board decisions with their cwn unions, 
or with their regional trade union organisations, but act only in a 
private capacity.
One other interesting point arising from the above figures is that 
whilst on both boards representatives of private business are in a 
majority, on the SDA board, the greater part of that majority is drawn 
frcm manufacturing industry (Edward Parker and Co, IBM UK, Dawson 
International, John Wbod Group) whereas on the WDA board, financial 
institutions predominate (Chartered Trust, Prudential-Bache 
Securities, National Westminster Bank, Pearl Assurance, Abbey 
National). This may partly be explained by noting that in 1981 the 
SDA established a wholly-owned subsidiary, Scottish Development 
Finance Ltd, to advise it on investment matters, the Board of which 
contained, as well as senior Agency staff, representatives of 
financial institutions such as Noble Grossart, Ivory and Sime, ICFC 
and the Royal Clydesdale Bank.
It is therefore, clear that the boards of these agencies do not act as 
representative bodies under the present government but as channels 
through which closer co-operation with the financial and ccmmercial 
sectors can be achieved. This policy has been openly pursued by the 
Conservative government. Answering a question before the Select
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Ccnmittee on Welsh Affairs in 1980, on the government's policy of 
encouraging the WDA to dispose of its assets, the Secretary of State 
for Wales, Nicholas Edwards replied that 1 because I am anxious there 
should be proper canmercial considerations given to these matters, I 
have strengthened the canmercial representation on the Board of the 
agency. I wish to have available to them the best possible expertise 
and advice1^ . Hcwever, judging by the present composition of the WDA 
board, it is not only oaimercial interests that are well represented 
on it. At least 5 of the 9 part-time Board members are also prominent 
members of the Conservative Party in Wales, including one ex- 
Conservative MP, an ex-chairman of the Welsh Conservative Party, and a 
former Conservative County Councillor and Parliamentary Candidate frcm 
Gwent. Only one of these Board members had been appointed prior to 
the Conservative election victory of 1979.
The above example illustrates the point made by C. Hood that 
Conservative Party opposition to 'quangos* under the Labour government 
of 1974/9 could partly be explained by their desire to see 
Conservative rather than Labour appointees an the boards of these 
bodies, 'snouts in the gravy train' as he describes it^. It also 
raises the issue of public input into the structures of the agencies, 
for whoever the boards of the SDA and WDA do represent, it is clearly 
not the electorate (in Wales, 23.6% of the electorate voted for the 
Conservative Party at the 1983 election). Other agency boards may not 
appear so partisan. In their report on the HIDB and its community co­
operative schemes Breathnach et al argue that 'appointments to the 
Board are not overtly political...'^. 'This must be qualified by 
reference to the remark of Farquhar Gillanders, writing sixteen years
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earlier on the appointment of the original Board in 1965 that "it was 
clear that political considerations rather than professional 
qualifications had been an important criterion in the selection of 
sane of the m e m b e r s ' 2 8 .  However, most interesting with respect to the 
HIDB is that it is advised by a Highlands and Island Consultative 
Council, the only body of its kind amongst UK agencies, which advises 
the HIDB through regular quarterly meetings, and is composed of 
representatives of the Highlands and Islands community. Henderson 
commented in 1968 that 'the Council has been most skilfully 
constructed to represent a fascinatingly wide range of political and 
other interests'^9. The Council, the membership of which was reduced 
frcm 46 to 31 in 1982, each member being appointed by the Secretary of 
State for Scotland on a four-year contract, has no power other than 
that of advising the Board on its policies and activities.
However, as stated above, other UK agencies do not possess structures 
accomodating even this nominal level of public representation. The 
impression gained from interviews with Agency staff was indeed one of 
hostility toward such structures, they being seen as hampering the 
efficient implementation of the agencies' tasks^9. The agencies' work 
does, nevertheless, bring them into contact with bodies which do 
operate under a system of democratic control, such as the local 
authorities. However, no formal structures exist for co-operation 
between the agencies and local authorities. In Wales, for example, 
local authorities' structure plans are drawn up with varying degrees 
of co-operation from the WDA, dependent on the nature of the 
relationship existing between the Agency and the individual local 
authority. This process can lead to accusations of geographical
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favouritism on the Agency's part, as those local authorities which 
liaise most closely with it over structure plans, naturally tend to 
integrate them with Agency progranmes.
Even in the context of a project such as GEAR, with its overtly social 
aims, (which include 'to overcome the social disadvantage of 
residents', and 'to foster residents' ccmmitment and confidence')^ 
the SDA, as co-ordinator of the groups involved, has been criticised 
for pushing predetermined policies rather than ones agreed through
public participation^.
A closer link between the development body and elected representatives 
of the 'constituency' it serves exists in the Enterprise Boards 
established by a number of Labour-controlled metropolitan authorities 
since the elections of 1981 • The West Midlands Enterprise Board, for 
example, has 12 members, 8 of whom are county councillors, and 4 of 
whom act as nominated unpaid directors. These latter , nominated by 
the Council, are expected to have relevant experience in the field of 
economic development. The councillors are all members of the County 
Council Economic Development Committee; this coranittee sets out the 
general operating strategy of the Board, and accountability is 
maintained by quarterly reports from the Board and through the 
attendance of staff of the Economic Development Unit at Board 
meetings^.
The Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB) is managed by part-time, 
paid directors, none of whom are politicians, but who include 
representatives of the South East Region TOC, and of local employers.
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The directors are served by an internal management canmittee, which 
represents the various operating divisions of GLEB. (These number 
five, four of which are directly involved in the provision of economic 
services for local companies.) The Board has, as its members, 
councillors who, on behalf of the Greater London Council (GLC) are 
responsible for appointing the Board*s directors and its chief 
executive^. Accountability is maintained through the issuing of 
guidelines to GLEB by the GLC Industry and Employment Committee, 
through an annual funding agreement between the GLC and GLEB, which 
sets out the economic and social priorities of its work, and through 
the attendance of a GLC representative at all GEEB Board meetings. 
G1EB*s work is also guided by the recommendations of the London 
Industrial Strategy, a document produced by the Economic Policy Group 
of the GLC Industry and Employment Canmittee, which contains detailed 
proposals for twenty-two sectors of the London economy.
Even in these bodies, however, emphasis is on accountability upwards 
to the relevant local authority department, so that though there is 
greater scope for the expression of local opinion than exists in the 
larger development agencies the structure still does not allow for 
broad interest representation within the organisation itself.
Benelux Agencies
At a managerial level, the organisational structure of regional 
development agencies in the Benelux countries does not differ greatly 
from that of agencies in the UK, though, as has been seen, their staff 
canplements are generally far smaller. For example, the NOM has 7
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departments, 4 of an operational nature, and 3 supporting; 3 are 
supervised by the Managing Director, and 2 each by 2 Assistant 
Managing Directors. The staff of the NQM, at 31st December 1983, 
numbered only 31 • The Managing Director is responsible to the NQM 
Board of Directors, which is appointed by the sole shareholder, the 
Government, through its representative, the Minister for Economic 
Affairs. The Managing Director does not have a seat on the Board. As 
will become clear, one of the most striking characteristics of the 
governing structures of Belgian and Dutch agencies is the strict 
demarcation line drawn between policy-making, supervising and 
implementing structures. The management of the NQM is appointed by a 
meeting of shareholders (which in practice means the government, 
through the Minister of Economic Affairs) and can be suspended or 
dismissed by the same authority. Some of the agencies do not, 
however, base their structure on the separation of operational and 
supporting departments. The LIOF, in 1985, reorganised its four 
operational departments into two divisions, finance and development, 
each comprising departments whose work was of a nature both 
operational and supportive. QOM-WV operates four departments, which 
perform mixed functions, supervised by four departmental heads, one of 
which is the senior staff member, or general manager.
As has been noted in Chapter Three, Belgian agencies have their 
staffing levels laid down in statute. The staff structure is also 
rigidly defined. The regulations stipulate not only the number of 
staff the agencies should employ, but also the number to be employed 
on each of the various salary grades, and the type of positions in 
which they should be employed. It is as a result of such regulations
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that difficulties arise like the SDRW's inability to improve its 
internal audit procedure for the want of a suitably qualified member 
of staff (see Chapter Four). Though the agencies are keen to attract 
personnel with experience of industry and ccnraeroe, the staff of the 
agencies are, in effect, public employees. When the SDRW was 
disbanded in 1983, many of its staff were redeployed to other regional 
government organisations^.
Regulations governing the personnel of Dutch agencies are not so 
restrictive. It may be suggested that it is as a consequence of this, 
that Dutch agencies have been better able than their Belgian 
counterparts to present an image which divorces them from mainstream 
public sector organisations. Two examples taken from agency publicity 
material illustrate this point:
"It is the NCJM's policy to appoint only people with a good record 
of previous industrial experience to both management and 
administrative positions,, as th NCM considers that this will 
lead to more effective performance"^.
"The Province (Overijssel) felt that assisting small and medium­
sized companies was a must, but also realise that public officers 
cannot operate freely and effectively in this field. So they 
funded a group of managers and businessmen with extensive 
international experience in industry, finance and consulting, who 
are fully dedicated to leverage (sic) the relative strengths of 
small and medium-sized companies1 ^ .
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As, in this respect, the internal organisation of Dutch agencies more 
resembles that of a private company than of a government organisation, 
so their governing structures differ from those of the Belgian 
agencies. Shareholders appoint the Board of Directors (Raad van 
Canmissarissen). In the cases of the NQM and 00M, these are made up 
of representatives of both central and regional governments, and of 
employers and employee organisations, though in the case of the NOM 
trade union representation was withdrawn in 1977, and reinstated only 
in 1983^®. As in the UK the tendency has been for the Board of 
Directors, or KVC to assume direct control of the agency*s management. 
The structure of the NQM originally made provision for this task to be 
carried out by a Cccmission of Delegates (Ccranissie van Gedelegeerden) 
consisting of three members of the RVC, but up until 1979, according 
to Yuill, this system has not been carried out in practice, the RVC 
choosing to supervise agency activities directly. Each agency in the 
Netherlands also has its cwn advisory committee (variously called Raad 
van Advies, Raad van Advies en Overleg, Advies College) composed of 
representatives of government organisations, the municipalities and 
local employers. The importance of these ccranittees appears to vary 
from one agency to another, but they are generally convened only once 
a year.
In Belgium, representative procedures are more formalised, and have 
been covered in detail in Chapter Pour. As in Holland, the senior 
staff of the agencies form a distinct cadre, supervising the 
activities of the various departments, but not having any position in 
the governing structures of the agencies. The supreme governing body 
of Belgian agencies is the General Assembly (Asserablee
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G^nerale/Algemene Vergadering), which is composed of various 
representative of political parties, according to their strength on 
the provincial and municipal authorities, of employers and workers' 
organisations, and of the intercomraunales. The General Assembly 
elects the members of an Administrative Council (Conseil 
d'Administration/Raad van Beheer) in proportions directly paralleling 
the composition of the Assembly itself. The Administrative Council 
then appoints the members of an Executive Office (Bureau 
Executif/Direcktieccmite). Each Belgian agency therefore has a three- 
tier structure of control over its operations, each level carefully 
reflecting a balance of political and economic representative 
interests. The Flemish agencies also have a separate supervisory 
structure, which consists of a College of Cannissioners (College van 
Ccmmissarissen) made up of representatives of both public and private 
sector organisations. It is on this body that central government is 
represented by a Government Commissioner and an Inspector of Finances, 
though they sit on the Administrative Councils of the SERB and the 
now-defunct SERW. The structures described above stand in marked 
contrast to those in operation amongst Dutch and UK agencies. The 
General Assembly of the GOM-VB, for example, has 35 representatives of 
political parties amongst its membership of 81, 11 Christian 
Democrats, 10 Liberals, 7 Socialists and 7 Flemish Nationalists. The 
representation of the various political parties on the General 
Assembly changes after every provincial election, the Christian 
Democrats, for example, lost four seats on the General Assembly after 
the 1982 provincial elections. Political representation was even more 
prominent in the General Assembly of the SERW, 16 of the 32 members 
were delegates from the provincial authorities. However, the research
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did not uncover any significant evidence that the activities of 
Belgian agencies were hampered by the presence of diverse political 
groups on their policy-making bodies. Most interviewers, when 
questioned on this subject, seemed to accord with the view expressed 
in one SDRB promotional brochure that 'the broad representativeness of 
the General Assembly and Board of Directors ensures the effectiveness 
of the Brussels Regional Development Authority's decisions and 
effectiveness'39. The governing structures of the SERB are divided 
not only by political ideology but also by language, it being the only 
agency which operates in an officially bilingual area. Nevertheless, 
an SEE© staff member interviewed during the course of the research, 
whilst conceding that the SEE© had experienced 'plenty of political 
problems', argued that the political parties tended to have cannon 
agreement on the need to develop Brussels and that this consensus 
over-rode party divisions in decision-making^. The former Secretary- 
General of the SDRW, Qnile Nols, spoke of *a unity of purpose* amongst 
delegates to the Societe's governing bodies^. However, an 
alternative view was expressed by an MEP for the Volksunie, the 
Flemish Nationalist party which seeks an independent Flanders. He 
claimed that establishing a separate agency for each of the 5 Flemish 
provinces, each body having a different political balance on its 
controlling committees, meant a deliberate strategy of 'divide and 
rule' which denied the instruments of economic development in Flanders 
cannon direction^.
The New Industries Department situated within the Anti-Crisis Division 
of the AREED steel company in Luxembourg has a staff of only three, an 
engineer, an economist and an administrative Secretary^, and it is
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not therefore practical to canpare its structures with those of other 
agencies. It is accountable to senior management through the heads of 
the Anti-Crisis Division. It is also able to utilise the resources of 
departments within other divisions of the company.
iii) Control
The concluding section of this chapter sets out to broach, in the 
light of preceding analysis the question of control in relation to the 
strategies and activities of the development agencies. At this stage, 
the issue will be raised in practical rather than theoretical terms, 
the need being to identify at what level effective control, that is, 
decision-making power over resources and functions, is exercised. A 
constitutionalist might argue, for example, that the UK nationalised 
industries, being accountable to parliament through the relevant 
government minister, are ultimately controlled by those who elect the 
UK parliament. No-one could pretend, however, that when decisions are 
reached over the closing of 'uneconomic* coal-mines, or the 
electrification of a certain stretch of railway line,, it is the 
electorate which is directly exercising power.
Examples cited in this and the preceding chapter, have indicated that, 
in respect of the substantial majority of agencies under study, 
effective control of the major aspects of their character, rests with 
government, either central or regional. In every country that the 
study has covered, with the exception of Luxembourg, government plays 
the dominant role in the provision of finance to the agencies, whether 
it be through the payment of operating costs, the underwriting of
loans, or the disbursement of grants. In the UK and Belgium, the 
powers and objectives of the agencies are delineated by government 
statutes, and, in the Netherlands, central or provincial government 
authorities had majority shareholdings in three of the first four 
agencies to be established.
Many of the agencies also have close working relationships with other 
state financial institutions. In the Netherlands, the NOM had, during 
its first years of operation, a representative of the National 
Investment Bank (NIB) on its Board, to advise on investment matters^. 
Representatives of the NIB and the Dutch Restructuring Company (NEHEM) 
sit with representatives of central government departments an the 
Haagse Contact Group, which oversees government funding of the LIQF. 
Belgian agencies have developed close contacts with the government- 
controlled Regional Investment Companies (SRI/GIM - Societe Regional 
D*Investissement/Gewestelijke Investeringsmaatshappij) since the 
agencies* investment functions were transferred to them. The SDRB, 
for example, has established a written protocol with the regional 
investment company for Brussels,, the SRIB^. in Belgium, the 
agencies also play an important part in the government planning 
process, channelling inventories of the socio-economic needs of their 
respective regions upwards to the regional government, and assisting 
with technical issues in the implementation of the plan. In the UK, 
two of the agencies, the SDA and WDA, were specifically established as 
part of government industrial strategy, the main instrument of which 
was the state holding company, the National Enterprise Board (NEB). 
All five main UK agencies continued to meet twice a year with the NEB, 
even after its incorporation into the British Technology Group (BTG).
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In the early days of the agencies' operations, one of the most 
persistent concerns voiced by critics was that the various 
responsibilities of the NEB and the development agencies were not 
clearly defined.
Given, therefore, the pervasive nature of government influence an the 
activities of agencies it would nevertheless be inaccurate to 
characterise all agencies as being equally affected by the 
relationship. Degrees of control differ according to circumstance. 
For instance, it may be wholly consistent with government strategy to 
allow an agency a degree of independence, and freedom from civil 
service control, given that the agencies are generally required to act 
with a speed and flexibility not possessed by conventional government 
bodies. Similarly, the structure of an agency may be important in 
determining the practicality of certain types of control. The status 
of agencies in the Netherlands as private companies, m y  make them 
less amenable to the type of control exercised through government 
departments, over UK agencies which are constituted as public bodies. 
There is certainly a qualitative difference between the nature of 
control as exercised by the IDS over the HUB, where, as has been 
shown above, expenditure figures from the agency must be deposited in 
triplicate on the departmental desk every month, and that exercised by 
the Dutch government over the LIGF, where Board members can reject 
projects supported by the government and its representatives on the 
Board46.
Control can be exercised in a variety of ways, through financial 
limits, operating guidelines or direct representation on the Board,
379
to give only three examples frcm the agencies in this research. The 
UK government has, in the main, tended to exercise its authority 
through financial controls over the development agencies in the same 
way that it has controlled nationalised industries, without resorting 
to ministerial representation on the Board. (Sane might argue that 
this is a hollow distinction, given the political composition of the 
WDA Board, discussed above). The NOM, however, has two central 
government representatives on its Board, whilst the Belgian government 
has two official representatives on the Administrative Councils of 
both the SERB and the SERW (in respect of the Flemish agencies, these 
officials sit on the supervisory organisation, the College of 
Commissioners). In effect, the nature of control can be determined by 
a number of different conditions. For example, there is the 
constitutional tradition of the country concerned in the running of 
the type of organisation which the agencies represent. In the UK, 
there has been a growing interest, both academic and political, in the 
use by government of nan-Departmental special-purpose bodies. Most 
commentators have emphasised the close control that government 
maintains over these 'quangos*. Christopher Hood has argued that 
'repeated attempts are made to create 'rational' accountability 
systems through financial targe try, and the like, but the attempts at 
more or less unacknowledged political intervention in nominally 
independent agencies appear to be endemic to the system, as with the 
recurring plant-closure issues in which nominally 'independent' 
industrial assistance agencies may come under pressure frcm Whitehall 
notably because ministers are themselves under pressure frcm MPs and 
the mass media ^ . However, established practice may differ in other 
countries, as in Belgium, where the need to ensure equality of
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treatment for a variety of political and linguistic groups, has led to 
many public organisations being run by boards composed of 
representatives of these interests, as well as representatives of 
government.
This example of interest representation in Belgium leads on to a 
second point affecting the nature of control, which is that evidence 
gained from this research suggests that there may be a correlation 
between the relative degree of government control, and the size of the 
budget of the Agency concerned, and the political sensitivity of the 
area in which it is employed. In Belgium, the issue of regional 
economic development is inextricably linked with the larger questions 
of regional identity and self-government, which in turn have serious 
implications for the nature of the Belgian state itself. Because it 
is of paramount political importance that the government is still not 
perceived to be favouring one linguistic community over the other, it 
must have sufficient control over agency staff and resources to ensure 
that they remain broadly equal over time, hence, for example, the 
rigid controls over staff complements noted above.
In the UK, this point is best illustrated by the example of the 
creation of the IDB in 1982 as the executive arm of a government 
department, the Department of Economic Development (DFID). This marked 
a significant increase in government control over economic 
development in Northern Ireland, introducing a relationship between 
agency and government closer than that existing anywhere else in the 
UK. It could be argued that this change was a reflection of the 
importance of both the factors mentioned above, budget-size and
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political sensitivity. Firstly, the amount of public money expended 
on economic development in Northern Ireland was considerable, as had 
been highlighted by the loss of NIDA's £17.7m investment in De Lorean. 
Secondly, as this high level of expenditure indicated, the government 
attached great political importance to successful economic development 
in Northern Ireland as a means of defusing sectarian tensions. (The 
policy was first enunciated by a Labour Northern Ireland Secretary, 
Roy Mason, as ’jobs, homes, hope1.) As Terry Carlin,Northern Ireland 
Officer of the ICTU, a body which consistently opposed the 
government's plans to incorporate the IDB into one of its own 
departments, wrote in a memorandum published in January 1982, 'the 
government's main arguments against establishing an independent Board 
include the close relationship between government policy and economic 
and industrial development'^®. In other wards, the work of the IDB, 
being central to the government's overall Northern Ireland policy had 
to come under direct government supervision through the Northern 
Ireland Civil Service.
The third and final factor to be considered here is the character of 
senior personnel within the agencies. The more attuned these 
individuals are to the government's objectives concerning their 
organisation, the less necessity the government will feel to interfere 
in its day-to-day running. Where it exists, governments prefer to use 
their power of appointment and dismissal to insert in strategic posts 
managers and administrators that can be relied upon in this respect, 
hence the changes noted concerning senior staff at the SDA and WDA. 
However, there are occasions when the attitude of senior staff and 
Board members can conflict with those of central or regional
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government representatives. For example, during the period that the 
SDRW was under the supervision of central as opposed to regional 
government, its General Assembly, drawn as it was from regional 
bodies, was dominated by representatives of the Socialist Party and 
its trade union allies. In circumstances such as these, it may be 
necessary for government to attempt to exert greater control over the 
agencies.
However, if the extent of government control over the agencies is 
variable, then consideration must be given to other potential sources 
of influence. Two groups which have an involvement in the governing 
structures of agencies in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands are 
employers, or the representatives of private business, and trade 
unions. However, their relative importance in relation to the 
agencies tends to depend upon the extent to which government is 
sympathetic to their respective interests. For example, the election 
of a Conservative government in 1979 resulted in a reorientation of 
agency activities which gave private sector interests greater 
influence. The SDA will not now make an investment unless it can 
attract private sector support. Other changes can be attributed to 
private sector pressure such as the releasing of profitable 
investments from agency control, and the opening-up of low-cost 
factory premises to service as well as manufacturing industry.
As with the employers, the influence of trade unions on the agencies 
tends to depend upon the leverage it can exert through government at 
any given time. However, since the agencies have, in general, been 
operating during a period of long-term economic depression, the
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pressure which they have been able to exert on governments determined 
to pursue policies inimical to the interests of labour, has been 
minimal. The Scottish TUC and Wales TUC strongly supported the 
creation of the SDA and WDA respectively, and the ICTU has been 
closely associated with economic development agencies in Northern 
Ireland. Individual trade unionists benefited frcm the patronage of 
the Labour government in being appointed to the governing bodies of 
the agencies. The first Chairman of the WDA was a former general 
secretary of the Iran and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC), Sir David 
Davies. However, in the UK as in the Benelux countries, trade unions 
became disillusioned with the operating methods of the agencies. In 
the Netherlands, as noted above, trade union representatives withdrew 
from the governing structures of the NOM in 1977 when it became clear 
that certain NOM investments might lead to short-term job-losses. 
More recently, the SDA has been accused by senior trade union 
officials of trying to attract foreign investment to Scotland by the 
offer of a * union-free environment1 ^ . Trade unions have been more 
prominently involved in the activities of the Enterprise Boards, which 
generally have trade union representation at Board level, and which 
insist on the full recognition of trade union rights by the firms in 
which they invest. The South East Region TUC, in particular, has 
worked closely with GLEB in formulating and implementing the London 
Industrial Strategy.
Whether as 'social partners' co-opted by the state in the 
administrative structures of the agencies (as in Belgium), or as the 
beneficiaries of state economic policy (as in the UK, the employers 
under the Conservative government of 1979 onwards, and the trade
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unions, to a lesser extent, under the Labour government of 1974-79), 
the role of these economic interest groups in relation to the agencies 
has been subsidiary to that of the state.
Any random survey of significant events in the history of these 
agencies under study would provide a powerful indication of the main 
conclusion of this chapter, that it is the state which effectively 
controls the character and direction of the agencies. It was the 
Wallonian regional government which wound up the SDRW^, it was 
pressure frcm government which led to the selling off of the SDA's 
investment in Stonefield Vehicles^, and it was the Dutch government 
which in 1985, ordered a review of the agencies" operations^. 
Similarly, the transfer of the Belgian agencies" investment functions 
to separate regional investment bodies, the involvement of the SDA in 
the GEAR project and the removal of the province of Drenthe from the 
geographical remit of the NOM, all resulted from central government 
decisions. It might be argued that in taking these actions, the state 
was merely responding to external pressures. Even if this is the 
case, and the argument is not one which will be taken up here, it does 
not detract frcm the central implication that regional development 
agencies must be analysed in the context of their role as state-j/t 
directed agencies.
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chapter seven
Agency Performance (UK agencies)
This chapter attempts a tentative analysis of an area of the agencies* 
work which has not previously been the subject of detailed study, that 
is their performance. Performance can be considered in two aspects, 
the effects which the agency generates on the economy in which it 
operates, such as changes in ownership structures, in the availability 
of industrial property, even the sectoral composition of the local 
manufacturing base, and the extent to which the agency has been able 
to achieve its stated statutory objectives. Both these definitions of 
performance entail considerable difficulties in measurement. In the 
first instance, it is extremely problematic to prove a causal 
relationship between the activities of any one agency and changes in 
regional economic indicators. One example of this is the debate which 
took place over the contribution that the HIDB had made to reversing 
the population decline in many of the localities in which it operated. 
It proved impossible to disentangle the effects of the activities of 
the agency frcm those of the burgeoning North Sea Oil industry^. As 
for measuring performance by reference to agencies' stated objectives, 
this process is encumbered by the vague nature of these objectives, as 
propounded in the founding legislation of a number of agencies, and 
noted above. For example, one of the WDA's main purposes is to 
'promote industrial efficiency and international competitiveness in 
Wales'^.
In recent years the United Kingdom has, in the case of two agencies, 
the SDA and WDA, taken to setting public performance targets in 
relation to two of their statutory functions, the provision of 
finance, and property for industry. However, these targets are 
designed purely to measure the economic return on public expenditure, 
and as a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General stated in 
February 1985 financial duties set for the SDA and WDA, in the 
absence of other tests of performance, did not provide an adequate 
overall measurement of operational efficiency1.^  In subsequent 
sections of this chapter, the agencies* performance in terms of their 
investment and property functions will be considered not only in 
relation to the financial return which these activities provide the 
agencies, but also in relation to other effects such as the type of 
company which these functions support, the employment they sponsor, 
and the geographical areas into which they are directed. However, the 
activities of agencies in the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries 
are not confined to the functions of investment and the provision of 
property; indeed, certain of the Belgian agencies carry out neither of 
these functions. The effects of other functions are difficult to 
evaluate, for their objectives may be social as well as economic. 
For example, expenditure on the improvement of the environment may 
make the affected localities more attractive to incoming or expanding 
business, but also has the purpose of making safe dangerous coal 
deposits, and of enhancing the living conditions of residents.
This chapter sets out to examine the following questions, amongst 
others. What type of companies are the agencies aiding through their 
activities? Is it possible to measure the number of jobs they are
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creating? What are the financial results of their operations? The 
aim of such an analysis is to establish an accurate picture of the 
economic consequences of their work. It is hoped that this approach 
will be more profitable than attempting to make a value judgement on 
their 1 effectiveness*, which would be dependent upon a perception of 
the aims which the agencies cure considered to be pursuing.
Industrial Investment
Formal measurement of the investment performance of the two main UK 
agencies, the SDA and WDA, was not introduced by the government until 
1981 (though performance had been measured internally by sponsoring 
departments in previous years). Moreover, as mentioned above, these 
figures give only a partial indication of the nature and performance 
of the agencies* investment portfolios. They show the total financial 
return earned on investments over a twelve month period, expressed as 
a percentage of the capital base, that is the Public Dividend Capital 
and National Loan Fund monies made available to the agencies. Since 
1981, performance, as measured by these instruments, has not matched 
up to government expectations, as revealed in the annual and 
cumulative target rates of return established by the sponsoring 
departments (See Table 1). As can be seen, whilst the SDA's rates of 
return have been low, they have been relatively consistent, whilst 
those of the WDA have tended to fluctuate. This might suggest that 
the WDA investment portfolio is less balanced than that of the SDA, 
but statistical analysis of the two agencies* portfolios according to 
industrial classification does not support this contention (See Table 
2). A survey of the investment activities of the SDA, WDA and fflDB
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covering the period between June 1981 and June 1982, published in 
February 1985, showed that the SDA and WDA, had similar investment 
failure rates (19.6% * and 22.7%8 respectively, of investments by 
value failed or expected to fail). Interestingly, the HIDB's 
investment failure rate was significantly lower, at 12.3%**, and the 
Board also submitted to the report that its failure-rate since it made 
its first investment in 1968, was only 7.7%^ . As will be shown belcw, 
the HIDB has a far greater proportion of its investments in small 
business than both the SDA and the WDA.8
However, it is not easy to gauge accurately the financial performance 
of agency investments in the early years of their activities. For 
example, Minns and Thomley, who analyse the investments of the 
Northern Ireland Finance Corporation and the Northern Ireland 
Development Agency between 1972 and 1976 in their study of state 
shareholding, argue that it is not possible to calculate a rate of 
return for the companies invested because of the lack of available
q
information . They note, nonetheless, that of 17 companies invested
in 1976, 4 were in receivership or liquidation, and 1 was not 
1 otrading1 . The NIFC, established in 1972, incurred considerable 
investment losses in view of its remit to act as a financial rescue 
vehicle for companies which were suffering trading difficulties. Its 
successor body, the NIDA, only invested in such companies on the 
instruction of government, and then under guarantee that all losses 
incurred in undertaking such cases would be reimbursed. 
Notwithstanding this, the net investment losses of the NIDA in its 
first year of operation were £6,854,000^. In 1978 the Northern 
Ireland Development Order wrote off £7,338,000 of the agencies
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liabilities^. Its accumulated deficit at the end of the 1980/81 j
financial year was £18,329,000^. The IDB, which succeeded the NIDA 
in 1982, has not published information concerning financial returns on 
its investments; in March 1985, 6 of its 36 investments were in 
liquidation or receivership, representing an investment value of 
£764,000 out of a total portfolio worth approximately £12 million^.
As already noted above, the HIDB has claimed to the National Audit 
Office that its investment failure rate between 1968, when it first 
took equity and 1982, was extremely low. This appears to be 
supported, at least with regard to the earlier years of investment 
activity, by the conclusion of Minns and Thornley that 'the success 
rate of the HIDB companies as a whole, as far as it is possible to 
judge, compared favourably with that of private companies unsupported 
by the state. Between 1968 and 1975 three companies in which the HIDB 
had shares were liquidated and four were taken over. Excluding those 
that were liquidated, the profits record for those for which figures 
are available show a reasonable achievement, and in three cases show a 
very high achievement1 ^ .
Prior to 1981 the methods that the agencies used to measure their 
performances varied. The amounts set aside in provision for losses on 
investment annually by the WDA shows how investment losses grew with 
the size of the portfolio. Of its investments between 1976-1981, 
those to the value of £4,600,500 consisted of 16 companies in 
receivership or liquidation, or that had ceased trading (27.2%). 
Writing in 1980, Cooke noted concerning the WDA 'the evidence that its 
overall loss an capital invested frcm the beginning amounts to only
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4.5%'^. As to the nature of the holdings at this earlier stage, 
whilst figures show that there were proportionately more investment 
stakes comprising 30% or more of the equity of an individual company, 
there was never a stage when the WDA held any significant number of 
subsidiary companies. This was in apparent contrast to the Scottish 
Development Agency, which according to the Financial Times, had by 
1979 1 established 18 wholly-owned subsidiaries of which three have 
collapsed, whereas the WDA has only one majority holding' ^ ®. As the 
newspaper then noted, the investment policies of the WDA were
1
therefore, being unfavourably compared with those of the SDA as being j- 
too cautious and conservative. Cooke disagreed with this view, and 
claimed in support of his argument that by 1980, far from being 
1 aggressive and risky' the SDA level of industrial investment was 
lower than that of the WDA and that fewer SDA investments had gone 
into receivership^. (The premise being that if the SDA had been 
pursuing a more adventurous investment policy than that of the WDA, 
then it would have had to write off more investments). A possible 
explanation of these seemingly opposing views is provided by the 
Scottish TOC in its critical review of the SDA's first five years of 
operation 'the Scottish Development Agency - the first half decade*.
The report states that 'in a fairly early period of its development, 
two small companies were given backing (SCQFISOO and Tridynamics).
The collapse of these companies and the appalling publicity which they 
attracted (including totally unscrupulous attacks from the Shadow 
Secretary of State and the CBI) resulted in a change in thinking 
within the SDA. The Chief Executive made it clear to the STOC General 
Council that there would be less emphasis on major holdings in 
relatively small and growing companies on the basis that such
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companies required as great an input of management time as much larger 
undertakings did1^ .
Changes in the investment policies of the SDA and WDA cannot therefore 
be wholly ascribed to the restrictions brought in by the 1979 
Conservative government. Its Labour predecessor had already cut back 
levels of investment finding, returns on investment were low, and 
there were few majority holdings in either portfolio. The rhetoric 
which surrounded the founding of the agencies which described state 
holding companies which would establish their own enterprises and take 
leading manufacturers in the regional economy into public ownership 
should not be allowed to cloud the fact that under Labour the 
investment policies of the SDA and WDA were never more than cautious.
It has been noted above that the size of agency investments, both in 
terms of financial value and of the proportion of equity stock, have 
tended to decline in recent years, particularly since the revised 
investment guidelines issued to the SDA and WDA in 1979 obliged them 
to gain the approval of their respective Secretaries of State before 
making an investment of over £1 million, or over 30% of the equity
9 1
stock of an individual company • Two important facts emerge 
imnediately frcm an analysis of the size of the agencies1 investments, 
using the most up-to-date descriptions of their portfolios (See 
Table 3). Both the SDA and WDA have portfolios the balance of which, 
in terms of the number of companies invested, is weighted towards 
comparatively small investments (under £100,000). This is 
particularly the case in relation to the SDA, which channels 
investment through its Small Business Unit. In contrast, 16 of the 30
394
investments in trading companies noted in the 1984/5 Annual Report of 
the IDB, are of over £100,00022. This difference in the composition 
of the portfolios may partly be explained by reference to two factors, 
the ability of the IDB to give grant (as opposed to share and loan) 
assistance to many Northern Irish companies, and the continuing 
activities of the LEDU, which provides financial assistance for 
Northern Irish companies with less than 50 employees. Unlike its 
sister agencies in Great Britain, the IDB therefore offers equity and 
loan assistance only to companies of a certain size.
The HIDB also offers grant assistance to private companies, a facility 
which it operates in conjunction with the provision of equity and 
loans. According to evidence submitted by the HIDB to the Ccrrmittee 
on Scottish Affairs 'of the 1,100 cases'(of financial assistance, 
grant, equity and loan) 'in 1982/2, 51% involved a financial package 
of £5,000 or less, and 73% a package of £10,000 or less'2”*.
As for the size of equity stakes, the agencies, as indicated above, 
now have few majority holdings in invested companies. For example, of 
212 companies supported by the WDA through investment at the end of 
March 1985, it had a controlling interest in only 4, 3 of these being 
finance or holding companies set up by the Agency to assist its 
investment policies2 .^ This characteristic is even more pronounced in 
the case of the SDA. Of the 772 in its investment portfolio, it has a 
majority share in only 2, one of which, SDF Limited, serves as a 
source of investment advice for the agency, which established it, and 
has only nominal capital 2 .^ Even the IDB which, as was shown above, 
has made a higher proportion of large investments than the other
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agencies, possesses only 3 majority stakes in its portfolio of 36 
trading and non-trading companies^. Unfortunately, figures are not 
available concerning the number of instances in which the agencies 
have exercised their right to appoint ncn-executive directors to the 
boards of companies in which they invest, though the impression gained 
during the course of research was that the practice was not 
widespread, and generally was confined to larger investments, such as 
De Lorean. It should be said, at this point, that the Comptroller and 
Auditor General's report on the investment activities of the SDA, WDA 
and HIDB, which was published in February 1985 expressed general 
satisfaction with their techniques of investment monitoring and 
appraisal, though with certain qualifications^. Also in 1985, a 
Public Accounts Committee report on nominee directors on the boards of 
publicly-invested companies noted that of the regional development 
agencies surveyed, only the WDA required its appointees on the boards 
of invested companies to submit a written annual report on the 
company1 s financial state^. The Comptroller and Auditor General's 
report also makes an interesting comparison concerning the maturity of 
investments within the portfolios of the three agencies surveyed which 
shows that at 31 March 1984, approximately 4% of the 791 companies 
assisted at the date by the SDA by way of loans and shareholdings, had 
been held in the portfolio for over 5 years^. The comparative 
figures for the WDA were 7% of 183 companies^®, and for the HIDB 
approximately 40% of 2,400 companies . It should be borne in mind 
that the HIDB had operated its equity function for 16 years at the 
time this comparison was made, whilst those of both the SDA and the 
WDA had been operating for 8.
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Is it possible to make comments concerning the types of businesses in 
which the agencies invest? Morgan has attempted a detailed survey of 
companies in which the WDA has invested, which he divides into two 
categories, 'core' and 1 peripheral1 ^ . The 'core' firms, which he 
estimates, constitute 20.8% of invested companies by number, are 
generally externally-controlled, with high levels of female 
employment, and categorised as 1light industry1 ‘Peripheral' 
firms, he claims, are usually small firms with a low level of 
unionisation amongst their workforces, low profits and low 
productivity. These findings must be seen in the light of Morgan's 
general view of the WDA's position in relation to the international 
division of labour. 'Because it is a capitalist development agency' 
he argues 'it is inextricably bound up with the idiosyncracies and 
nuances of differential economic development, as it is associated with 
the predominating market system'^. Analysis of the larger Agency 
investments whose activities are described in annual reports, suggest 
that they reflect the differing natures of the regional economies. 
For example of the 98 investments, details of which were provided by 
the SDA for the purposes of this research, 23.5% can be categorised in 
the textile, leather and clothing sector. This is a sector of 
traditional importance to both the Scottish and Northern Irish 
economies, and indeed, 13 of the IDB's 30 investments in companies 
trading at the end of March 1985 operate in it~^. However, there is 
contrasting evidence, which suggests that not in all cases do the 
agencies' investments policies directly follow the industrial 
composition of the region's economy. Over 30% of the WDA's 
investments, for example, are, according to figures given in the 
Agency's 1983/4 Annual Report, in the sectors of office machinery and
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data processing equipment manufacture, and electric, electronic and 
instrument engineering, areas which do not represent industries in 
which the Welsh economy has any historic strength^.
Both the above trends are noted by Minns and Thomley in analysing 
HTD3 investments between 1968 and 1976. They note that 'the types of 
firm supported by the HIDB have been varied but the majority are 
industries which use the natural resources of the Highlands, such as 
fishing, tourism, game processing, and cheese making, or else are 
traditional to the Highlands, such as weaving. In two cases, craft 
industries were supported because they were considered suitable to 
rural areas even though they had been 'artifically' introduced. Other 
industries supported have been those which require a high level of 
technology and which are not traditional to any area of the country, 
such as the manufacture of optical equipment and the operation of 
helicopters, or industries which supply commodities for local 
consumption, such as boats and engineering1 ^ . These comments appear 
to be supported by more recent figures (Table 4) which show that 
51.26% of the Board's investment in the form of shares and loans has 
been expended on companies operating in the areas of fishing and 
tourism, but also that 25.04% was invested in manufacturing and 
processing,*^ activities, which, according to the Board have generally 
been 1 under-represented1 in the regional economy^.
The SDA was the only agency that provided details of the ownership of 
the companies in its portfolio. Of the 98 companies for which it gave 
information, 87.8% were Scottish owned, 5.1 % had their headquarters 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom and 7.1% were overseas companies.
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However, Morgan conducted his own survey of WDA-invested companies, 
which concluded that 2.8% of all invested firms were owned by overseas 
corporations, and 16.7% by UK firms controlled from outside Wales 
Considering only investments over £50,000 the proportion of foreign- 
owned companies rises to 4.8%, and that of non-Welsh UK companies to 
29.3%. The issue of the agencies1 role in promoting indigenous 
development and whether or not they should encourage companies whose 
operations are controlled 'externally1, either elsewhere in the UK or 
abroad, is a politically sensitive one. Morgan, for example, argues 
that whilst 'the WDA has encouraged diversification of the industrial 
base' it 'has, concomitantly, aided disarticulation of the Welsh 
economy, and has certainly helped foster the branch circuit mentality 
that external control brings with it^*. In 1983, the SDA aroused 
controversy by investing in an American company, International 
Microelectronic Products, because the company had no immediate plans 
to establish a presence in Scotland. However, the extent to which the 
agencies encourage the establishment of externally-controlled 'branch 
plants' within their regions cannot be judged from an analysis of 
their investments alone, for the type of companies in question, being, 
customarily, subsidiaries of multinational companies, do not require 
equity or loan assistance from an agency. In these cases, state 
financial assistance is often disbursed direct by the government under 
regional grant schemes.
Of the SDA's 98 investments, details of which were provided for the 
purposes of this research, 40 were in the form of equity investments, 
29 combined equity and loan investment, 19 consisted of loans alone 
and 10 others involved a form of guarantee, higher purchase
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arrangement, or other special facility^. Study of the 96 WDA 
investments, details of which are given in the 1984/5 Annual Report, 
reveal certain differences in the two agencies* preferred form of 
investment, which centre on the WDA's use of the secured loan. Both 
agencies prefer to have an equity stake when larger investments are 
made. They also make use of quite canplex share arrangements. The 
WDA's investment in the Saxonland Furniture Company, for example is in 
the form of * cumulative convertible participating redeemable 
preference shares'^.
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Cumulative since 1981/2 3.90


















Table 2 Analysis of Agency Investments by SIC (Standard 
Industrial Classification)
%




Electrical, electronic and instrument 
engineering 14.3 10.0 3.3
Textiles, leather and clothing 23.5 9.5 43.3
Manufacture of paper products 
and printing 5.1 8.6 6.7
Manufacture of metal goods 5.1 8.1
Mechanical engineering 4.1 6.6
Chemical industry 1.0 5.1
Metal manufacture 3.1 4.9
Processing of rubber and plastics 1.0 3.8
Banking finance and business services 3.4
Manufacture of motor vehicles, parts 
and other transport equipment 2.0 3.2 6.7
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Timber and wooden furniture
Food, drink and tobacco
Coal extraction and manufacture of 
solid fuels
Other services, including recreational 
and cultural
Manufacture of nan-metallic mineral 
products
Transport, caimunication, distribution 
and repairs
Other manufacturing industries 
Extraction of minerals 
Agricultural and fisheries 
Construction
















Analysis of Agency Investment Portfolios by Size of Investment
SDA WDA IDB
Investments of
over £500,000 8 1.0 7 3.3 3 8.3
Investments of
£100,001-500,000 43 5.6 41 19.3 16 44.5
Investments of
£100,000 and under 721 93.4 164 77.4 17 47.2
TOTAL 772 100 212 100 36 100











23 306 746 13.26
Fisheries Grants
Shares & loans
10 688 633 
29 835 748 




19 517 553 
24 499 974 




3 190 091 
6 151 403 3.50
Tourism Grants
Shares & loans
34 545 277 
15 040 569 
49 585 846 28.21
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Other service 
industries Grants 6 264 819
Shares & loans 5 935 137
12 199 956 6.94
Total Grants 82 889 244
Shares & loans 92 896 615 
175 785 859
1 = grants, shares and loans approved
2 = at 1983 prices




Scrutiny of the factory-building function is central to an analysis of
agency performance, for, as has been shown in previous chapters, this
function has absorbed a major part of the UK agencies' expenditure
over time. The largest portfolios of property, in terms of both
factory units, and floor space, are maintained by the SDA and WDA. The
WDA, for example, inherited on 1 January 1976, when it commenced
operations, a stock of 16.7m sq. ft. of factory space^. Between this
date and 31 March 1985 it constructed a further 10.7m sq. ft. in the
45form of advance factories, bespoke orders and modernisations . 
Allowing for disposals, and the decommissioning of older premises, the 
WDA's factory portfolio had by 31 March.1985, risen to
AC
20.1m sq. ft. , an increase of over 20% on the portfolio which it had 
inherited. As is shown in Table 5 figures provided by the agencies 
show that the WDA had a lower proportion of its premises, 
approximately 18% of available factory space, vacant at 31 March than 
its sister agency the SDA, for which the corresponding figure is 
23.3%^. The agencies have, in the past argued that the proportion of 
premises which they own which lie vacant are broadly comparable with 
the proportion of vacant property owned by private property companies, 
allowing for the diversity of the agencies' stock. The WDA's vacant 
property is, however, concentrated in certain areas such as West 
Glamorgan, West and North West Wales^. Vacancy rates in Wales range 
from 13.6% (Bridgend area) to 29.6% (Carmarthen area)^. Comparable 
figures for a regional breakdown of vacancy rates affecting SDA 
property are not available in full because the Agency statistics 
provided on total factory stock and vacant premises are tabulated
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according to different geographical criteria. Those areas for which 
it was possible to make a calculation included Tayside and Fife, where 
27.7% of factory space was available to let, and Lothian and Borders, 
for which area the corresponding figure was 11.3%^. This indicates 
that vacancy rates in SDA property, are like those of WDA property, 
subject to significant regional variation.
The SDA, at 31st March 1985, was in possession of 2,693 factory units,
ci
comprising a total of 21,765,733 sq. ft. of industrial floor space . 
The WDA, with only 7.7% less floorspace (20.1m sq. ft.), owned 41.5% 
less units (1,575)^. Consequently, the average size of a WDA unit, 
at 12,749 sq. ft. , is over 50%, greater than that of the average size 
of an SDA unit, 8,082 sq. ft. This pattern is reflected in a 
comparison of the numbers of employees at agency-owned sites, (see 
Table 6) for the WDA, possessing on average larger units has tenants
21.6% of whom employ over 50 staff, whilst the corresponding figure
for tenants of SDA-owned property is only 16.1%^. Interestingly, 
however, the average floor-space per worker employed in agency-owned
premises is, in the case of both agencies, comparatively similar,
444.2 sq. ft. for the SDA, and 462.3 sq. ft. for the WDA. This 
indicates that the employment effects, in terms of the utilisation of 
factory space constructed, of the agencies' factory programmes, have 
been roughly equal. However, if one analyses employment in SDA and 
WDA-owed factories over the nine years since their establishment, it 
is apparent that employment has fallen, both in terms of an increase 
in the amount of space per employee, and in overall figures. For 
example, whilst on 1 January 1976, the WDA inherited 16.7m sq. ft. of 
factory space, on which 59,800 people were employed^, by 31 March
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1985, though factory space owned by the WDA had increased to 20.1m 
sqft employment had failed by 27.4% in these factories, to 43,400^. 
Similarly, at 31 March 1978, the earliest date for which such figures 
are available, 77,000 people were employed in SDA-owned premises, 
covering 25.2m sq. ft. of space^. Though by 31 March 1985, factory 
space owned by the SDA had fallen 13.5% to 21.8m sq.ftemployment had 
fallen by 36.4%, to 49,000^ ®. To extrapolate further, in 1976 the WDA 
had 3.6 workers employed on each 1000 sq. ft. of its property; by 1985 
the figure had fallen to 2.2 workers per 1000sq. ft. In 1978, the SDA 
had 3.1 workers employed on each 1000 sq. ft. of its property; by 1985 
that figure also had fallen to 2.2.
In 1983/4 following recommendations from the Committee of Public 
Accounts^, the government introduced a system of financial targets 
for the SDA and WDA, relating to returns made on their factory- 
building activities. These were meant to operate in a similar fashion 
to those targets which were already in operation relating to the 
agencies1 investment activities. In terms of the per centage 
financial return on investment in new or modernised industrial 
premises, the SDA failed to meet the target set for it by the 
government in the financial years 1983/4 and 1984/5, whilst the WDA 
succeeded in meeting its targets for both these years^. However, the 
SDA's targets were twice the level of those set for the WDA, 
reflecting, it might be suggested, the different nature of property 
markets in the two countries, and it would therefore be inappropriate 
to place great significance on these figures.
Turning briefly to the activities of the other UK agencies in this
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area, the HB  inherited, in September 1982, a total of 635 factory,
workshop and warehouse units, comprising a floor space of 20,5m sq.
filft., from the former Department of Commerce . Approximately 12% of 
this floorspace was available for letting or awaiting surrender on the 
occasion of the transfer, according to the IDB 1982/3 Annual Report^. 
The IDB's predecessors, the NIFC and NIDA, had no responsibility for 
the provision of industrial premises, but the philosophy behind the 
establishment of the IDB was that all industrial development functions 
would be amalgamated in one organisation. However, the acquisition 
and construction of industrial property has not proved to be a high 
priority for the IDB. In the three years following its establishment 
in 1982, it constructed only 42 units, with a total floorspace of 4.9m 
sq. f t . P a r t l y  as a result of this, and of the continuing "drive 
towards privatisation"^ which has involved the disposal of a larger 
number of units to private sector buyers, the IDB1 s factory portfolio 
had, by March 31, 1985, been reduced to 592 units, or 18.3 m. sq. 
ft.*^ , a reduction of 11% from the floorspace inherited in 1982. The 
IDB 1984/5 Annual Report noting that a 'major review of IDB 
landholdings throughout Northern Ireland has been taking place during 
the year' added that 'it has been apparent for some time that the 
existing portfolio exceeds the IDB's anticipated requirements'^. It 
is, however, difficult to make any independent judgement on the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the IDB's factory provision function, as 
the government does not require that the Board meet a public financial 
target for return on its factory holdings, and no figures are 
available concerning the numbers employed in IDB-cwned factories.
The HIDB's factory portfolio, at 31 March 1984 amounted to 1.12m sq.
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ft. of floorspace, 26% of which was, at that time, available for
letting^. Figures relating to the number of units owned by the Board
were not made available for this period, but, at March 31 1983, the
Board had been in possession of 265 units^. Vacancy rates for Board
property, as at 31 March 1584, varied widely from one region to
another; ranging fran 82% of HIDB-awned floorspace in Naim, to only
4% in Caithness*^ . In 6 of the 19 administrative regions in which the
HIDB had property holdings, vacancy rates were over 25% of available
floorspace^. a feature of the Board's property portfolio, reflecting
the nature of economic development in the region, is the preponderance
of small industrial units. At the end of March 1983, over 70% of the
units owned by the HIDB were of 500 sq.m (5,382 sq. ft.) or less in
71size'. For many years, the Board did not measure its factory- 
building function against any commercial criteria, in the light of the 
complete absence of private sector activity in this area, but the 
government introduced financial targets, similar to those under which 
the WDA and SDA operate, on 1st April 1984^.
At 31 March 1983, the DBRW (MWD) had under ownership 1.99m sq. ft. of
factory space, consisting of 292 units^. 38 of these units,
representing 13% of the total, were, at this time, untenanted^.
34.2% of the floorspace, 0.68m sq. ft., and 33.6% of the units were
located in Newtown, the largest centre of population in the Board's 
75area .
The employment effects of the factory-building programmes of these 
other UK agencies are not easy to determine, owing to lack of 
statistical evidence. In areas such as the Highlands and islands of
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Scotland, moreover, the provision of industrial premises does not form 
as important a part of economic development work as it does in, for 
example, the industrial valleys of South Wales. As has been already 
noted, the IDB does not disclose figures relating to overall 
employment in its factories. According to figures published in the 
DERW (MWD) 1982/3 Annual Report, however, employment in premises under 
its ownership has increased by 16.7% over four years, from 4479 in 
March 1979, to 5351 in March 1983^, the latter figure representing an 
employment density of 2.7 workers per 1000 sq. ft. of floorspace. At 
31 March 1984 the HIDB claimed to have employed in its industrial 
units a total of 1976.5 staff^, its calculation having translated 
figures for part-time employment into full-time equivalent. On this 
basis, employment density represented 1.8 workers per 1000 sq. ft. of 
floorspace.
Indications are that, following a period during which factory-building 
dominated other economic development activities, UK agencies are now 
pursuing policies of review and retrenchment in relation to the 
function. The SDA carried out a review of its property function in 
1983. The IDB and WDA have recently taken similar action, and in each 
case, the result has been the direction of resources towards the 
provision of made-to-measure bespoke factories in the context of an 
overall decline in the number of units built. This policy has been 
pursued in conjunction with the disposal of significant amounts of 
property to the private sector. In 1984/5, for example, the SDA sold 
off 2.1m sq. ft. of premises, which represented approximately 9% of 
its total portfolio^. In the same year, the WDA constructed 432,000 
sq. ft. of factory space in the form of 58 advance factories, bespoke
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units and modernisations, when in 1981/2 it had constructed
2,731,000 sq. ft. of factory space, consisting of 456 units^. As was 
pointed out at the time, this was considerably in excess of one unit 
for every day of the year. The pattern of the WDA's factory-building 
programme over the first ten years of its operations can be seen in 
full in Figure 1.
The agencies do not make public the criteria by which they choose 
sites for the establishment of industrial premises "in advance of 
demand", advance factories. Development has, in the past, been 
targeted on specific areas, either as a response to a government 
directive, as in the case of the WDA crash programme of factory- 
building at the site of steelworks closures in Cardiff, Ebfcw Vale, 
Newport and Port Talbot, or as a consequence of an agency initiative. 
The SDA's programme of Area Projects, for example, had by 31 March, 
1985 led to the construction of approximately 2.6m sq. ft. of 
industrial property in the areas chosen for development®®. Similarly, 
in Mid Wales, Newtown, the industrial centre of the area covered by 
the DBRW (MWD), has accommodated a large proportion of the Board's 
factory-building programme. This reflects not only the Board's 
special statutory responsibility for the town, but also its place at 
the hub of the growth-pole strategy on which the Board bases its 
activities. As noted briefly above, factory construction cannot play 
an identical role in the diverse regions served by UK agencies. 
Whilst the construction of speculative factory developments in areas 
of high unemployment, as an attraction to both new and expanding 
indigenous firms, and relocating external firms, represented a major 
plank of traditional regional policy in urban areas of Scotland and
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Wales and was therefore enthusiastically taken up after 1975 by both 
the SDA. and WDA, it is of less significance in the rural areas served 
by the HIDB and DBRW (MWD), because of the Improbability of attracting 




Summary of agencies1 industrial property holdings
Year-end Hillicn No. of %vacant*
Sq. ft. units
SDA 1984/5 21.8 2,693 23.3
WDA 1984/5 20.1 1,575 18.0
IDB 1984/5 20.5 635
HIDB 1983/4 1.1 265 26
DBRW (MWD) 1983/4 2.0 292 13
= % of total sq. ft. vacant and available for letting.




SDA and WDA. - factory tenants by numbers of employees
SDA WDA
No. of No. of % of No. of % of
employees tenants total tenants total
1-50 861 83.9 556 78.4
51-100 70 6.8 63 8.9
101-500 73 7.1 83 11.7
501-1000 11 1.1 4 0.6
1000+___________11_______ U __________3________CM
1026 100.0 709 100.0





















WDA - s’actory-Buildinq 1976-1985 
(by s<^ . footaqe constructed)
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U1 o ui o <_n o
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1 = 1st 3 months of 1976 only 
Source: Information sunplied by WDA
417
At the end of the financial year 1984/5, the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General qualified the accounts of both the SDA®^ and WDA^, because of 
discrepancies which had been revealed between the value of their 
property portfolios as listed in their accounts, and their estimated 
value on the open market. At the request of the Comptroller, 
independent surveyors had valued the SDA portfolio at £166.8m, and the 
WDA portfolio at £92m (in both cases including in the valuation only 
completed premises). In the case of the SDA, this was £108m, or 39%, 
less than the book value appearing in the accounts; in that of the 
WDA, the difference was £223m, or 71%. The disclosure of this massive 
gap between estimated and actual value illustrated the ‘creative* 
aspect of drawing up accounts for public bodies such as the agencies, 
and indicated the depressed state of the industrial property market in 
many of the areas in which they are active. More importantly, 
however, it emphasised that the agencies' work in this field cannot be 
adequately measured by financial criteria alone, a point which has 
already been made in relation to the investment function. The 
independent valuation showed that the large amounts of money (making 
up the biggest single share of agency budget) expended over time on 
the acquisition and development of industrial sites have not created a 
factory stock of equivalent value. A commercial rate of return cannot 
be expected on these activities, unless they are confined to areas of 
high demand (such as the South Wales M4 corridor, or the Scottish 
'Silicon Glen'). Activity outside these areas, where the public 
sector provides the facilities where the private sector will not, has 
to be judged in terms of employment created. This is a calculation 




Neither the SDA or WDA have ever made it their practice to set targets 
for job creation, or issue figures concerning the jobs which their 
activities have created, other than those related to individual 
projects. In the WDA's Statement of Policies and Programmes, 
published in January 1977, it was stated that 1 the WDA do not consider 
that it is possible to set targets for themselves in terms of such 
measures as overall levels of employment, or environmental quality in 
Wales'^. It went on to argue that 'the Agency*s programmes will, of 
course, make a major impact on employment. The magnitude of the 
employment which will be created or maintained cannot be precisely 
forecast since it will depend both on the type of industry which 
responds to the available opportunities and on the general level of 
economic activity in the UK as a whole over the next five years'®^. 
However, such statements did not prevent the Agency from claiming in 
1981, in its publication 'WDA; The First Five years' that its factory- 
building activities between 1976 and 1981 'had helped to create 11,000 
jobs'®5 and that investment funds were expected at the time of 
investment to create 3300 jobs. An example from the 1984/5 WDA Annual 
Report demonstrates the vague nature of the Agency's published remarks 
concerning jobs " . . .2 9  companies.... announced their intention to set 
up projects in Whies costing £59m, and producing 2650 jobs. Another 
1000 jobs are due to be created and a further 2450 safeguarded as a 
result of expansion projects announced by overseas firms already 
established in Whles"^. Similarly, 'a record total of 148,000 sq.m 
( 1 .5 9  sq. ft.) of space in WDA factories was occupied by 242
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companies, which were forecasting the creation of nearly 5100 jobs 
over the next 3 years1 ^ . Unfortunately, the WDA does not, in its 
published material, follow through these job forecasts over time, in 
order to analyse how many of the predicted jobs are actually created, 
and there is evidence to suggest that the Agency's figures have been 
in this respect, unreliable. For example Aled Eurig in his analysis 
of the Agency notes that 'job figures given by the Agency for those 
employed in the Agency's advance factories have been at best 
confusing, at worst downright misleading1 He goes an to allege 
that the number of new jobs created by the WDA advance factory
on
programme between 1976 and 1981 was approximately 4,000.
As noted above, the SDA has maintained a policy in relation to jobs 
similar to that of the WDA, though, in 1983, it abandoned traditional 
practice by citing job creation estimates in its Corporate Plan which 
suggested that the Agency's activities would create33,600 jobs between 
1981/2 and 1984/5. However, these projects are funded not by the SDA 
alone but jointly by a combination of the Agency, local authorities, 
and, in certain areas, private business. Such job creation as has 
taken place cannot therefore be attributed solely to SDA expenditure. 
In addition, two of the projects, at Clydebank and Dundee, operate 
within ares which have been designated by the government as Enterprise 
Zones, and therefore benefit from government expenditure in the form 
of tax exemptions.
By the end of the financial year 1984/5 the Agency had expended 
£122.8m on seven area projects, in which 12,939 jobs had been 'created 
and provided for'^. However, the total estimated investment both
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Q2
private and public in these initiatives amounted to £888.9m. Like 
the WDA, the SDA's references to job creation tend to be generalised 
'1984/5 was the most successful year ever in attracting investment 
into Scotland by overseas corporations...total prospective investment 
was over £600m.... which in due course will provide some 7,000
Q-3
valuable new jobs .
Interestingly, this lack of clarity concerning job creation figures is 
not a universal characteristic of UK regional development agencies. 
At least 3 of the agencies (the HIDB, IDB and LEDU) annually attempt 
to measure the number of jobs which the activities of their 
organisation have been responsible for establishing. For example, the 
H U B  has estimated that between 1974 and 1983, the activities of the 
Board resulted in the creation of 17,148 jobs (using a method of 
calculation which translates part-time and seasonal jobs into full­
time equivalent) and the retention of 6,400 more^. In publishing 
figures such as these, the Board has nevertheless retained a cautious 
attitude toward job creation claims. For example, with regard to the 
question of monitoring job creation, as discussed above in relation to 
the WDA, the Board has stated that 'it is also important to follow up 
assisted cases to assess whether projected employment increases did in 
fact o c c u r B o a r d  research into cases assisted in 1974 showed 
approximately 80% of predicted employment actually occurred, and 
further revealed differences in actual job creation between various
Q C
sectors of economic activity.
Both Northern Irish agencies, the IDB and LEDU, set targets annually 
for job creation and publish estimates of jobs actually created which
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are measured against these targets. Set up in September 1982, the IDB 
in its 1982/83 Annual Report published nine months later, declared 
that 1 its objectives should be challenging yet attainable'. 
Consequently, the IDB announced that one objective would be to 
increase job promotions fran 3500 in 1982/3 to 10,000 by 1985/6, with 
an immediate objective of 5000 job promotions in 1983/4, of which 3000 
were expected to come from home industry, and 2000 from inward 
investment.^ By the following year, in its 1983/4 Annual Report, it 
was publishing figures for jobs promoted, renewed and maintained,
go
classified by geographical location and economic sector. It thus
splits job creation figures into three categories: jobs promoted, a 
category which takes into account the discrepancy between the 
projected and actual number of new jobs created; jobs renewed, defined 
by the IDB as employment related to any substantial initiative 
financed by the Board to preserve employment seriously at risk, and 
jobs maintained, employment related to finance given by the IDB where 
no other substantial initiative has been possible. The Board has, so 
far, had varying success in meeting its job creation targets, which 
relate to job promotions alone. After having achieved 3791 promotions 
in its first year of operation (1982/3) against a target of 3500, the 
number of promotions fell in the following year (1983/4) to 3556 
against a target of 5000. The target for the year 1984/85 was 
accordingly revised to 5250 promotions, and 5267 were, according to 
the Board, achieved (see Table 7).^ It seems unlikely, given these 
figures, that the Board's original target, outlined in its first 
Annual Report, of 10,000 job promotions in the year 1985/6 would be 
a c h i e v e d . I t  is interesting to note that the IDB is alone amongst 
UK agencies in publicly setting itself targets for job creations,
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figures which are often used by politicians and economists as a source 
of criticism of its activities.
In the first ten years of its existence LEDU claims to have promoted 
11,180 j o b s . ^  In 1981 the government expanded LEDU's remit to 
include the deprived urban areas of Belfast, and also the service 
sector of industry, and set it a target of 12,000 job promotions 
between 1981 and 1986.^°^ In addition to this LEDU has since 1981 set 
itself annual job promotion targets. In an interesting justification 
of this policy its 1984/5 Annual Report stated that 'against a 
background of difficult economic conditions and rising unemployment 
the Agency set itself increasingly higher job targets which in the 
four years since 1981 have been met and indeed exceeded. The 
formulation of this ongoing strategy with the commitment to achieving 
job targets has helped to create a sense of challenge among the LEDU 
Board, Area Panels and the Staff. It has also led to a more effective 
use of LEEU's resources and the introduction of a number of new job 
creating initiatives.'^^ During the four year period 1981-85 LEDU 
claimed to have promoted 11,830 jobs, only 170 short of the 























Source: IDB and LE3XJ Annual Reports
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Cost-per-job estimates
In recent years, those academics involved in the study of government 
regional policy measures have increasingly turned to the use of 
calculations estimating the cost of each job created through such 
measures. This type of analysis has however, been criticised for 
its inherent lack of precision, and may not be an ideal method of 
evaluating the work of regional development agencies. On a general 
level, it has been argued by certain of the agencies that they are not 
primarily jcb-creation agencies. For example, Aled Eirug, in his 
study of the WDA, quotes a senior member of the Agency's staff as 
stating that 'Our investment, of course, is not intended as such to 
create j o b s . ' ^ 6  Secondly, such measurements cannot reveal the 
nature, security or longevity of the jobs created, and as a 
consequence, may tend to emphasise the creation of short-term, low- 
cost jobs, rather than relate the agencies' work to their respective 
regional economies in total.
In addition, there are difficulties in making the necessary 
statistical calculations with accuracy. One common problem is found 
in determining the expenditure to be included in the calculation. It 
could be argued that administrative overheads, and expenditure on 
functions such as promotion and publicity, land reclamation and small 
business advice, which have no directly measurable return in terms of 
job created should be excluded. Similar arguments can occur in 
relation to the number of jobs to be calculated against costs. For 
example, if an agency supplies 20% of the start-up capital for an 
invested firm, it could be suggested that only 20% of the jobs created
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by such a project could accurately be ascribed to the agency. 
Additionally/ as has already been shown, those agencies which have 
produced job creation figures have calculated them according to a 
number of different categories - jobs promoted, retained, renewed, 
maintained or saved, and decisions have to be made as to which should 
be included in the cost/job equation. Certain bodies which have used 
cost-per-jab figures to evaluate their economic development activities 
such as Sheffield City Council and the Greater London Enterprise Board 
(GLEB) have reasoned that calculations should be made not in terms of 
jobs created but job-years created, a definition which takes into 
account the fact that jobs created by the agencies may only exist for 
a limited duration, and allows for the inclusion of part-time and 
seasonal work.
However, as has been shown in the past, it is evident that differences 
do exist in the costs of job creation between the various instruments 
of regional industrial and economic policy. The difficulties of 
measuring such figures, some of which have been outlined above, have 
not prevented claims and comparisons being made on this basis which 
could have significant effects on the future direction of government 
policy. For example, John Benington, in an article in Local Economy, 
the journal of the London Economic Policy Unit (LEPU), claims that the 
average cost per job for employment created by local authority- 
sponsored enterprise boards is approximately £5000, whilst the 
equivalent figure for government regional assistance is £32,000 and 
that for employment created in government Enterprise Zones is 
£68, 0 0 0 . In the light of such claims, it is clear that even a 
general estimate of cost-per-jab figures far regional development
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agencies would be of interest. Therefore, a broad calculation has 
been made, using job-creation figures supplied by the agencies, and 
calculating them against total agency expenditure during the period in 
which the jobs were created. Only jobs created or promoted were 
included in the calculation, other categories being discounted. It 
was possible to make calculations in respect of three agencies only 
(the WDA, IDB and HIDB) and for two of these, expenditure figures have 
not been corrected to allow for changes in prices over time.
Notwithstanding the qualifications made above, the figures appear to 
indicate (see Table 8) that regional development agencies are capable 
of generating jobs at less cost than traditional regional policy 
measures. If figures for jobs retained or maintained were to be 
included in the calculation, then the cost per job average for both 
the WDA and the HIDB would be reduced to a rate broadly comparable 
with recent estimates of the cost to the state of maintaining an 
unemployed person. ^ Indeed, the Chairman of the HIDB claimed in the 
Board's 1983 Annual Report that the average cost of retaining or 
creating a job to the HIDB was actually less than the cost to the 
state of maintaining, an unemployed person, though he did not 
substantiate the figures used. However, as referred to above, the 
cost-per-job figures claimed for the regional enterprise boards 
established by the metropolitan authorities are smaller than those of 
the regional development agencies for which it was possible to make a 
calculation. For example, a 'job audit' carried out during 1984/5 by 
independent consultants, Thornton Baker for the Greater London 
Enterprise Board, found that, as of 31 December 1984, the cost per job 
created by GLEB investments, including job targets to 31 December
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1986f and a proportionate share of overheads, was £3,624, on the 
assumption that the investments would realise only 50% of their 
cost.”' ^  Similarly, according to an article in the Financial Times of 
6 May 1986 the West Midlands Enterprise Board has claimed that the 
jcbs it created in 1984/5 cost an average of £2071 each. With limited 
resources, and operating under local control, the boards have 





Years Expenditure Jobs Cost per 
covered (£m) created job (£)
WDA 1976-81 164.01 14 300 11 469
IDB 1982-85 238.32 12 006 17 579
HIDB 1974-83 175.83 17 148 10 251
LEDU 1981-85 42.84 11 830 3 168
= expenditure on industrial investment, factories and 
industrial estates.
= total expenditure on all functions.
= expenditure on grants, shares and loans.
= expenditure on administration, loans and grants.
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Geographical aspects of performance
One aspect of the agencies' performance which has not been covered 
extensively in previous studies, and which nevertheless merits 
analysis, is the geographical distribution of their resources. The 
statutory remits of the agencies tend to address the regions for which 
they have responsibility as single entities, and refer to subregions 
only in general terms. For example, the Welsh Development Agency Act 
1975 cites the WDA's first statutory purposes as being 'to further the 
economic development of Wales or any part of Wales'.^® However, 
unemployment rates, and other measures of economic deprivation are not 
uniform across the regions, and pressures consequently exist for 
agencies to allocate resources to certain specified areas within the 
regions across which their responsibilities extend. It is therefore, 
of some importance to note how the resources of the agencies, 
particularly as reflected in their investment and factory-building 
programmes, are distributed within their respective regions.
Certain of the UK agencies have made explicit their prioritisation of 
specified areas. For example, one of the HIDB's 'key board policy 
objectives' is that 'the Board give special attention to and inject a 
higher level of assistance per head of population into the more remote 
and socially fragile areas in the islands and peripheral mainland 
areas'.m a  second objective is that 'special attention' should be 
given to areas which, because of major industrial closures, have 
become major unemployment blackspots.^^ The DBRW (MWD) also have 
publicly-announced criteria by which resources are allocated, though 
these are in direct contrast to the objectives of the HIDB in that
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they comprise a 1 growth pole' strategy which has been propounded by 
the DBRW (MWD) since its inception in 1977.^^ (the HIDB1 s published 
objectives 'reject the adoption of any rigid strategy based on
1 *1 A
concentrating investments in growth areas and key settlements.) 
This involves the concentration of resources on a limited number of 
growth areas, 'special' towns, and 'key* towns and villages. The SDA 
does not publicly espouse geographical priorities for its investment, 
but its support for area projects has, it would appear, introduced an 
element of discrimination by location into its activities, as limited 
resources are increasingly channelled to specific areas. Similarly, 
the WDA does not publicly give priority to locations within its 
region, except when specifically directed by central government as was 
the case with those areas affected by the run-down and closure of 
steel plants in the late 1970's and early 1980's. However, its 5 year 
Corporate Plan, published in July 1984, identified three types of area 
to be assisted within Wales: prime sites, such as those bordering main 
roads like the M4 and A55, outer urban areas like the industrial 
valleys of South Wales, and rural areas.^ ^  The Plan suggests that 
differing methods of assistance should be applied to these distinct 
areas, or, as the then WDA marketing director Alan Sutton described 
it: 'this means the agency has a different policy for different parts 
of Wales. We have a social policy and a market policy, and we have to 
find a route between them' ® Such ideas complement remarks made by 
WDA Chairman John Williams in 1983 in outlining the Agency's policies 
to the Financial Times that 'what we want are sunrise industries, and 
we would like to house them in a triangle formed by Cardiff, 
Abergavenny and Chepstow. They would be near to the M4 and M5 
motorways, and close to London'
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Having noted the differing geographical perspectives of the agencies, 
it is necessary to consider next the evidence concerning the actual 
distribution of their resources. Unfortunately, as with many of the 
agencies' activities, there are few published statistics covering this 
aspect of their performance. Moreover, compiling statistics from raw 
data can be complicated by the agencies' use of differing, often 
undefined geographical units in breakdowns of statistics concerning 
investments and factory construction (these being the two functions of 
the agencies which are most amenable to measurement on a subregional 
basis). An exception to this rule would appear to be the HIDB, which, 
presumably, as a consequence of its long-stated commitment to 
prioritise assistance to certain of the most deprived parts of the 
Highlands and Islands, has always published a geographical breakdown 
of its expenditure. In the Board's first Annual Report, the then 
chairman, Robert Grieve, stated that the success of the Board would 
ultimately be judged on its ability to stem the depopulation of the 
seven crofting counties, and this subsequently gives a geographical 
aspect to the Board's work, which did not apply, to the same extent, 
to other agencies. Breathnach et al. in their 1984 report on the 
HIDB's community co-operatives made reference to the Board's 
geographical distribution of expenditure, finding that the Board's 
'sub-regional development priorities over the last decade'..'show a 
degree of spatial variation, with the figure for the most favoured 
region, West Ross, over seven times that of the least favoured region, 
Naim. In general,' they state 'inaccessible peripheral regions are 
most favoured, and central regions (Moray Firth, Great Glen) least 
f a v o u r e d . ®  Bre^tH.nprh et al. also studied the geographical
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distribution of jobs created and retained through Board assistance and
11Qconcluded that it followed closely the pattern outlined above.1 1
Similarly, the DBRW (MWD), with its explicit growth pole strategy 
provides annual geographical breakdowns of its factory-building 
programme, and its grant schemes. Not surprisingly, the town of 
Newtown, which represents the focus or growth centre of the strategy, 
absorbs a large proportion of the Board's resources. Far example, 
33.6% of the Board's factories as held on 31 March 1983 were located 
in Newtown, constituting 34.2% of floor space owned by the Board, 120 
though the population of Newtown accounts for only 4.5% of the total 
population of the DBRW (MWD) area. The concentration of resources 
upon Newtown and its environs is also reflected in the distribution of 
factory units and industrial floorspace across the five local 
authority areas which fall within the DBRW remit. Montgomery, the 
authority which includes Newtown contained, at 31 March 1983, 41.4% of 
Board factory units, which constituted 49% of its total floorspace, 
although it accounted for only 24.1% of the population of the DBRW 
(MWD) a r e a . ^22 Conversely, Ceredigion, with a population which makes 
up 28.7% of the DBRW (MWD) t o t a l , 123 sharing with Meirionydd the 
region's highest unemployment levels, had within its boundaries, at 
31 flferch 1983, only 18.8% of the Board's factory units, and only 10.1% 
of floorspace. 12^ in describing these figures it is not intended to 
make criticism of the policy of the Board or the other agencies here 
described. Taking the above case for example, it could be argued that 
a completely equitable distribution of factory construction 
proportionate to population is neither achievable nor desirable. In 
deciding where to build advance factory units, other factors must be
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taken into consideration, which could include, for instance, the 
amount of existing industrial property in the area, the extent of 
existing manufacturing activity, the level of local unemployment, and 
the amount of land available for industrial building. Furthermore, 
the Board has publicly stated that its factory-building programme 
follows closely its previously announced Board Strategy, which 
represents a list of geographical priorities for the area, and 
consequently implies an uneven distribution of resources. In setting 
out the figures, it is merely intended to point out that such uneven 
distribution does occur, and that it is a corollary of the agencies' 
activities which has previously passed unremarked. Furthermore, it is 
important to recognise that this uneven distribution of resources is 
characteristic of all agencies, not only those whose activities are 
carried out according to a publicly enunciated geographical strategy.
As noted above, the WDA has only recently, with the publication of a 
Five Year Corporate Plan, made public reference to the role played by 
geographical criteria in determining the allocation of its annual 
resources.^ 6  However, figures taken from the 1981/2 and 1982/3 
Annual Reports of the agency, which analyse the amounts of investment 
finance approved by the Agency by counties, show certain areas, such 
as West Glamorgan, Clwyd and Dyfed, receiving consistently low levels 
of assistance. Disparities can be particularly pronounced. For 
instance, in 1981/2, investment per head in West Glamorgan was £0.64p, 
compared to £8.75p in Pcwys. Unfortunately, figures issued by the 
Agency relating to its factory portfolio are not classified on a 
county basis. Instead they are subdivided into the 8 areas served by 
the WDA1 s regional offices. On this basis the areas centred an the
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Swansea and Carmarthen offices, which contain respectively 1,742,000 
sq. ft. and 1,329,000 sq. ft. of WDA-owned industrial floorspace can 
be contrasted with those areas associated with the offices at Hirwaun 
and Treforest, which possess respectively 4,340,000 st. ft. and 
4,265,000 sq. ft. of floorspace.Disparities of this size in the 
scale of factory construction can only be partly explained by the 
comment in the Agency’s 1977 ’Statement of Programmes and Policies’ 
that 'the WDA will tailor the scale, type and location of advance 
premises as closely as possible to the circumstances of the various 
parts of Wales'.^8 As Eurig, in his study of the WDA, has noted of 
WDA advance factories 'the nature of their geographical distribution 
is particularly striking in their relation and proximity to the major 
communications routes, the M4, A465 and A 5 5 ' J ^  He takes up this 
point from Cooke who has argued that 'the location policy of the WDA 
is governed by the needs of capital for good inter-regional linkages 
to supplies and markets. Further, given that the major locations of 
unemployment are not closely related to these routes, except for the 
ex-steel communities, then most WDA-inspired locations pay relatively 
less attention to the needs of local cannunities than is the case with 
forms of complementary investment'
Similar trends can be extrapolated from the relatively small amount of 
published information relating to the geographical distribution of SDA 
activity. For example, of the 98 investments, comprising 101 
industrial sites, details of which were provided by the SDA for this 
research, 50 of the sites (49.5% of the total) were located in 
Strathclyde, whilst at the other extreme, only one site was located in 
Grampian.^ Likewise, figures made available relating to the SDA's
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factory portfolio show that whilst the SDA owns 132,408 sq.m of 
industrial floorspace in Strathclyde, consisting of 261 factory units, 
it owns only 15,862 sq.m, comprising 59 factory units in Grampian. ^ 
In an article published in the Scotsman newspaper in January 1985, 
Alf Young drew up a table of SDA investments (defined to include 
mortgages, site loans, shares in and loans to large and small 
businesses, and Leg-Up loans) by parliamentary constituency at the end 
of 1984, and cross-tabulated it by unemployment rate and the political 
party holding the s e a t .  ^ 3  He found that ‘only ten of the top twenty 
are Labour-held, in spite of Labour* s electoral dominance in Scotland 
as a whole, and its virtual monopoly of unemployment black-spot s..1. 
He concluded that it was ‘clear that where the SDA's money goes bears 
no relation to the size of an area's economic problems...Cash is just 
as likely to be placed in areas enjoying relative prosperity as in the 
crumbling industrial heartlands where unemployment is at its 
highest*
In Northern Ireland, analysis of the geographical spread of agency 
resources is particularly significant, because of the need for the 
industrial development agencies to appear 'even-handed* in their 
treatment of the Protestant and Catholic ccranunities. A criticism of 
such agencies in the past has been that by building on existing 
disparities in manufacturing industry their activities have tended to 
favour the Protestant majority. It could be argued that these special 
circumstances are reflected in LEDU's decentralised form of 
administration, by which investment proposals are channelled through 
four regional boards. The IDB, by contrast, appears to favour a 
sector-based approach, the geographical implications of which it has
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not yet publicly explored. Examination of the IDB's investments in 
companies trading at 31 st March 1985 shows that 50% of the IDB- 
invested companies based in Northern Ireland are located in the city 
of Belfast and the county of Down. ^ 5  It could be argued that this 
merely reflects the concentrations of population in these areas, and 
their industrialised nature. However in the 1983/84 IDB Annual Report 
a geographical breakdown of jobs promoted, renewed and maintained by 
the Board during that year was published , which revealed, when 
cross-tabulated with population figures, considerable differences in 
job-creation rates. For example, in County Tyrone, 0.817 jobs had 
been 1 promoted, renewed or maintained* per 100 members of the 
population, whereas in County Armagh the comparable figure was more 
than three times this level, at 2.536^^. Unfortunately, in the 
following year's Annual Report (1984/5) no geographical breakdown of 
the jcb-creation figures appeared. One of LEDU's three stated aims is 
to 'acknowledge in the promotion of small businesses the variations in 
the rate, level and duration of unemployment as it is manifest 
throughout Northern Ireland^*. As noted above, the agency operates 
through four area panels, and it publishes annually a breakdown of 
projects assisted and jobs promoted in each of these areas. Analysis 
of these figures for the four-year period from 1981, when LEDU was 
given a countrywide remit, to 1985, shows that over half (50.2%) of 
the jobs promoted by LEDU during this time were in the Eastern area, 
with 21.1% in the Southern Area, 16.2% in the Northern area, and 12.5% 
in the Western* ^ . However, this can be explained by the fact that 
over 50% of the Northern Irish population is resident in the Eastern 
area, which includes Belfast, Bangor, Ballymena and Lisburn.
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As has therefore been shown above, there is evidence to suggest 
subregional disparities in the distribution of resources by each of 
the UK development agencies. In certain cases, this can be seen to be 
the result of publicly-declared policies as for example with the HIDB 
which prioritizes the historically-deprived region comprising the 
1 crofting counties', and the DBRW (MWD), which pursues its growth pole 
strategy. However, elsewhere, the uneven distribution appears to be 
the result of a lack of concern for or interest in spatial planning, 
which allows resources to be pulled to economically favoured regions, 
and to those areas where local authorities have struck up close 
informal relations with the agency concerned.
External judgements on agency performance
Having considered above various statistical measures of the agencies' 
performance, in this, the final section concerning the UK agencies, 
judgements expressed by individuals and organisations external to the 
agencies will be discussed. These 'external commentators' can be 
divided into three broad categories: 'official', 'professional' and 
'academic'. 'Official' commentators, such as parliamentary committees 
and government bodies, are of particular importance in terms of the 
political, and consequently practical, impact of their reports on the 
agencies. 1 Professional1 judgements have been made by those involved 
in the day-to-day activities of the agencies, the representatives of 
employers, trade unions and local authorities. Somewhat less 
influential but more profuse are the conclusions of 'academic' 
commentators, certain of which have been referred to in earlier 
chapters. These can in turn be subdivided into three distinct groups:
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critics of the Left, who have tended to assimilate the agencies into 
Marxist theories of capitalist development: 'reformists', who accept 
the agencies' role as instruments of state economic intervention but 
criticise their policies and modes of operation, and critics of the 
Right, who view the agencies as constituting an undesirable form of 
interference in the workings of the free-market economy. Whilst it 
would be unwise to portray any of these groups as putting forward 
purely objective assessments of agency performance (for example, their 
arguments may be designed to substantiate previously declared 
positions in relation to the agencies) they each contribute to a 
climate of opinion which may have seme influence on future attitudes 
adopted by government toward the agencies. A useful illustration is 
the pressure toward rationalising the activities of those bodies 
involved in the promotion of inward investment in the regions around 
regional development agencies, which would act as 'one-stop shops' for 
potential investors. The government's moves towards this policy were 
sometimes hesitant, but the eventual emergence of organisations such 
as the SDA's Locate in Scotland (LIS) and the WDA's WINvest, were, it 
could be argued, prompted by arguments made by 'official', 
'professional' and 'academic' commentators alike. However, it is 
generally difficult to view these different assessments as forming a 
coherent whole as, bringing to bear varying perceptions of the 
agency's role on the analysis of their activities, they tend to judge 
them by different standards of performance.
To take the first example, 'official' caimentators, parliamentary 
committees and government 'watchdog* bodies, have tended to concern 
themselves primarily with the cost-effectiveness and operational
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efficiency of the agencies. The House of Cannons Public Accounts 
Committee, which regularly scrutinises the agencies' report and 
accounts has made recommendations which have led to the introduction 
of financial measures for the agencies' factory-building and 
investment functions^ ^ . They have also been critical of the 
agencies' handling of a number of separate investment projects, 
including Scofisco (HIDB), Stanefield (SDA), P. Leiner (WDA) and De 
Lorean (NIDA/IDB)^. These criticisms are contained in reports which 
were ccranissioned following the loss of public funds invested in these 
canpanies. In February 1985 the National Audit Office published a 
report on the investment activities of the SDA, WDA and HIDB which was 
presented as 'a follow up to the examination by the Committee of 
Public Accounts (PAC) in earlier y e a r s I t  concluded 'that, 
overall, the appraisal and monitoring procedures operated by the 
bodies had improved generally in accordance with assurances given to 
the PAC. They had new reached a reasonably satisfactory standard 
having regard to the nature and size of individual investments, the 
value of the investment portfolios, and staffing constraints...'^^.
For its first-ever report, the House of Cannons Select Canmittee on
Welsh Affairs chose to study the role of the Welsh Office and
'associated bodies' in developing employment opportunities in Wales, a
remit which led it to consider the WDA^^. The report, published in
1980, was noted for its warning that continuing high levels of
145unemployment in Wales could lead to severe social unrest , but it 
also made a number of recanmendations concerning the WDA, including 
that the Agency should take over the overseas promotional work of the 
Development Corporation for Wales, that the target rates of return on
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investments be lowered, and that more resources be made available for 
advance factory construction*^. Published in the same year, a report 
by the House of Cannons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs on the 
promotion of inward investment in Scotland provoked political 
controversy by recommending the closure of the SDA's promotional 
offices abroad^ It argued that the offices constituted an
unnecessary duplication of facilities already provided by the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth office. The recommendation was not supported 
by the government (See Chapter 3).
In general, the standard and frequency of parliamentary reports 
concerning regional development agencies has reflected poorly on the 
system of parliamentary accountability upon which they are based, for, 
with the exception of the Committee of Public Accounts, scrutiny by 
Westminster has been irregular, and those reports which have dealt 
with the agencies1 activities, have tended to be preoccupied with a 
narrow concept of financial economy, which is primarily concerned with 
the safeguarding of public money.
Amongst those most intimately concerned with the operations of the 
agencies within their respective regions, the local employers, trade 
unions and local authorities, initial reservations about their 
establishment appear to have been discarded, as pragmatic working 
relationships have developed. This was the conclusion drawn from a 
series of interviews conducted with representatives of the above 
bodies in the course of this research, and it appears to be supported 
by the limited amount of published material available concerning the 
opinion of these 'professional* observers on the agencies.
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The regional trade union organisations, the Scottish TOC (STOC), Wales 
TOC and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions, (NI)ICTO, have consistently argued over the past ten years for 
increased resources to be made available to the agencies by the 
government, but they have also supported many of the agencies' 
activities. In 1980, the then Secretary of the Scottish TOC, James 
Milne, in oral evidence to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs 
remarked that 'the SDA in my view has been a very successful 
operation. I think it could do more. It needs to be given the 
resources and to do more^®. In the following year, the STUC 
published a review of the SDA's first five years of activity*^. The 
tentative nature of the criticisms contained therein was suggested by 
the STUC's explanation that the review was 'an introduction to a 
discussion on the achievement of the Scottish Development Agency' 
which 'does not attempt to draw any final conclusions'^^. Its main 
point of difference with the running of the Agency was that it had 
'never had the industrial investment function which was envisaged by 
the STOC as its principal raison d'etre'^. This echoed criticism 
made by the WTOC of the WDA's industrial investment role in evidence 
submitted to the Select Committee on Welsh Affairs in 1980*^. The 
main strand of trade union criticism of the agencies to this day, 
however, has concerned the scale rather than the nature of their 
activities. For example the (NI) ICTO, in a paper published prior to 
the 1983 General Election, called for the doubling of both the IDB's 
financial resources and its job targets' . The paper contended that 
'if the Board does no more than make minor adjustments to the previous 
work of NIDA and the Department of Commerce, we can expect returns of
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a similar order - minor improvements in the job creation effort!
Employers' organisations were also predominantly hostile towards the 
agencies when they were first created, regarding them as facilitating 
1back-door nationalisation1 through the prosecution of 1politically- 
motivated' investment policy^ ^ . However, they gradually became 
reconciled to the agencies, as the investment role proved to be 
comparatively insignificant in comparison with functions such as land 
reclamation and the promotion of inward investment. This process was 
quickened by the Conservative government's appointment to the Agency 
boards of men with strong comnercial backgrounds, and the imposition 
of strict financial criteria on the investment and factory-building 
activities.
Like trade unions and employers' organisations, local authorities were 
wary of the agencies when first established. It m s  thought that they 
would infringe upon the responsibilities of traditional local 
government organisations, and that they would disrupt planning 
systems. Interviews carried out during the course of the research, 
with representatives of local authorities indicate that tensions still 
exist. Resentment was expressed, for example, about the relative ease 
with which the agencies can obtain funds from central government, 
their interest in self-publicity, and their alleged favouritism toward 
certain areas. It must be stressed that these judgements are 
subjective, and have not been borne out by published material. Local 
authorities, whilst critical of the agencies in private, in practice 
are determined to attract Agency finance to their localities. 
However, in December 1979, a report prepared for Highland Regional
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Council by the Institute for the Study of Sparsely Populated Areas,
j C/T
presented a highly critical picture of the HIDB1 . It argued that
the financial assistance that the Board gave to industry was 'too
narrowly defined1, that the criteria by which it gave assistance was
1 too strictly carmercial) , and that not enough finance was being
given to service industries. In addition, the Board's administration,
it said, was 'too centralised and its lack of contact with firms
at the local level meant that the Highland Regional Council had to
fill in the gap. In all, it concluded that the Board 'which has a
very wide remit and a relatively small budget'^59 was »t00
160bureaucratic and ccmmercially-minded' . Though the report went far
beyond the relationship between the local authority and the Board, it 
identified two areas of common concern for local authorities in 
regions served by development agencies, the lack of an overall 
planning framework within which to co-ordinate the economic 
development work of local authorities, and the various government- 
sponsored agencies, and the avoidance of duplicated and overlapping 
responsibilities in the attracting of inward investment.
The judgements of academic commentators an the performance of the 
agencies have in part been alluded to in the first chapter when 
theoretical perspectives of their role were discussed. Whilst the 
agencies have not so far attracted as much academic scrutiny as have 
other aspects of regional policy, a body of criticism concerning them 
has been built up which, for the sake of simplicity, can be divided 
into three broad categories: marxist/statist, reformist/pluralist and 
free market.
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The first category includes such writers as Philip Cooke, Mike Geddes 
and C G Morgan, whose view is that regional development agencies are 
instruments of the state used to restructure the economy in the 
interests of capital, mediating the effects of government economic 
policy, whilst at the same time promoting restructuring through 
diversification and increased productivity. Thus Morgan comments on 
the WDA: 1 Because it is a capitalist development agency in a liberal 
democracy, and was part of a political debate over devolution, the 
work of the Agency has had to try to reflect the interests of the 
pressures that brought about its existence in its contemporary form: 
with efficiency predominating, since the WDA can, by its very being 
(including building and investing as an integral part of its being) 
legitimise the very pit closures or steel shutdowns, or whatever, that 
its existence depends on1 ^ ^  .
Given this view of the agencies* role, judgements concerning their 
performance tend to be generalised. Geddes writes that it *is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the HIDB's efforts to 
restructure capital in the region. Clearly, traditional regional 
policy indicators such as jobs created, cost per job, population and 
employment trends are not directly relevant while adequate data on 
regional output, profits etc. is not a v a i l a b l e * B e l i e v i n g  the 
agencies* goal to be the reassertion of the supremacy of capital 
within the regions, he sees that their success is to be measured in 
terms of the absence of resistance to this process. 'The fact that 
the class nature of social conflict has been mainly latent and hidden 
rather than open and active can in part be related to the role of the 
HTDB in managing and regulating the process of change in order to
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confine it within safe limits and maintain bourgeois social and 
ideological hegemony'
{
A common theme amongst both these commentators and the 
reformists/pluralists covered below is the tendency for the agencies 
to make much of their own propaganda. Writing on the first six years 
of the HTDB's operations, Ian Carter made the remark that 'we should 
not view the Board as it would like to be viewed, as a thrusting, 
dynamic combination of action agency on the Tennessee Valley Authority 
model, but rather as a fairly passive milch-cow'^^. He argues that 
the Board claims credit for occurrences that are beyond its control, 
but concedes that 'it is undoubtedly the case that the HIDB has played
1 fiR
an effective role for capital#.. . Like other academic writers 
sharing his perspective Carter effectively criticises the agencies for 
their success in carrying out what he perceives to be their aim.
By contrast, those commentators who viewed the establishment of the 
agencies as a legitimate attempt on the part of an interventionist 
government to faster regional economic regeneration have generally 
expressed disappointment about the extent of their achievements. 
Their criticisms have focused on two aspects of the agencies' 
performance, the carrying-out of their industrial investment function 
and the scale of funding which they have received from government. 
Mawson and Miller, for instance, argue that 'the greatest criticisms 
of the Development Agencies have arisen over their apparent lack of 
success in the industrial investment field, in spite of the relatively
1 fifi
small amount of their budget devoted to this area of activity . 
They describe how both the SDA and WDA 'have suffered from the
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collapse of a number of companies in which they have invested and the 
rate of return on their investments has been negative and thus well 
below the targets now set for them. This means that the Agencies have 
been failing to fulfil two of the aims, safeguarding jobs and yielding 
profitable investments'^^. Their conclusion is that the 'Agencies 
clearly do not have sufficient resources to make any real impression 
on the scale of problems they are currently facing'^®. Other 
writers, who have concentrated their studies on individual agencies, 
have made similar points. Eurig concludes his study of the WDA by 
stating that 'whatever its potential, the WDA has made little impact 
on the underlying problems of South Wales. Its financing programmes 
have been excessively conservative, constrained by strict, state- 
imposed criteria ... it has failed to pursue a strategy of integrated 
economic development and has not been able to provide good quality 
jobs in the place where they are needed' Hood and Young whose
study of Scottish industrial policy is generally sympathetic to the 
SDA nevertheless recognise that the size of its contribution to 
economic recovery is small: '... while agency activities and
initiatives are to be applauded, there are many of these which would 
be made more effective if the industries concerned were the subject of 
UK strategic thinking. Others are so brittle that one major national 
decision could destroy years of work at SDA l e v e l T h e  heart of 
the criticisms that these above writers make, though often annotated, 
is that the agencies have not attempted to fulfil the broader role 
that the government originally conceived for them. This is 
particularly the case in relation to the SDA, WDA and NIDA/IDB whose 
genesis was closely connected, as has been shown, to the industrial 
strategy of the 1974 Labour government, which in turn had many
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academic proponents (the most notable of which was Stuart Holland). 
Their critiques are consequently based not on the activities of the 
agencies, but on the actions that they have failed to take. The 
equivocal nature of the conclusions drawn frcm critical analysis of 
this type is best expressed by Keating and Midwinter, whose study of 
the government of Scotland includes summaries of the achievements of a 
number of Scottish public bodies, including the SDA and the HIDB^ ^  . 
Posing the question 'Has the SDA been a success?1 they reply 'Perhaps 
not, measured against the promise of Labour's 1974 election manifesto 
to make it "the main instrument for the regeneration of the Scottish 
economy... If however, one adopts a more realistic view of what such 
an agency can achieve, the record is more positive. It has 
established an entrepreneurial role in Scotland's economic and 
physical development, intervening selectively and seeking out 
opportunities, such as those in high-technology industry and area 
redevelopment'^^. As for the HIDB, they conclude, in the same manner 
that '... the Board has not been an unqualified success. However, it 
is almost certain that without the .Board's intervention, matters would 
have been considerably worse.' ^ ^
Criticism of the agencies from a free-market perspective, that is one 
which challenges their role as state-sponsored promoters of economic 
development, on the grounds that their activities distort competition 
on the open market between private companies, has not, despite the 
altered ideological climate of the 1980's, been widespread. In the 
early years of the SDA and WDA, there was, however, heavy criticism of 
their investment function by business ccnmentators. For example, in 
1979, Bill Jamieson, the City Editor of the Western Mail, in the wake
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of the collapse of P. Leiner, a canpany in which the WDA had invested 
£2m, was led to write that the Agency 'would do well to consider in 
the light of its investment performance thus far, whether it should be 
in the business of making equity investments at all'^^. Criticisms 
of this type were met by the introduction by the Conservative 
government of measures which relegated the investment function to a 
secondary role, to be carried out in accordance with commercial 
practice. Consequently, as the government found itself able to 
accommodate the agencies into its radical rightwing economic 
perspective, so did free or social market economists. Glvn Davies, 
professor of banking at the University of Wales Institute of Science 
and Technology has gone so far as to refer to the SDA and Scottish 
Office as being 'responsible for the creation of an economic miracle' 
in Scotland^^.
There remain, yet, those to whom the whole concept of interventionist
agencies is anathema. The rightwing 'think-tank' group the Adam Smith
Institute, in its report on the public sector in Britain ('The Omega
File') amply represents this view. This 'comprehensive review of
government functions' describes the SDA as 'the embodiment of
corporatist thinking that has typified Scottish policy for the last 
1 7fiforty years' . Steeped as it is in the 'philosophy... of 1950's 
regional economics' the agency's operational methods are uncommercial, 
and its industrial investment function 'a sort of merchant banking 
service... is a failure, with a poor return on investments. The 
Scottish people would have been better off if the money had been put 
into premium bonds' ^ ^ . The report alleges that most of the SDA's 
interventions are 'superfluous or harmful'. Scotland is not to 'be
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nursed back to health by the transfusion of subsidies' but by 'a
reduction of taxes, and of regulation on companies and on land
development'^®. It concludes 'that there could be consultation with
the CBI, the Scottish Council and other voluntary bodies to see if
they wish to take over particular SDA functions. For good measure,
the report also recommends the winding up of the HIDB, its functions
to be assumed by the Highland Regional Council 'The Highlands would
lose nothing that exists now. But there would be a gain to the
community as a whole in the abolition of a quango containing several
full-time members on large salaries, the replacement of a duplicated
system of administration, and the transfer of the decision-making
1 fifl
process down to a more local and personal level' .
As has been demonstrated above, by the differing judgements of 
academics, government officials, trade unionists, employers and 
politicians, no consensus has emerged about the performance of UK 
development agencies since the establishment of the HIDB in 1965. In 
this respect, the comment of Gwyndaf Williams which referred 
specifically to the study of agencies such as the HIDB and MWD (DBRW) 
could usefully be extended to apply to all the agencies covered by 
this research. Williams' observation was that any 'study of the 
impact of rural development agencies depends essentially on the
1 ftl
evaluation framework adopted - institutional, economic or social' .
450
CHAPTER SEVEN - REFERENCES
1. M Keating and A Midwinter 1 The Government of Scotland', 
Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1983, p41.
2. Welsh Development Agency Act 1975, ch 70, Clause 2 (b)
3. National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 'Investment Activities of the Scottish Development 
Agency, Welsh Development Agency and the Highlands and Islands 





8. See below, reference 23.
9. Minns and Thomley, op. cit., p106.
10. Ibid.
11. NIDA Annual Report 1980/81 .
12. Industries Development (NI) Order, quoted in NIDA Annual 
Report 1977/78.
13. NIDA Annual Report 1980/81 .
14. IDB Annual Report 1984/85, p63.
15. Minns and Thomley, op. cit., p15.
17. P Cooke, 'Discretionary intervention and the Welsh Development 
Agency', op. cit., p276.
18. 'Public enterprise with the valleys at heart' Article in the 
Financial Times, 25/1/79.
19. P Cooke, 'Discretionary intervention' p276.
20. 'The Scottish Development Agency - the first half-decade', 
Scottish TUC, 1981.
21. See, for example, SDA Industrial Investment Guidelines, para 14, 
printed as an appendix to the 18th report from the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 1980/81.
22. IDB Annual Report 1984/5 pp60-63.
23. HIDB evidence to Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, 1983/4 
(unpublished draft copy), p5.
24. WDA Annual Report 1984/5, pp53-59.
25. SDA Annual Report, 1984/5, ppA11-A12.
26. IDB Annual Report, 1984/5, pp60-63.
27. National Audit Office, op, cit., pp1-2.
28. Committee of Public Accounts, Role and Responsibilities of 
Nominee Directors, House of Commons Paper 33, 1984/5.
29. National Audit Office, p12.
30. Ibid, p16.
31. Ibid, p20.
32. C G Morqan 'The role of the Welsh Development Agency in Wales' 




35. IDB Annual Report, 1984/5, pp60-63.
36. WDA Annual Report 1983/4 p15.
37. Minns and Thomley, p63.
38. Figures taken from HIDB Annual Report 1983, p61.
451
39. 'The Highlands and Islands: Economic and Social Background' HIDBr 
unpublished paper, 1984, p3.
40. C G Morgan, p101.
41. Ibid, p98.
42. Information provided by the SDA for the purposes of research.
43. WDA Annual Report, 1984/5 p58.
44. WDA Annual Report, 1976/7 p22.
45. WDA Annual Report, 1984/5 p16.
46. WDA Annual Report, 1984/5 p4.
47. Figures extrapolated from information supplied by the SDA and WDA 
for the purposes of research.
48. From information supplied by the WDA.
49. Ibid.
50. From information supplied by the SDA.
51. Ibid.
52. From information supplied by the WDA.
53. Ibid.
54. From information supplied by the SDA.
55. WDA Annual Report, 1976/7 p22.
56. WDA Annual Report, 1984/5 p4.
57. SDA Annual Report, 1977/8.
58. WDA Annual Report, 1984/5 p19.
59. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 18th and 33rd 
Reports, Session 1979/80.
60. See SDA and WDA Annual Reports 1983/4 and 1984/5.
61. IDB Annual Report 1982/3 p6.
62. Ibid, p23.
63. IDB Annual Reports 1982/3 - 1984/5.
64. IDB Annual Report 1984/5, p49.
65. IDB Annual Report 1984/5, p58.
66. Ibid, p49.
67. Extrapolated from information provided bv the HIDB.
68. HIDB Annual Report 1983, p5.
69. From information provided by the HIDB.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. HIDB Annual Report: 1983 p57.
73. Mid Wales Development Annual Report 1982/3 p26.
74. Ibid. p11.
75. Ibid, p26.
76. Information provided bv the DBRW (MWD).
77. Information provided bv the HIDB.
78. SDA Annual Report 1984/5 p57.
79. Information supplied bv the WDA.
80. SDA Annual Report 1984/5 p 65.
81. SDA Annual Report 1984/5, pA13.
82. WDA Annual Report 1984/5, p63.
83. 'A Statement of policies and programmes' WDA, 1977, p12.
84. Ibid.
85. 'WDA: The First Five Years' WDA, 1981, p3.
86. WDA Annual Report 1984/5 pp7-8.
87. Ibid. p 8 .
88. Eurig, op. cit., p20.
89. Ibid, p35.
90. SDA Annual Report 1982/3.
452
91. SDA Annual Report 1984/5, p65.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. d 11.
94. HIDB Annual Report 1983 p61.
95. Unpublished draft copy of HIDB evidence to Select Committee on 
Scottish Affairs, 1984, p5.
96. Ibid.
97. IDB Annual Report 1982/3, p8.
98. IDB Annual Report 1983/4, p35.
99. IDB Annual Reports 1982/3 - 1984/5.
100. IDB Annual Report 1982/3, p8.
101. LEDU Annual Report 1983/4, p6.
102. LEDU Annual Report 1984/5, p5.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid, p6.
105. See for example, David Thomas, 'Should we still help the 
regions?' New Society, 1st December 1983, pp358-9.
106. Euria. op. cit., p34.
107. John Benincrton 'Local economic strategies: paradigms for a 
planned economy?' Local Economy, Issue 1, Spring 1986, p19.
108. A study carried out for BBC North-East bv Prof. Adrian Sinfield 
estimated that the cost to the crovemment of an unemployed person
in 1984/5 was. on averaae. E6300-E7000. Quoted in the Financial
Times. 27/3/85.
109. GLEB Annual Report 1984/5 p11.
110. WDA Act 1975, ch. 70. Clause 1 (2) (b).
111. HIDB evidence to Select Committee, o p .  cit., p2.
112. Ibid.
113. See above. 'DBRW (MWD) history'. Chapter 3.
114. HIDB Annual Report 1983, o37.
115. Financial Times, 19/7/84.
116. Ibid.
117. Financial Times. 8/9/83.
118. P Breathnaeh et al, op. cit.. p10.
119. Ibid. p11.






126. WDA. Corporate Plan of the Welsh Development Acrencv, 1984-90, 
WDA. July 1984.
127. Frcm information provided bv the WDA.
128. Statement of Policies and Programmes, op. cit., p10.
129. Euria. p17.
130. Cooke 'Discretionary intervention' o273.
131. Frcm information provided bv the SDA.
132. Ibid.
133. Cited in Radical Scotland, 'The SDA: livina under an illusion'. 
April/Mav 1986. o14.
134. Ibid.
135. IDB Annual Report 1984/5 pp60-63.
136. IDB Annual Report 1983/4, p35.
137. Ibid.
453
138. LEDU Annual Report 1982/3 p3.
139. Extrapolated from fiqures in LEDU Annual Reports 1982/3— 
1984/5
140. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 18th report, 
session 1979-80 (HC736), 33rd report, session 1979-80. (HC782), 
21st report, session 1Q81-7.
141. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 21st report, 
session 1981-2, 18th report, session 1979-80.
142. National Audit Office, p1.
143. Ibid.
144. House o f  Ccmmons Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, op. cit.
145. Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, 1st Report, session 1979-80 
op.cit., Vol 1, para 28.
146. Ibid, para 51.
147. Stephen Younq 'The Foreiqn-Owned Manufacturing Sector' in Hood 
and Younq, op* cit., pi05.
148. Oral evidence to Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, 
session 1979-30, op. cit.
149. 'SDA - the first half decade', STUC, 1981.
150. Ibid, p1.
151. Ibid, plO.
152. Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, 1st Report, session 1979-80, 
op. cit., vol 2.
153. (NI) ICTU, 'The Trade Union Alternative', 1983.
154. Ibid, para 2.8.1.
155. Interviews with Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish CBI 
representatives.
156. G A Mackay and E M 0 McNab 'Concurrent functions of public 
authorities in the Highland region', report for Highland Regional 
Council by the Institute for the Study of Sparsely Populated 






162. Geddes, op. cit., p7.
163. Ibid, p9.
164. Carter, op, cit., p73.
165. Geddes, p12.




170. Hood and Young, op. cit.
171. Keating and Midwinter, op. cit.
172. Ibid, p36.
173. Ibid, p41.
174. Article in Financial Weekly, undated, 1979.
175. Financial Times, 8/9/83.
176. Eamonn Butler, Madsen Pirie, Peter Young 'The Omega File'








Gwyndaf Williams 1 Promoting the role of the rural economy: the 
role of development aqencies in remoter rural areas' in Regional 
Studies, vol 18 no. 1, p76.
455
CHAPTER EIGHT
Agency performance (Benelux agencies)
Looked at as a group, the regional development agencies of the Benelux 
countries present greater difficulties in terms of evaluating their 
performance than their UK counterparts. This is because, as will be 
shown below, the functions which they carry out are not readily 
amenable to measurement, being for the most part indirect in effect. 
For example, of these agencies, only two Dutch organisations, the NOM 
and LIGF were, at the time this research was carried out, providing 
equity investment for industry, and this on a much smaller scale than 
that of UK agencies such as the SDA and WDA. Similarly, only the 
Belgian SDRB, and to a lesser extent, the ARBED New Industries 
Department, based in Luxembourg, are active in the provision of land 
and property for industrial use. Those functions which constitute the 
staple element of the agencies' activities such as research, the 
provision of information to small businesses and inward investors, and 
participation in the structures of regional economic planning, do not 
produce a directly-measurable return, either in financial or 
employment terms. Therefore, an evaluation of their performance must 
either be deferred or take a form even more subjective than that 
applied to the UK agencies.
Obj ectives
As with the UK agencies, it is appropriate to ccmmence analysis of the 
Benelux agencies' performance, with a reminder of the objectives to
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which they are statutorily committed, the goals against which their 
activities should ultimately be measured. It is possible to find here 
the same vagueness or breadth of objective discerned in relation to 
the UK agencies. For example, the stated aim of the largest Dutch 
agency, the NOM is simply 'to help improve the social and economic
-I
structure of the Northern Netherlands' . The general remit of the 
ARBED New Industries Department speaks more specifically, stating that 
its aim is 1 to seek to promote the creation of new employment 
opportunities, and to further diversification of the national economic 
structure . By contrast the Law of 15 July 1970 which made provision 
for the establishment of regional economic development agencies in 
Belgium did not set out general objectives, but specified aims in 
terms of tasks to be undertaken, namely the preparation of a study to 
promote economic development, the preparation of an inventory of 
regional social and economic needs, assistance in the implementation 
of the Five-year Plan, and the provision of financial support to 
approved industrial projects . (It should be noted in passing that 
only one of these four functions is susceptible to direct 
measurement).
Industrial investment
As indicated above, the only agencies in the Benelux countries 
involved in the provision of funds for industry at the time the 
research was carried out were the NOM and LIQF. However, until 1981, 
Belgian agencies were, as suggested by the statutory aims given above, 
able to carry out this function. With the exception of the SDRW,
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their activities in this field were carried out on a comparatively 
small scale, as can be seen frcm Table 1. The industrial investment 
function carried out by the Belgian agencies has now been transferred 
to regional investment companies, acting in each of the three regions 
of the country, and, in both Flanders and Brussels, continuing to 
liaise with the existing regional development agencies. This process 
of transfer was not without its difficulties. In February 1981, the 
SDRW transferred 24 investments to the SRIW, which constituted its 
investments or 'missions deleguees' held on behalf of the Regional 
Executive. However, 25 other investments, made frcm the SDRW's own 
funds, could not be handed over until 1982, because of a protracted 
dispute concerning their value^. Four of these investments were of 
over 50% of voting stock, and two were of 20% exactly. The nature of 
investments, in terms of the type of industrial activity carried out 
by the investment companies, can be seen in Table 2. This indicated 
that a high proportion of the investments (28%) were in service- 
related companies. The majority of these 'service investments' were 
non-commercial enterprises funded by the SDRW for social as well as 
economic reasons, such as a company studying the treatment of 
household waste, and one established for the purpose of attracting 
tourism to the Ardennes.
Evaluation of these investments by independent experts (experts 
exterieurs) resulted in a reduction of the book-value of the SDRW's 
portfolio from BF 392,996,717 to BF 211 ,536,852, a devaluation of 
approximately 46%^. Partly as a consequence of this, the SDRW 
recorded a loss of BF 188,219,489 (approximately £23 million) in 
1981^, following on from a loss of BF 181,616,919 in 1980^. The
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agency's cumulative losses at the end of 1981 were running at BF
o
602,617,875 (approximately £7.3m)°, and this was after it had 
successfully called on the government to settle debts which it had 
built up with the bank Credit Communal de Belgique in carrying out 
industrial projects directly authorised by the government, amounting 
to BF 512,565,422^.
The SDRW also disbursed loan capital through the CPTEI (Cellule de 
Promotion Technologique des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises - Unit for 
the Technological Development of Small and Medium-sized Business). 
During 1981, the final year for which figures were available for the 
purposes of this research the Unit lent to 13 companies, and claimed 
to have created 127 jobs1 .^ Six of the 13 investments were classified 
as being in the mechanical engineering sector, which may be explained 
by the fact that loans can only be issued for the development of a new 
product or technological innovation. The total disbursed in loans in 
1981 was BF 95.5m11.
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TABLE 1
Belgian regional development agencies - equity investment in 1978.






TOTAL FLANDERS 16 154.5
SDRB 1 50.0
SDRW 16 260.5
Source: Douglas Yuill, 'Regional Development Agencies in Europe1.
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TABLE 2
SDRW investments at 31 Dec 1980 by SIC.
Manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment 
Electrical, electronic and instrument engineering 1
Textiles, leather and clothing 1
Manufacture of paper products and printing 2




Processing of rubber and plastics 1
Banking, finance and business services
Manufacture of motor vehicles, parts and other transport equipment 
Timber and wooden furniture 1
Food, drink and tobacco 1
Coal extraction and manufacture of solid fuels
Other services, including recreational and cultural *7
Manufacture of non-metallie mineral products 1
Transport, communication, distribution and repairs 1
Other manufacturing industries 
Extraction of minerals 
Agriculture and fisheries
Construction 1
* Including five 'non-productive' companies
Source: SDRW Annual Report 1980
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As Table 1 shows, the SDRB has played only a nominal role in
investment. At the end of 1982, as in 1978, it had only one
investment, in Celebor, a company manufacturing medical supplies .
As with most matters relating to public institutions in the Brussels
area, there were political difficulties concerning the establishment
of the regional investment company for the area, the SRIB, and it did
not become operational until three years after the two other
investment companies , Therefore, when the SDRB made its investment
in Celebor in 1981, it was made, according to the SDRB Annual Report
for that year 'in close accord with the services of the SNI' (the
national investment company). The report added that 'this investment
has been made in consideration of the economic and above all social
interest which Celebor represents, in the absence of the SRI, to whom
1 4the investment will be transferred much later . According to the
Director of Administration for the SDRB, who was interviewed for the
purposes of this research in November 1984, there remains provision
for the roles of the SRIB and the SDRB to overlap in the field of 
1 Rinvestment , and this appears to be the case with the other Belgian 
regional development agencies. For instance, the SDRW retained 
investments in two companies which it managed on behalf of the 
Regional Executive, after the rest of its 'missions delexjuees' had 
been transferred to the SDRW^. Likewise, the Flemish GOM's whose 
investments were in the main transferred to the GIMV by means of a 
protocol signed in February 1981, retain interest in a small number of 
ccmpanies. For example, the GOM-Limburg had investment in 1982 in 
three enterprises^; a clothing co-operative, in which it had BF 19.5m 
of investment, and which made a profit of BF 1.308.567 in 1982; a 
canpany formed to develop an exhibition hall in Genk, in which it had
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invested BF 1.0m, and which lost BF BF 3.030.556 in 1982, and a co­
operative set up by the five Flemish GOM's, the Service for the 
Promotion of Industry, and the Belgian Company for International 
Investment, to provide financial, industrial and technical reports 
about potential investments. This canpany made a profit of BF 442.680 
in 1982 but was in the process of being wound up at the end of that 
year, as a result of the takeover of the GOM's main investment 
activities by the GIMV.
The investment portfolios of the two Dutch agencies which at the time 
of this research were providing equity capital for industry, have been 
referred to briefly in a preceding chapter (Chapter4 ). It is more 
difficult to gauge the financial performance of these investments than 
to gauge that of the UK agencies' investments because like their 
Belgian counterparts, the Dutch agencies provide few details 
concerning costs incurred and returns made on their investments. 
Keyser and Windle reported that in 1975 the NOM had lost Dfl 1.26m and 
the LIOF Dfl 0.034in*®. At 31 December 1979, the NOM's operating loss 
amounted to Dfl 58m, and^ by the end of 1982 it had reached Dfl 102m 
(approximately £24m)^. Figures given in the NOM annual report of 
1982 indicate that in'1981 the total loss on the NOM's investment 
portfolio was Dfl 33m on 33 investments (the majority participations 
losing Dfl 20m and the minority participations Dfl 13m)^ . in 1982 
the loss on 27 investments was Dfl 11.1m (the majority participations 
losing Dfl 11m, and the minority participations Dfl 0.1m)^. The 
figure for 1982 was considered to be particularly promising, because 
the loss was accounted for by the writing-off of Dfl 62.5m invested in 
two companies, Magnesia International and Noordelijke Zoutwinning.
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The NOM's experience with its industrial investments is probably best 
summed up by this extract frcm the 1980 report, which was printed in 
an English translation: 'In the seven years that the NOM has been able 
to offer risk-bearing capital, it once again became clear that it is 
not a guarantee to get positive results. Many of the firms obtaining 
risk-bearing capital from the NOM were until now not able to realise 
positive returns. Starting-up costs went on for a longer period than 
anticipated and together with incidental losses, the additional 
capital was partly eaten away. As a result, the NOM often had to 
finance the venture a second time'22.
The 27 investments held by the NOM at the end of 1982 amounted to Dfl 
120.240m in book-value2 .^ Compared with the investment portfolios of 
UK development agencies, the NOM possessed a far higher proportion of 
majority shareholdings; 16, or 59% , being made up of 50% or more of 
the invested companies' share capital. The other regional development 
agency in the Netherlands which offers investment capital, the LIOF, 
has, by contrast, majority holdings in only six of its 28 investments, 
six others being of 50% of voting stock exactly22. In the financial 
year ending 31 December 1 983, the LIOF lost Dfl 3.490.000 in 
investments written off, and the portfolio as a whole recorded a loss 
of Dfl 2.130.89626. In 1982 the loss had been Dfl 1 .121 .50527. It 
would appear that the comment made by de Wit and Walker in reviewing 
the investment activities of the NOM applies equally to the LIOF. 
They suggest that 'because of the risks of equity-financing the NOM 
may make losses as well as profits. Indeed, there is to some extent a 
bias towards loss-making since the NOM supports enterprises in sectors 
in difficulty and takes equity participation in firms which, although
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78economically viable, are experiencing difficulties' .
Provision of industrial property and land
In contrast to the position in the UK where all the agencies covered
(with the exception of the regional boards of the NEB) have, as part
of their services, provided industrial property for both local and
incoming investors, in the Benelux countries it is only the SDRB, and
to a lesser extent, the privately-run ARBED New Industries Department,
which carry out this role. At the end of 1982 the SDRB owned or
managed a property portfolio of 94 hectares (consisting of 57 hectares
which it had itself acquired, and 37 which it managed on behalf of the
29Belgian State under the terms of a convention signed in 1975) .
According to a review of its activities published by the SDRB in 1982,
on
it had by that time put to use only 35 of the 94 hectares . Figures 
published in the 1982 SDRB report show that 86,192 sq.m. (or 927,771 
sq.ft) of industrial floorspace had been constructed on these sites, 
and that they were occupied (or in the process of being occupied) by
O -l
29 companies, employing 2188 personnel .
These figures can be more fully understood in the context of the 
SDRB's overall land-use policies shaped with reference to its unique 
position amongst the regional development agencies covered in this 
study. Unlike those other regional development agencies, the SDRB 
does not serve an economically depressed or deprived region, but an 
important industrial, commercial and administrative centre. Land 
values within this area are at a premium. This is not only because of
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the lack of land suitable for industrial usage in a metropolitan area 
of this size, but because of the preference of many of the region's 
governing ccmmunes for residential as opposed to business development. 
(An aspect of the Belgian system of local taxation is that the local 
authority received tax revenue from residential but not industrial 
premises.) There is therefore considerable hostility from certain 
ccmmunes tcward the granting of planning permission for industrial 
purposes for sites within their jurisdiction. As a result, the SDRB 
has considered it important to build up a stock of industrial land 
under its ownership or management (patrimoine immobilier regional) to 
supply the needs of existing and incoming business. Furthermore, 
unlike agencies in the UK, it has refused to sell off any of this 
stock to the private sector, preferring to rent property out on a 
long-term lease.
Because of the shortage of land for industrial development in 
Brussels, and because of the fact that the SDRB charges its tenants 
only a peppercorn rent, there is great demand for its properties. For 
example, during 1982, 71 companies applied to the agency to be 
located on one of its industrial estates or in one of its industrial 
buildings^. During the same period only three companies were cleared 
by the Board of Directors to take up an occupancy in an SDRB property. 
In the light of this level of demand the SDRB is able to select those 
companies to which it wishes to lease. All tenants have to satisfy 
strict criteria concerning the number of staff to be employed, the 
types of jobs to be provided, and levels of environmental pollution, 
such as noise and waste.
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It can be seen, therefore, that a financial analysis concerning the 
SDRB's performance in the provision of industrial land would not be 
useful in the context of this research, because it does not operate 
the function on a commercial basis, utilising only a small proportion 
(37%) of its stock, and letting it out on long-term leases at nominal 
levels of rent. In addition, the agency does not publish separate 
figures relating to its industrial property activities. However, an 
indication of their financing can be derived from scrutiny of figures 
setting out the SDRB's initial budget for 1982. These show operating 
costs of BF 145.290.000 being financed by operating subsidies from the 
provincial and regional authorities, including a subsidy from the 
Region of BF 92.711.000 to cover activities relating to industrial 
property (operations patrimoniales), and by its own income, which is 
described as 'essentially the revenue derived from rent', and which is
“5 “5
calculated at BF 36.292.788J . In the profit and loss account 
published in the SDRB's 1982 annual report, rent, which is classified 
under 'other operating proceeds', amounts to BF 24.915.817 in the year 
ending 31 Dec 1982^. It is clear that the costs of acquiring, 
building upon, and maintaining its stock of industrial land and 
property far outweigh this level of revenue, and that the function is 
subsidised by both the regional and provincial authorities.
As noted above, 2188 personnel are employed by tenants of the SDRB in 
its factories and units which comprise 927,771 sq.ft. of floorspace. 
This equates to one employee per 424 sq.ft. or 2.36 workers per 1000 
sq.ft., a density of employment which is strikingly similar to the 
figures calculated for the SDA and WDA (see above, Chapter Seven). 
The SDRB gives no figures concerning the vacancy rate affecting its
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industrial property portfolio, but, given the comparatively small 
amount of property which it has constructed and made available to let, 
and the high level of demand for premises, it can be estimated that it 
would be most unlikely for there to be any vacancies other than those 
of a 'frictional' nature, caused by companies vacating as a result of 
business failure, or the need for renovation work to be undertaken on 
certain properties.
As was noted in a previous chapter (Chapter Four), at the time this
research was undertaken, none of the other Belgian or Dutch agencies
provided either industrial land or properties, this function being
undertaken in both countries generally by private companies or the
local authorities (De Wit and Walker record that in 1980 the NOM did
provide a factory for a company wishing to locate in the province of
Groningen but emphasise that this was strictly a 'one-off' 
35 \occurrence-*J.)
In Luxembourg, one of the original tasks of the ARBED New Industries 
Department was to make available to incoming investors the sites and 
properties which the steel-making company no longer required. 
However, such stock is not ideally suited to the requirements of the 
majority of businesses, and the significance of this provision has 
subsequently been undermined by the involvement of the Luxembourg 
government in the creation of a number of industrial estates in the 
area. No information is available on the disposal of property for 
industrial use by the New Industries Department, but it is noted by 
Schmit and Walker that both land and factories are available at low 
cost^. However, the limited stock of such property held by ARBED
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indicates that the role of the New Industries Department in this field 
is a short-term one, and it cannot, in reality, be usefully compared 
with that of public sector agencies active in the provision of 
industrial property in the UK and Belgium.
Other functions
Of the diverse other functions carried out by the agencies none are
readily amenable to the sort of statistical analysis designed to
produce seme quantitive measure of performance. For instance, the
Dutch agencies grant importance to promotional activities which aim to
attract investment from both outside the Netherlands and from other
regions of their own country. According to the LIOF 1983 Annual
Report, Dfl 1.027.926, or approximately 14% of its operating costs
37were directed m  that year toward the attraction of investment . The 
report states that in 1983 eight foreign and five Dutch companies made 
investments in Limburg totalling Dfl 54m, and creating 225 jobs®®. 
Since 1978, it is claimed in the report, 50 companies (25 of them 
foreign and 25 Dutch) have made investments in Limburg totalling Dfl 
293m, and employing 1144 personnel®^. It is, however, impossible to 
gauge what part the promotional activities of the LIOF played in 
attracting these companies, for such locational decisions are 
influenced by many other factors, such as the availability and size of 
regional grants, the nature of the local labour market, and the 
strength of the local infrastructure.
In Belgium, where the SDRB and the SDRW (prior to itsdissolution) gave
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little prominence amongst their activities to the attraction of 
investment, and where responsibility for this function has, in 
Flanders, been assumed by a separate body known as FIOC (Flanders 
Investment Opportunity Council), the agencies are involved in a number 
of small-scale operations, the effectiveness of which is difficult for 
the outside observer to measure. An example of this can be found in 
the 'cellules' or units, referred to in Chapter Four, and operated by 
Belgian agencies on behalf of formerly the central, now the regional 
government. These units carry out specific tasks for government, 
according to fixed-term contracts, and funded by a fixed government 
grant. The work of these units has centred on research, albeit with 
specific industrial applications in mind. For instance, the SDRB has 
managed on behalf of the regional government a unit which has 
developed an urban heating system for use in residential areas of the 
city. A similar unit was managed by the SDRW, which also had units 
researching into the treatment and recycling of household waste, and 
into reducing the cost of housing construction and renovation. It was 
originally envisaged that the housing unit would eventually build 
houses for sale to those who could not afford to buy at market prices, 
and that through the sales the unit would become self-supporting. 
However, Hindley and Walker have reported that the houses, built with 
'innovative construction materials', 'turned out to be much more 
costly than anticipated because of their high architectural standard 
and the choice of site'^O. The SDRW's Housing Unit was, upon the 
winding up of the agency, transferred to the Regional Executive, where 
it continues to operate, under the auspices of a ministerial 
department. Customarily, the efficiency of such units has been 
measured by a monitoring committee (comite" d 'accompagnement) of
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government officials, and the ultimate arbiter of their performance 
remained the sponsoring organisation, which upon the expiry of a 
contract, could decide whether or not to renew it, for what length of 
time, and with what level of funding.
Flemish GOM's have also taken an interest in social issues such as 
housing. In the case of the GOM-Limburg work in this field is carried 
out in conjunction with local housing associations, the responsibility 
of the agency being to prepare a detailed list of projects and sites 
to be submitted to the regional executive, in order to receive funds 
for building. The most part of the GOM's work, however, consists of 
research, planning, the provision of information and advice, and 
advocacy on behalf of the region. This type of work is wholly public- 
funded, and has no direct result in terms of financial return or job 
creation.
Job creation
Having discerned that many of the agencies' functions are of a type 
which have no direct impact in employment terms, it is not surprising 
to learn that, as the majority of UK development agencies, they do not 
set themselves job-creation targets, nor that job-creation as such 
does not feature prominently in their annual reports or promotional 
literature. Such references as do appear tend, as was shown in 
relation to the UK agencies, to be of a generalised and 
unsubstantiated nature. In an undated pamphlet, which promotes the 
Northern Netherlands, the NOM says of itself that 'not only have its
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efforts preserved or created seme 12f000 new jobs but it has salvaged 
another 5,000 jobs for companies which either needed injections of 
capital or new management techniques'^. Likewise, the SDRB, in a 
review of its activities from its inception in 1974 to 1982 claims 
that 'its action in the space of less than eight years has resulted in 
the creation or retention of more than 3,400 jobs in Brussels, without 
taking account of the retention of the Volkswagen company1^  where 
numerous jobs were saved following several interventions.
In the absence of detailed information to test claims such as these, 
it is possible only to fall back on the crude method of analysis of 
comparing the amount expended by the agencies on investment with the 
number of jobs linked to the invested companies. Industrial 
investment is the only function where expenditure on that function and 
jebs associated with the expenditure can be clearly delineated, and as 
shown above, amongst the Benelux agencies, only two Dutch agencies, 
and the new defunct SDRW have involved themselves in the function on 
any significant scale in the recent past. Of these agencies the NOM 
held, at the end of 1982, investments to the value of Dfl 120.240m in 
27 companies employing 3792 workers^. This translates into an 
investment of Dfl 31 ,709 (or £7,461) per worker. Similarly, the 
CMPTEI (see above) which Hindley and Walker describe as having 'an 
excellent reputation both for efficiency and flexibility'^ made loans 
worth BF 133.5m in the periods, 1 March 1980 to 1 September 1980, and 
1 January 1981 to 31 December 1981 for which records are available. 
The SDRW claimed that these loans created 176 new jobs, which 
translates into BF 0.758m or £9,724 per job. If comparisons can be 
made using such basic methods of analysis, these figures compare
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favourably with those for UK agencies (see Chapter Seven), the figure 
for the SDRW being more reliable because it is calculated on the basis 
of new jobs created rather than jobs in the invested companies, which 
may or may not have been retained if the investment had not been made.
The above examples have indicated the difficulty of formulating an 
independent judgement about the performance of the Benelux 
development agencies. It could be argued that in certain cases, such 
as those of the Flemish GOMs and the ARBED New Industries Department 
their roles are so limited that such questions are superfluous. 
Whilst this would be an extreme view to take of agencies which within 
their own regions continue to play a role in the industrial 
development process, it is worth noting that certain of the agencies 
appear to be becoming increasingly marginal to this process, and that 
this may in itself give some indication of their relative performance. 
For example, Schmit and Walker point out that the ARBED New Industries 
Department no longer takes part in industrial promotion^, the 
responsibility for which has been taken over by the government, nor 
does it disburse financial assistance as it once did, assistance being 
available from the government, and, as has been referred to above, its 
provision of industrial property is of less importance now that the 
government has begun to construct industrial estates. It has also 
been noted previously that responsibility for the industrial promotion 
of the Flanders region has been transferred from the Flemish GOMs to 
the new inward investment body, FIOC. Similarly, the Belgian 
agencies' function of providing equity capital for industry has been 
passed cn to new regional investment companies. The most striking 
example of this trend has been the dissolution of the SDRW in 1983,
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whereby its functions were redistributed to the Regional Executive and 
the SRIW. Of particular interest is that this action did not appear 
to have raised any great controversy in the normally volatile climate 
of Belgian regional politics. The former secretary-general of the 
SDRW, interviewed for the purposes of this research, indicated that 
the only dissent arose from the Wallonian trade unions, who were 
nevertheless pacified by the transfer of the investment function to 
the SRIW^. (Trade unions in the Northern Netherlands had previously 
expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the NOM carried out 
its investment policy by withdrawing their representatives from its 
board of directors.)
The splitting up of the activities originally carried out by the 
regional development agencies, and the increased prominence of 
monofunctional organisations, such as the Belgian regional investment 
companies does not necessarily imply greater political control of 
their functions. Firstly, it might be argued that governmental 
control would be easier to exercise over a single unified agency. 
Secondly, evidence of the structure and early activities of the 
regional investment companies does not suggest that they are under any 
more political influence than the agencies themselves. For example, 
when the agencies had responsibility for industrial investment, they 
carried out a dual role in both making investments on their own 
account, and investing in firms as directed by the State (missions 
deleguees). Similarly, other activities, such as those carried out by 
the Units or 'cellules' were for the most part determined and funded 
by government. It could be argued that as the SDRW was classified as 
a 'transitional institution' the SRIW embodied more fully the
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decentralisation of the power of economic intervention to the 
Wallonian region. However, in reality, the channels of 
accountability within the SRIW do not appear to differ greatly from 
those of the SERW, with a Board of Directors appointed by a General 
Assembly, and an Executive Committee, responsible for the supervision 
of the day-to-day running of the company, nominated by the Board of 
Directors and appointed by the Regional Executive. It carries out the 
same dual system of investment, and like the SDRW is given its remit 
and obtains the bulk of its investment from the regional executive.
A brief analysis of the sectoral composition of the SRIW's two 
investment portfolios will show that political factors do influence 
the work of the agency. For instance, 26% of the SRIW's own 
investments are in high-tech industries, compared with only 5% of 
government-directed investments, whereas 35% of the government- 
directed investments are in the more traditional sector of timber, 
paper and printing, compared with only 3% of the SRIW's own 
investments^. These figures suggest that the government is inclined 
to intervene more in the interest of preserving jobs in declining 
industries than in stimulating the development of the more 
commercially-viable, technology-based growth sectors. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be demonstrated that this control has been increased 
since the abolition of the SDRW. A representative of the Flemish 
regional executive, interviewed for the purposes of this research in 
November 1984, stressed that the regional investment companies were, 
in statutory terms, independent companies, and that in the case of the 
Flemish investment company, GIMV, they were anxious to dispel their 
public image of supporting 'lame duck' companies, and to see a clear
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4ftdistinction drawn between government-directed and other investments .
The creation of the regional investment companies and the dispersal of 
functions associated with regional economic development amongst a 
number of organisations, can be seen as an attempt to increase the 
importance of the industrial investment function in a manner which 
could not be carried out within the confines of the strict statutory 
regulations, which govern regional development agencies in Belgium. 
In this way they circumvented the constraints on financial and staff 
resources imposed by government. Given the country's history of 
public funding of regional development, it follows that the regions 
themselves should wish to expand their use of public investment as an 
instrument of economic regeneration. Unfortunately, by expanding 
through the separation of functions, it may be that they will lose 
seme of the benefits that result from the consolidation of industrial 
development powers within one regional organisation.
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Analysis of SRIW according to industrial sector, as at 30/9/84
1 2 Own investments- -^ Directed Investments^
% %
New technologies 26 5
Timber, paper & printing 3 35
Electronic manufacture - 4
Aerospace - 4
Chemical 16 6
Clay, ceramics, earthenware - 9
Glass 9 11





1Portfolio of 85 enterprises
o
Portfolio of 88 enterprises
Source: SRIW Annual Report 1983/4
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CHAPTER NINE
Regional development agencies in the UK and the Benelux countries - 
Conclusion
The intention of this concluding chapter is to lay out concisely the 
main findings of the research detailed above into regional development 
agencies in the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries, and to 
follow these with brief remarks about their implications for the 
future work of the agencies. One of the purposes of the research 
which has been undertaken for this project was simply to document and 
describe institutions which have previously received too little 
academic attention. The second half of this thesis has, however, 
attempted to move from a descriptive to an analytic mode, and it is to 
the findings of this section to which most frequent reference will be 
made.
The field of study
Before reviewing any other of the findings of this research, it should 
be noted that, at the very least, the topic of regional development 
agencies has been shown to be an important area of study in its own 
right. It was stated in Chapter Five that whilst the powers which the 
agencies exercised might not in themselves be new, the exercise of 
these powers by a single, unified body in any one administratively- 
defined region was a novel phenomenon, and the historical review 
contained in the first chapter clearly places them in this context. 
In that first chapter, an officer of a Welsh local authority was
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quoted as stating that their establishment marked 'the death of 30 
years of British regional policy.'^ Yet, in the ten years or more 
since they commenced operations in Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
UK, there have been comparatively few academic studies of their 
activities, Dearlove and Saunders write that 'the available 
literature on the regional level of the state in Britain is remarkable 
for its paucity..regional state institutions do exist and are 
powerful, yet few people seem to be aware of or are interested in 
their e x i s t e n c e ' T h e  extensive series of interviews with 
politicians, trade union officials, employers' representatives, and 
academics concerning regional development agencies carried out in the 
course of this research, served only to confirm this impression. Yet, 
if only for the reasons of novelty given above, and the fact that not 
only have regional development agencies, unlike many other instruments 
of regional economic policy, shown a considerable degree of 
institutional durability in a rapidly changing and frequently 
unfavourable political and economic climate but also that there now 
exist pressures for government to add to their number, they merit 
continuing detailed analysis.
Diversity
A theme which runs through most of the chapters of this work is the 
varying nature of the agencies under study. In each area studied, in 
powers, functions and objectives as in finance, structure and control, 
differences have been observed. Certain agencies have the power to 
give grant assistance, others the power of canpulsory purchase; seme 
derive their powers from statute, others have powers only equivalent
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to those of private companies. The Flemish GOM’s operate primarily as 
research bodies, the SDRB as a land bank, and the Dutch agencies as 
investment companies; only the UK agencies carry out the functions of 
a comprehensive regional development agency. The objectives of UK 
agencies tend to be expressed in different terms to those of the 
Benelux agencies. Budgets available to the agencies are of widely 
differing sizes, and sources of funding can vary. British and Dutch 
agencies are governed by boards of directors, the British appointed by 
the government, the Dutch through the agencies' shareholders, whereas 
the Belgian agencies are governed by a general assembly of 
representatives from local authorities, trade unions and employers' 
organisations. This diversity has previously been noted by Yuill et 
al^, as remarked on in the literature survey at the beginning of this 
study.
Why do these differences exist? In part, they reflect the 'ad hoc' 
nature of the agencies' establishment, there being no common 
precedents upon which their creators could draw. However, even in 
Belgium, a country where the agencies were created under the same 
statute, they have evolved in different ways, shaped by differing 
circumstances. Thus, five small agencies were established in Flanders 
in order to link with existing economic councils, whilst a much larger 
organisation covered the whole of the region of Wallonia, and in 
Brussels, the regional development agency combined its functions with 
those of an ' intercomnunale de developpement econcmique', or local 
economic development council. They also reflect characteristics of 
government, hence the comparatively centralised nature of the UK 
agencies, and the decentralised nature of their Belgian counterpartis.
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As these two examples show, differences can be between both regional 
development agencies in different nations, and agencies serving 
different regions within the same nation, though national boundaries 
are still the most significant factor in influencing the nature of the 
agencies covered in this survey.
It does not necessarily follow from these findings that such diversity 
is disadvantageous to the work of the agencies, or that there is any 
particular virtue in uniformity, in this context. It is not to be 
expected that an agency such as the HIDB, which has to tackle the 
economic and social problems of an historically deprived rural area, 
will be likely to carry out its work in a manner closely resembling 
that of an organisation such as the SDRB, charged with the task of 
promoting industrial development in one of the major commercial and 
administrative centres of Western Europe. Yet, it is necessary to ask 
the question whether or not it is possible to make meaningful 
comparison between an organisation such as the SDA, with an annual 
budget of approximately£10Om, and a staff of 700, and the Dutch agency 
GOM, with an annual budget of approximately £200,000 and a staff of 6.
Common factors
The agencies studied in this research were all established within the 
space of fifteen years, and the majority in a four-year period between 
1974 and 1978. This leads one immediately to consider the possibility 
of common factors leading to their creation. At least three such 
factors were identified in the course of the previous chapters. The 
first was a move toward selectivity in regional policy, expressing a
482
desire on the part of government to move beyond the traditional 
methods of regional policy, the dispensation of automatic financial 
assistance to ccmpanies locating in a particular region, to a system 
which, through identification of companies at ground level, would 
target assistance on particular growth sectors. The second was the 
common preoccupation of governments with the problems of depressed 
regions. This became more pronounced during the mid-1970's, as those 
areas with a limited manufacturing base, such as Limburg, Wallonia and 
South Wales, became the first casualties of the trade recession 
induced by the international oil crisis of 1973/74. Following on from 
this, governments also responded to pressures, primarily electoral, 
generated by regional or separatist movements within these areas. In 
Belgium, both the Flemish and Wallonian nationalist parties were 
involved in bargaining over the formation of coalition governments, 
and the agencies emerged as by-products of a wide ranging process of 
decentralisation initiated during this period. Likewise, in the UK, 
the creation of the SDA and the WDA can, in retrospect, be regarded as 
the high-point of the political influence of the Scottish and Welsh 
Nationalist Parties. In the cases of the Highlands and islands and 
Northern Ireland no immediate electoral threat was presented to the 
governing party, yet there was a universal recognition that measures 
should be taken to revive these areas economically. It has already 
been noted that, on the formation of the HIDB, a government minister 
referred to the Highlander as 'the man on Scotland's conscience',^ and
v
in Northern Ireland there has been constant political pressure for a 
solution to the ongoing civil strife, and the establishment of LEDU, 
NIFC, NIDA and the IDB can be seen as in part a response to this 
problem, by which political tensions might be relieved through
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economic regeneration.
In Chapter Five it was noted that the powers and objectives of the 
agencies, whether statutory or private in origin were, in the main, 
generalised and vague. This can be ascribed partly to the lack of 
common precedent for this type of organisation, which was remarked on 
above, and also to the lack of planning which had gone into their 
creation. In the UK, with the jettisoning of the radical economic 
plans envisaged by the proponents of Labour's National Industrial 
Strategy, it can be argued that the SDA and WDA were left to define 
their own areas of activity, or, as was stated in Chapter Five, 'the 
vague phrasing of their enabling statutes left their mode of operation 
in the hands of the members, and senior staff of the agencies 
themselves, or of the Minister and civil servants of the overseeing 
departments1 ^ . In addition, and indeed stemming from this, it is
possible to discern a common pattern in the behaviour of the agencies 
during their early years. The vague nature of their remits encouraged 
fanciful speculation on the part of those opposed to their creation 
about the scope of their activities, 'an extension of Bennery in 
Wales'^ as the WDA was called, or 'an extension of Socialism in 
Scotland for Socialism's sake'^ in the case of the HIDB. It also 
persuaded the agencies, in response to this type of criticism, to 
pursue their operations in a manner designed not to offend any of the 
major conservative interest groups within the regions they served, and 
thus ensured their political survival.
In the absence of strong directional guidance from other quarters, it 
is to be expected that in such organisations, the desire to preserve
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their own institutional framework will assert itself, and be reflected 
in the promotion of a consensual self-image, and the publicly- 
advertised pursuit of seemingly value-free goals, such as the 
'improvement' of the region, the promotion of 'high-technology' and 
'growth' industries, and the attraction of inward investment. Neither 
is it surprising that agencies should choose to foster a 
'technocratic' image of an organisation concerned with the 
'modernisation' of the economy, the assisting of technical innovation, 
and the development of new production processes, because, in the 
public mind, this tends to set them apart from political controversy, 
and cultivates a perception of their staff as professionals engaged in 
non-contentious activity. In more recent years, the need to act in a 
commercial manner has been used in the same way to remove the agencies 
frcm the arena of political decision-making. As stronger links have 
been forged between these government agencies and the private sector, 
and senior staff have been drawn directly from the business 
environment, agency policy has become more cautious, "intervening in 
the direction of the market rather than against it" in the words of 
SDA Chief Executive, Dr. George Mathewson®. It was noted in the 
literature survey that Butt Philip has remarked that the agencies' 
central dilemma consists in the fact that 'politically, these bodies 
cannot afford to do too little or to lose too much money by trying to 
do too much'9.
In apparent contrast to the current trend toward more commercial 
practices within the agencies, another common factor amongst those 
agencies surveyed, which has been identified by this research, is 
their inability to operate without some form of external subsidy.
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Despite the government's setting of strict criteria for returns on
investments made by the SDA, WDA and HIDB in equity and loan capital,
and capital used in factory construction, their results are modest,
and the activities continue to rely upon state funding. In the
provision of investment for industry, millions of pounds have been
lost as a result of the bankruptcy of companies supported by the SDA,
the WDA, the HIDB, the IDB, the SDRW and the NOM. In Northern
Ireland, the NIDA/IDB lost £17 million invested in the De Lorean Motor
Company, an incident which resulted in a special report from the House
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts^. In the Netherlands, the
NOM, founded in 1974, made a positive return on its investment
portfolio for the first time in 1983^ ^ . In Belgium, the SDRW found
that the market value of its investments was seme £2.3 million, or
46%, less, according to independent experts, than its own estimate,
1 7when they were made ready for transfer, to the SRIW in 1981 . The
property portfolios of the SDA and WDA were similarly devalued in 
1985, by 61% and 71% respectively (see Chapter Seven). Even an agency 
such as the SDRB, offering industrial space for rent in a highly- 
congested European capital, exists only by way of state subsidies.
As has been shown by the above study, there is ground for argument 
about the effects of the agencies' activities, and the use which they 
make of public money, as performance is so difficult to measure, 
(though it will be suggested below that they represent one of the most 
cost-effective of regional policy instruments). There may indeed be 
differences between the successes of the SDA, in regenerating inner- 
city Glasgow and promoting central Scotland as a focus for high- 
technology industry, and of the HIDB in the reversal of a century-long
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process of population decline, and the failure of the IDB to attract 
investors to Northern Ireland, or of the GOM-Limburg to halt the 
decline of traditional industries within the region, but cannon to all 
their activities is the fact that they do not make money out of them.
This may appear a simple point, but, at a time when the work of the 
agencies is being increasingly dominated by the need to follow 
canmercial practice, when the Dutch government is reviewing the future 
of its commitments to the LIQF^, when the Flemish GOM's are being 
compelled to operate within the strictest budgetary and staff 
constraints, it is important that it be accepted. If it was to be 
accepted by the governments concerned, both national and regional, 
then the agencies would be able to concentrate upon goals such as 
employment creation, and the diversification of the regional economic 
base, without being preoccupied with attempts to recoup expenditure 
and ' balance the books', attempts which have been shown above to be 
generally unsuccessful. If it is to be accepted that the aims to 
which the agencies are working, however loosely they may, in practice, 
be defined, are worthwhile ones on which public money should be 
expended, then it is not necessary for there to be great concern when 
they fail to make a 15% return on investment, or when it is realised 
that the factories which they have constructed in remote or 
economically-deprived regions, as part of a public programme of 
economic redevelopment, cannot be sold at a profit.
Having noted previously the diverse aspects of the agencies under 
study, four factors have now been outlined which demonstrate that, 
despite their differences, it is legitimate to consider them as
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generically-linked organisations. These are the time of and reasons {' 
for their establishment, the vagueness of their remits, their need for 
external subsidy, and their cultivation of a technocratic, non­
political image. However, a qualification must here be inserted I 
concerning one of the bodies studied above, the ARBED New Industries 
Department. Though the New Industries Department has been regularly 
referred to in the course of the preceding text, representing as it 
does the closest approximation to the type of organisations which have 
been the subject of study in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, the 
research has shown that it can be differentiated from them in a number 
of ways, two of which are of particular significance. Firstly, it is 
part of a private company, its work being funded by inccme received by 
ARBED from other activities, and, as such, is accountable ultimately 
to that company's Board of Directors. Secondly, its activities, if 
they are concerned with any objectives other than those of the ARBED 
company, are concerned with the economic development of Luxemburg as a 
whole, and of no specific part of that country. There is, therefore, 
no regional dimension to its work. Though, as has been shown above, 
it shares certain of the characteristics of the other agencies 
studied, it cannot be said to come within the terms of the definition 
of a regional development agency given in Chapter One, namely 'an 
organisationally distinct body, created by a public initiative, for 
the primary purpose of encouraging the economic and industrial 
development of a specified region'^, and cannot be included in the 
scope of the conclusions and recommendations laid out during the 
course of this chapter.
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Performance - the agencies' role and efficiency
Brief reference was made in tile previous section of this chapter to 
the question of agency performance, which formed the subject-matter of 
Chapters Seven and Eight. Despite the problems inherent in measuring 
performance that were outlined in those chapters, it is nevertheless 
necessary to make some comment in conclusion on what might be 
described as the 'effectiveness' of the agencies. Such analysis can 
often fall at the first hurdle of defining the objectives to which the 
agencies are working, and against which their performance is to be 
measured. Certainly, if as their objective one takes the objective of 
government regional policy, namely the removal of regional 
inequalities frcm within the framework of the unitary state, then they 
have not been successful. If there has been any reduction in overall 
regional disparities during the past ten years, it has occurred 
because once-prosperous regions are being reduced to levels of 
economic deprivation that prompted special government assistance when 
they manifested themselves first in the traditionally 'backward' 
regions. In this sense, the HIDB can claim success in that the level 
of unemployment in the Highlands and Islands has risen by a smaller 
percentage than that of unemployment in Scotland as a whole, though 
unemployment in the Highlands has, in the recent past, reached record 
levels. Similarly, whilst levels of overseas investment in the UK 
have fallen overall in recent years, the WDA now claims to be 
attracting a record percentage, 25%, of that investment to Wales. 
Sane commentators, presumably with this in mind, have even suggested 
that the role of regional development agencies is to make acceptable 
to the public, or to 'legitimate', the restructuring process which
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British capital is undertaking during the recession. For example, in
Chapter One, Morgan is quoted as writing that 'the WDA can, by its
very being (including building, and investing as an integral part of
its being) legitimise the very pit-closures, or steel shutdowns or
whatever, that its existence depends upon . Both views, however,
seem to ascribe to the agencies too influential a role in the
economies within which they function. In the context of an
unfavourable trade climate, and operating under governments which
have, for the most part of their existence, pursued deflationary
macroeconomic policies which have placed a high priority on the
restraint of public expenditure, the agencies cannot be expected to
have made a major impact on regional differentials through their own
efforts alone. In the context of capital flows in and out of the
regions, the budgets of the regional development agencies are
ccmparatively small. A review of the SDA carried out in 1986 by the
Treasury noted that though the Agency "has had a substantial and
positive impact an Scotland's economy and environment" in the ten
years since the Agency was established, Scotland's relative position
within the UK economy has remained "broadly unchanged"^ ^ . In the
literature survey, it was noted that Butt Philip had warned in 1976,
that little could be expected frcm UK agencies in terms of new jobs or
1 7industries for some years to come .
On the other hand, the view that the social discontent which results 
from mass unemployment and the run-down of traditional manufacturing 
industries can be dispelled by the provision of a few advance 
factories indicates an inflated view of the power of the state, and a 
pessimistic view of the human psyche.
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It is the conclusion of this study that the most important criterion 
upon which the work of the agencies can be judged in the present 
economic climate is that of the creation and preservation of 
employment. It is a criterion frcm which many agencies have, in the 
past, shied away, indicating that they do not consider themselves to 
be job-creating agencies, that they are in the business of 
establishing a climate in which long-term stable employment can be 
achieved. These arguments are difficult to maintain today as Western 
Europe suffers the effects of continuing mass unemployment. There 
need be no juxtapositioning of short-term 'artificial' jobs, designed 
to boost employment figures, with long-term 'real' jobs which can only 
be achieved through 'leaner' more capital-intensive companies. The 
attitude of development agencies to employment creation is contrasted 
by Moore and Booth with that of enterprise boards where, "there is at 
least a political statement of intent to exert seme democratic control 
over the way in which enterprises operate, and, in particular, the 
influence of labour in setting key objectives. Employment, in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms becomes the primary operational 
goal."18
The agencies' performance should be monitored according to figures 
which take account of the type of employment created, and its likely 
duration; one such method has been referred to in Chapter Seven, 
namely calculating job-years created rather than jobs. Such a system 
would undoubtedly represent an improvement on the present position in 
the UK, where the public monitoring of jobs, which was criticised in 
Chapter Seven, does not appear to extend much beyond the press release
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which announces each new project. A system of job-targets has been 
operated by the IDB since 1982, and by the LEDU since before that 
date, without any apparent adverse effects on either organisation. 
Indeed, as noted in Chapter Seven, the system has proved a positive 
spur to the LEDU, which stated in its 1984/85 Annual Report that it 
had 'set itself increasingly higher job targets which in the four 
years since 1981 have been met and indeed exceeded. The formulation 
of this ongoing strategy with the commitment to achieving job targets 
has helped to create a sense of challenge among the LEDU Board, area 
panels and the staff. It has also led to a more effective use of 
LEDU's resources, and the introduction of new job creating 
initiatives'^. There is no reason why the system of monitoring job 
creation, if not the setting of job as opposed to financial targets, 
cannot be extended to other regional development agencies in the UK. 
This would fulfil the recommendations of the 1985 National Audit 
Office report into the investment activities of the SDA, WDA and HIDB, 
which called for measures other than purely financial ones to be 
devised . The Committee of Public Accounts made a recommendation 
along the same lines in a report later in the same year which 
concluded that 'in our view the performance of the agencies' and the 
Board's investment function needs to be measured in terms both of 
financial duties and statutory objectives. Profitability alone is an 
inadequate measurement for, as the Comptroller and Auditor General 
pointed cut, the bodies could make investments which were not entirely 
consistent with their development aims' ^  .
To state that the measure by which the agencies should ultimately be 
judged is employment creation would be perfectly consistent, in the
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case of regional development agencies such as the SDA and WDA at least 
with their original aims, one of which was 'the provision, maintenance 
and safeguarding of employment . Neither would it be to deny the 
validity of other measures of the agencies' performance, such as the 
amount of inward investment attracted, the number of advance factories 
constructed, and the rate of return on invested companies, merely to 
emphasise that factors such as these represent differing means to the 
same end, namely the creation of stable long-term employment within 
the region. As long ago as 1978, JR Davies whose article on the 
investment policy of the SDA was referred to in the literature survey, 
argued that the agency should use its investment policy to pursue 
social objectives such as employment creation, without aiming for a 
commercial rate of return .
Those measures of the cost involved in employment created by the 
agencies which can be derived frcm publicly-available statistics were 
discussed in Chapter Seven. These, whilst not giving any indication 
of the extent to which the agencies are fulfilling their job-creating 
potential, do show that in comparison with other instruments of 
regional policy currently in operation in the countries surveyed, such 
as regional investment grants, enterprise zones and freeports, they 
constitute an inexpensive method of encouraging employment.
Counter to the above suggestion, it could be argued that, as has been 
shown by the study, many of the Benelux agencies are involved in 
activities which have no direct job-creating potential, and that the 
measures of performance discussed above would, in their case, be 
irrelevant. This is indeed the case at present,and, as the Flemish
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GOM's have be cane increasingly marginalised in recent years, it is 
hard to imagine a satisfactory method of judging the effectiveness 
with which they carry out their current tasks, centred as they are, 
around research and information - provision, planning and advisory 
services. In a succeeding section, it will be suggested that one of 
the lessons which can be drawn from a comparative study of the UK and 
Benelux agencies is that their effectiveness is maximised when they 




When dealing with agencies which have constituted an active part of 
regional policy in three major industrialised nations for the past ten 
years, it is worthwhile setting aside for a while purely economic 
questions, and asking what positions these organisations occupy in the 
political process? It was suggested earlier that, in relation to the 
devolution of economic power, the UK agencies are Revolutionary only 
in their inherent regional i d e n t i t y ' H e r e  then is a distinct 
contrast between the Belgian and, to a lesser extent, Dutch agencies, 
and the UK agencies. The Belgian agencies were classified by the 
government as 'transitory institutions' representing a bridging stage 
in the devolution of economic power to the regions and the transition 
of Belgium to a federalised state. Unlike the UK and Dutch agencies, 
they were controlled by the elected regional authority, their day-to- 
day affairs supervised by representatives of the regional ccmmunities. 
Their activities have, thus, been assimilated into a structure of 
regional as opposed to national policies.
By contrast, the UK regional development agencies are not accountable 
to the population they serve, even their relationship with central 
government is of a nature which impairs democratic control at the 
national level. Dear love and Saunders have indicated that the lack of 
accountability of these agencies is part of a wider problem affecting 
a range of British regional institutions. Of these institutions they 
write that 'we are dealing in every case with non-elected 
bodies....there is no electoral check other than that most tenuous and 
indirect channel of accountability which runs from the agency to a
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central department to a minister to Parliament and thence to the 
electorate as a whole
The creation of the UK regional development agencies has been referred 
to as part of a process of administrative devolution, but it could be 
argued that this strategy was calculated to block any fundamental 
process of economic or political devolution of power during the mid 
1970's. The creation of agencies such as the WDA and DBRW (MWD) in 
Wales for example, coincided with the transfer of functions concerning 
industrial development from the Department of Trade and Industry to 
the Welsh Office. Thus whilst the Labour government was attempting to 
put over to the Welsh electorate a policy for the devolution of 
certain executive powers to the Welsh Assembly, it was at the same 
time consolidating the position of economic development organisations 
whose responsibility was to central government alone. Hence, there 
followed a battle by devolutionists and nationalists within Wales and 
Scotland to place the Welsh and Scottish development agencies under 
the control of their respective assemblies. As might have been 
expected, the defeat of these devolution proposals at the polls (or in 
the Scottish case, their failure to secure the requisite majority 
amongst the Scottish electorate) have done nothing to forestall the 
proliferation of regional 'ad hoc' organisations operating through 
government appointees. As Drucker and Brown have pointed out in 
relation to Scotland 'at the same time as the political control over 
Scottish Office functions was growing the government was creating more 
ad hoc Boards of the type the Scottish Office was meant to 
replace....there is no doubt that the creation of ad hoc Boards run by 
appointed members has diluted democratic control over the functions of
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government in Scotland, giving rise to demands for greater 
accountability1 ^ .
As has been noted above, because the industrial policies of the Labour 
government frcm which they emerged provoked great hostility from the 
business canmunity in particular, and because of their association 
with the NEB, the SDA and the WDA were, in their early years, keen to 
promote broad acceptance of their activities. They therefore promoted 
an image of themselves which projected them as technocratic 
organisations with obj ectives which could be supported by diverse 
sections of the community. As this study has shown, however, the 
agencies do not operate in a political vacuum. They take decisions 
which have sectoral and geographical implications, they transmit the 
political philosophies of the governing party, and they make political 
decisions about the course of their activities. This is summed up by 
Dearlove and Saunders when they write of regional institutions in the 
UK that 'these are political agencies charged with making politically 
crucial and contentious decisions. In most cases, they attempt to 
disguise this political function through the assiduous cultivation of 
a technocratic image, but this cannot obscure the fact that they 
decide how millions of pounds will be spent and that these decisions 
inevitably reflect particular values which perforce go unchallenged in 
any open political argument or debate. In the absence of any 
effective democratic control, they tend to make their decisions 
according to the influence enjoyed by professional interests within 
them and/or powerful private sector interests outside them1^ .  when 
applied to regional development agencies in the UK, this view must be 
modified, in recognition of the important part that the regional
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Secretaries of State play in determining the funding and overall 
direction of the agencies under their control. However, the general 
point that the agencies are structured in a way that removes large 
areas of decision-making frcm the public domain nevertheless holds 
true, and is consistent with C. C. Hood's 'political' theory of 
agency-growth, described in the literature survey, which sees the 
agencies as means by which the state co-opts support for potentially
oo
controversial interventions .
To create an ad hoc body for the promotion of economic development is 
not to remove the necessity to take political decisions on such 
matters. The process of making these decisions may in this way be 
removed frcm the public arena, but the decisions still have to be 
taken, and they are, in consequence, taken in private by a group of 
government appointees. As JR Davies remarks, in his study of the 
industrial investment policies of the SDA 'the role of agencies such 
as...the SDA and the determination of their social priorities are 
issues far too important to leave to the professional staff of these 
agencies. While some degree of operative independence may be 
necessary for effective commercial decision-taking, there is no 
justification for the delegation of broad issues of policy'
As remarked in Chapter Six, 'in respect of the substantial majority of 
regional development agencies under study, effective control of the 
major aspects of their character rests with government, central or 
regional.'*5 B.C. Smith in his major study of decentralisation
observes that ' the use of special-purpose bodies outside the main 
structure of government has spread to the subnational level in many
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contemporary states.... Rather than depoliticising area government, 
'ad hoc' appointed bodies merely substitute the politics of the centre 
for the politics of the area'^. Political convention in the UK 
dictates that such organisations should maintain a show of 
independence frcm government, but as has been demonstrated in the case 
of nationalised industries, despite the cultivation of a public facade 
of independence, the political wishes of the government are invariably 
translated in one form or another to the decision-making process. 
Formal methods exist in legislation, by which the government can 
direct the UK agencies, and these have been used, if infrequently: for 
example, in 1979 the Conservative government issued revised guidelines 
to the agencies concerning industrial investment. Of greater 
significance is the government's control over sources of finance, 
which enables it not only to determine the agencies' overall level of 
funding but to emphasise the areas in which it would wish the agencies 
to concentrate their resources. As indicated in Chapter Six, the 
research suggests that control is likely to be of a more overt nature 
when organisations are active in areas of high political sensitivity, 
thus the close government supervision of the affairs of the IDB.
Yet, if in one sense, as demonstrated by the preceding comments, the 
UK agencies constitute 'recentralisation1 rather than decentralisation 
of power, in another sense, they can develop a symbolic importance 
within the regions they represent. The then President of Plaid Cymru, 
Gwynfor Evans is quoted by Drucker and Brown as saying 'Until 
recently... .Wales was not even acknowledged to be an entity for 
administrative and economic purposes. The progress which we have made 
during the last generation in this direction has given us an
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administration which is based for the most part on the national 
community and increasingly this ccmmunity is the basis for economic 
organisation, as with the WDA'32.
Regardless of the centralised process of government to which they were 
linked on their establishment, the UK agencies joined the lengthening 
line of institutions which, based as they were on Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, strengthened the sense of national distinctiveness. 
The feeling was neatly summed up in a cartoon in the SDA's promotional 
journal, which featured a cartoon in which a Scottish lion considered 
a news paper headline expressing the disappointment of the English 
West Midlands at not being granted a development agency like the 
Scottish Development Agency, and commented 'But then, its a region, 
not a nation133. Drucker and Brown conclude that the creation of 
the SDA and WDA was 'arguably the most important step forward 
devolution had ever taken....Between them these two development 
agencies will make the running for ever more power and money to be 
given to their tasks of improving the Scottish and Welsh industrial 
bases...Their work will serve further to heighten Scots' and 
Welshmen's sense that the government that matters to them is Scottish 
and Welsh government. Their very existence will keep the argument for 
devolution alive no matter what happens to the Nationalist electoral
threat13^.
Lessons for UK and Benelux agencies
In the course of interviews carried out for the purposes of this 
research, it was noted that there was little awareness on the part of
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staff of the UK or Benelux agencies of the practices of agencies 
operating outside their own countries. Representatives of the UK 
agencies meet together twice a year for discussion, but as far as 
relations across national boundaries are concerned, instincts of 
competition and suspicion tend to prevail. This is unfortunate, 
because it would appear frcm this research that agencies in these 
countries have much to learn from each other.
In the case of the UK agencies, there is a need to study the governing 
structures of their Belgian counterparts, to which have been 
incorporated methods of representation of the communities which the 
agencies serve, without the disruption or political controversy which 
UK agencies fear would result frcm an opening-up of their structures 
to local control. A constant theme of this research as it relates to 
the UK agencies has been their deficiencies both in terms of internal 
corporate planning and also planning in the wider regional context. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the Belgian agencies are 
closely involved with the planning framework of their respective 
regions, carrying out surveys to discern the social and economic needs 
of the region, transmitting these needs to the regional government, 
and then assisting at local level in the practical implementation of 
the completed plan. One of the great virtues of the UK agencies' 
present role is the manner in which they draw together various 
functions which were previously carried out by disparate government 
organisations. However, much of the advantage thus derived is wasted 
by a lack of co-ordination between the agencies and other statutory 
bodies within the region, such as the local authorities, and the 
Manpower Services Canmission.
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It has, for example, been noted in this study that relations between 
regional development agencies and local authorities in the UK tend to 
be of an 'ad hoc' nature, dependent upon informal contacts, and that 
they consequently vary from one authority to another. Though three of 
the agencies were established shortly after the local government 
reorganisation of 1974, the legislation establishing them did not 
define their relationships with the new authorities. Reorganisation 
also presented difficulties for the HIDB in the sphere of planning. 
As Bryan McGregor comments on the establishment of the Highland 
Regional Council, and its effect on the HIDB, 'under the old system 
the Board had a legitimate planning function, at least an advisory and 
co-ordinating role. This was now undermined'^ . More recently, an 
atmosphere of uncertainty about the scope of local authority 
industrial development initiatives was created by the government's 
abolition of the metropolitan counties, which had been most active in 
this field, and the recommendations of the Bums Committee, which 
argued that local authorities should not involve themselves directly 
in economic intervention, but should confine themselves to 
infrastructural improvements. Indeed, it has been argued in some 
quarters that UK regional development agencies have been used 1 to 
block the emergency role of local authorities'^. A more widely held 
view of the position was expressed by Mawson and Miller in a review of 
local authority economic initiatives, when commenting that 'By the 
early 1980's, the proliferation of economic development agencies and 
organisations, both within Central Government and at the local level 
began to pose questions about duplication and overlap of activities 
and demonstrated a lack of co-ordination and overall direction in
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public policy'
In contrast, in Belgium, relations between the SDRW and the 
"interccmmunales" (federations of local authorities, or communes) were 
described by Schmit and Walker, in Yuill's study of European regional 
development agencies, as 'constant and harmonious'®®. These relations 
received formal expression through the 'conseil technique' or 
technical council within the SDRW which consisted of representatives 
frcm the SDRW and the intercommunales.
Similarly, the SDRB is represented on each of the 'commissions de 
concertation' or planning ccmmittees established in each of the 19 
communes in Brussels in 1976, which have responsibility for the 
planning of local economic development.
Without the introduction of a unified planning framework involving the 
agencies, the establishment of development agencies in the English 
regions, a proposal being widely canvassed in political circles at the 
time of writing, would only be counter-productive. The Labour, 
Liberal and Social Democratic Parties are all committed to the 
establishment of development agencies in at least seme of the English 
regions, and the ideas has been supported by Conservative ex-Cabinet 
Ministers Michael Heseltine and Leon Brittan.
Given the general conclusion of this research, that the regional 
development agency concept represents an important contribution to 
regional economic development, it might be expected to follow from 
this that agencies of this type should be established in England.
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There are, however, several factors which must be taken into 
consideration by proponents of regional development agencies for the 
English regions. The first, mentioned above, is the present lack of a 
planning structure in which agencies can operate. We have already 
seen examples of the wasteful competition that might take place 
between regional development agencies in Northern Ireland, England, 
Scotland and Wales in such incidents as the reported attempt by the 
WDA to persuade a high-technology project developed by the GLEB to 
relocate in Wales, and the transfer of electronics companies from the 
depressed West Midlands of England to central Scotland, at the behest 
of the SDA. Secondly, it should be recognised that the existing 
agencies have a political as well as economic significance. This has 
been described in a previous chapter in relation to their creation, 
which was in part a reaction to regional, and in the case of the SDA 
and WDA, specifically nationalist pressures, and a recognition of the 
special problems of these areas. If regional development agencies 
were established in the English regions then not only might the 
economic effect in terms of increased competition for finite resources 
be detrimental to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, so might 
political opinion in these regions be adversely affected, in that it 
might be felt that their special problems were no longer being 
adequately dealt with in the framework of a unitary British state.
Thirdly, the distinctive political factors which make the existing 
regional development agencies more than mere economic instruments of 
central government may also contribute to their effectiveness in a way 
that could not be duplicated outside the areas in which they presently 
operate. In an article on the possible establishment of regional
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development agencies in England, Moore and Booth take up this point 
when they state that 'the United Kingdom is not a uniform political 
system. Scotland is different. There is no English equivalent of the 
Scottish Office' (or for that matter the Welsh or Northern Ireland 
Offices)' which can bring together a whole range of governmental 
responsibilities under one minister. In England, who would regional 
development agencies answer to? The Department of Environment, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, or the Treasury? Moore and Booth 
develop their point in relation to Scotland, where such success as the 
SDA is perceived to have had has been widely attributed to a consensus 
of opinion on matters concerning the Scottish economy, crossing 
traditional boundaries between interest-groups and political parties. 
They argue that this consensus is b o m  of uniquely Scottish factors 
which they identify as 'cultural catalyst', a sense of national 
identity over-riding class differences, 'elite networks', the 
community of interest existing between industrial, commercial, 
financial and political elites in Scotland (which have come publicly 
to the fore over issues such as the closure of the BSC Gartcosh 
Steelworks, and the take-over battle for the Distillers Company) and 
'instrumental institutions', the 'unique matrix of Scottish political 
and financial institutions', which underpins the sense of national 
identity and provides the means for integrated operations^, These 
arguments show that there is no simple institutional formula for the 
regeneration of the English regions in the establishment of their cwn 
regional development agencies.
Perhaps a more profitable example for the English regions to follow 
would be that of the municipal enterprise boards, which despite the
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hostility of national government, have carried out pioneering economic 
development work in a number of depressed English regions, such as 
Merseyside, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire. They have been only 
briefly considered in the course of this research because they have 
operated up till now on a local rather than a regional scale, but 
following the demise of their original benefactors, the metropolitan 
counties, in April 1986, some are expanding their activities. 
Channelling investment capital frcm pension funds and local authority 
rates (money provided under section 137 of the Local Government Act), 
the boards have, through the use of planning agreements with companies 
in which they invest which lay down production and employment targets, 
created a considerable number of long-term jobs at comparatively 
little cost. It was noted in the literature survey that both Yuill, 
and Mawson and Miller linked the establishment of regional development 
agencies to a concentration of government regional aid on the support 
of local industry within the region^. This approach is presently 
more evident within the work of enterprise boards. The development 
agencies would be well advised to learn from these indigenous 
examples, as well as those frcm overseas.
Of fundamental importance for the Benelux countries, particularly 
those based in Belgium, is the need to expand their activities through 
the provision of adequate government funding. Operating with scant 
financial and human resources, the representatives of Benelux agencies 
interviewed for this study, clearly envied the size of grant aid that 
the British government provides its agencies. Only once these 
resources are acquired will the agencies be capable of operating the 
ccmprehensive range of functions which their counterparts do. In this
506
respect, the creation of separate regional investment companies in 
Belgium was a retrograde step, because it deprived the Belgian 
regional agencies of the ability to offer integrated services from one 
source. In the UK, considerable strides have been made over the past 
ten years toward reducing the number of different organisations 
involved in the industrial development process, and progress has been 
most marked in those areas that are served by regional development 
agencies. The concentration of these functions within a smaller 
number of bodies may facilitate, as a by-product, greater central 
control of that development process, and this is a factor which may 
explain the dominance of the opposite tendency in the neofederalist 
Belgian political system. However, as it has been indicated above 
that bodies such as the regional investment companies do not appear to 
be significantly different in their system of accountability than the 
regional development agencies, it may be that economic advantage is 
being sacrificed without substantial gains in local control. It is 
the conclusion of this research that a more beneficial step would be 
the formal absorption of the existing agencies into the structure of 
the investment companies.
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